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This practice-based PhD thesis presents a major work of hybrid journalism-policy research - the 
candidate’s UNESCO-published study Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age1 (Posetti 
2017a2) - and associated outputs (including journalism, industry reports, and public events), 
together with this critical and connective exegesis that provides theoretical and reflective 
context for the major artefact (i.e. aforementioned book) at the core of the project. The United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) commissioned the major 
artefact in 2014 to provide quantitative data and qualitative research to demonstrate 
international developments in legal and normative frameworks that support the principle of 
confidential source protection which is central to the practice of investigative journalism, with 
an emphasis on emerging digital era implications. The resulting book, published by UNESCO in 
2017, examined a decade’s worth of relevant source protection developments in 121 
countries. Its impact was significant, as evidenced by international media coverage, citation in 
a major judgement on journalistic source protection from the European Court of Human 
Rights, through a Report from the UN Secretary General, and via a UN General Assembly 
Resolution on journalism safety. Described by UNESCO as a “benchmark study” (UNESCO 
2017a), the book makes a major contribution to this emerging area of scholarship, especially 
through its development of a comprehensive 11-point framework for assessing legal source 
protection instruments and normative environments. It is the first study of its kind to map and 
analyse the convergent digital era threats posed to source protection globally. These laws and 
frameworks sit at the complex intersection of a range of threats involving: the undercutting of 
source confidentiality by mass and targeted surveillance; the risk of source protection laws 
being trumped by national security and anti-terrorism legislation; the expanding requirements 
for third party intermediaries to mandatorily retain (and potentially handover) citizens’ data 
for increasingly lengthy periods of time; and debates about diverse digital media actors’ 
entitlement to access source protection laws where they exist. This exegesis provides a 
critically reflective account of the development of the study (i.e. Protecting Journalism Sources 
in the Digital Age) as a hybrid work of journalism and international public policy research. It 
presents a theoretical account of the scholarship around source protection, the fraught history 
of the UN’s role in commissioning research designed to develop international freedom of 
expression rights and standards, and the shifting nature of journalism and press freedom 
                                                             
1 The book is appended to this exegesis as a PDF: Appendix 2 






advocacy in the networked public sphere. It describes the act of ‘making content out of 
process’ and maximising research impact through the extended life of the project. This 
involved interwoven collaborations, engaging stakeholder communities and broader publics in 
the research and dissemination processes, explaining and promoting the study’s findings, and 
carefully negotiating iterative publication through protracted UN diplomatic and bureaucratic 
processes. Together, this critical reflection and scholarly analysis form the exegetical thesis, 
explicating the hybrid model of networked public communication at the heart of the 
production, publication and impact of the UNESCO-published study Protecting Journalism 











This PhD project would not have been possible without the love, support and sacrifices of my 
husband and daughter. So, Tim and Amalia: this is for you. It is also submitted with recognition 
of the patient, encouraging and insightful supervision of Professor Stephen Tanner and 
Associate Professor Marcus O’Donnell. Sincere thanks also go to my mother and sister who 
loyally helped ‘pick up the pieces’ during the last phases of PhD deadline push. Finally, I would 
like to express gratitude for the contributions of the myriad researchers, research assistants, 
peer reviewers, expert interviewees3 and UNESCO staff4 affiliated with the development of the 
book at the heart of this project: Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age (Posetti 
2017a). My sincere hope is that this PhD, in its multiple intersecting components, will serve 
investigative journalism, help support the development and maintenance of open societies 
through sustainable accountability journalism, and draw attention to the importance of the 
public’s ‘right to know’, along with journalism’s role in defending it. Additionally, I hope it 
ultimately aids the vital research and advocacy on press freedom, journalism safety and media 
literacy undertaken and supported by UNESCO’s Freedom of Expression and Media 
Development Division.5 
 
Julie Posetti, August 2018 
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book is sole-authored by the candidate, who was also the project’s Chief Researcher. 
4 Particular thanks go to Dr Guy Berger and Caroline Hammarberg 
5 Disclaimer: This body of work is the responsibility of the author, and the ideas and opinions expressed in it are not 
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     Prologue 
 
“Will you listen to my story?” he asked. It was 11pm on a Sunday in 1996, and I had almost let the phone 
ring out as I walked towards the door at the end of my shift as an Australian Broadcasting Corporation 
(ABC) reporter in Sydney. But the tone of desperation in his broad Australian-accented voice – a voice 
that spoke of a life hard-lived – made me sit back down and listen.  
 
‘Shane’ was the survivor of brutal child abuse in state-run children’s homes in the 1970s and ‘80s. I 
listened for an hour while his voice verged from shaking with rage to choking on tears. The next night, 
he visited the offices of the ABC’s flagship radio current affairs program AM with a thick dossier of 
evidence that he’d collected over the course of a decade in his quest for justice. He became the 
pseudonymous confidential source of my investigative series on child abuse in state care for AM that 
shone a national spotlight on the institutional abuse of children. It led to blanket coverage from 
competitor news organisations and the New South Wales Premier taking a helicopter to inspect 
children’s homes around the state. The series was recognised with the 1996 Australian Human Rights 
Award for Radio. 
  
‘Shane’s’ story was one of many that I produced for the ABC based on confidential sources and 
whistleblowers that focused on criminal breaches of social justice – from paedophile rings with links to 
politics and the judiciary, to police inaction on domestic violence. Such stories became the hallmark of 
my professional journalism career. But they are also a hallmark of my journalism philosophy – a 
philosophy informed by my own experiences of injustice, including as the survivor of domestic abuse at 
the hands of my stepfather in the 1980s (Posetti 2013a), at a time when violence against women and 
children was barely recognised. 
 
These stories put flesh on the lessons I’d learned as a trainee journalist about the importance of 
confidential sources to investigative journalism - especially journalism with vulnerable humans at its 
heart. For me, they also personalised one of the cardinal rules of journalism: first, protect your sources. 
 
At the core of my practice is a commitment to social justice and human rights inextricably linked to 
freedom of expression. This practice is anchored within public broadcasting in the service of the public 
interest, operating within a tradition of respect for, and collaboration with, engaged audiences. And at 
the centre of my being is a determination to fight - against censorship, exploitation, injustice, racism, 
sexism, and bigotry; and for the right to ‘speak truth to power’. Such values naturally situate me as a 
‘crusading’ or ‘activist’ journalist. They have drawn me into conflict with powerful figures and 
organisations - including the Murdoch press in Australia (ABC News 2010)7 - and they have at times 
                                                             
7 See also: Manne, R (2011) Bad News, The Quarterly Essay, Vol 43 





caused tensions in professional relationships. But they also make me deeply committed to defending the 
rights of vulnerable confidential sources and whistleblowers, and they make me especially mindful of 
the potential impacts of my own journalism on them.  
 
These characteristics, traditions and practices followed me into academic research and journalism 
education. With the advent of social media in the mid 2000s, I adapted my research and teaching 
instantaneously to accommodate new modes of storytelling, public journalism, audience collaboration, 
and interactivity. As an early adopter, teacher and researcher of ‘Twitter journalism’, I brought these 
intersecting elements together in an experimental public journalism project updated for the Social 
Media Age, called #ReportingRefugees. (Posetti 2012) This was a highly collaborative and interventionist 
project, dependent upon intersecting partnerships with the ABC, two Australian universities, refugee 
support organisations, a social media start-up, and audiences in the networked public sphere. It also 
involved sensitive and vulnerable sources, including several who required confidentiality. This project 
represented my first attempt at developing a hybrid approach for negotiating and navigating human 
rights in public. I further developed this approach in the production of the high-impact international UN 
study at the core of this PhD project. 
 
The global relationships built around my journalism research and education practice ultimately led to my 
authorship of Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age (Posetti 2017a). In 2007, I won a national 
prize for innovation in university teaching and learning that resulted in an invitation to South Africa’s 
Rhodes University as a visiting journalism academic. That invitation came from Professor Guy Berger (a 
former apartheid era political prisoner and activist editor) who was then Head of the School of 
Journalism and Media Studies at Rhodes, and it represented the beginning of collaborations that have 
spanned a decade. Two years after Berger moved to Paris as Director for Freedom of Expression and 
Media Development for UNESCO, I was hired by the Paris-based (and UNESCO-affiliated) civil society and 
industry organisation World Association of News Publishers (WAN-IFRA) and its World Editors Forum 
(WEF) to lead research and journalism initiatives as Research Fellow and Research Editor. It was in this 
context that I ultimately became the author and lead researcher for Protecting Journalism Sources in the 
Digital Age, a study commissioned for UNESCO by Berger. I have since been contracted to co-edit the 
UNESCO-commissioned book Journalism, ‘Fake News’ and Disinformation with the Executive Director of 
WEF, Cherilyn Ireton – a book on the cusp of publication as I write in August 2018.8 
 
These overlapping, interplaying experiences and practices provide broader context for this PhD project. 
                                                             
Tweets Get Up An Editor’s Nose, He Shouldn’t Become a Twitter Troll, Mail & Guardian Online: 
http://thoughtleader.co.za/guyberger/2010/12/03/when-tweets-get-up-an-editors-nose-he-shouldn%E2%80%99t-
become-a-twitter-troll/ [Accessed: 25/8/18] & Rosen, J (2011) NewsCorp is Bad News, ABC News: 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2011-11-21/rosen-news-corp-is-bad-news/3683736 [Accessed: 20/7/18]. 







Behind the scenes is also a story about synergistic opportunities and relationships - between colleagues, 
friends, professional collaborators and those who occupy places in my life at the intersection of those 
roles. It is a story of challenges, achievements, and conflicts that arose during the high-stress and high-
speed production of a very substantial piece of research, on a contentious subject situated at the 
confluence of a range of sensitive geopolitical issues.  
 
There are layers of irony and intrigue within this backstory about producing research on threats to 
investigative journalism and freedom of expression rights for a UN organisation with a fraught history of 
such research, and a reputation within some sections of civil society as being exposed to censorship. 
(Sleazak 2016)  
 
But in the end, this is a story about the making of a high-impact public policy book where journalism, 
human rights advocacy, and research intersect in the networked public sphere. It is a story that 
converges personal and professional spheres; one which demonstrates a model built on collaboration, 
engaged audiences, perseverance, determination to push through barriers, global inter-connected 
relationships, and practice-led research; a model explicated through this exegesis. 
 
Note: This exegetical thesis deploys methodologies and theories associated with autoethnography and 









Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
“Privacy is essential to protect journalistic sources, which enable a society to benefit from investigative 
journalism, to strengthen good governance and the rule of law, and such privacy should not be subject 
to arbitrary or unlawful interference”. (UNESCO 2013) 
 
This practice-led PhD project9 features a number of intersecting and interdependent component parts. 
These are: 
 
1. The major artefact: Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age (Posetti 2017a), a 
substantial work of hybrid journalism-international policy research produced for UNESCO 
2. The journalistic and industry research outputs and events produced by the candidate in 
association with the ‘major artefact’ e.g. journalism produced about the research, commentary 
on the research, and public events connected to the research (see appended ‘Impact Timeline’) 
3. This critical, ‘connective’ research exegesis which provides a theoretical and reflective context 
for the unique artefact.10 
 
This chapter introduces each of these elements and their interrelationship in the context of the 
intersectional model of policy development, advocacy and journalism used to negotiate freedom of 
expression issues in and through this PhD project. It highlights the key conclusions of the UNESCO study, 
along with development of the theory of ‘making content out of process’ (Posetti 2013) which underpins 
the associated outputs. Finally, it outlines the structure and key components of this exegesis.  
 
1.1 The major artefact  
 
The impetus for the major artefact at the core of this project, Protecting Journalism Sources in the 
Digital Age (Posetti 2017a), was a November 2013 UNESCO Resolution which mandated a 
comprehensive study on internet-related issues. It declared that: “Privacy is essential to protect 
journalistic sources, which enable a society to benefit from investigative journalism, to strengthen good 
governance and the rule of law, and such privacy should not be subject to arbitrary or unlawful 
interference.” (UNESCO 2013) 
                                                             
9 The project components were produced during the candidate’s enrolment as a PhD student at the University of 
Wollongong (UOW), in accordance with UOW requirements. 
10 A PDF copy of the book and an ‘impact timeline’ featuring a series of exemplar associated outputs are appended to 






I was contracted to undertake the research on behalf of WAN-IFRA/the World Editors Forum (which 
entered into a contract with UNESCO11) where I was based on secondment from the University of 
Wollongong (where I was employed as a journalism academic) as Research Fellow and Research Editor 
during 2014/2015. The major artefact was initially commissioned as a study designed to provide 
quantitative data and qualitative analysis around legal and normative frameworks supporting 
journalistic source protection in the context of digital disruption.12 The original purpose of the 
commission was twofold: to feed into a broader UNESCO study on the internet and knowledge 
societies13 and the second edition of the Organization’s major biannual report, World Trends in Freedom 
of Expression and Media Development14. However, shortly after I began the research, the complexity 
and scope of the undertaking expanded significantly as a range of emerging intersecting issues became 
clear to me, and subsequently to UNESCO. Ultimately, the commission grew into a comprehensive 
global study of Digital Age source protection issues across 121 countries, requiring the examination of a 
decade’s worth of developments. It was published by UNESCO as a stand-alone 80 thousand-word book 
in April 2017 as part of the Organization’s flagship ‘Series on Internet Freedom’15. Prior to publication in 
full, it also served as a feeder study for the associated UNESCO publications mentioned above. 
 
Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age highlighted four key inter-related themes for 
understanding the evolving international regulatory environment and Digital Age impacts of erosion, 
restriction and compromise. These were (Posetti 2017a p18):  
 
1. The widespread use of mass and targeted surveillance of journalists and their sources 
undercutting legal source protection frameworks by intercepting journalistic communications 
and impacting significantly on investigative journalism practice16 
2. The risk of source protection laws being trumped by national security and anti-terrorism 
legislation that increasingly broadens definitions of ‘classified information’ and limits exceptions 
for journalistic acts 
                                                             
11 Both UNESCO and WAN-IFRA/WEF are based in Paris and WAN-IFRA has special status with UNESCO 
12 Original research contract between UNESCO and WAN-IFRA (the global news publishing association based in 
Paris that also houses the World Editors Forum) dated August 4th, 2014 (Personal document collection). I led the 
research in my capacity as WAN-IFRA Research Fellow and WEF Research Editor (2014/2015), with the support of 
the University of Wollongong, Australia.  
13 Note: The overarching report triggered by the 2013 UNESCO Resolution known as the ‘UNESCO Internet Study’ 
was published in late 2015 as Keystones to foster inclusive Knowledge Societies: Access to Information and 
Knowledge, Freedom of Expression, Privacy, and Ethics on a Global Internet, UNESCO: Paris 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0023/002325/232563E.pdf [Accessed 14/07/18] It cites Protecting Journalism 
Sources in the Digital Age. 
14 Note: This global study was published in late 2015 as World Trends in Freedom of Expression and Media 
Development 2015: Special Digital Focus (Available at: http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0023/002349/234933e.pdf 
) and it features a major pre-publication extract from Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age. 
15 Available at: https://en.unesco.org/unesco-series-on-internet-freedom [Accessed 13/7/18]. 
16 Note: As demonstrated by the case study featured in Posetti J (2017a) The impact of source protection erosion in 
the Digital Age on the practice of investigative journalism globally (pp 103-112). This theme also extends to debate 





3. Expanding requirements for third party intermediaries to mandatorily retain (and potentially 
handover) citizens’ data for increasingly lengthy periods of time further exposes journalistic 
communications with confidential sources  
4. Debates about journalistic actors’ entitlement to access source protection laws where they exist 
are intensifying internationally in the context of shifting understandings about the range of 
people who undertake ‘acts of journalism’  
 
A major output of the study was an 11-point framework (Posetti 2017a pp88-89) for assessing 
source protection dispensations in the Digital Age. The framework embeds significant 
recommendations, as follows: 
 
1. Recognise the value to the public interest of source confidentiality protection, with its legal 
foundation in the right to freedom of expression (including press freedom), and to privacy. These 
protections should also be embedded within a country’s constitution and/or national law,  
2. Recognise that source protection should extend to all acts of journalism, and across all platforms, 
services and mediums (of data storage and publication), and that it includes digital data and meta-
data,  
3. Recognise that source protection does not entail registration or licensing of practitioners of 
journalism,  
4. Recognise the potential detrimental impact on public interest journalism, and on society, of 
source-related information being caught up in bulk data recording, tracking, storage and collection,  
5. Affirm that State and corporate actors (including third party intermediaries) who capture 
journalistic digital data must treat it confidentially (acknowledging also the desirability of the 
storage and use of such data being consistent with the general right to privacy),  
6. Shield acts of journalism from targeted surveillance, data retention and handover of material 
connected to confidential sources,  
7. Define exceptions to all the above very narrowly, so as to preserve the principle of source 
protection as the effective norm and standard,  
8. Define exceptions as needing to conform to a provision of “necessity” and “proportionality” — in 
other words, when no alternative to disclosure is possible, when there is greater public interest in 
disclosure than in protection, and when the terms and extent of disclosure still preserve 
confidentiality as much as possible,  





exceptions, and ensure that law-enforcement agents and judicial actors are educated about the 
principles involved,  
10. Criminalise arbitrary, unauthorised and wilful violations of confidentiality of sources by third 
party actors,  
11. Recognise that source protection laws can be strengthened by complementary whistleblower 
legislation.  
I began the UNESCO study realising that it would be extremely challenging given the complexity of the 
issues, limited resources, global remit and major deadline pressure. But I did not fully appreciate, nor 
anticipate, at the outset how much the breadth, scope and difficulty of the research would expand, 
especially given that highly contentious Digital Age implications were rapidly evolving as the research 
unfolded. Secondly, at the time of commissioning, I was unaware of the extent of the fraught historical 
context which had plagued earlier UNESCO-commissioned research around freedom of expression 
issues17. When I began to address this increasingly complex set of issues, I realised that for this project 
to be effective, I had to operate at the intersection of international policy development, advocacy and 
journalism: in order to navigate and negotiate freedom of expression in public. It is this broader process 
which is described in this exegesis. 
 
1.2 ‘Making content out of process’: associated outputs 
 
As I describe in Chapter Six of this exegesis, the research process, writing and publication of the book 
were part of a broader practice that I call ‘making content out of process’ (Posetti 2013 pp88-100). This 
practice, applied to the Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age project, involved a series of 
associated public events, staggered pre-publication outputs, affiliated journalistic publications, industry 
research publications, and social media engagement. These outputs are mapped and hyperlinked on the 
‘impact timeline’ featured in appendix 9.1, and below is an ‘exemplar sample’ (Bull 2005) of these 
secondary outputs. They include: 
 
1. My chapter on The Urgent Need to Shield Journalism in the Age of Surveillance for the 
World Editors Forum (WAN-IFRA) flagship global report ‘Trends in Newsrooms 2014’. I was 
Editor of this report (Posetti 2014c; 2014d)18 
                                                             
17 Note: See detailed discussion of the New World Information and Communication (NWICO) scandal in Chapter 
Four of this exegesis 
18 Report also available here: http://www.wan-ifra.org/sites/default/files/field_media_image_file_attach/WAN-
IFRA_Trends_Newsrooms_2014.pdf  See also: this feature story based on the chapter published on the World Editors 
Forum’s blog: :  http://blog.wan-ifra.org/2014/06/24/trends-in-newsrooms-the-urgent-need-to-shield-journalism-in-





2. My chapter Source Protection Erosion: The Rising Threat to Investigative Journalism in 
‘Trends in Newsrooms 2015’ (World Editors Forum/WAN-IFRA). I was also Editor of this 
edition of the report (Posetti 2015a; 2015b)19  
3. My article for WAN-IFRA/World Editors Forum about the key ‘takeaways’ from the major 
extract taken from Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age titled 13 Key 
recommendations and findings released from global source protection study and published 
in UNESCO’s World Trends in Freedom of Expression and Media Development 2015: Special 
Digital Focus (UNESCO 2015). This piece was designed to communicate these major 
research findings to the media industry and related stakeholders, and to continue building 
interest in the content, along with anticipation for the publication of the full book (Posetti 
2015f).  
4. My World Press Freedom Day 2016 Op Ed for The Sydney Morning Herald and The Age. 
Titled Threats to Investigative Journalism Creep Close with Erosion of Source Protection, this 
piece explicated the key findings and recommendations of the then still ‘forthcoming’ 
Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age for an influential and broad audience 
(Posetti 2016) 
5. My Sydney Morning Herald Op Ed for World Press Freedom Day 2017, coinciding with the 
launch of Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age. Titled It’s getting harder to 
report the truth in a post-Trump world, this piece allowed me to connect my research to 
emerging global political issues, thereby increasing its relevance and traction (Posetti 
2017b) 
6. My piece for the Global Investigative Journalism Network (GIJN) explaining the practical 
implications of the research for a core target audience: investigative reporters - The 
Eroding State of Source Protection20 
7. My story, coinciding with the book launch, targeting academic and specialist audiences for 
The Conversation. It was titled Surveillance and data collection are putting journalists and 
sources at risk21 
8. A series of interactive events designed to engage broader publics, civil society groups and 
industry. These events are described in the appended ‘Impact Timeline’ but one is 
highlighted to demonstrate efficacy. This event is the preliminary launch of the study at the 
Frontline Club in London, hosted by the London Foreign Press Club. The video of this event, 
featuring prominent editors and lawyers, is available here: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=7&v=SroPCL-xsY8 [Accessed 18/8/18] 
(Churchill 2015) 
                                                             
19Report also available here: http://www.wan-ifra.org/sites/default/files/field_media_image_file_attach/WAN-
IFRA_Trends_Newsrooms_2015.pdf [Accessed 31/8/18] And companion blog post is here: https://blog.wan-
ifra.org/2015/07/01/source-protection-erosion-a-global-case-study-on-the-rising-threat-to-investigative-journ  
20 Also available here: https://gijn.org/2017/05/29/the-eroding-state-of-source-protection/  [Accessed 30/8/18] 
21 Also available here: http://theconversation.com/unesco-report-surveillance-and-data-collection-are-putting-






The objective of deploying journalistic methods and strategies to engage both specialist and general 
audiences in discussions and debates about Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age was 
threefold:  
 
a) To use narrative devices and news frames to highlight the relevance and urgency of the 
research and its underlying issues 
b) To explicate and promote broader understanding of a difficult, contentious and complex set of 
interwoven issues central to contemporary debates at the intersection of privacy, technology, 
journalism and freedom of expression 
c) To enact the method of ‘making content out of process’ and to aid community building around 
the research with the purpose of keeping interest in the project alive during the long wait for 
publication-in-full. 
 
While this kind of hybrid practice of public advocacy is becoming more common in the digital context, 
what is distinctive about the process in this instance is the associated negotiation of the UNESCO 
publication process. This process included an arduous verification procedure common to both 
journalism and academic research, however it was also accompanied by concerns over geopolitical 
sensitivities inherent in navigating diplomacy within intergovernmental organisations - this required 
even more rigorous standards of verification, along with ‘balance’. These tensions are unpacked in 
Chapter Six – a Critical Reflective Practice (CRP) account undertaken cooperatively22 with key actors 
connected to the project. My public performance of ‘making content out of process’ became an 
accountability mechanism to help ensure the publication of the report, but also its effective 
dissemination through constructing a ‘community of interest’ around the research in production, 
throughout its iterative publication phases.  
 
1.3 This exegesis 
 
This exegesis addresses the complex intersection of the issues outlined above, providing both critical 
reflection and scholarly context, it also situates Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age within 
the project entire. Following on from an explication of the multiple methods deployed in undertaking 
the PhD research project as a whole (Chapter Two), the exegesis provides a comprehensive overview 
and analysis of relevant theories, scholarly literature and professional context.  
 
                                                             
22 Note: my deployment of the terms ‘cooperative deconstruction’, ‘collaborative deconstruction/reconstruction’, 
‘interactive unpacking’ and ‘negotiated memory’ throughout this exegesis does not indicate a willingness on behalf of 
all interviewees to self-identify as contributors to these processes and/or outcomes. The interviewees do not have co-






Chapter Three covers the first grouping of theory and literature. Titled Literature and context A: The 
surveillance state, journalism and the Digital Age, this chapter offers scholarly context for the themes of 
the major artefact (i.e. the UNESCO-published book), with an analysis of academic literature along with 
high-level industry and civil society research. It includes references to academic publications that cite 
Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age, and it interweaves scholarly and industry research with 
key elements from the main artefact to provide foundational academic support for the book’s themes, 
findings and recommendations. 
 
Chapter Four, Literature and context B: UNESCO Freedom of expression research - a fraught history, 
draws on a substantial body of scholarship detailing the historical and political context of freedom of 
expression research commissioned by UNESCO, dating back to the late 1970s. Particularly relevant are 
the impacts of the so-called New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) scandal of 
1980, which continue to resonate today. This incendiary public debate was fuelled by Western press 
freedom lobby groups outraged at misconstrued attempts by UNESCO to support redistribution of 
international media power and ‘protect’ journalists through a mechanism that was interpreted as a step 
towards ‘licensing’ or ‘registering’ journalists. These moves were perceived by opponents of the 
UNESCO MacBride Commission’s NWICO research report as symptomatic of attempts to undermine 
core tenets of Western press freedom philosophies. Ultimately, in the context of this fight, both the US 
and UK quit UNESCO for extended periods, causing a financial crisis with 21st century echoes. This 
chapter (Chapter Four) provides geopolitical and historical context, along with scholarly underpinning 
for the ‘critical reflective account’ of logistical difficulties, geopolitical sensitivities, and tensions 
connected to the production and publication of Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age which 
are presented in Chapter Six of the exegesis. 
 
Chapter Five is titled Literature and context C: Networked publics and hybrid journalism research. It 
begins with an examination of notions of journalistic autonomy, objectivity and independence through 
an assessment of related professional practices and analysis of the theories driving them. This analysis is 
undertaken with the purpose of contextualising the profession’s ritual rejection of ‘belly-gazing’ or 
‘inside the beltway’ reportage i.e. journalism about the practice of, and threats to, journalism. This 
examination aids understanding of many journalists’ reluctance to report on the impacts of mass 
surveillance and national security overreach on journalism practice, despite the broader freedom of 
expression implications. Based on an assessment of the literature, the chapter goes on to suggest, 
however, that there are many justifications for such coverage embedded within normative frameworks 
of journalism practice.  
 
Purposefully, Chapter Five analyses a range of ‘journalisms’ categorised under the umbrella of ‘advocacy 
journalism’. (Waisbord 2008) I present a taxonomy of ‘journalisms’ in this category that includes ‘activist 





journalism’. The theories underpinning these practices are unpacked, and parallels with (and distinctions 
from) other forms of journalism practice at the fringes of the mainstream (such as ‘public journalism’) 
are drawn with reference to the literature. I also encourage a ‘rebooting’ of journalism values in this 
regard, recognising the implications of ‘networked press freedom’ (C.f. Annany 2018) and theories of 
media freedom that embrace the role and rights of audiences. (C.f. Reid 2017) Finally, I highlight the 
need to appreciate the networked nature of contemporary source protection – which could be termed 
‘networked source protection’. Additionally, Chapter Five supports the operation of this exegesis as an 
explication and examination of my approach to ‘making content out of process’. (Posetti 2013 pp88-100) 
To this end, it interrogates academic research on ‘networked journalism’ (Beckett 2008), social 
journalism, and modes of social media-fuelled stakeholder engagement. In sum, the chapter theorises 
the process of developing and performing a hybrid model of publicly-engaged knowledge production 
and distribution for application to other such projects.  
 
Chapter Six is my first-person account of the commissioning, research, production and publication 
processes involved with Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age.  It draws on a blend of theories 
and methods, including ‘reflective practice’ (Burns 2013 pp35-36; Fook et al 2009 pp287-292; Niblock 
2007 pp20-32; Milan 2012 & Moon 1999), Critical Reflective Practice’ (Lawrence 2011 pp256-268), 
thematic analysis, and autoethnography. It is informed by qualitative interviews with select expert 
research subjects who were directly or indirectly involved with the UNESCO study. This occurs through a 
process of what I call ‘cooperative deconstruction’ or ‘collaborative critical reflection’23. I am deploying 
these terms to describe a process involving a shared unpacking of the issues I analyse in connection with 
the project. This process involved three iterative interviews and ongoing email exchanges with the 
UNESCO Director who commissioned Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age along with 
interviews with other key actors.24 These interviews serve to inform and check my own Critical 
Reflective Practice. Chapter Six is also designed to elicit good practice recommendations for producing 
UNESCO-commissioned research on freedom of expression destined for the networked public sphere. 
Additionally, it serves to demonstrate the impediments, strictures, potential impacts and reach of the 
core artefact, along with the possibilities offered by an intersectional model for the public negotiation of 
freedom of expression, bringing together journalism, advocacy and public policy research. This chapter 
blends my personal insights, memories, feelings and experiences with those of colleagues involved with 
the project and/or the issues that underpin it. Highlighting the role of ‘making content out of process’, it 
reflects on the public performance of networked journalism and research as acts of advocacy designed 
                                                             
23 Note: my deployment of the terms ‘cooperative deconstruction’, ‘collaborative deconstruction/reconstruction’, 
‘interactive unpacking’ and ‘negotiated memory’ does not indicate a willingness on behalf of all interviewees to self-
identify as contributors to these processes and/or outcomes. The interviewees do not have co-responsibility for my 
analysis and conclusions, nor do they necessarily agree with them. 
24 These interviewees are: UNESCO’s Dr Guy Berger; former senior UNESCO Freedom of Expression project 
officer (Dr Courtney Radsch); the UN Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom 
of Opinion and Expression (Prof. David Kaye); and one of the subjects of a case study featured in Protecting 





to further freedom of expression rights at the international level.  
 
1.4 Conclusion and summary 
 
This introductory chapter to the exegetical thesis has outlined the objectives and purposes of each of 
the other chapters, providing a shorthand guide to the central problems, arguments, theories and 
methodologies underpinning the execution of Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age. It has 
also highlighted the collaborative, participative and connective method at the heart of the broader PhD 
project, which includes the core artefact (the UNESCO-published study) and the range of associated 
outputs documented and analysed via this thesis. 
 
The ultimate aim of this exegesis is to reflect on and aid the future navigation and negotiation of 
freedom of expression advocacy in public through high-impact research and convergent storytelling 
undertaken by journalists, intergovernmental organisations and civil society groups. The PhD project as 
a whole, serves as an intervention in support of protecting confidential sources - a journalistic practice 
recognised as a central tenet of journalism, one essential to the sustainability of investigative 
journalism, at time when the practice of accountability journalism globally is facing unprecedented 
Digital Age threats and myriad other converging pressures. It posits that the era of ‘networked 
journalism’ (Beckett 2008) and ‘networked press freedom’ (Annany 2018) requires an approach that 







Chapter 2: Methodology 
 
Through a combined approach of research-on-practice and research-through-
practice, the methodology provides a unique insight into the production of a 
creative artefact. It builds new knowledge by constructing theory in an under-
theorised area... Meanwhile, through the deconstruction of the production process, 
it reveals how journalism utilises familiar social science research methods in 
compiling, analysing and organising data…Taken together, the two approaches 
constitute a strong argument for [journalism] to be accepted as a legitimate 
research outcome. Exegesis and creative artefact are intimately intertwined: the 
written analysis contextualises and explores the contribution to knowledge. 
(Lindgren and Philips 2011 p.81) 
In this chapter, I will outline the mixed methodological approach adopted for this PhD project. For this 
purpose, I will aggregate and explain the methods used to support research and practice connected to 
the main artefact and its associated outputs. The methodologies applied to the construction of this 
exegesis will also be explicated. 
2.1 Situating the major artefact: Protecting Journalism Sources in the 
Digital Age 
A mixed methodological approach, combining quantitative (‘datafication’) and qualitative methods - 
Participatory Action Research (Reason & Bradbury 2008), Thematic Analysis (Guest 2012), semi-
structured interviews (Rabionet 2011), Case Study (Mills et al 2010), and Constructivist Grounded Theory 
(Charmaz 2000) methodologies - was adopted for the UNESCO study.  
2.1.1 Baseline data 
The initial methodological plan for the UNESCO study involved treating a 2007 Privacy International 
report25 (Banisar 2007) as baseline data for the research. But that report did not include a public data 
set. (Posetti 2017a p14) 
 
A process of ‘datafication’ was therefore applied to the Banisar (2007) report in order to (Posetti 2017a 
p14): 
 
• Identify every country mentioned in the 2007 report  
                                                             
25 This eight-year-old report by David Banisar was titled Silencing Sources: An International Survey of Protections 





• Establish which countries required additional research to strengthen the available data, 
thus enabling an updated benchmarking of the 2007 research 
 
This process of ‘datafication’ resulted in the identification of 124 countries for further study but the 
research brief limited the countries under examination to UNESCO Member States, reducing the final 
number of States for assessment to 121. 
2.1.2 Environmental scan 
Acting as both Chief Researcher and study author, having established the initial data, I assigned each 
country to a researcher or research assistant, according to language capacity, to enable commencement 
of an Environmental Scan (Posetti 2017a pp14-15) process – a qualitative mapping exercise. I 
commissioned four academic researchers26 to assist on the project, eight Review Panel members 
(representing academia and civil society), and 11 research assistants27. Between them, they spoke 11 
languages. In cases where a researcher didn’t have the necessary language skills, the research was firstly 
conducted targeting English language sources. The process of undertaking the Environmental Scan 
involved: searching the legislative, legal and relevant NGO databases within countries; searching online 
news sites; contacting affiliates of news publishing organisations and NGOs/academics specialising in 
press freedom, freedom of expression, privacy, media law; contacting sources within specific countries. 
(Posetti 2017a pp14-15) 
 
Through the Environmental Scan process, confidential source protection developments that had 
occurred in the legal, regulatory, and judicial environments dating from 2007 were identified within the 
countries under investigation. I then coded the documents produced, further narrowing the data corpus 
to a subset of countries where developments had occurred. Ultimately, changes (mostly with negative 
signifiers) occurred in 69% of countries examined. (Posetti 2017a p18) Finally, these countries were 
divided into the five UNESCO regional groups: Africa, Arab States, Asia and the Pacific, Europe and North 
America, Latin America and the Caribbean for the purpose of regional trends analysis. 
2.1.3 Surveys and qualitative interviews 
Next, I developed a set of online survey questions in consultation with academic members of a Review 
Panel that assisted the study through a process of ongoing peer review. This survey was launched in 
October 2014 and it continued until January 2015. (Posetti 2017a p15). It featured qualitative questions 
designed to engage members of the journalistic, academic, legal, freedom of expression and digital 
content communities internationally. Respondents were asked to: pinpoint shifts in the legal and 
                                                             
26 Note: A/Prof Marcus O’Donnell was one of these researchers. He was then both a UOW colleague and my PhD co-
supervisor 
27 Note: although these colleagues variously contributed to research underpinning the study, I was the project’s Chief 





regulatory environment pertaining to source protection since 2007; identify key experts for future 
qualitative interviews and; suggest potential case studies.  
 
Additionally, the results from a survey launched during the World Editors Forum (WEF) in Turin (Italy) in 
June 2014 with UNESCO support (Posetti 2014b) were analysed and synthesised with the data from the 
main survey issued in connection with Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age. The earlier 
survey was originally designed to feed a submission to UNESCO’s over-arching Internet Study, and it 
targeted editors along with investigative journalists. The focus of this survey was the impact of the 
‘Snowden-Effect’28 on newsrooms. The WEF survey data usefully expanded the corpus to enable 
assessment of the impacts of Digital Age source protection erosion on investigative journalism and 
editorial processes and practices. UNESCO also provided me with additional survey data gathered in 
connection with the over-arching Internet Study for examination. That survey asked: “To what extent do 
laws protect digitally interfaced journalism and journalistic sources?” (UNESCO 2014b) The combined 
data was then scanned for evidence of changes to legal source protection frameworks and digital 
elements which had not been identified in the Environmental Scan process. 
 
As acknowledged in Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age, the fact that these surveys were 
conducted online could have discouraged potential respondents due to concerns about communications 
surveillance and interception. But ultimately, 134 people from 35 countries responded to the combined 
surveys (Posetti 2017a p16) and that data was used to: inform the regional overviews (Posetti 2017a 
pp57-101) presented in the book; assist in the development of three thematic studies (Posetti 2017a 
103-133); and pinpoint shifts in the global legal and regulatory source protection environment dating 
back to 2007. 
2.1.4 Analysis and case studies 
Dozens of actors with legal, journalism, and freedom of expression expertise were identified through 
these combined processes.  Ultimately, with the goal of achieving regional and gender balance, 49 
interviewees were selected from 22 countries on the basis of relevant expertise. (Posetti 2017a p16) To 
achieve a level of consistency, I developed nine key qualitative questions to be put to each expert actor 
during semi-structured interviews. Approximately 50 long-form interviews were then conducted by me 
and (under my guidance) the researchers and research assistants. These interviews were conducted via 
telephone, Skype, email and face-to-face, between November 2014 and March 2015. They were 
assigned in accordance with language capacity and recorded, transcribed, translated and coded before 
being analysed by me. They served the purpose of deepening the research and forming the foundation 
                                                             
28 Note: the ‘Snowden effect’ refers to the impacts of NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden’s 2013 revelations about 
US-orchestrated mass surveillance programs. These revelations continue to reverberate within newsrooms and among 







of the thematic studies. This process was also informed by interview data that I had gathered for Trends 
in Newsrooms 2014, a major global report published by WAN-IFRA (Posetti 2014d), which included a 
chapter on international newsrooms’ responses to the threat of mass surveillance revealed by the NSA 
whistleblower Edward Snowden. 
 
Three thematic case studies were ultimately identified for in-depth analysis: 
 
• The impact of source protection erosion in the Digital Age on the practice of investigative 
journalism globally. (Posetti 2017a pp103-112) 
 
• Sweden: How a State with one of the oldest and strongest legal source protection 
frameworks is responding and adapting to emerging digital threats. (Posetti 2017a pp112-
120)  
 
• Towards an international framework for assessing source protection dispensations in the 
Digital Age. (Posetti 2017a p120-133) 
 
2.2 ‘Making content out of process’ through ‘participative action 
research’ 
I also deployed ‘Participative Action Research’ (PAR) strategies in both gathering final pieces of data for 
the production of the main and in the process of building an audience for its publication. This set of 
experiential methods involves deriving understanding through a collaborative, reflective process 
designed to effect social change. As Reason and Bradbury (2008) have summarised, it: 
• Is a set of practices that responds to people’s desire to act creatively in the face 
of practical and often pressing issues in their lives in organisations and 
communities;  
• Calls for engagement with people in collaborative relationships, opening new 
‘communicative spaces’ in which dialogue and development can flourish;  
• Draws on many ways of knowing, both in the evidence that is generated in 
inquiry and its expression in diverse forms of presentation as we share learning 
with wider audiences;  
• Is values oriented, seeking to address issues of significance concerning the 
flourishing of human persons, their communities, and the wider ecology in which 





• Is a living, emergent process that cannot be predetermined but changes and 
develops as those engaged deepen their understanding of the issues to be 
addressed and develop their capacity as co-inquirers both individually and 
collectively (Reason & Bradbury 2008 pp3-4) 
My system of ‘making content out of process’ (Posetti 2013), as described in this exegesis, can be 
understood as an expression of Participative Action Research (PAR). It involves the creation of 
journalism and real-time social media content about the research process as it progresses, while 
simultaneously building communities of interest around that content, with a view to actively engaging 
research participation and amplification of a project’s objectives. In the case of Protecting Journalism 
Sources in the Digital Age, I used explanatory and activist reporting (see discussion in Chapter Five) 
approaches to engage key stakeholders in the research process (e.g. journalists, news organisations, civil 
society groups, academics, media lawyers) and encourage their participation in it. This involved targeted 
reporting for niche audiences (on and offline) and industry research outputs. I also engaged in public 
acts of ‘reflective practice’ (see discussion of this method later in this chapter) – describing my own 
experiences of working with confidential sources and the implications of source protection erosion for 
the kind of investigative journalism that I have practiced. My objective was to generate knowledge-
sharing and awareness-raising alongside action connected to the research findings (as they emerged) in 
response to increasingly urgent threats to press freedom posed by mass surveillance and national 
security overreach.  
 
This PAR-journalism approach was also designed to educate and activate broader publics through 
mainstream journalism about the wider societal implications of source protection erosion for the 
sustainability of open societies, and public events to discuss the preliminary research findings and 
additional insights as the research progressed. 
 
In the interests of engaging key stakeholders around the forthcoming study, with a view to capturing up 
to date data, and to assist with distribution and amplification post publication (again, being mindful of 
the ‘creating content out of process’ method), I convened two panel discussions during the final phase 
of the UNESCO-commissioned research. The first panel, staged in Washington DC during the World 
News Congress/World Editors Forum in June 2015 (Posetti 2015d; Greenslade 2015), featured me and 
the following experts: 
 
• Gerard Ryle (Executive Director, International Consortium of Investigative Journalists) 
• Charles Tobin (US attorney specialising in source protection) 
• Amy Mitchell (Director of Journalism Research, Pew Research Centre) 






A second panel (July 2015) was initiated by the London Foreign Press Association and hosted by the 
Frontline Club. It was designed as an interactive pre-launch of the study’s findings (Churchill 2015). The 
panellists (in addition to me) were: 
 
• Jonathan Calvert (Editor, Insight, The Sunday Times) 
• Gavin Millar QC (Barrister specialising in media law, including source protection) 
• Jeremy Myers (BBC Internet Research Specialist) 
• Paola Totaro (then President of the London Foreign Press Association) 
 
The contributions of the panellists during both sessions were leveraged to update and strengthen the 
study’s analysis during the final phase of research. This approach of using the networked public sphere 
to ‘make content out of process’ during the production of the major artefact was redeployed in the 
context of the eventual publication and release of the book (see discussion in Chapter Six of this 
exegesis, and the ‘impact timeline’ appended as 9.1). This involved a range of international public events 
and panel discussions featuring expert actors and engaged online communities in connection with these 
events, along with reportage from me about the project carried by both mainstream (e.g. The Sydney 
Morning Herald) and niche publications (e.g. Global Investigative Journalism Network). The aim was to 
make the research participants and networked publics agents for policy change (empowered by new 
knowledge) in response to Digital Era threats to confidential journalistic communications on which 
investigative reporting depends. 
 
Data collection for the study at the core of this exegesis officially began on August 1st, 2014, and it ended 
on July 27th, 2015 when the finalised study was submitted to UNESCO. However, Protecting Journalism 
Sources in the Digital Age (Posetti 2017a) was not published in full until April 2017. 
 
2.3 Research methods deployed in the production of this exegesis 
 
A variety of models have been proposed for production-based PhDs and exegetical frameworks in 
journalism studies (Nash 2014; Phillips 2014; Lindgren & Phillips 2011), and this exegetical thesis can be 
situated within such frames. This exegesis responds to what Nash (2014) describes as: “the singularity 
and value of journalism as a research practice in its combination of a reflexive empirical focus, a focus 
on contemporary phenomena and an intense engagement with the politics of knowledge”. (Nash 2014 
p.76)  
 
Nash proposes that a typical exegesis would include a literature review, an exposition of the 
methodology and an “evaluation of the success of the journalism component of the project in answering 





emphasises the documentation of process (Phillips 2014), while Lindgren and Philips (2011) point to the 
connective nature of exegesis and creative artefact: 
Through a combined approach of research-on-practice and research-through-
practice, the methodology provides a unique insight into the production of a 
creative artefact. It builds new knowledge by constructing theory in an under-
theorised area... Meanwhile, through the deconstruction of the production process, 
it reveals how journalism utilises familiar social science research methods in 
compiling, analysing and organising data…Taken together, the two approaches 
constitute a strong argument for [journalism] to be accepted as a legitimate 
research outcome. Exegesis and creative artefact are intimately intertwined: the 
written analysis contextualises and explores the contribution to knowledge. 
(Lindgren and Philips 2011 p.81) 
 
2.3.1 A connective exegetical model 
Drawing on these models from journalism studies, this exegesis follows an augmented ‘connective 
model’ (Hamilton & Jaaniste 2010 pp31-44) for practice-led research exegeses, as explicated by 
Hamilton and Jaaniste (2010):  
 
This model combines earlier approaches to the exegesis, which oscillated between academic 
objectivity and personal reflexivity by providing a contextual framework for the practice, and 
commentary on the creative practice (Hamilton & Jaaniste 2010 p.31)  
 
It identifies an emerging hybridised approach to exegesis construction, highlighting three core elements: 
• Situating concepts (Definitions and Theories) 
• Precedents of practice (Traditions and Exemplars) 
• Researcher’s creative practice (the creative process, the artefacts produced and their value as 
research) 
 
My approach to this exegesis responds to the three elements above as follows: 
 
Situating concepts (Definitions and Theories): key terms and relevant theories underpinning both the 
major artefact and the exegesis will be explicated, analysed and synthesized. This is done in this chapter, 
along with the three literature and context chapters (Chapters 3-5) 
 
Precedents of practice (Traditions and Exemplars): a range of comparable artefacts will be referenced, 





with a corpus of parallel outputs produced by (or in association with) me. This is done throughout but 
particularly in Chapter Four, and in the appended ‘impact timeline’ (9.1) 
 
Researcher’s creative practice (the creative process, the artefacts produced and their value as research): I 
will reflect critically on my scholarship and professional practice connected to the execution, production, 
publication and distribution of Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age as a research-journalism-
intergovernmental policy hybrid. The undertaking of this project at the intersection of a global industry 
organisation with a press freedom remit (WAN-IFRA/World Editors Forum) and a UN body operating in 
the zone of ‘realpolitik’ (UNESCO) will be analysed with reference to competing forces, ethical and 
professional tensions, impediments and obstacle negotiation. As part of this process, I will present an 
annotated portfolio of associated outputs demonstrating an emerging intersectional model for 
‘networked press freedom’ (Annany 2018) practice and performance. The key artefacts are presented as 
components of this thesis submission and the critical reflection is presented in Chapter 6) 
 
Additionally, I will introduce two new elements to the ‘connective exegesis model’ which enhance the 
critical reflective process:  
 
‘Cooperative deconstruction’ through qualitative semi-structured, longform interviews with key expert 
actors: six interviews with four key experts connected - either directly or indirectly - to the UNESCO 
project were undertaken specifically for the exegesis, as part of a collaborative reflective process that I 
am calling ‘cooperative deconstruction’. The Thematic Analysis of these interviews provides a 
framework for comparing and contrasting my critical self-reflection against other actors’ experiences. It 
will also allow for enrichment of the intersectional model of policy development, advocacy and 
journalism for negotiating freedom of expression in public explicated in this exegesis. I draw on these 
interviews throughout the critical reflection in Chapter Six. 
 
Autoethnography: I will draw on principles from the traditions of ‘analytic autoethnography’ (Anderson 
2006) and ‘feminist autoethnography’ (Ettore 2017a, Ettore 2017b) to support a cathartic rendering of 
my own lived experience of producing the work at the core of this exegesis, with reference to other key 
participants’ experiences. The autoethnographic approach informs my critical reflection in Chapter Six. 
 
My incorporation of both autoethnography and ‘cooperative deconstruction’ inform my approach to 
‘Critical Reflective Practice’ (CRP) (Lawrence 2011 pp256-263) in assessing and analysing the processes, 
procedures, outputs and ethical dilemmas undertaken, produced, and experienced in the course of 








2.3.2 Applying ‘cooperative deconstruction’ and autoethnography to 
Critical Reflective Practice 
 
Variations of Critical Reflective Practice methods are used in the context of the study of social work 
(Fook 2007 pp263-275; Fook & Askeland 2009), nursing practice (Lawrence 2011 pp256-263) and 
Journalism Studies, particularly in reference to education/training, and development of professional 
ethics and standards (Niblock 2007; Burns 2013).  
 
‘Critical reflection’ and ‘reflective practice’ are not interchangeable terms but they can interact and work 
in tandem. The concept of ‘reflection’ has its roots in Socrates’ idea of the ‘examined life’ designed to 
support engagement with the world in an ethical and compassionate manner (Nussbaum 1997). Donald 
Schon is considered a founder of ‘reflective practice’ (Schon 1993). Schon’s work addressed a perceived 
crisis in the professions which was indicated by a gap between theory and practice. His approach 
involved engaging professionals in reflection as a tool to unearth theory embedded in professional 
practice. However, Erlandson and Beach (2008) have identified a ‘double-sided ambivalence’ associated 
with Schon’s conceptualisation of ‘reflective practice’:  
 
One concerns contradictory attitudes, expressions or feelings that are simultaneously directed 
toward an object, person or action, the other concerns undecidability and a fluctuation of 
meaning between a thing and its opposite. Both of them concern an aspect of uncertainty. 
(Erlandson & Beach 2008 p.409)  
 
Reflective practice requires reflexivity, defined by Steier (1991) as a ‘turning back on itself’ and White 
(2002) as an ability to look both internally and externally. And ‘critical reflection’ can be described as a 
process focused on reflecting on power that is designed to excavate, analyse and transform deeply held 
assumptions, often with practice impacts and broader social change objectives (Agger 1998).29 Applied 
to scholarship, this process can also involve increased awareness of the self as author and researcher, 
within a framework that encourages reflective practice as a device to help ‘locate’ the researcher 
(Ferrari 2010 p.217). The goal of ‘reflective practice’, according to Fook (2007), is to improve the 
accountability of professional practice via continual scrutiny of the principles on which it is based. “For 
this reason, the ability to reflect upon practice in an ongoing and systematic way is now regarded as 
essential to responsible professional practice.” (Fook 2007 p.441) In my case, the engagement of key 
informants in this Critical Reflective Process enhances this work of professional accountability.  
 
Fook (2007) describes critical reflection applied to improve professional practice as: 
                                                             







reflective practice that focuses on the power dimensions of assumptive thinking, and therefore 
on how practice might change in order to bring about change in the social situations in which 
professionals work. (Fook 2007 pp441-42)  
 
Askeland and Fook (2009) identify three major types of cultural assumptions which are challenged by 
critical reflection: “These include assumptions regarding interpersonal communication and dialogue, 
professional helping and workplace cultures, and regarding knowledge, learning, research and the place 
of emotions.” (Fook & Askeland p.287)  
 
In Journalism Studies, Niblock (2007 p.20) has defined ‘reflective practice’ and ‘reflexive research’ in the 
context of the rise of the ‘journalist-academic’ (a categorisation I identify with) and perspectives on 
journalism as ‘research-in-practice’. Sheridan-Burns (2013), meanwhile, describes reflective practice as 
the ‘bridge’ between journalism theory and professional practice. “It is through critical self-reflection 
that journalists develop self-reliance, confidence, problem-solving abilities, cooperation, and 
adaptability while simultaneously gaining knowledge.” (Sheridan-Burns 2013 p.36) She adds that critical 
reflection is also the process by which journalists learn to recognise their own assumptions and find 
their places in the broader social context. (Sheridan Burns 2013 pp35-36) This is true, too, of the 
collaborative research process I experienced in the production of Protecting Journalism Sources in the 
Digital Age.  
 
In addition to applying Critical Reflective Practice to analysis of the production processes and 
construction of audiences (developed as communities of interest) around the published work, I have 
also applied the core principles to the undertaking of qualitative interviews for this exegesis. Borrowing 
from Ryan et al (2010 p.115), who describe the “messy process of reflection and action” involved in a 
collaborative writing exercise, I can identify the collaborative development of knowledge and shared 
awareness through a process of mutual critical reflection undertaken during long-form, semi-structured 
interviews with four key informants in the areas of journalism, UN diplomacy and civil society advocacy 
who participated in the research and production of Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age in a 
variety of capacities. My interviewees are: 
 
Dr Guy Berger, Director of Freedom of Expression and Media Development, UNESCO: Dr Berger 
commissioned Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age for UNESCO and co-authored (with me) 
the research outline (attached to the commissioning documents) in my capacity as Research Fellow and 
Research Editor with the World Association of News Publishers (WAN-IFRA) and the World Editors 
Forum (WEF). He was the UNESCO manager responsible for the book’s publication and ultimately 
ensured its passage through multiple political approval processes at UNESCO. I have collaborated with 





decade. For this exegesis, I conducted three (iterative) interviews with Dr Berger in 2017 and 2018 – two 
face-to-face and one via Skype. 
 
Professor David Kaye, UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom 
of opinion and expression: Professor Kaye is an international expert on human rights law focused on 
freedom of expression and digital rights. He was engaged in my UNESCO research project from early 
2015, reviewed the final draft, championed its publication and cited it prior to publication in his second 
thematic report to the UN General Assembly in 2015. He also invited me to participate in expert 
consultations on source protection and whistleblower rights designed to inform his own research for the 
UN, and I presented on my research findings (before my book was published) during a panel at UN 
headquarters in New York in 2015, on which he was also an expert speaker. I interviewed Professor Kaye 
via Skype in May 2018 for this exegesis. 
 
Dr Courtney Radsch, Advocacy Director for the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ): Dr Radsch is 
currently with the press freedom and journalism safety NGO CPJ, but she was previously a senior expert 
working to Guy Berger at UNESCO in Paris, with responsibility for editing the first edition of the flagship 
UNESCO report World Trends in Freedom of Expression and Media Development in 2014 – a study which 
experienced many of the hurdles and challenges familiar to the production and publication of Protecting 
Journalism Sources in the Digital Age (see discussion in Chapter 6). She also acted as an expert source for 
my UNESCO study, following her departure from UNESCO in early 2014. Interviewed her for this exegesis 
in April 2018. 
 
James Risen, National Security Editor at The Intercept: Risen was previously the long-serving National 
Security Editor and CIA Correspondent at The New York Times, where his commitment to source 
confidentiality and investigative journalism based on whistleblowers and sources acting in the public 
interest led him into conflict with the newspaper’s management and landed him in court on pain of jail 
for refusing to divulge the identity of a source, in a legal case that embarrassed the Obama 
administration and ultimately resulted in the intervention of the US Attorney General. He has since 
joined The Intercept, the international online publication co-founded by the journalist-lawyer Glenn 
Greenwald who collaborated with Edward Snowden to reveal the overreach of the US’ national security 
apparatus. I spoke to Mr Risen during research for Protecting Sources in the Digital Age, but he was 
unable to participate in the study during its production due to legal constraints and the impacts of the 
court case. However, he has since collaborated with me on a project designed to better equip journalists 
to work with whistleblowers (see discussion in Chapter Six). I interviewed him in April 2018. 
 
The methodology for these interactive, long form interviews (which have been transcribed for analysis 
as described below) borrows from journalistic interview techniques (Altheide 2002 pp411-430; Sedorkin 





historians and ethnographers, including autoethnographers (Brennan 2013 p.27; Smith 1989 pp316-30). 
Interactive interviews tend to be collaborative in nature, involving researcher and subject in fluid 
exchanges that conversationally probe issues and experiences, delivering "in-depth and intimate 
understanding of people's experiences with emotionally charged and sensitive topics" (Ellis et al 1997 
p.119). They frequently involve multiple interview sessions and can be situated in the context of well-
established or emerging relationships (Adams 2006 pp704-23). Relational ethics can be further 
complicated by continuation of interpersonal ties between autoethnographers and their 
collaborators/interview participants. In some instances, friends and professional collaborators are 
interviewed, in others, interviewees become friends during the course of the research process: “We do 
not normally regard them as impersonal ‘subjects’ only to be mined for data. Consequently, ethical 
issues affiliated with friendship become an important part of the research process and product.” (Ellis et 
al 2011 p.30) These experiences30, and associated ethical dilemmas, resonate with me given the long-
standing relationships I have with two of the interviewees (Berger and Radsch), in particular.  
 
‘Relational concerns’ are considered a fundamental aspect of research inquiry and on occasion 
autoethnographers feel obligated to show their work to participants (Ellis 2007 p.3) where it impacts on 
them, in order to give them an opportunity to respond and re-frame their contributions in the context of 
the collaborative exercise of sense-making of experience. Such conduct would generally be considered 
antithetical to professional journalistic practice, but it intersects with the desire expressed by James 
Risen (one of my exegesis interview subjects) that confidential sources and whistleblowers working with 
journalists be treated as ‘friends’31. It is also a technique adopted by researchers when identifying 
research participants in connection with their contribution, where it is considered ethically appropriate 
to do so. While autoethnographers recognise the need to be mindful of potential impacts on research 
integrity, “Most of the time, they also have to be able to continue to live in the world of relationships in 
which their research is embedded after the research is completed.”(Ellis et al 2011 p.31) Interestingly, 
autoethnographers also have to contend with one of the common dilemmas experienced by news 
reporters: the inconsistency of witness accounts. “We know that memory is fallible, that it is impossible 
to recall or report on events in language that exactly represents how those events were lived and felt; 
and we recognize that people who have experienced the ‘same’ event often tell different stories about 
what happened.” (Ellis et. al. 2011 p.31) 
 
Finally, it’s worth recognising the disconnect between investigative journalism practice and 
autoethnographic storytelling involving interview subjects. As Wahl-Jorgensen (2013) observes: 
“Journalists rely on the outsourcing of emotional labor to non-journalists – the story protagonists and 
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other sources, who are (a) authorized to express emotions in public, and (b) whose emotions journalists 
can authoritatively describe without implicating themselves.” (Wahl-Jorgensen 2013 p.129) This is 
essentially what I have done, recalling my experience as an investigative reporter keen to outsource my 
lived experience to expert sources, rather than rely entirely on my own critical reflections. This 
experience is familiar to Lindgren (2017 p.183), who has written about the challenges of operating in the 
mode of ‘journalist-as autoethnographer’, including the discomfort of “putting oneself in the frame” 
which can lead to the outsourcing of memory processing. Particular challenges of this enterprise – as I 
encountered in the production of the ‘reflective practice account’ featured in this exegesis (Chapter Six) 
– include overcoming the objectivity norm and other news reporting conventions that encourage the 
journalist to distance herself from her own story. 
2.3.3 Adding analytic autoethnographic methods 
Autoethnography combines characteristics of autobiography and ethnography. That is to say, it 
combines retroactive and selective written reflections on past experiences with study of a culture’s 
shared experiences, values and beliefs, along with relational practices, in order to advance cultural 
understanding. (Ellis et al 2011) Autoethnographers seek to make cultural characteristics familiar to 
‘outsiders’ as well as ‘insiders’ by detailing aspects of cultural experience through personalised 
illustration: “To accomplish this might require comparing and contrasting personal experience against 
existing research, interviewing cultural members, and/or examining relevant cultural artefacts.” (Ellis et 
al 2011 p.345) For more detailed discussion of the process of comparing personal experience with 
research, see Ronai (1995 pp 395-426 & 1996 pp 109-31) For explorations of the role of interviewing 
others in the context of autoethnography see Foster (2006), Marvasti (2006 p525-547), and Tillmann-
Healy (2003 pp 729-749). Finally, Boylorn (2008 pp 413-433) and Denzin (2006 pp 391-395) deal with the 
examination of cultural ‘artefacts’. 
 
Autoethnographies produced by researchers invoke “thick descriptions of personal and interpersonal 
experience” (Ellis et al 2011 p.14) based on assessment and analysis of patterns of cultural experience 
derived from interviews (which I have deployed), field notes and other artefacts (which, in my case, 
include emails, margin notes in early draft copies of the main artefact, text/app messages and social 
media messages), and using descriptive narration along with a recognisable authorial voice to weave the 
observations together (as I do in this exegesis). The autoethnographic researcher’s objectives include 
making personal and cultural experiences engaging and meaningful but they also focus on reaching 
broader and more diverse audiences than achieved by comparatively inaccessible traditional research 
outputs. (Ellis et al 2011 p.14) 
 
My approach to autoethnography in this exegesis follows ‘analytic autoethnography’ as outlined by 
Anderson (2006 p.373-395). He presents a framework for this method which includes: analytic 





commitment to theoretical analysis (Anderson 2006 p.373). It is a methodological mode well-suited to 
my project, which has at its core a book that is categorised as a hybrid research-journalism-
intergovernmental policy text and involves a process of critical reflection informed by other key actors 
through interviews. According to Pace (2012), it involves the application of Grounded Theory analytic 
strategies to the process of critical reflection. He describes the model as particularly valuable to 
“researchers who want to practise autoethnography within a realist or analytic tradition of professional 
practice.” (Pace 2012 p.1) 
 
There are noted distinctions between Grounded Theory (Charmaz 2000 pp 509-35) and what are 
frequently termed ‘layered accounts’ in autoethnography. These situate the author’s experience within 
the corpus of data, the relevant academic literature and abstract analysis. The simultaneous procession 
of data collection and analysis overlap with GT (Charmaz 1983 p.109), but layered accounts differ in that 
they use ‘vignettes, reflexivity, multiple voices, and introspection’ (Ellis 1991 p.23) to invite readers to 
‘participate’ in the process of producing. (Ronai 1992 p.102) 
 
These theories and methods of autoethnography (with an emphasis on ‘analytic autoethnography’) and 
‘reflective practice’ (with an emphasis on Critical Reflective Practice) are applied to the production of 
this exegesis, especially regarding the deconstruction and reconstruction of the story of the creation, 
publication, distribution and impact of the major artefact. This will occur with reference to the 
interviews with key actors, my personal reflections, shared recollections, contemporaneous notes, 
emails, conversations on messenger apps, and comments on draft reports. Additionally, it will be 
complemented by the curation of an annotated collection of research publications, journalism outputs, 
events, and core social media activities connected to the UNESCO study, featured on an ‘Impact 
Timeline’ appended to the exegesis (See Appendix 1).  
2.4 Conclusion and summary 
In this chapter I have outlined the methodological frameworks underpinning the production of: 
 
1. Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age, the major artefact at the heart of this PhD 
project 
2. The range of associated and participative processes that fed the development, production and 
promotion of this book 
3. The Critical Reflective Practice account produced in this exegesis  
 
The major artefact was produced through a series of overlapping, rigorous research methods common 
to both journalism and academic policy research (and intensified in the context of UN geopolitics) but 
these traditional methods were enhanced by connective and participatory strategies which sought to 
‘make content out of process’ and simultaneously create an audience to enhance its impact. This 





project in a broader scholarly context and through its unique approach to ‘cooperative deconstruction’ 













Chapter 3: Literature and Context A - The Surveillance State 
Journalism, privacy and the Digital Age 
 
 
There is widespread recognition in international agreements, case law and 
declarations that protection of journalists’ sources (are) a crucial aspect of freedom 
of expression that should be protected by all nations. (Banisar 2007) 
…journalistic communications are increasingly being caught up in the surveillance 
nets of law enforcement and national security agencies as they trawl for evidence 
of criminal activity, terrorism and national security threats, and conduct leak 
investigations. (Posetti 2017a p.12) 
…world events and the advances of technology pose significant challenges just as 
the privilege is becoming established firmly in international human rights law. A 
major UNESCO report in 2017 warned that anti-terrorism and national security 
legislation, government surveillance, and data retention and disclosure 
requirements all could undermine journalistic privilege. (Carter 2017) 
 
3.1 Literature and context overview  
 
This chapter is the first of three thematic chapters, which serve as a scholarly anchor for convergent 
themes underpinning both the major artefact (with its associated outputs32) and this exegesis.  These 
chapters provide a series of contextual, comparative literature reviews that explore a range of theories 
and academic research, along with high level professional publications (including research and reports 
from intergovernmental organisations, civil society and industry), across the fields of journalism studies, 
activism and advocacy, digital communications, human rights law, and the history of UNESCO as a 
publisher of research on freedom of expression issues connected to the practice of journalism. This 
literature review is designed to explicate the intersectional model underpinning the production, 
publication and impact of Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age (Posetti 2017a). The purpose 
is to provide intersectional perspectives on the navigation and negotiation of freedom of expression in 
the networked public sphere via UNESCO-commissioned research on the global state of journalistic 
source protection in the post-Snowden era. The scholarly and industry research assessed in this section 
is augmented with an ‘impact timeline’ (Appendix 9.1) which situates Protecting Journalism Sources in 
the Digital Age within the recent history (starting in 2013) of UN declarations, resolutions, reports, 
statements, comments and actions relevant to the themes. Additionally, it plots major related 
                                                             





developments initiated by regional intergovernmental bodies and relevant international jurisprudence 
alongside the major outputs from the Protecting Journalism Sources project. The purpose of the timeline 
is to demonstrate the evolution, trajectory and impact of the book, again highlighting the intersectional 
production and dissemination model of this PhD project across academic research, policy development, 
journalism and civil society advocacy. 
  
Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age, finally published in full by UNESCO in April 2017, is the 
main artefact at the core of this PhD project. But the nature of the study – which can be categorised as a 
hybrid publication sitting at the intersection of public policy reports, journalism, and academic research 
– precluded inclusion of a comprehensive literature review. As a result, the three-part literature review 
and context section of this exegesis commences with Literature and Context A: The Surveillance State - 
Journalism, Privacy and the Digital Age (Chapter Three). This chapter assesses scholarly research 
connected to the protection of journalists’ confidential sources and whistleblowers in the context of 
digital disruption. This is achieved through an interweaving of scholarly literature, research and policy 
documents with the key findings and pertinent excerpts from my UNESCO study on the theme. 
 
In the next chapter (Chapter 4), Literature and Context B: UNESCO freedom of expression research 
publications - a fraught history, I address the contentious history of UNESCO research and publications 
in the freedom of expression arena connected to the practice and defence of journalism. The role of 
UNESCO in commissioning such research, raising awareness and pressing for change on issues relevant 
to source protection is emphasised. This enables contextualised analysis of the intended purpose and 
impact of the major artefact, along with my critical reflections on the issues, strictures, obstacles and 
tensions connected to the ‘realpolitik’ (Brew 2015) involved in producing a contentious global study for 
an intergovernmental organisation like UNESCO.33 
 
Finally, in Literature & Context C: Applying the principles of advocacy journalism to freedom of expression 
research in a ‘networked press freedom’ era (Chapter Five) alternative theories supporting production of 
public interest journalism and research in the social media era are explored in the context of 
communicating the freedom of expression risks associated with source protection erosion. Here, the 
emphasis is on the intersecting themes of advocacy and activist journalism, social journalism, digital 
communications; digital citizenship, and ‘networked press freedom’.  
 
Taken together, the analysis of scholarly literature and reports reviewed in these chapters is designed to 
explicate the hybrid model underpinning the production, publication and impact of Protecting 
Journalism Sources in the Digital Age (Posetti 2017a). 
 
                                                             





3.2 Protecting journalism sources: intent and purpose 
 
In both journalism and legal studies, and in international policy instruments, there is a broad and 
longstanding agreement on the need to protect the confidentiality of journalism sources. As Banisar 
(2007) has noted: 
There is widespread recognition in international agreements, case law and 
declarations that protection of journalists’ sources (are) a crucial aspect of freedom 
of expression that should be protected by all nations. 
The need to ensure a free flow of information, especially in regard to information derived from 
whistleblowers, is the general justification for protecting confidential communications between 
journalism practitioners and their sources. Martin (1983) describes whistleblowing as disclosure by an 
employee of their employer’s improper activities, and whistleblowers as “…merely ordinary employees 
who feel so troubled by their employer’s conduct that they feel compelled to take action”. While 
whistleblowing covers issues broader than employers’ conduct, the absence of protections can cause a 
‘chilling effect’ making those with sensitive information valuable to the public interest being more 
reluctant to come forward. Another flow-on effect involves those doing journalism becoming more 
cautious about seeking and using information supplied on condition of confidentiality, “because of 
knowledge or suspicion that they will be put under pressure to reveal sources, with resultant 
concomitant shrinkage of public interest content.” (Posetti 2017a p.12) 
 
In the absence of confidential sources, many acts of investigative storytelling - from Watergate (St Dizier 
1985) to the major 2016 investigative journalism project ‘the Panama Papers’ led by the International 
Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ)34 – might never have surfaced. Such sources often require 
anonymity to protect them from physical, economic or professional reprisals following the public 
exposure of their revelations. In the case of the Panama Papers, the confidential source who delivered 
the biggest data dump in the history of journalism demanded anonymity and would only agree to 
communicate via heavily encrypted methods (MacGregor, Watkins et al 2017 pp505-552).  
 
Internationally, journalists are guided by an established ethical obligation to protect their confidential 
sources from unmasking – this commitment is essential to public trust in professional journalism. In 
parallel, and in recognition of the vital function that confidential sources play in facilitating ‘watchdog 
journalism’ (Waisbord 2000, Schultz 1998) or ‘accountability journalism’ (Downie & Schudson 2009), 
there is also a strong tradition of legal and normative source protection frameworks internationally. 
These laws are often referred to as the journalists’ ‘privilege’ (Nestler 2005) or ‘shield laws’ (Fargo 2006) 
because they are designed to shield the journalist from being forced to reveal a source’s identity (an act 
                                                             





that in turn shields the source). “Such protection is viewed as necessary to ensure the free flow of 
information - an essential element of several international human rights agreements.” (Posetti 2017a 
p.30) In some countries, it is actually a legal requirement that journalists protect their sources. In 
Sweden, for example, journalists can be prosecuted for revealing the identities of their sources (Hendler 
2010; Posetti 2017a pp112-1935). However, in many countries, journalists can still be compelled to 
identify their sources through legal processes – sometimes on pain of penalties, prosecution and 
imprisonment.  
 
There are limited exceptions to legal source protection, such as when a journalist is accused of 
committing a crime, if s/he witnesses a serious crime, or circumstances involving immediate and grave 
threats to human life. For a discussion of the need to limit the journalist’s privilege in exceptional 
circumstances, see Carney (2009). The international instruments concur that the protection of sources is 
“indispensable” and a “basic condition for press freedom”, as Banisar (2007) has noted: “Without it, the 
media will not be able to effectively gather information, and provide the public with information, and 
act as an effective watchdog” (Banisar 2007 p.13). The presumption made is that “exceptional 
circumstances” are required to justify disclosure of journalists’ confidential sources. Accordingly, the 
need for information about the source must be judged as essential, and only in cases where there is a 
‘vital interest’ can disclosure be justified (Carney 2009). As I concluded in Protecting Journalism Sources 
in the Digital Age, “Where the legal line is drawn, and how it is interpreted, varies around the world but 
the principle that sets confidentiality as the norm, and disclosure as the exception, is the generally 
accepted standard.” (Posetti 2017a p.11)  
 
While international practices vary significantly, Europe is considered to be at the forefront of legal 
source protection defence and maintenance. There, direct demands to expose sources tend to be 
exceptions rather than the norm, with recognition of the right to source protection fairly well 
established in many countries. However, many of these laws are limited in scope, or in their application 
(e.g. restricting access to certain categories of journalism practitioners). In 2011 the Council of Europe 
Parliamentary Assembly adopted Recommendation 1950 on the protection of journalists´ sources. This 
Recommendation reaffirmed the centrality of source protection to democratic journalistic function. 
Specifically, this Recommendation noted broad exceptions to source protection in Hungary and called 
on the government to amend the law which it described as being: 
…overly broad and thus may have a severe chilling effect on media freedom. This 
law sets forth neither the procedural conditions concerning disclosures, nor 
guarantees for journalists requested to disclose their source. (COE 2011)  
 
                                                             





Regional intergovernmental organisations such as the African Union (AU), Council of Europe (CoE), the 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and the Organisation of American States 
(OAS) have all specifically recognised journalistic source protection rights. The European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) has also found that this right is an essential component of freedom of expression in 
several judgements. (Posetti 2017a pp41-56)36  
 
3.2.1 Protecting journalism sources: Digital Era implications 
 
However, this principle of journalistic source protection works in practice only if the identity of the 
confidential source is not able to be easily discovered by other means, and if there are limits on the use 
of any identifying information if it is revealed. The Digital Age risks to the security of these legal and 
normative source protection frameworks were highlighted by Edward Snowden’s extraordinary 
revelations in 2013 – which he initially divulged to journalists as a confidential source - about mass 
surveillance undertaken by the US National Security Agency (NSA). In an age when most journalism is 
researched and produced in a digital environment, the threats highlighted by these leaks are very 
significant. The surveillance nets scoop up journalistic communications and the ‘shield’ of source 
protection is penetrated further as a result of mandatory data retention policies and the role of third-
party intermediaries such as social media companies (see detailed discussion later in this section). 
 
As a result of these Digital Age developments, there are also new questions now facing courts, 
legislators, media lawyers and journalists. In the analogue era, the standard questions regarding 
confidential source protection were (Posetti 2017a p.13):  
 
1) Can a journalist be forced to reveal the confidential source of published information by a 
court?  
2) Can journalists and news organisations be the subject of targeted surveillance and search and 
seizure operations? 
 
But now, there are additional key questions:  
 
1) Do the processes of automatically intercepting and collecting communications through mass 
surveillance and mandatory data retention which enable subsequent analysis via 
technologically advanced tools (e.g. programmes that give intelligence agencies access to third 
party intermediary data stores) constitute a breach of recognition of a right to withhold the 
identity of sources?  
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2) Can the effects of such potential interference be minimised or limited through introducing or 
updating legal source protection frameworks that engage with these challenges?  
 
And, as Banisar (2007) noted, even a decade ago the trend towards national security overreach and 
mass surveillance had begun to surface: 
The protections are being bypassed in many countries by the use of searches of 
newsrooms and through increasing use of surveillance. There has also been an 
increase in the use of criminal sanctions against journalists, especially under 
national security grounds for receiving information from sources. (Banisar 2007 
p71) 
More recently, European organisations and law-making bodies have made significant attempts at a 
regional level to identify the risks posed to source protection in the changing digital environment, and to 
mitigate these risks. For example, a 2010 report from the Council of Europe stated that: “The 
confidentiality of journalists’ sources must not be compromised by the increasing technological 
possibilities for public authorities to control the use by journalists of mobile telecommunication and 
Internet media.” (COE 2010) 
 
In a report on online freedom of expression, assembly, association and the media for a Council of 
Europe Conference of Ministers on Freedom of Expression and Democracy in the Digital Age, Brown 
2013) drew attention to the increasing risks posed by metadata retention and handover:  “If this 
government surveillance of a substantial part of all internet communications (and collection of 
‘metadata’ about them) continues, it will be much more difficult for journalists to protect their sources, 
particularly those revealing controversial or potentially illegal government activities.”  
 
Recent academic research (2017) by Hintz and Brown has assessed the impacts of these policy debates 
in the UK. There, they conclude that while there has been limited review of problematic policies 
highlighted by the Snowden revelations, reform is impeded by a growing range of surveillance 
capabilities (Hintz & Brown 2017 pp782-801). As I concluded in Protecting Journalism Sources in the 
Digital Age, source protection laws are increasingly at risk of erosion, restriction and compromise 
around the world, a development that represents a direct challenge to the complementary universal 
rights to freedom of expression and privacy covered by Articles 12 and 19 of the UN Declaration on 
Human Rights (UN GA 1948), and Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(UN GA 1966).  
 
Writing about positive developments in international jurisprudence supporting the protection of source 
confidentiality, Carter (2017) cited the just published Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age as 





 …world events and the advances of technology pose significant challenges just as 
the privilege is becoming established firmly in international human rights law. A 
major UNESCO report in 2017 warned that anti-terrorism and national security 
legislation, government surveillance, and data retention and disclosure 
requirements all could undermine journalistic privilege. (Carter 2017) 
 
Carter (2017) has called for future research pertaining to freedom of expression to focus on 
international law and contemporary challenges involving technology, surveillance, and shifting 
understandings of democratic citizenship. This is precisely what Protecting Sources in the Digital Age did 
in the context of examining the status of international legal frameworks supporting source protection, 
as regards the role and practice of investigative journalism dependent upon confidential 
communications with sources and whistleblowers. The Digital Age implications are therefore the main 
focus of this section of the literature review. 
 
Under the rubric of privacy erosion and national security overreach impacts identified globally through 
the research process, Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age highlighted four key inter-related 
themes for understanding the evolving international regulatory environment and the regional analyses 
contained within the book. These were (Posetti 2017a p.18):  
 
• The widespread use of mass and targeted surveillance of journalists and their sources 
undercuts legal source protection frameworks by intercepting journalistic communications  
• The risk of source protection laws being trumped by national security and anti-terrorism 
legislation that increasingly broadens definitions of ‘classified information’ and limits 
exceptions for journalistic acts 
• Expanding requirements for third party intermediaries to mandatorily retain citizens’ data 
for increasingly lengthy periods of time further exposes journalistic communications with 
confidential sources  
• Debates about digital media actors’ entitlement to access source protection laws where 
they exist, are intensifying internationally37 
 
These themes informed the international and regional catalogues of developments affecting legal source 
protection frameworks – including legislative changes, judicial precedents, incidents and revelations – 
along with the case studies documented in the book (Posetti 2017a pp103-133). They are re-examined 
below, for the purpose of this exegesis, as subjects for analysis anchored in (and interwoven with) the 
academic literature. 
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3.3 The role of mass surveillance and targeted surveillance in eroding 
privacy and undercutting legal protections 
 
Podkowik (2014) argues that technological developments and a change in operational policing and 
intelligence service methods are redefining the legal classification of privacy and journalistic privilege 
globally. Additionally, law enforcement and national security agencies have shifted from a process of 
detecting crimes already committed, to one of threat prevention in the post-September 11 
environment, aided by rapid technological advancement. The simple act of using certain modes of 
communication – like mobile technology, email and social networks - may result in a person being 
subject to surveillance in the Digital Age. That is to say, commission of a crime, or suspicion of 
committing a crime are no longer essential prerequisites. (Podkowik 2014; Banisar 2008) As a result, 
“journalistic communications are increasingly being caught up in the surveillance nets of law 
enforcement and national security agencies as they trawl for evidence of criminal activity, terrorism and 
national security threats, and conduct leak investigations.” (Posetti 2017a p.12) This is a phenomenon 
that has particular currency in the US, where Gardner (2016) argues that the intelligence community has 
become: “the unacknowledged supreme master of the federal government”. (Gardner 2016 p.320) By 
threatening aggressive investigative journalism and shielding government malpractice, he argues that 
US intelligence agencies have ultimately done more to undermine US democracy than to make citizens 
safe.  
 
The now dominant social platforms are also complicit in these developments. “You have zero privacy 
anyway…Get over it” (Sprenger 1999) Sun Microsystems CEO Scott McNeally famously said in a 1999 
interview. A decade later, Google’s Eric Schmidt added: “If you have something that you don't want 
anyone to know, maybe you shouldn't be doing it in the first place.” (Esguerra 2009) However, privacy is 
“commonly recognised as a core right that underpins human dignity and such other values as freedom 
of association and freedom of speech”. (Banisar 2011) The evidence of mass privacy erosion in the 
‘Surveillance State,’ revealed when Edward Snowden blew the whistle on the NSA in collaboration with 
The Guardian and The Washington Post, triggered United Nations’ responses (see discussion below) that 
ultimately led to the commissioning of Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age. "They know 
where you got on the bus, where you went to work, where you slept, and what other cell phones slept 
with you," (Snowden 2016) Snowden explained while illustrating the global impacts of mass surveillance. 
(The Guardian 2014) 
3.3.1 What is surveillance?  
Lyon (2009) defined surveillance as “the focused, systematic and routine attention to personal details 
for purposes of influence, management, protection or direction”. (Lyon 2009 p.24) A range of scholars 





40) have warned that surveillance is a broader problem than the impingement of individual privacy, one 
which was too slow to surface in journalistic treatment as well as scholarly research. As Paliwala (2013) 
has written of the manipulation of the internet for surveillance purposes: “…cyber-utopians did not 
predict how useful it would prove for propaganda purposes, how masterfully dictators would learn to 
use it for surveillance”. (Paliwala 2013 p.104) Andrejevic (2014) has argued that mass surveillance 
represents a fundamental alteration to the power dynamics of society: 
…Surveillance should be understood as referring to forms of monitoring deeply 
embedded in structural conditions of asymmetrical power relations that underwrite 
domination and exploitation. (Andrejevic 2014 p2625) 
Mass surveillance can be defined as the broad, arbitrary monitoring of an entire or substantial fraction 
of a population38.  
  
A major report by the Council of Europe (2016) Mass Surveillance: Who is Watching the Watchers? 
referenced Snowden’s disclosures as “compelling evidence of the existence of far-reaching, 
technologically advanced surveillance systems” (COE 2016). The report described the evolution of a 
massive ‘surveillance-industrial complex’: 
…which risks escaping democratic control and accountability and threatens the free 
and open character of our societies. The surveillance practices disclosed [by 
Snowden] endanger fundamental human rights, including the rights to privacy, 
freedom of information and expression, and the rights to a fair trial and freedom of 
religion. (COE 2016 p1) 
 
Brooke (2016), has observed that “In the societies of control, all are reduced to data”  (Brooke 2016 
p.65) while Quill (2014) contends that modern States have an insatiable appetite for data about their 
citizens – frequently motivated by a desire to control populations, pre-empt threats, and counter 
challenges to power and authority. The ‘internet of things’ (Weber & Weber 2010) – which involves the 
augmentation of household devices public utilities and healthcare systems etc with smart technologies – 
has extended the digital surveillance network previously served by CCTV cameras and satellite-based 
global positioning systems (GPS). Additionally, the ubiquitous practice of social media sharing means 
that “Facebook has a richer, more intimate hoard of information about its citizens than any nation has 
ever had.” (Grossman 2010) Combined with Snowden’s revelations of mass surveillance, and the 
‘internet of things’, the self-exposure that happens as a result of en-masse social media use (Lyon 2017 
pp824-842), has contributed to what Heikkila and Kunelius (2017 pp 262-76) have described as the 
‘structural transformation of privacy’. Which explains Steinberg’s contention that:  
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…few people are less happy these days than privacy campaigners. The fact that 
everyone carries sensor laden mobile phones makes national security agencies 
more powerful than they were before. Even where privacy protecting technologies 
exist, they cannot be said to be equal and opposite in effect to the ubiquitous 
computing we now live amongst. Mobile computing is a permanently power 
shifting technology that permanently empowers the security services. (Steinberg 
2015) 
 
The UN Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, Ben Emmerson, wrote in a 2014 report that States can obtain 
access to the email and phone content of an effectively unlimited number of users and access a 
continuous overview of particular websites’ activity: 
 
All of this is possible without any prior suspicion related to a specific individual or organisation. 
The communications of literally every Internet user are potentially open for inspection by 
intelligence and law enforcement agencies in the States concerned. (UN GA 2014)  
 
Emmerson’s report also expressed concern about the extent of targeted surveillance: “Targeted 
surveillance…enables intelligence and law enforcement agencies to monitor the online activity of 
particular individuals, to penetrate databases and cloud facilities, and to capture the information stored 
on them.” (UN GA 2014) 
 
The University of Toronto’s Monk School of Global Affairs’ Citizen Lab has discovered command and 
control servers for FinFisher software (also known as FinSpy) backdoors, in a total of 25 countries, 
including 14 countries in Asia, nine in Europe and North America, one in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, and one in Africa. (Marquis-Boire et al 2013) This software is exclusively sold to governments 
and law enforcement agencies. (Blue 2014) As Rogers and Eden (2017) have observed, the Snowden 
documents: 
  
…revealed that intelligence agencies conduct large-scale digital surveillance by exploiting 
vulnerabilities in the hardware and software of communication infrastructures. These 
vulnerabilities have been characterized as ‘weaknesses’, ‘flaws’, ‘bugs’, and ‘backdoors’". 
(Rogers & Eden 2017 p.802)  
3.3.2 Mass surveillance: the implications for journalists  





communications with confidential sources39. More recent work of mine for UNESCO also points to new 
risks involving the digital targeting of journalists and their sources by malicious actors (including States 
and corporations) in the context of online disinformation campaigns. (Posetti 2017d; 2018b) 
Additionally, the lack of transparency (and contestability) connected to surveillance practices that target 
journalists or catch them in the net also heightens the risk.40 According to Belgian Media Law expert, 
Professor Dirk Voorhoof: “When it comes to monitoring online communications, the practices that are 
breaching the rights (associated with) protection of journalists’ sources almost become invisible, and 
these practices are often to be situated in the nearly invisible actions of security and intelligence 
services.” (Posetti 2017a p.23) He described this lack of transparency, and associated lack of 
enforcement of source protection laws in the digital environment, as a problem for democracy. 
 
Privacy International’s Tomaso Falchetta described the particular risks mass surveillance poses to 
journalism for the UNESCO study: “Mass digital surveillance is inherently untargeted, thereby collecting 
all types of information, often greater than those obtained by other legal means. The surveillance is 
likely to result in the interception of information about other sources, research on pending stories, and 
the personal life of the journalist.” (Posetti 2017a p22) The knock-on effects for sources and journalists 
of such exposure are detailed in a chapter on the digital targeting of journalists and their sources in 
UNESCO’s handbook41 on Journalism, ‘Fake News’ and Disinformation. (Posetti 2018b) 
 
The practice of ‘outsourcing’ the interception of citizens’ communications to allied Five Eyes (Teague et 
al 2017) countries’ national security agencies (e.g. US, UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand), in order 
to avoid domestic privacy and freedom of expression laws, may heighten the risks for journalistic source 
protection: 
The Five Eyes alliance – comprised of the United States National Security Agency 
(NSA), the United Kingdom’s Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), 
Canada’s Communications Security Establishment Canada (CSEC), the Australian 
Signals Directorate (ASD), and New Zealand’s Government Communications 
Security Bureau (GCSB) – is the continuation of an intelligence partnership formed 
in the aftermath of the Second World War. (Nyst & Crowe 2014) 
 
Couldry (2017 pp182-88) has described the existence of ‘surveillance democracy’ - continuous, 
automated surveillance – as being in conflict with values like autonomy that underpin democracy. As 
Eide (2016) states: “…surveillance of everyone…will clearly increase the fear of communicating and thus 
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limit citizens’ free exchange of views, a vital part of a democracy.” (Eide 2016 p.4) Heikkila (2016 p.101) 
has identified the need for citizens in democracies to access ‘pockets of secrecy’ to support 
experimentation with new political ideas and design public interventions – activities threatened by mass 
surveillance. This is especially true for journalists, their confidential sources, and whistleblowers. 
 
According to former UN Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of 
Expression and Opinion, Frank La Rue, by 2013 States could achieve almost complete control of 
telecommunications and online communications “…by placing taps on the fibre-optic cables, through 
which the majority of digital communication information flows, and applying word, voice and speech 
recognition….” (UN General Assembly 201342) La Rue’s successor, David Kaye43, delivered his first report 
to the UN Human Rights Council in May 2015, highlighting the importance of anonymity and encryption 
as defences against surveillance: “Encryption and anonymity enable individuals to exercise their rights to 
freedom of opinion and expression in the digital age and, as such, deserve strong protection.” (UN 
General Assembly 2015a) Kaye’s report references the role of encryption in defending confidential 
communications between journalists and their sources. Professor Kaye’s next formal report to the UN – 
delivered to the UN General Assembly in September 2015 - focused specifically on the need to protect 
journalists’ sources and whistleblowers in the digital era. (Kaye 2015b) His official report cites Protecting 
Journalism Sources in the Digital Age (which was still forthcoming at the time) in several places.  
 
Here: 
Everyone depends upon well-sourced stories in order to develop informed opinions 
about matters of public interest. Professional reporting organizations emphasize 
that named sources are preferable to anonymous ones. Nonetheless, reporters 
often rely upon, and thus promise confidentiality to, sources who risk retaliation or 
other harm if exposed [Posetti 2015]. Without protection, many voices would 
remain silent and the public uninformed (Kaye 2015b p.7) 
 
As well as here: 
…any person or entity involved in collecting or gathering information with the 
intent to publish or otherwise disseminate it publicly should be permitted to claim 
the right to protect a source’s confidentiality. Regular, professional engagement 
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may indicate protection, but its absence should not be a presumptive bar to those 
who collect information for public dissemination [Posetti 2015]. (Kaye 2015b p.9) 
And here: 
Protection must also counter a variety of contemporary threats. A leading one is 
surveillance. The ubiquitous use of digital electronics, alongside government 
capacity to access the data and footprints that all such devices leave behind, has 
presented serious challenges to confidentiality and anonymity of sources and 
whistle-blowers [Posetti 2015]. (Kaye 2015b p.11) 
 
As discussed throughout Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age, legal and normative defences 
designed to secure confidential sources are undercut if information leading back to sources is caught in 
the net - through both mass surveillance and unchecked targeted surveillance deployed by States and 
other actors. Different kinds of physical surveillance have historically impacted on source protection, but 
digital data has enabled a higher magnitude of surveillance, and the advent of cheap storage and 
processing power makes bulk surveillance feasible and far-reaching. Digital surveillance undercuts 
source protection because it gets around legal controls designed to protect sources by exposing them 
via indirect means. As the Committee to Protect Journalists’ Dr Courtney Radsch44 told me in an expert 
interview for the UNESCO study (Posetti 2017a): 
…journalists (are) being caught up in essentially spy craft, getting surveilled and 
targeted. And there is so little transparency about this whole Five Eyes system - so 
many technology companies and related internet companies are based in five eyes 
nations. I think that we are really potentially looking at an environment where it 
becomes virtually impossible for journalists to protect their sources, one where 
journalists are no longer even needed in that equation given governments’ broad 
surveillance powers.45 
 
In some countries, surveillance techniques are deployed as a specific means of intercepting information 
used to incriminate reporters (Posetti 2017a p.22; Bell & Taylor 2017). Experts interviewed for the 
UNESCO study indicated that surveillance could be legitimate and pointed to the “necessary and 
proportionate” conditions put forward by civil society groups,46 but expressed concern about cases 
when there was a lack of legality, independent oversight, transparency or consideration for journalistic 
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3.4 The ‘trumping effect’ of national security/anti-terrorism legislation 
 
Over the past decade, in parallel with the normalisation of mass surveillance, increasingly restrictive 
anti-terrorism and national security legislation has been enacted, overriding (and threatening to 
override) existing legal protections, including ‘shield laws’. (Fernandez 2017 pp202-18) This arises from 
moves to broaden the scope of ‘classified’ information and make exceptions to coverage, along with 
attempts to criminalise all disclosure of ‘secret’ information (including in some cases, the publication 
thereof) irrespective of public interest or whistle-blowing considerations. The result of the increasing 
risk to both journalists and their sources is a further constraining, or “chilling”, of public interest 
journalism dependent upon confidential sources. (Posetti 2017a48) 
Banisar (2007) noted that: “A major recent concern…is the adoption of new anti-terrorism laws that 
allow for access to records and oblige assistance. There are also problems in many countries with 
searches of newsrooms and with broadly defined state secrets acts which criminalise journalists who 
publish leaked information.” (Banisar 2007 p.64) This threat has escalated dramatically in the 
intervening years, as a parallel to digital development, and occurs where it is un-checked by measures 
designed to preserve fundamental rights to freedom of expression and privacy, as well as accountability 
and transparency. In practice, this leads to what I have described as a ‘trumping effect’, where national 
security and anti-terrorism legislation effectively take precedence over legal and normative protections 
for confidential journalistic sources (Campbell 2013). Further, the classification of information as being 
protected by national security or anti-terrorism legislation has the effect of increasing the reluctance of 
sources to come forward. 
 
3.4.1 Historical context: the paranoid state 
During World War II, Weber (1946) discussed the response of ‘paranoid’, ‘insecure’ institutions during 
times of conflict, saying that a culture of secrecy prevailed with the ‘official’ version of events frequently 
relying on deception, disinformation and misinformation (Campbell 2013)49. But Weber noted that 
“Bureaucratic administration always tends to be an administration of the 'secret session'; in so far as it 
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can, it hides its knowledge and action from criticism.” (Weber 1946 p.233) Gardner (2016) has traced 
the rise of the ‘national security state’ in the United States from World War II, to Daniel Ellsberg’s 
leaking of the Pentagon Papers to The New York Times, through to the Washington Post’s Watergate 
coverage dependent upon ‘Deep Throat’, and on to Snowden’s revelations. He argues that successive 
administrations persisted in using their national security powers not so much to punish foreign agents 
but rather to pursue protestors, leakers and the journalists they leak to (Gardner 2016).  
 
The specific risk in the post 9/11 environment was signalled by Banisar (2008): “Terrorism is often used 
as a talisman to justify stifling dissenting voices in the way that calling someone a communist or 
capitalist were used during the Cold War.” (Banisar 2008 p.4)  According to Banisar’s report for the 
Council of Europe (COE), following the 2001 terrorist attacks many European countries adopted new 
laws or expanded the use of old laws to monitor communications. Pozen (2010) has said that post-9/11, 
“The use of state secrets appears both more pervasive in practice and more discredited in the public 
mind than at any point in history.” (Pozen 2010 pp257) The unprecedented scope and scale of 
surveillance experienced in the 21st century is partly a product of the internet’s central business model, 
according to Richards (2013). “It used to cost states money and resources to spy on its citizens, now 
thanks to technology we have a variety and scope of surveillance that is unprecedented in human 
history.” (Richards 2013 p.1936) 
 
As Brooke (2016) has observed, ironically while each Islamic-inspired terrorist attack perpetrated on 
Western soil elicits promises from politicians that terrorists will not destroy democratic values and 
freedoms, they at once commence or tighten restrictions on freedom of expression or undercut existing 
protections of the liberties that differentiate democracies from totalitarian states. “The state views the 
disclosure of its own secrets as a matter of the utmost seriousness, as an existential threat and this is 
the reasoning behind the often brutal and disproportionate response which I saw first-hand while 
reporting on Wikileaks and subsequent leaks.” (Richards 2016 p.1936) 
 
In the context of international 21st century terrorism, States increasingly trade off rights like privacy and 
freedom of expression against responsibilities for security and safety. Weber’s paranoid institutions are 
now on a permanent war footing, with ‘the war on terror’ justifying permanent omniscient surveillance 
and interception. As Gardner (2016) wrote: “Since 9/11, intelligence agencies have accrued even more 
power and have employed the act and other laws to pursue the likes of Bradley Manning50 and Edward 
Snowden, to ensnare journalists—Glenn Greenwald, James Risen51, and Michael Hastings, among 
others—who convey classified information not to the enemy but to the public.” (Gardner 2016) 
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3.4.2 National security and the expansion of the surveillance state 
 
Banisar (2008) noted the development of a “worrying trend in the use of both authorised and 
unauthorised electronic surveillance to monitor journalists by governments and private parties to track 
their activities and identify their sources”. (Banisar 2008 p.10) According to Banisar, most of the 
incidents were authorised under the broad powers of national laws or undertaken illegally, in an 
attempt to identify the sources of journalistic information. These laws expand surveillance in a number 
of ways (Banisar 2008 p.10): 
 
• Extending the range of crimes that interception is authorised for; 
• Relaxing legal limitations on approving and conducting surveillance including allowing for 
warrantless interception in some cases; 
• Authorising the use of invasive techniques such as Trojan horse and remote keystroke monitoring 
to be used; 
• Increased demand for identification of users of telecommunications services. 
Gillian Phillips, Director of Editorial Legal Services of The Guardian, specifically referenced the 
implications of governments invoking national security and anti-terrorism measures that interfere with 
protections for journalists and their sources in the post 9/11 environment. Calls for unlimited 
monitoring and use of modern surveillance technologies to access all citizens’ data, under the guise of 
national security necessity, directly challenge journalists’ rights to protect their confidential sources, she 
said, pointing to the escalation of such interventions in the aftermath of terrorist attacks from 9/11 to 
the Charlie Hebdo massacre in Paris. (Nolan 2015) 
 The Charlie Hebdo killings and the ease with which terrorists have managed 
to launch attacks in mainland Europe, give rise to calls for unlimited 
monitoring and use of modern surveillance technologies to snoop and access 
all citizens’ data, which directly challenges journalists’ rights to protect their 
confidential sources, for example.” (Nolan 2015)  
While recognising widespread source protection legislation she said: “legal protections are not worth 
the paper they are written on if technical developments allow states to go behind those protections in 
secret”. (Nolan 2015) 
According to the Director of Canada’s Centre for Law and Democracy, Toby Mendel, the main issue is 
the redefinition of national security in the current climate.  
The problem is not so much new rules…but a changing understanding of national 





terrorist actions, which can theoretically be undertaken by anyone, the issue 
becomes far more generalised, and so the risk to source protection becomes far 
more serious. (Posetti 2017a p.20) 
3.4.3 Implications for journalists and source protection 
 
Privacy International’s Tomaso Falchetta highlighted a major problem with regard to the impact of anti-
terrorism and national security legislation on journalistic source protection in his interview for 
Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age:  
…Most laws regulating interception and surveillance do not specifically recognise 
additional rights for journalists. This is particularly so with regards to counter-
terrorism legislation that provides for expansive powers of state surveillance 
without making provisions for protection of journalists' sources. Traditional 
national security laws and new counter-terrorism laws adopted in numerous 
countries give authorities extensive powers to demand assistance from journalists, 
intercept communications, and gather information. (Posetti 2017a p.20) 
Like other experts interviewed about these themes for the UNESCO study, US journalist and press 
freedom advocate Josh Stearns acknowledged that there are, in limited circumstances, security reasons 
for compelling journalists to reveal their sources. He cautioned, however, that “too often the blanket of 
national security is thrown over things that probably aren’t a good fit, or it is used too expansively.” 
(Posetti 2017a p.20)  
 
This complexity is evident in Australia, where national security and anti-terrorism grounds have been 
invoked to classify information on asylum seeker arrivals and detention, requiring most journalism 
undertaken on boat arrivals and immigration detention centres to be dependent upon confidential 
sources. However, revelation of any such classified information has now been criminalised (Farrell 
2015b), exacerbating the chilling effect. Journalists have been reported to the Australian Federal Police 
(AFP) by Australian government agencies with requests that the police assist with identifying the sources 
of the leaks (Farrell 2015a; Fernandez 2017). 
 
A report by The Guardian (Ball 2015), based on files leaked by Edward Snowden, highlighted the 
potential controversy in this area. It stated that a UK Government Communications Headquarters 
(GCHQ) information security assessment had listed “investigative journalists” alongside terrorists and 
hackers in a threat hierarchy. This approach manifested in the arrest of David Miranda at Heathrow 
airport in 2013 as he attempted to transport documents connected to Edward Snowden’s revelations. 
Miranda, the partner of the man who broke the Snowden story – lawyer and then Guardian journalist 





Walker (2017) contends that Greenwald, The Guardian and Miranda viewed their mission as one of 
“ethical disclosure in the public interest of a vast web of governmental surveillance programmes”. 
(Walker p129)  But MI5 insisted that Miranda was involved in ‘terrorism’ (as defined in the U.K. 
Terrorism Act 2000) because his mission sought to influence the government by promoting a political or 
ideological cause. Walker concludes: 
…complex linkages between journalistic activities and the label of ‘terrorism,’ which 
is becoming a primary threat to investigative journalism in the contemporary 
world. It will require reflection upon the conceptual nature of terrorism and 
journalism in a setting of ethics, public policy, and law. (Walker p129) 
Former Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression at the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights Dr Catalina Botero has stated that some governments use tools to block and threaten and spy on 
journalists: “Not because of security reasons, but because of the need to control what’s going on in the 
public sphere”. (Posetti 2017a p.21) Globally, these issues point to the need for law reform according to 
Media Legal Defence Initiative CEO Peter Noorlander: “Existing national security and search and seizure 
laws should be amended to strengthen source protection.” (Posetti 2017a p.21) 
These issues also impact on anonymity and encryption, which are enablers of the right to privacy, and 
which each has great relevance to the confidentiality of journalistic sources (Kaye 2015a). Linked to 
these are real-name registration systems for electronic communication, which potentially expose 
reporters and their communications with sources to undue scrutiny. There is also a potential chilling 
effect on sources who often prefer to contact reporters via anonymous or pseudonymous accounts and 
encrypted communications tools. The same applies to the legal regime concerning encryption, which is 
also increasingly affected by national security considerations, with Five Eyes countries moving towards 
forcing third parties (e.g. phone companies, ISPs and social media companies) to either provide pre-
installed back-door access within devices or to assist in decrypting content (Human Rights Watch 
2017)52. Heikkila (2016) has observed that “While intelligence agencies are said to look at those pockets 
of secrecy that threaten security, these agencies’ activities can also root out all dissent and political 
creativity.” (Heikkila 2016 p.101) They can also interfere with accountability journalism dependent upon 
communications with confidential sources. 
 
Eide (2016) highlighted another consequence of incursions on journalistic source protection in cases 
where the source is suspected of association with terrorism. Through a comparative analysis of 
instances in Afghanistan, the UK, and Norway, she demonstrated that “both the right to access 
extremist sources and the right to protect such sources are fragile”. (Eide 2016 p.1) Terrorist incidents 
are seen to intensify calls for increased mass surveillance and intrusion into journalists’ investigative 
work which seeks to understand the motivations and triggering experiences of those involved in 
                                                             





terrorist networks or at risk of becoming affiliated – journalism of inarguable public interest value, 
according to Eide, in the context of global efforts to counter violent extremism through social cohesion 
strategies. 
 
There is a clear need to ‘decouple’ secrecy from privacy. The former is corrosive, while the latter is 
defensive. In the words of former World Bank Vice President and Chief Economist Joseph Stiglitz (1999), 
secrecy is:  
…antithetical to democratic values, and it undermines democratic processes. It is 
based on a mistrust between those governing and those governed; and at the same 
time, it exacerbates that mistrust… [In the 20th century] in country after country, it 
is the secret police that has engaged in the most egregious violations of human 
rights (Stiglitz 1999 p.1)  
This is why the abuse of national security and anti-terrorism legislation to suppress critical 
accountability-motivated reportage of government policy and the actions of politicians in the absence of 
necessity and proportionality, and in some cases through the criminalisation of journalism (Greste 
2018), is particularly egregious to freedom of expression rights. 
 
3.5 The role of third-party intermediaries, data retention and metadata 
breaches 
 
The long-term storage, handover, interception, and capture of data by third party intermediaries 
(McKinnon et al 2014) is compounding the impacts of surveillance on source protection and confidential 
source-dependent journalism globally. This is the third theme emerging from the literature, case law, 
and the research underpinning this PhD dissertation (across both the major study and exegesis) in the 
form of surveys and expert interviews.  
 
In the UNESCO publication Fostering Freedom Online: The Role of Internet Intermediaries (MacKinnon et 
al 2014), the authors cite the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) 
definition of Internet intermediaries as entities that ‘bring together or facilitate transactions between 
third parties on the Internet. They give access to, host, transmit and index content, products and 
services originated by third parties on the Internet or provide Internet-based services to third parties.’ 
Most definitions of internet intermediaries explicitly exclude content producers. If ISPs, search engines, 
telcos, and social media platforms, for example, can be compelled to produce electronic records (stored 





then legal protections that shield journalists from disclosing confidential sources may be undercut by 
backdoor access to the data. (Human Rights Watch 2017)53  
 
A 2014 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights Report, The Right to Privacy in the Digital 
Age concluded that there is a pattern of: 
…increasing reliance of Governments on private sector actors to retain data ‘just in 
case’ it is needed for government purposes. Mandatory third-party data retention – 
a recurring feature of surveillance regimes in many States, where Governments 
require telephone companies and internet service providers to store metadata 
about their customers’ communications and location for subsequent law 
enforcement and intelligence agency access – appears neither necessary nor 
proportionate. (UN OHCHR 2014)  
Privacy International legal officer Tomaso Falchetta said: “there is a growing trend of delegation by law 
enforcement of quasi-judicial responsibilities to Internet and telecommunication companies, including 
by requiring them to incorporate vulnerabilities in their networks to ensure that they are ‘wire-tap 
ready’.” (Posetti 2017a p.25) This was a point emphasised by the UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights’ in her report on the right to privacy in the digital age in 2014. (UN OHCHR 2014) 
Increasingly, States are introducing mandatory data retention laws. Such laws require 
telecommunications and Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to preserve communications data for 
inspection and analysis, according to a report of the Special Rapporteur on Promotion and Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism. (UN GA 2014) In practice, this 
means that data on individuals’ telecommunication and internet transactions are collected and stored 
even when there is no suspicion of criminal activity. (EFF 2011) 
 
Some of the data collected under these policies is known as metadata. Metadata is data that defines and 
describes other data, or as the Electronic Frontier Foundation’s Peter Eckersley has put it, “Metadata is 
information about what communications you send and receive, who you talk to, where you are when 
you talk to them, the length of your conversations, what kind of device you were using and potentially 
other information, like the subject line of your emails.” (Wise & Landay 2013) Advocates of long-term 
metadata retention insist that there are no significant privacy or freedom of expression threats.54 
“However, even when journalists encrypt the content, they may neglect the metadata, meaning they 
still leave behind a digital trail when they communicate with their sources. This data can easily identify a 
source, and safeguards against its illegitimate use are frequently limited, or non-existent”. (Posetti 
2017a citing Noorlander p.26) 
                                                             
53 For a detailed analysis of this theme across Africa, Arab States, Europe and North America, and Latin America and 
the Caribbean, see Posetti, J (2018) Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age pp 57-101. 







For these reasons, former Editor-in-Chief of The Guardian Alan Rusbridger has observed that it may no 
longer be possible for journalists to promise sources that they will protect them. (Posetti 2018c) And 
there may be no need for journalists to do jail time after refusing to reveal a source in a court of law 
because a State or corporate actor could simply identify a source through metadata excavation and 
analysis. (Bell & Owen 2017)   
 
Australia’s former Press Council Chair, Professor David Weisbrot has said that mandatory data retention 
legislation that fails to protect journalistic communications risks “crushing” investigative journalism: 
 
I think that whistleblowers who are inside governments or corporations will definitely not come 
forward because their confidentiality and anonymity will not be guaranteed. If they came 
forward, a journalist would have to say: ‘I have to give you some elaborate instructions to avoid 
detection: don’t drive to our meeting, don’t carry your cell phone, don’t put this on your 
computer, handwrite whatever you’re going to give me.’ (Meade 2015) 
 
Senior Lawyer (the with Australia’s Law Institute of Victoria), Leanne O’Donnell highlighted the problem 
in her country with regard to 2015 legislation that allowed law enforcement officials to access 
journalists’ metadata without a warrant. Additionally, there was no exemption for journalistic 
communications in data retention policies. She added that there were also no protocols that could assist 
ISPs, and other companies to determine if official handover requests apply to journalistic 
communications. There had been, therefore, no legal provision or practical protection for journalistic 
data, she stated. (Posetti 2017a p.25) The situation was partially addressed in Australia through the 
passage of amendments requiring the issue of warrants to access journalists’ metadata and the 
appointment of a Public Interest Advocate to assess such warrant applications. (Griffiths 2015) However, 
Australian media lawyer and commentator Richard Ackland has noted that the so-called ‘journalists 
information warrants’ are “warrants in name only” and operate within a system of secrecy (with 
sanctions and penalties applied to journalists who reveal the very existence of the warrants) that lacks 
appropriate appeal capacity. “Hand-picked ‘public interest advocates’ – chosen by the prime minister, 
no less – are on tap to make submissions. The journalist whose information is being sought by the 
warrant is not informed and cannot make submissions to the issuing authority.” (Ackland 2015) 
 
Former Guardian Australia investigative journalist Paul Farrell discovered in early 2015 that he was one 
of several reporters targeted by the Australian Federal Police (AFP) in source-hunting investigations 
connected to journalism about asylum seekers, migration policy and Australia’s system of offshore 
detention of boat arrivals. (Farrell 2015a)55 In February 2016, Farrell extracted documentary proof from 
                                                             






the AFP that they had amassed a 200-page dossier on him in reference to the aforementioned leak 
investigations. (Farrell 2016) Two months later, Farrell was advised by the Australian Privacy 
Commissioner that the AFP had accessed his metadata – largely pertaining to emails - the previous year 
without a warrant. (Meade 2016)56 This was, technically, a legal breach of journalists’ privilege at the 
time it occurred – prior to the legislative amendments requiring a warrant to access a journalist’s 
metadata. It was the first time the Australian public had been made aware of such a case.  
 
Edward Snowden – the NSA whistleblower whose unprecedented revelations ultimately triggered the 
commissioning of the study at the core of this dissertation – was drawn to comment on the AFP’s 
targeting of Paul Farrell: “The Australian Federal Police are defending such operations as perfectly legal, 
but that’s really the problem, isn’t it? Sometimes the scandal is not what law was broken, but what the 
law allows.” (Ackland & Laughland 2016) Director of the Committee to Protect Journalists’ Technology 
Program, Geoffrey King described the breach as outrageous: “This should not be happening. But it is the 
inevitable result of mandatory data retention and mass surveillance, which is neither necessary nor 
proportional to any threat,” King said. “It doesn’t line up with the values that we all adhere to, to good 
counter-terrorism strategy, and it certainly doesn’t line up with a free and open society where 
journalists can do their jobs. (Ackland & Laughland 2016 p.?) Farrell could be considered a model of 
good practice for journalists seeking to produce reportage from their own experiences of surveillance 
and interception by the state in an effort to broaden public awareness of the risks, as suggested in 
Chapter Five.57 
 
The following year, on April 28th – one day after Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age was 
published by UNESCO (UNESCO 2017b) - the AFP held an extraordinary press conference admitting that 
they had accessed an unnamed reporter’s metadata without a warrant - that is, illegally. The AFP 
commissioner, Andrew Colvin, admitted that officers were seeking to identify the source of a leak 
involving the provision of ‘confidential police information to a journalist’ when the breach occurred. “It 
should not have occurred, the AFP takes it very seriously … and we take full responsibility for breaching 
the act,” Colvin told journalists during a televised press conference. Paul Murphy, Chief Executive Officer 
of Australian journalists’ union, the Media Entertainment and Arts Alliance, said the breach 
demonstrated an “over-zealous and cavalier approach” (Knauss 2017) to accessing metadata: 
…there is very little understanding of the press freedom concerns that we have 
been raising with politicians and law enforcement officials for several years now… 
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The use of journalist’s metadata to identify confidential sources is an attempt to go 
after whistleblowers and others who reveal government stuff-ups. (Knauss 2017) 
The limited judicial oversight of access to journalists’ metadata evident in these Australian cases is also 
an issue globally, raising significant accountability issues. Dupere (201558) has noted that in the UK the 
“covert practice of blanket mass digital surveillance of individual communications including journalists’ 
[was] undermining source protection” along with the “unknown extent of covert requests by public 
authorities for disclosure involving communications data and metadata”. (Dupere 2015 p.278) The 
absence of transparency is also a problem, with journalists in many cases barred, under threat of 
penalty or imprisonment, from publicly disclosing that their metadata has been accessed by authorities 
even if they do discover a breach. UK QC Gavin Millar, then Chair of the Centre for Investigative 
Journalism at Goldsmith’s University in London, told me in an interview for Protecting Journalism 
Sources in the Digital Age that countries like the UK have used covert powers to deny journalists 
knowledge of requests for access to their data (including metadata):  
 
…you get the judge involved but still the journalist doesn’t know about it. And the position of the 
NUJ [National Union of Journalists], and the International Federation of Journalists…is that 
that’s not enough. The issue is: do you put the journalist on notice of the possibility? Then you 
can’t just have covert access to journalistic source material. (Posetti 2017a p2559) 
 
The need to include the metadata attached to journalistic communications in any limitations applied to 
the reach of data retention laws is also highlighted by the legal and legislative developments, along with 
a range of associated incidents identified in Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age. The Media 
Legal Defence Initiative director Peter Noorlander said that many legislators do not realise the very real 
threat to privacy and media freedom posed by the collection of metadata. Also in an interview for the 
major artefact, Columbia University’s Susan McGregor called for legislation in the US to declare 
metadata private because of what it reveals about people’s personal lives (and, in the case of 
journalists, their confidential communications with sources). (Posetti 2017a p.26) 
 
As the Council of Europe’s 2016 report Mass Surveillance: Who is Watching the Watchers? Noted, the 
Five Eyes’ interconnected system of surveillance is “aimed at collecting, storing and analysing 
communication data, including content, location and other metadata, on a massive scale.” (COE 2016) 
These patterns also ensnare journalists (Posetti 2018d, Posetti 2018b) with the ‘needle in the haystack’ 
(Eide 2016) argument used to justify scooping up their metadata in the net.  
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There is also the aforementioned habit of ubiquitous ‘social sharing’ that leads journalists to self-
exposure through publicly posting, tagging, time-stamping, checking in, and so on, as Andrejevic has 
discussed. 
 
There is a price to be paid for convenience and customization – and we will likely end up paying 
it not just by sacrificing privacy, but by engaging in the work of being watched: participating in 
the creation of demographic information to be traded by commercial entities for commercial 
gain and subcontracted forms of policing and surveillance. (Andrejevic 2007 p98) 
 
According to Podkowik (2014), surveillance undertaken without a journalist’s consent should be 
considered as an act of interference with the protection granted by Article 10 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. He proposed that interference with journalistic confidentiality by means 
of secret surveillance should be recognised at least as equally onerous (or even more onerous) as 
searches of a home or a workplace. “[It] seems that in the digital era, it is necessary to redefine the 
scope of the protection of journalistic privilege and to include in that scope all the data acquired in the 
process of communication, preparation, processing or gathering of information that would enable the 
identification of an informant,” Podkowik wrote. (Podkovik 2014 p.3) 
 
3.6 Risks to journalism in the context of broadening definitions and 
entitlement to access protections 
 
In this digital and security-driven context, it becomes important to extend legal source 
confidentiality protection to all acts of journalism, not just to issues of identification after the 
publication of content based on confidential communications, but also to related prior digital 
reporting processes and journalistic communications with sources. (Posetti 2017a p.12)  
This is a central theme of Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age. Additionally, the importance 
of debating which journalistic actors qualify for source protection in the digital era – and where there is 
a need to answer questions like ‘Who can claim entitlement to source confidentiality protection laws?’ – 
is recognised. 
The persistent and complex questions “Who is a journalist?” and “What constitutes journalism?” are 
pertinent. Broadening the legal definition of ‘journalist’ to ensure adequate protection for non-
professional reporters (working on and offline) is logical, and in some countries case law is catching up 
gradually on this issue of redefinition. (Posetti 2017a p.2660) However, it also opens up debates about 
classifying journalists, and even about licensing and registering those who do journalism - debates that 
                                                             





are particularly potent where there is a history of State controls over press freedom, including 
censorship and the criminalisation of journalism. These themes are evident across industry and scholarly 
research on the issue of entitlement to access source protection laws. 
 
Various scholars (Russell 2014 p.193), journalism organisations and press freedom advocacy groups (c.f. 
Stearns 2013) have recently recognised this change in the landscape and proposed protecting journalism 
sources from legal repercussions by not limiting the protection to professional journalists. Many 
stakeholders have argued in favour of legal protections being defined in connection with ‘acts of 
journalism’, rather than through the definition of the professional functions of a journalist. These have 
bearings on the protection of both journalists and sources in the digital age. In December 2013, the UN 
General Assembly adopted a resolution which outlined a broad definition of journalistic actors that 
acknowledged that: “…journalism is continuously evolving to include inputs from media institutions, 
private individuals and a range of organisations that seek, receive and impart information and ideas of 
all kinds, online as well as offline, in the exercise of freedom of opinion and expression.” (UNGA 2013) In 
2014, the intergovernmental Council of UNESCO’s International Program for the Development of 
Communication (IPDC)61 welcomed the UNESCO Director-General’s Report on the Safety of Journalists 
and the Danger of Impunity, which uses the term ‘journalists’ to designate the range of “journalists, 
media workers and social media producers who generate a significant amount of public-interest 
journalism”. (UNESCO 2016) 
 
Many legal definitions of ‘journalist’ have been evaluated as overly narrow, as they tend to emphasise 
official contractual ties to legacy media organisations, may demand a substantial publication record, 
and/or require significant income to be derived from the practice of journalism. This leaves confidential 
sources relied upon by bloggers and citizen journalists largely unprotected, because these producers of 
journalism are not recognised as ‘proper journalists’, even when their output is clearly public interest 
journalism. There are many parallels between investigative journalism and the work undertaken by 
human rights organisations – organisations that depend upon confidential sources for information about 
human rights abuses. Such organisations now also often publish directly to audiences and are arguably 
engaged in ‘acts of journalism’. One relevant example involves an Amnesty International case from 2015 
in which Amnesty objected to having been a subject of surveillance (Amnesty International 2015a, 
2015b). Such definitions also exclude the growing group of academic writers and journalism students, 
lawyers, human rights workers and others, who produce journalism online, including investigative 
journalism (Posetti 2017a p103-133). 
 
These themes have resonance globally. As detailed in Protecting Sources in the Digital Age, Egyptian 
Media Studies Professor Rasha Abdullah would like to see source protection made accessible to a broad 
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range of communications actors: “It should apply to anyone who has information to expose, particularly 
in the age of digital media”. (Posetti 2017a p27) Arab Reporters for Investigative Journalism’s (ARIJ) Rana 
Sabbagh, echoed Abdullah’s call, saying: “…credible bloggers who are using reliable documents and are 
exposing corruption and injustice have to have some form of protection” (Posetti 2017a p27).  
 
In 2013, the US Society of Professional Journalists passed a unanimous motion that “strongly rejects any 
attempts to define a journalist in any way other than as someone who commits acts of journalism”. (SPJ 
2013) Russell (2014), in her analysis of attempts to define “journalist” in the context of US shield law 
debates, argued that: “Shield laws should be designed to protect the process through which information 
is gathered and provided to the public, not the status of the individual or institution collecting it.” 
(Russell 2014 p.193) She noted that a number of US jurisdictions already define journalism in such a 
way. In the state of Nebraska, for example, the shield law states “[n]o person engaged in procuring, 
gathering, writing, editing, or disseminating news or other information to the public” shall be required 
to disclose a confidential source or information provided by that source in any federal or state 
proceeding. 
 
In the view of US journalist and press freedom activist Josh Stearns: “we need to look at the acts of 
journalism rather than defining a particular type of person…defining an act is safer and more consistent 
with how media is created and consumed today, and (it) provides a stronger basis for protection.” 
(Sterns 2013) Interviewed for the UNESCO study, he further said:  
 
Even those who are blessed with journalism jobs and would fit all the qualifications that would 
protect such a person under law may not act in such a way as deserves protection. By orienting 
around an act, and protection of an act, we then hopefully establish actions that are for the 
public interest and have all these sets of qualities rather than just protect a person who 
automatically lumps in and excludes people who should otherwise be included. (Posetti 2017a 
p.28) 
 
 As Stearns also observed, “Given how much flux exists in the journalism world, how can we create 
boundaries around an idea while leaving enough flexibility to account for an unknown future?” (Stearns 
2013) 
 
In many contexts, however, without strong press freedom overrides, journalists themselves are liable for 
publication of leaked information, irrespective of source confidentiality issues. In such cases, they too 
need protection in terms of public interest defences being recognised in law and by the courts. In other 
words, confidentiality protection as such does not necessarily shield publication, even where it does 





protections (e.g. whistleblower protection legislation) to complement confidentiality protection, there 
can nevertheless be a chilling of disclosures of public interest information (Posetti 2017a). 
 
Central to these debates is the deployment of a ‘public interest test’ as a measure for assessing the 
entitlement for a journalistic actor to claim access to source protection frameworks. The term ‘in the 
public interest’, as it applies to acts of journalism, is not clearly defined and it is a complex concept. 
Moore (2007) argues that public interest journalism has two elements (Moore 2007 p.33):  
1. “…it is as a watchdog, holding the powerful to account, exposing 
fraud, deceit, corruption, mismanagement and incompetence… This 
watchdog role is (also) important…because those in power know 
they’re being held to account.” 
2. “This is the responsibility to inform, explain and analyse. Public- 
interest journalists find, digest and distil information that helps the 
public form views and make decisions.”   
Tension over the application of a public interest test to source protection legislation is explored in detail 
in the third major thematic study featured in Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age.62 As 
discussed there, application of such a test may, in some cases, have the effect of inadvertently excluding 
certain acts of journalism from source protection provisions. This concept needs further interrogation in 
reference to the development of shield laws, and it points to the need for a case-by-case assessment of 
the specific journalistic acts for which confidentiality is sought. 
 
3.7 The lack of protections and the impacts on journalism and 
journalism practitioners  
 
“We create vast tracts of data - from internet connection records to communications data – and this 
information can tell interested parties everything about a reporter, the story they’re pursuing, and the 
source they’re protecting,” (Townend & Danbury 2017 p.3) current Guardian Editor-in-Chief Kath Viner 
observed in a 2017 report for the UK parliament on 21st century source protection risks. Such risks occur 
in a reporting environment where digital contact with sources is more likely than in-person contact, and 
where law enforcement agents are able to access journalists’ data without the journalists or their 
sources ever knowing.  
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Dozens of international journalists, editors, lawyers and freedom of expression experts were 
interviewed63 for Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age to aid in the identification of source 
protection erosion impacts during the decade from 2007. The study concluded that there were myriad 
impacts on journalistic processes and practices internationally. The UNESCO study also mapped 
adaptations being undertaken by journalism practitioners and newsrooms in an attempt to shield 
sources from increasing risks of exposure. (Posetti 2017a64) But it also acknowledged that threats to 
anonymity and encryption undermine these adaptations. The results, the study found, include more 
reluctant sources, more tedious reporting strategies, and the risk that much public interest journalism 
will be hampered in the future. So, the attention of investigative journalists and their editors is now 
necessarily turning to risk assessment, self-protection and source education – a process which has led to 
considerable reflective practice by journalists internationally, highlighting the scope and extent of the 
issues (Eide & Kunelius 2018 p.75).  
3.7.1 Impacts of mass surveillance and device seizure 
 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, anti-terrorism and national security laws are increasingly used to 
justify the targeting of journalists for surveillance and the capture of journalistic communications in 
mass surveillance nets. One case of the direct undercutting of confidential source protection by mass 
surveillance occurred in July 2015, in the context of a German parliamentary investigation into the 
surveillance of German citizens in 2011. During the course of questioning, a German intelligence chief 
revealed that Der Spiegel journalists had also been under surveillance and that a CIA official stationed in 
Berlin had revealed the identity of one of the journalists’ confidential sources to the German 
government. (Tapper 2015) Further, documents linked to Edward Snowden published by The Guardian 
in 2015 revealed that the UK’s GCHQ (Government Communications Headquarters) had siphoned emails 
from some of the world’s top news organisations – the BBC, The Guardian, Le Monde, Reuters, The New 
York Times and The Washington Post among them – for internal distribution and analysis, having ranked 
news organisations just below terrorist organisations in a threat hierarchy. (Ball 2015) 
Citing Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age, Glowacka et al (2018) noted that the use of 
surveillance technology to compromise the confidentiality of journalists’ sources affects not just the 
right to freedom of expression, but also the observance of other human rights, like the right to privacy. 
The result is the undermining of the ‘public watchdog’ role of the press, they argue. 
A US editor who responded anonymously to the first of three surveys connected to the UNESCO study 
(Posetti 2014e) argued that mass surveillance meant that newsrooms could not protect the anonymity 
of sources anymore, and that sources could also expose themselves through their electronic 
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communications.65 Similar concerns were expressed by Indonesian investigative journalist with TEMPO 
magazine, Wahyu Dhyatmika, and Pakistani investigative journalist Umar Cheema in interviews for the 
book. In the Philippines, investigative journalist Marites Danguilan-Vitug, a co-founder of that country’s 
Center for Investigative Journalism, said that she believed her phone had been bugged, causing her to 
introduce additional security measures. 
 
Founder of the Arabic Media Internet Network Daoud Kuttab said that he now operates on the 
assumption that everything he does is “being watched” and that governments and security services have 
access to his communications, and those of many other media actors in his region. This was a point 
echoed by Mexican journalist, and World Editors Forum Special Adviser on Journalists’ Safety, Javier 
Garza Ramos. He said that journalists now operated under the assumption that they were under 
surveillance. (Posetti 2017a66) 
 
After Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age was submitted for publication in mid 2015, the 
impacts of source protection erosion on journalists and journalism practice became more urgent and 
entrenched, and the academic literature has recently begun to feature case studies on the theme. Eide 
(2016) identified three cases of surveillance and data seizure impacting on confidential source-based 
journalism on extremist organisations being undertaken in Afghanistan, the UK and Norway. In 2007 a 
young Afghan journalist working for a Canadian TV station was arrested and accused of being a Taliban 
accomplice because he was in possession of some photos and videos depicting them. He spent almost a 
year in detention, accused of being an enemy combatant, without access to a lawyer, in the US-led 
Bagram prison. After his release, he had promised to write a book about his experiences, which he 
claimed included being tortured. But he was gunned down in Kandahar within months of being released. 
The second case explored by Eide demonstrates threats to journalists’ access to information due to 
attacks on source protection in the context of national security justifications, (Eide 2016 pp107-116) In 
this instance, a BBC Newsnight reporter had his laptop seized by police in late 2015 under the UK 
Terrorism Act. Ian Katz, Newsnight’s editor, said: “While we would not seek to obstruct any police 
investigation we are concerned that the use of the Terrorism Act to obtain communication between 
journalists and sources will make it very difficult for reporters to cover this issue of critical public 
interest.” (Quinn 2015)  
 
A similar case occurred in Norway in mid-2015 when a documentarian investigating radicalization of 
Norwegians being recruited to ISIS had video material seized by the police. The Norwegian Supreme 
Court ultimately ruled in his favour in November 2015 after he had lost in two lower courts. He 
described how his sources, who were not active terrorists, had become scared as a result of the police 
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intervention and wanted to pull their interviews.  
Freedom to seek information from and about adversaries – be they brutal and 
extremist or not so brutal – seems to be a right in decline. These cases concern 
journalists’ fundamental right to access and protect their sources. If actions such as 
these are endorsed by an increasing number of powerful institutions and 
individuals, it will seriously hamper independent reporting, thus jeopardizing 
freedom of expression. (Eide 2016 p.111) 
Outgoing Editor-in-Chief of The Guardian Alan Rusbridger was despondent about the threat to 
investigative journalism posed by the erosion of source protection when I interviewed him for the 
UNESCO study in 2015. “Well, I’m very gloomy,” he said. “The limitations on existing legal frameworks 
supporting source protection in the UK are coming thick and fast. It’s like fighting a ‘Zombie War’,” he 
said, waving his hands in exasperation. (Posetti 2015a) Rusbridger suggested that investigative 
journalism might not be possible in the post-Snowden era. That concern was echoed by the Committee 
to Protect Journalists’ Dr Courtney Radsch: “I think that we are really potentially looking at an 
environment where it becomes virtually impossible for journalists to protect their sources—where 
journalists are no longer even needed in that equation, given governments’ broad surveillance powers.” 
(Posetti 2017a p.2567) Bolivian investigative journalist Ricardo Aguilar expressed serious concern about 
the reliability of legal source protection. He was charged with espionage and faced up to 30 years jail 
after refusing to reveal his source on a 2014 La Razon story. “…[M]ass surveillance, data retention and 
the appeal of [the] National Security category leaves the protection of secret sources in latent 
vulnerability,” he said. (Posetti 2017a68) 
 
Director of the US-based International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ), Gerard Ryle, was 
similarly direct: “I would say as a general rule these days, much more than in the past, it’s very difficult 
to protect sources because of the fact that electronic communications can be back-tracked and people 
can be found much easier than they may have been in the past,” he said. (Posetti 2017 p105) Ryle, who 
oversaw the global collaborative investigative journalism projects Panama Papers (ICIJ 2016), Offshore 
Leaks (ICIJ 2013), Luxembourg Leaks (ICIJ 2014) and other major investigations, once faced the threat of 
jail in Australia while reporting on police corruption for The Age, after refusing to give up a source to an 
ombudsman’s inquiry69. 
 
Thematic Study 2 in Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age - ‘How a state with one of the 
world’s oldest and constitutional legal source protection frameworks is responding and adapting to 
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digital threats’ (Posetti 2017a pp112-19) - assesses the state of source confidentiality in Sweden. There, 
source protection legislation is so strong that journalists can be jailed for revealing their confidential 
sources, and top investigative journalists take extraordinary measures to protect them from the impacts 
of mass surveillance, and other risks. One of the threats identified by the director of the investigative 
unit at Sweden’s national public radio (Sveriges Radio), Fredrik Laurin, is that of police seizing digital 
content due to gaps in source protection legislation in his country: “…It’s not an exception—this is 
definitely the modus operandi. The police, they don’t go into newsrooms very often here, but when they 
do, they have no problem in grabbing digitally stored information.” (Posetti 2017a70) 
 
3.7.2 The chilling effect 
 
Co-founder of Pakistan’s Centre for Investigative Reporting Umar Cheema was convinced he was under 
surveillance, and that his sources were aware of this, when he was interviewed for Protecting Journalism 
Sources in the Digital Age: “I am a prominent journalist, a distinction with its own advantages and 
disadvantages. Some [sources] tend to approach me out of respect and belief that I am the right person 
to be taken into confidence. Others hesitate, fearing any contact with me will put them on [the] radar 
screen since I am under surveillance, from phone to emails, and [my] social media accounts are 
monitored.” (Posetti 2018c) Cheema was kidnapped and tortured in 2010 and in the course of his 
captivity, according to his account, his sources were compromised. “The captors, who I strongly suspect 
belonged to our premier intelligence agency, took away my mobile phone, apparently for investigating 
in detail about my professional contacts through my phone contacts,” he said. (Posetti 2018c) “Some of 
my sources, who had shared information about national security, were coerced into silence. They never 
contacted me afterwards, other than telling me … about the harassment they had to face.” (Posetti 
2018c) Cheema said that threats to his safety sent via phone and email had become routine. (Posetti 
2017a p68) In the UNESCO study, International Editor of Algeria’s El Watan newspaper, Zine Cherfaoui, 
said that sources increasingly required face-to-face meetings: 
Since Snowden and mass surveillance, sources speak with difficulty and people 
don’t have as much confidence. To really discuss with people we prefer to avoid 
electronic means or social networks. The Snowden Affair turned upside down the 
work of journalists. … It’s harder to speak to people. We really have to go out and 
meet them. It’s face-to-face,” (Posetti 2017a p.105) 
 
The cost of digital security technology, training and legal fees connected to source protection in the 
post-Snowden era also represents a significant chilling effect on investigative journalism identified in the 
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literature (Bell & Owen 2017). In 2015, The Guardian was spending about a million pounds more a year 
on legal fees than five years earlier, according to former Editor-in-Chief Alan Rusbridger. “It’s definitely 
having a bad effect on the overall ability to report,” he said. “Of course, once you get into secure 
reporting there is a significant cost … in trying to create a safe environment where we feel we can offer 
our sources the kind of protection that they deserve.” Rusbridger pointed to the devastating impact of 
the changed landscape on regional newspapers, in particular. “[They] can’t afford to get tied up in 
defending their staff, or equipment, or the IT.” (Posetti 2017a p106) 
 
The findings of two PEN America surveys provide further empirical evidence to support the findings of 
the major thematic study on journalism practice within Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age. 
According to a 2013 PEN report, 85 percent of writers were worried about contemporary levels of 
government surveillance, and the assumption that they were under surveillance caused some writers to 
self-censor their work. More than a quarter of them said they were now reluctant to write or speak 
about certain subjects, and 27 percent had limited their communications with sources or friends abroad 
(Pen America 2013). A follow-up survey in 2015 with an international sample of respondents suggested: 
“Concern about government surveillance in democratic countries is nearly as high as in non-democratic 
states with long legacies of pervasive state surveillance.” (PEN America 2015) 
 
Further, two other research surveys from the past decade contextualise the findings of the UNESCO 
study in the US. In February 2015, the Pew Research Center released the results of a survey on 
“Perceptions of vulnerability and changes in behaviour” among members of the US-based organisation 
Investigative Reporters and Editors (IRE). Holcomb, Mitchell and Page (2015) found that 64% of 
investigative journalists surveyed believed that the US Government collected data about their 
communications. The figure rose to 71% among national political reporters and those who report 
foreign affairs and national security issues. Ninety percent of US investigative journalists who responded 
to the Pew survey believed that their ISP would routinely share their data with the NSA, while more than 
70% reported that they had little confidence in the ability of ISPs to protect their data. As a result, 49% 
of respondents said that over the previous year (2014-2015) they had changed the way they stored and 
shared sensitive documents. Twenty-nine percent said they had changed the way that they 
communicated with journalists and other editors. Almost 45% of respondents to the Pew survey ranked 
surveillance as the number one or number two challenge facing journalists. (Holcomb, Mitchell & Page 
2015) Nearly half of the national security, political and foreign affairs reporters among them also 
reported that concerns about surveillance had caused them to change the ways in which they 
communicated with sources (with reverting to face-to-face meetings being the main means of 
protecting sources). Meanwhile, 18 percent of this group reported that it was becoming harder to get 
sources to speak ‘off record’. 
 





journalists from major US news organisations, revealing the steps being taken to keep communications, 
sources and other confidential information secure in light of surveillance revelations. That study 
concluded that in the US, the combination of increased surveillance and government prosecution of 
leaks was having a big effect on the news gathering practices of national security reporters and their 
news organisations. It found that: “Journalists are struggling harder than ever before to protect their 
sources, and sources are more reluctant to speak. This environment makes reporting both slower and 
less fruitful.” (HRW 2014a) 
3.7.3 But is this not a ‘golden age’ for investigative journalism? 
“Technology is allowing information to be leaked on a vast scale. … For me as a journalist we’re in boom 
times, because you’re able to get information that’s incredibly detailed and you’re able to get stories 
that you couldn’t possibly [get before],” ICIJ’s Gerard Ryle told me in an interview for Protecting 
Journalism Sources in the Digital Age, declaring the digital era a “golden age for journalism,” despite the 
risks. (Posetti 2015f; 2017a p.104) Former Editor-in-Chief of Argentina’s La Nacion, Carlos Guyot, also 
acknowledged the significant benefits of Digital Era investigative reporting involving confidential 
sources, including access to leaked documents that would have been impossible to get even five or ten 
years ago, and the ease with which such data dumps can be transported on portable devices. “New 
technologies bring new challenges with them, but also new opportunities, like encrypted conversations 
via new software, although this must be combined with old fashioned practices. …There is nothing like a 
face-to-face meeting with a source,” he said. (Posetti 2017a p.104) 
 
However, one of the risks of this data boon is the rush to legislate against the impacts of leaks, according 
to Gerard Ryle. “The leaks are getting bigger, and therefore the law is scrambling to catch up…and that’s 
the danger for authorities, and for people who want secrecy, and I think that there is a push generally 
across the world to try and cope with this,” Ryle said. “[It’s] a problem for governments, agencies, any 
organisation that wants to keep secrets. It’s becoming more and more difficult to keep those secrets.” 
(Posetti 2018c) This helps explain the Obama administration’s unparalleled pursuit of leakers in the US, 
as noted by Kirtley (2014), in the post 9/11 US environment through attempts to force journalists to 
reveal the identities of their confidential sources “on the grounds that national security demands it.”71 
 
3.7.4 Going back to analogue basics on the assumption “You’re being 
watched” 
 
“We create vast tracts of data - from internet connection records to communications data – and this 
information can tell interested parties everything about a reporter, the story they’re pursuing, and the 
                                                             





source they’re protecting,” (Townend & Danbury 2017) current Guardian Editor-in-Chief Kath Viner 
observed in a 2017 report for the UK parliament on 21st century source protection risks. Such risks occur 
in a reporting environment where digital contact with sources is more likely than in-person contact, and 
where law enforcement agents are able to access journalists’ data without the journalists or their 
sources ever knowing.  
 
So, how do reporters protect their confidential communications with sources in the age of surveillance? 
Many of the journalists and editors interviewed for Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age 
discussed their return to pre-digital methods of sensitive source communication as a defensive measure. 
“I’m more careful with any digital platform that I’m involved in—whether it’s email, phone or any other 
digital format. I assume that [I am] probably being watched, listened to, or read. That’s my starting point 
and I take it from there,” Daoud Kuttab said. (Posetti 2017a p24) ICIJ’s Gerard Ryle said he adopted the 
same mode. “Don’t put things in writing, don’t do certain things if you don’t want them to come out 
afterwards. You have to assume that everything you do is being recorded or traced,” he said. (Posetti 
2017a)72  
 
UK QC Gavin Millar, who has advised The Guardian, reported telling his clients to revert to traditional 
methods of investigative journalism. “They actually have a contract phone and throw it into the Thames 
at the end of each week, they will meet sources in pubs, write notes, hide the notes...in distant places 
where people can’t get them if their houses are searched by police, and some of them are very, very 
good at it,” Millar said. (Posetti 2017a73) Bolivia’s Ricardo Aguilar said he avoided using digital 
communication in order to protect his sources. “Extreme distrust is the only defence against the 
possibility of a raking of secret sources in email accounts or social networks,” he said. (Posetti 2017a) 
And La Nacion’s Carlos Guyot said his investigative journalists were spending a lot more time on the 
road – travelling significant distances to enable face-to-face meetings with sources. “…Our main 
investigative reporter drove for three hours to a different city for a 15 minutes conversation with a 
source and drove back to our newsroom. If we are willing to endure the challenges, we can still do good 
journalism.” (Posetti 2017a) Meanwhile, Alan Rusbridger referenced ‘brown envelopes’ and ‘dark 
carparks’ as potential modes of secure source communication that might need to be reverted to if 
investigative journalism is able to be sustained in the Digital Age. 
 
Three journalists interviewed for the UNESCO study mentioned the trend of relying on chat apps as a 
more secure form of source interaction than email, but Mexican journalism safety expert Javier Garza 
Ramos warned against such an approach. “If we’re sloppy and we say everything we know about our 
sources on our WhatsApp, then of course the government is going to find out who our sources are, or 
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whoever is spying on us,” he said. (Posetti 2017a p109) Garza Ramos’ subsequent research (2016) for 
the Center for International Media Assistance identified additional technological solutions being 
pursued by journalists seeking to make their digital communications with sources and potential sources 
more secure.  
 
Former investigative journalist turned academic Paul Lashmar has published research that echoes my 
UNESCO study findings regarding the impact of source protection erosion on journalism practice. His 
qualitative interviews with a small sample of national security reporters (Lashmar 2017) revealed 
universal concern about the intelligence agencies’ greatly enhanced capability to track journalists and to 
“identify and neutralise” their sources: “…there is clear evidence of a paradigmatic shift in journalist–
source relations as those interviewed regard Five Eyes mass surveillance as a most serious threat to the 
fourth estate model of journalism as practised in Western democratic countries.” (Lashmar p665) 
 
One of the consequences of realising one is under constant surveillance as a journalist or researcher is a 
reluctance to report on the Five Eyes ‘project’ according to Ruby et al (2017 p.353), who have analysed 
research and reportage on mass surveillance to identify deterrants.  This chilling effect was also 
demonstrated in Waters (2017) qualitative study focused on seven national security reporters’ digital 
security stategies for evading government surveillance. The study followed a ‘panopticism framework’ 
which states that those under real or perceived observation will alter their behavior to be more 
subservient to authority. Waters found that: “the way they work has changed under a real or perceived 
threat of mass government surveillance, making their work more difficult and potentially damaging their 
communications with sources.” (Waters 2017 p.1) Several prospective interviewees refused to 
participate in Waters’ research because of the risks. This was also a reluctance I experienced while 
undertaking interviews for both Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age and this exegesis. 
 
3.7.4 Taking responsibility for digital security 
 
Recognising the role of encryption in the defence of journalism based on confidential sources, in 2015, 
the UN Special Rapporteur for the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Opinion and Freedom of 
Expression, Prof David Kaye, declared encryption an important tool to secure human rights as a range of 
States seek to limit the availability of encryption and ensure ‘backdoor access’ to encrypted data. (Kaye 
2015a) As digital research, investigation and production methods become further entrenched and 
normalised in contemporary journalism practice, “computer security and privacy risks threaten free and 
independent journalism around the globe”. (McGregor et al 2016)  
 
Through qualitative research focused on newsrooms, McGregor et al (2016) have identified “distinct—





within journalistic institutions, as well as unique issues in journalism compared to other types of 
organizations”. (McGregor et al 2016 p.15) Bell and Owen’s curation of research into journalism practice 
in the post Snowden era (2017) also revealed that many news organizations are woefully ill-prepared to 
protect their work and the identities of confidential sources from official snooping.  
 
It is clear that it is no longer just investigative journalists and national security correspondents who need 
to deal with Digital Age threats to source protection. According to Rusbridger, the net is widening. For 
example: “It’s become increasingly hard to report on the national health service because you know they 
all have confidentiality agreements, so if you’re a health reporter you probably want to make sure that 
you begin to understand this stuff.” (Posetti 2018c) This remains a particularly acute problem in regional 
newsrooms in the UK according to research from Bradshaw (2017) despite widespread reporting of 
police intercepting journalistic communications to identify sources: 
Regional newspaper journalists show few signs of adapting source protection and 
information security practices to reflect new legal and technological threats, and 
there is widespread ignorance of what their employers are doing to protect 
networked systems of production. (Bradshaw 2017 p334) 
Bradshaw contends that a ‘reactive’ approach to the crisis is no longer sufficient and that “publishers 
need to update their policies and practice to address ongoing change in the environment for journalists 
and sources.” (Bradshaw 2017 p334) The other factor to consider is that seemingly innocuous local 
stories built on anonymous sources can turn into large-scale investigative journalism projects. From little 
stories big stories grow. But careless initial contact with a source makes such a person increasingly 
vulnerable as the story develops. Swedish public radio’s Fredrik Laurin said journalists’ skills are 
underdeveloped when it comes to protecting sources in the ‘digital hemisphere’. “Very few journalists 
use encryption and know how to use it—it’s not in their toolbox and that is a major problem,” he said. 
(Posetti 2017 p.109)  
And when you do come into contact with sources…you often get confronted with 
very important questions—how do you, in reality, protect this source? Are you 
going to store the information on the company server? How are we going to 
communicate? What level of encryption do you use? Serious questions. (Posetti 
2017 p.109) 
Laurin’s hardcore dedication to digital security in the interests of protecting his sources could be viewed 
as extreme but it needs to be understood in the context of the Swedish legal source protection 
framework that actually criminalises unauthorised source revelation. “It’s me, Fredrik who goes to 
prison if you are my source and I lose my notebook at the bar and your name comes out because of 





p.12574) Laurin said he also banned his staff from using certain devices due to concerns about security 
vulnerabilities: 
 
I need to survey—which I do, very thoroughly—who my suppliers are. I know exactly where my 
server is standing, I know exactly what the contract says, the hard discs in that server are 
named in my name, with my phone number. There’s a tag on the material that says this 
material is protected according to the Swedish constitution. (Posetti 2017a p.125) 
 
According to Laurin, his team’s digital security expertise and caution gives them an edge in journalism 
based on confidential sources. Such an edge was demanded by both Edward Snowden and the Panama 
Papers’ source known as ‘John Doe’. (McGregor et al 2017) 
 
However, digital security measures designed to protect sources can be unwieldy and time-consuming, 
and these factors remain a deterrent to many investigative journalists. ICIJ’s Gerard Ryle told me that he 
considers some colleagues unnecessarily paranoid: “When we were doing the Offshore Leaks project we 
started off by trying to encrypt a whole email communication with everyone we were working with, it 
became a complete nightmare, because, first of all not all of us are very technological, including myself, 
and it became a hindrance to communication,” Ryle said in a 2015 interview for Protecting Journalism 
Sources in the Digital Age. (Posetti 2017a)75 However, a year later heavy encryption was the default 
requirement of ICIJ during the Panama Papers investigation which saw 400 journalists from 80 countries 
working collaboratively for 12 months to produce high-impact journalism that ultimately brought down 
a government. To participate in the project, all members were required by ICIJ to use two-factor 
authentication and encryption. Prior to the Panama Papers investigation, a survey of 118 ICIJ members 
found that 47% of journalists were mostly unaware of PGP encryption or two-factor authentication, and 
45% had never used. (McGregor et al 2017) However, after the Panama Papers collaboration, which 
used a secure interactive platform known as the Global I-Hub, over 60% of surveyed journalists reported 
to researchers that the encryption requirements for the collaboration, which demanded all documents 
and messages (no matter how sensitive) be encrypted, were “easy” to use. (McGregor et al 2017 p.505) 
 
The gender dimensions of source protection were also identified in the major artefact, which noted “The 
particularly acute impact on women journalists and sources when the privilege is undermined, due to 
gender factors involved in face-to-face meetings when online communication is compromised by 
surveillance as well as the gender-specific factors in online harassment.” (Posetti 2017a p134; See also 
Carter 2017; Micek & Nolasco 2018) 
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3.8 Journalists need training in digital security, but so do their sources 
 
One of the emerging trends identified in Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age was that 
journalists were beginning to train their sources in digital security to help them ensure their anonymity. 
La Nacion’s Carlos Guyot said: “If we want journalism to survive and flourish in the 21st century, there is 
no other option than give our reporters, and sources, the tools necessary to do their jobs.” (Posetti 
2017a p110) Former Guardian Editor Alan Rusbridger also acknowledged this challenge. “But because 
often sources are of interest to people with access to surveillance equipment, corporate or government, 
it feels like an unequal battle really.” (Posetti 2017a p11176) Executive Director of Arab Reporters for 
Investigative Journalism (ARIJ) Rana Sabbagh concurred that even the best training cannot keep up with 
global intelligence services: “…because even if you give them the best software and training, the 
intelligence agencies are always a step ahead. They are using the latest technologies to decrypt the 
content, they are using technologies coming from countries that are supposed to protect free speech 
like the US and Switzerland”. (Posetti 2017a77) Broadening awareness within the general community to 
the privacy risks posted by surveillance and data-retention/handover, along with the implications of 
national security overreach in reference to protecting confidential sources and whistleblowers can go 
some way towards strengthening defences. This is one of the reasons I emphasise the need to 
mainstream these discussions – through explanatory journalism and community events - to enable 
better grassroots protections against interference with journalistic communications.78 
 
3.8.1 Collaborating and outsourcing to protect sources  
 
By 2015, International news organisations had begun expanding the use of secure drop boxes and 
collaborating on platforms designed to securely receive digital information from confidential sources. 
AfriLeaks, for example, is a Pan-African project that uses a highly secure mailbox designed to receive 
leaked documents, which connects investigative media houses to whistleblowers. It is operated by the 
African Network of Centers for Investigative Reporting. In Mexico, Mexicoleaks launched in 2015 with a 
similar mission. Sourcesûre and Balkanleaks are Francophone and Bulgarian websites that follow the 
same model, allowing whistleblowers to upload secret documents anonymously. Sourcesûre, which is 
based in Belgium, to take advantage of strong source protection laws there, was jointly established in 
February 2015 by France’s Le Monde, and Belgian publications La Libre Belgique, Le Soir de Bruxelles and 
RTBF (Radio Télévision Belge Francophone). Yves Eudes, Sourcesûre’s cofounder and a journalist at Le 
Monde, said that the cross-border, multi-platform collaboration between leading Francophone news 
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organisations is a “spring of immunity” against coercion for journalists and their sources. “Unity is 
strength. This initiative could not have been launched by Le Monde or RTBF alone. Sourcesûre is 
underpinned by a whole spectrum of collaborators, from liberal to conservative media outlets, united by 
common journalistic values,” he said. (Posetti 2017 p112) 
 
Ultimately, is it sustainable to promise confidentiality to sources in an era when it is so easy to identify a 
source without the involvement of the journalist, especially considering it can be a life or death matter? 
ARIJ’s Rana Sabbagh was clear in her response: “Even in the best and most democratic of countries, one 
can’t promise that anymore. There is no 100 percent guarantee.” (Posetti 2017a79) The need to re-
examine and update journalism ethics in reference to working with confidential sources and 
whistleblowers in the Digital Era (Posetti 2018a) is addressed later in this exegesis. It is also alluded to in 
the literature. Wasserman (2017) noted the “recent wave of prosecutions of disruptive sources in the 
United States suggests that confidentiality pledges—even buttressed by shield laws—may protect 
journalists, but do little to protect sources”. (Wasserman 2017 p72) However, the current Editor-in-Chief 
of The Guardian Kath Viner wrote in the forward to a UK parliamentary report published in 2017 that 
the Panama Papers collaboration proved that: “We still tell the same kinds of stories: scrutinising those 
in power; exposing wrongdoing; and working in the public interest. Our journalism continues to rely on 
an ability to offer protection and anonymity for sources and whistleblowers.” (Townend & Danbury 
2017 p.3) 
 
3.9 Summary and Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have interwoven the essential arguments and most pertinent data from the major 
artefact with academic literature, and high level research from intergovernmental orgasnisations, civil 
society groups and industry bodies in order to anchor Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age 
within broader scholarship. This process has also enabled an augmentation of the data produced during 
my UNESCO research project, the reseach for which ceased in mid 2015, with scholarship and research 
that has emerged within the intervening years (i.e. up until the time of submitting this thesis in August 
2018). This has allowed me to demonstrate that the trends that I identified in Protecting Journalism 
Sources in the Digital Age have in fact become more entrenched, and increasingly global in their 
manifestation. The impacts of these trends include:  
 
• Increasing reliance by investigative journalsits on encryption technology to defend 
communications with confidential sources from intrusion and interception, in parallel with 
reversion to analogue methods of contact where practicable;  
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• Increasing collaboration on global investigative journalism projects involving the ‘outsourcing’ 
of source protection;  
• An increasing sense of powerlessness against surveillance as the technology advances and the 
risks increase in parallel;  
• Increasing attention on the issues from scholars researching at the intersection of journalism, 
technology and freedom of expression 
 
However, from this overview of the emerging academic literature on the practical impacts of source 
protection erosion in the Digital Age, one clear gap that needs addressing in the scholarly research field 
is in the area of collaborative approaches to mitigation: between competing journalists and news 
organisations; between journalists and umbrella source ‘clearing houses’ like ICIJ; between journalists 
and civil society organisations and; between journalists and their sources. Another issue requiring 









Chapter 4:Literature and Context B – the fraught history of UNESCO 
freedom of expression research publications  
 
…information in all fields shall go unfettered. But we shall never cease to affirm 
that such freedom cannot be fully affirmed until it becomes a reality for everybody. 
UNESCO has devoted its efforts to bringing about such conditions ever since it was 
founded on the authority of its constitution which enjoins it to “work for the 
unrestricted pursuit of objective truth and the free exchange of ideas and 
knowledge”, and to that end, “to increase the means of communications between 
peoples”. (MacBride et al 1980 p14) 
…researchers and authors trying to navigate the assessment and reporting of 
global trends in media development and freedom of expression under contract to 
the Organisation can, ironically, struggle with the impacts of ‘diplomacy’ within the 
UN system where the research intersects with politically sensitive issues (Reid & 
Posetti 2017) 
In this chapter I will unpack the long and complex history of UN actors in freedom of expression-oriented 
diplomacy and advocacy. UNESCO – the United Nations’ Education, Scientific and Cultural Organisation – 
is ostensibly the only UN agency with a specific press freedom remit. UNESCO’s Freedom of Expression 
and Media Development Division does much valuable work, including leading the UN’s response to 
increasing threats to journalism safety, emphasising the propensity for journalists to be murdered with 
impunity. It is also responsible for World Press Freedom Day and issues the annual World Press Freedom 
Prize to journalists facing extreme duress. 80 In this work, it collaborates with civil society groups, 
academics, industry bodies, specialists within other intergovernmental organisations, and the UN Special 
Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression. 
However, historically, UNESCO has been particularly vulnerable to conflicts connected to freedom of 
expression research that it has commissioned, given the extreme geopolitical sensitivities surrounding 
the issues. Controversies dating back to the late 1970s triggered by the MacBride Commission and the 
so-called New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) report of 1980 continue to echo 
in the halls of UNESCO’s Paris headquarters today81. Many of these disputes have their origins in 
differentiated philosophies between Western Member States and those of the Global South regarding 
the status and practice of journalism in society. These embedded tensions were exacerbated in the 
context of escalating sensitivities around mass surveillance and national security overreach, creating an 
                                                             
80 See detail of the UN Plan of Action on the Safety of Journalists and the Issue of Impunity here: 
https://en.unesco.org/un-plan-action-safety-journalists?language=en See details of the World Press Freedom Prize 
here: http://www.unesco.org/new/en/communication-and-information/freedom-of-expression/press-freedom/unesco-
world-press-freedom-prize/about-world-press-freedom-prize/ And read about the International Day to End Impunity 
For Crimes Against Journalists here: https://en.unesco.org/commemorations/endimpunity [All accessed 31/8/18] 





increasingly fraught environment for the production of Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age 
(Posetti 2017a) - a study sitting at the intersection of these highly contentious issues. 
 
4.1 UNESCO freedom of expression research: Intent and purpose 
 
United Nations actors, including UNESCO, have been much engaged in debate about the implications of 
the emerging Digital Age threats to legal and normative source protection frameworks. They have 
commissioned research, initiated inquiries and formulated resolutions relevant to the issues at the core 
of this study, namely the impacts of surveillance, national security/anti-terrorism legislation, data 
retention/handover, the role of third-party intermediaries, and shifts in entitlement to access 
protections connected to redefinitions of journalism. A number of UN Special Rapporteurs have also 
made interventions pertinent to the defence of journalistic source confidentiality, as threats posed by 
privacy erosion in the context of omniscient surveillance, along with national security overreach 
increased in the post-Snowden era. 
 
Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age (Posetti 2017a) was effectively mandated by the 
UNESCO Resolution on internet-related issues in November 2013 which stated that:  
…Privacy is essential to protect journalistic sources, which enable a society to 
benefit from investigative journalism, to strengthen good governance and the rule 
of law, and…such privacy should not be subject to arbitrary or unlawful 
interference… (UNESCO 2013) 
And this mandate was reinforced via a UNESCO General Conference Resolution in November 2015 
(UNESCO 2015e), carried after the major artefact was submitted to UNESCO for publication and a major 
excerpt had been published (UNESCO 2015b), but before it was published in full, which requested that 
UNESCO: 
4.4 Recognise the role that anonymity and encryption can play as enablers of 
privacy protection and freedom of expression and facilitate dialogue on these 
issues. 
6.2 Recognise the need for enhanced protection of the confidentiality of sources of 
journalism in the digital age; 
The important role played by regulatory and normative frameworks in defending the defining 
journalistic principle of confidential source protection was the context for these UNESCO mandates.  
The role of UN Organisations in defending freedom of expression rights connected to the practice of 





1948) and Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (UN GA 1966). But it 
wasn’t until 2011 that the UN Human Rights Committee formally endorsed a form of journalistic 
privilege designed to protect journalists from having to divulge the identity of confidential sources, apart 
from in exceptional circumstances, and in accordance with the tests of necessity and proportionality. 
This occurred in the context of General Comment 34 issued by the Committee, which stated that, as 
parties to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR): “States…should recognize and 
respect that element of the right of freedom of expression that embraces the limited journalistic 
privilege not to disclose information sources.” (UN HRC 2011) 
 
I have mapped legal instruments and so called ‘soft law’ developments (e.g. resolutions, declarations, 
statements, comments, recommendations and reports) (Conde 2004 p.242) that constitute the 
regulatory and normative frameworks overseen by the United Nations from the period 2013-2018 in the 
appended ‘impact timeline’ (Appendix 1, 9.1). Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age (Posetti 
2017a) is situated within this timeline to provide context for its commissioning, development and 
impact. The timeline can also be seen as a demonstration of evidence of digital disruption and challenge 
to the international regulatory and normative frameworks that support press freedom (Joyce 2015), its 
corollary privacy, and the right to confidential communications between those doing journalism and 
their sources. 
4.2 Realpolitik and the fraught history of UN involvement in freedom 
of expression issues 
In spite of a long history of involvement in freedom of expression issues, the role of UN Organisations in 
defending rights connected to the practice of journalism has a fraught history - one encumbered by 
realpolitik. According to Brew (2015), this German term with its origins in mid 19th century political 
pragmatism, either represents the best approach to meaningful change and political stability in a world 
buffeted by uncertainty and rapid transformation, or it encapsulates an attitude of cynicism and cold 
calculation, a transparent and self-justifying policy exercised by dominant nations over weaker ones. 
(Brew 2015) In the context of research for the UN, it often means the need to balance the ideals of the 
subject matter (e.g. press freedom and transparency) against the demands of an intergovernmental 
organisation effectively beholden to Member States’ competing, and sometimes irreconcilable, 
objectives and demands. It can also involve negotiating perceived imposts on freedom of expression 
with international bureaucrats, for whom the interests of diplomacy are paramount. These are the 
geopolitical realities of international communications research commissioned by UNESCO. 
 
A recent (non)event at UN headquarters in New York effectively illustrated the complexity of the UN’s 
press freedom mission, as anchored in the international legal and normative frameworks. The UN 





journalists on May 3rd, 2018, to mark World Press Freedom Day. But in an act of supreme irony, the UN 
AOC demanded politically motivated edits to a presentation from the keynote speaker, Alan C Miller – 
the Chief Executive of the News Literacy Project (The New York Times 2018). Miller’s presentation 
included video clips focused on the severe restrictions on press freedom in Egypt, Mexico and Turkey, 
while also referencing Russia and Pakistan. He said he was first told he must delete the references to 
Turkey, and then a UN AOC official told him that all of the clips would need to be dropped. After Miller 
refused, the UN AOC reportedly cancelled the event claiming that it was ‘postponed’ (UN AOC 2018). In 
response, Miller, posted about the incident on his organisation’s website to explain what he viewed as 
the censorious actions of UN AOC officials seeking to placate Turkey (a founding Member State of the 
UN AOC and the world’s leading jailer of journalists). (Miller 2018)  
 
“I could not permit this censorship of our presentation due to the stated concern that it would offend 
one or more countries engaged in repression and violence against journalists,” Miller wrote (Miller 
2018). Earlier in the day, the UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres issued a message for World Press 
Freedom Day declaring that: “A free press is essential for peace, justice and human rights for all. It is 
crucial to building transparent and democratic societies and keeping those in power accountable” (UN 
2018b). Several of the journalists who were scheduled to appear on the UN AOC panel responded by 
publicly condemning the apparent UN-sponsored hypocrisy (The New York Times 2018). 
 
UNESCO is the UN agency responsible for World Press Freedom Day82 and the International Day to End 
Impunity for Crimes Against Journalists83. UNESCO’s Guy Berger has written that lessons learned about 
press freedom from World War II were incorporated into the Organization’s constitution, “…which 
perceived that to secure peace and end warmongering, societies needed a free flow of information.” 
(Berger 2013 p.132) Such a flow is an essential function of press freedom, the core principles of which 
found specific support within UN regulatory frameworks under Article 19 of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), ratified in 1966 and coming into force a decade later. Specifically, 
Article 19.2 stipulates: 
Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include 
freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless 
of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any 
other media of his (sic) choice. (ICCPR 1966) 
Problematically, however, as indicated there is a history of issues and tensions within UN organisations 
connected to the commissioning and publication of research and policy papers pertaining to freedom of 
expression issues.  
                                                             
82 C.f. UNESCO (n.d.) https://en.unesco.org/commemorations/worldpressfreedomday/2018%20%20 [Accessed 
3/3/18] 





4.2.1 Unpacking the history of UNESCO’s communications research  
As UNESCO has written about its own history of communications research, since the 1960s, there has 
been a substantial tradition of research commissioned by the Organisation “with topics ranging from 
rural radio and farm forums to satellites and Internet, and their application for educational media”. 
(UNESCO 2009 p219) The Organisation wrote a chapter called UNESCO’s Contributions for Cultural 
Diversity and Communications for Development for Jan Servaes’ (2008) book Communications and Social 
Change, which detailed its approach to research in the field in historical context. That book grew out of 
UNESCO-commissioned research titled Approaches to Development: Studies on Communications for 
Development (Servaes 2003), demonstrating a pattern of high-quality research produced by UNESCO, in 
collaboration with academics. According to UNESCO, its communications research brief involves 
monitoring the ‘information society’ as a whole, in collaboration with other organisations that have 
relevant mandates. While it acknowledges that sometimes its role is simply as a source of information or 
experts, “On other occasions it plays a more prominent role: in promoting South-North dialogue, in 
reinforcing communication capacity in the developing countries, or in monitoring a free flow of 
information.” (UNESCO 2008 p219) 
 
Concerns about ‘protecting’ journalists – an issue bound up with debates around source confidentiality 
and journalism safety – are a recurring theme in UNESCO’s research agenda. The issue first attracted the 
attention of the UN General Assembly in 1970, with a decision to develop an international agreement 
for “ensuring the protection of journalists engaged in dangerous missions”. (Chocarro Marcesse 2017 
p45) In the case of the UNGA, tensions emerged between States over the categorisation, definition and 
(most problematically) registration of journalists in reference to the applicability of the ‘protection’ 
being considered, and the project was ultimately abandoned. (Chocarro Marcesse 2017 p48) However, 
these issues would echo through the decades84, re-emerging dramatically within UNESCO in the late 
1970s and early 1980s in the context of a major global communications research project, and finding 
resonance with the production, publication and research framework underpinning Protecting Journalism 
Sources in the Digital Age.85 
 
Much of UNESCO’s work in this space has been anchored within the Organisation’s International 
Programme for the Development of Communication (IPDC)86 87and executed through the UN Plan of 
                                                             
84 Note: Within UNESCO, parallel debates continued and in 1978 the need to protect journalists and media workers 
undertaking their duties found formal recognition in the ‘Declaration on Fundamental Principles concerning the 
Contribution of the Mass Media to Strengthening Peace and International Understanding, to the Promotion of Human 
Rights and to Countering Racialism, apartheid and incitement to war’ Available here: 
http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=13176&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html [Accessed 
5/8/18]. 
85 See discussion on the commissioning, production and publication of Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital 
Age later in Chapter Six of this exegesis. 
86 I am co-editor and contributing author to the IPDC-commissioned book Journalism, ‘Fake News’ and 
Disinformation (2018) 
87 Dr Guy Berger is the current IPDC Chair. He is interviewed for this exegesis, having commissioned Protecting 





Action on the Safety of Journalists (UN 2012), initiated by the IPDC. The IPDC was established in 1980 to 
aid media capacity building in developing countries (Berger 2013) as debate raged between Member 
States about inequitable international communications flows. This followed publication of a highly 
controversial report produced by the so-called MacBride Commission (C.f. Nordenstreng 1984). The 
story of that Commission, and the incendiary global study it produced, provides useful context for my 
dissection (Chapter Six of this exegesis) of the politics and tensions entailed in the production and 
publication of Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age. 
 
4.2.2 The great New World Information and Communication Order 
debate  
 
The International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems was established by UNESCO in 
1977 in the context of a global debate about access to news, Western media companies’ dominance of 
international news flows, and emerging communications technologies. The purpose of the Commission 
was to conduct research to help devise a new approach to these problems in the interests of advancing 
human development and peace (goals central to UNESCO’s mission). The Commission was headed by 
Irish Nobel Laureate Sean MacBride and such was his influence, that it is frequently referred to as the 
MacBride Commission. The Commission was comprised of 15 members representing academia, industry 
and civil society organisations globally. The theoretical approach that emerged from this collaborative 
exercise became known as the New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) and the 
major report produced was titled Many Voices One World: Towards a new, more just and more efficient 
information and communication world order. (MacBride et al 1980) It is most frequently referred to in 
the literature as the MacBride Report (Frau-Meigs 2013). 
 
The then UNESCO Director General Amadou Mahtar-M’bow wrote the foreword to the 318-page 
research report: 
…information in all fields shall go unfettered. But we shall never cease to affirm 
that such freedom cannot be fully affirmed until it becomes a reality for everybody. 
UNESCO has devoted its efforts to bringing about such conditions ever since it was 
founded on the authority of its constitution which enjoins it to “work for the 
unrestricted pursuit of objective truth and the free exchange of ideas and 
knowledge”, and to that end, “to increase the means of communications between 
peoples”. (MacBride et al 1980 p14) 
However, the report – published at the height of the Cold War - became one of the most divisive 
publications in the history of UNESCO. A massive backlash developed, with roots in Western nations’ 
objections to the report’s support for an ongoing debate about the ‘protection’ of journalists and 





The issue went to the heart of an ongoing argument between Member States over the licensing or 
registration of journalists. In the US and the UK (among several other non-Anglophone Western nations) 
the notion of licencing or registering journalists is considered antithetical to core press freedom values 
because it is a device often used by despots and dictators to muzzle the press – by controlling who can 
call themselves a journalist, work as a journalist, and what legal protections they can access (such 
devices are also often used to control what journalists are entitled to do/say/write). So, the concept of 
ascribing protections to journalists as a defined group was an incendiary idea in certain Western media 
and civil society organisations (particularly those based in the US). One of the early briefing papers 
published by the MacBride Commission was titled World Communication Order 4: Protection of 
Journalists (UNESCO 1979). It presented a range of recommendations, including four UNESCO-organised 
conferences on the theme, and it discussed the question of entitlement to ‘protection’ (entailing 
definitions of ‘journalist’).  
 
 But there were new issues triggered by the NWICO report connected to the so-called ‘right to 
communicate’ (McKenna 2013), involving concepts similarly antithetical (Nordenstreng 2013) to 
Western Member States’ press freedom ideals. In response, a group of US media interests gathered 
under the World Press Freedom Committee umbrella (one unfurled in the mid 1970s in response to a 
belief that UNESCO was seeking to control international information flows). (Bullen 2002) These fresh 
contentious issues included the linking of ethical criteria, and other obligations regarding content, to 
rights such as entitlement to ‘protection’. And while the over-arching MacBride report did not endorse 
such a system of ‘protection’, the fact that it left the door open to what was interpreted as a policy that 
eroded democratic notions of press freedom outraged several nations - the US and the UK key among 
them. (Nordenstreng 1999) 
 
Then, in 1981, UNESCO convened a meeting in collaboration with the International Federation of 
Journalists, the International Organization of Journalists, and publishers’ representatives, to progress 
discussion on the journalism ‘protection’ question. (Nordenstreng 2016) The controversy escalated with 
several Western news organisations reporting that the push amounted to an attack on press freedom by 
UNESCO. (Nordenstreng 2011; Palmer 2013) In response, the World Press Freedom Committee (WPFC) 
managed to get 63 media organisations (representing 21 countries) to sign the Declaration of Talloires 
which rejected the concept of UN ‘protection’ and ‘special status’ pertaining to journalists. (Bullen 2002)  
 
Next, the UK, and then the US, withdrew from UNESCO (and withheld funding for UNESCO programs) 
partly in reaction to the controversy. The UK did not re-join UNESCO until 1997 and the US remained out 
until 2003. (Nordenstreng 2012) Following the MacBride controversy, the concept of the New World 
Communication Order (NWICO) was abandoned by the UNESCO hierarchy, the MacBride report was 
buried (for years it was extremely difficult to source until it was republished in collaboration with an 





Vincent 1992 pp31-121) As Hackett (2013) has written: 
…the UN buried the concept along with the report itself, given the ferocious and 
successful opposition of the US and UK governments and Western-based media 
conglomerates to NWICO. (Hackett 2013 p13)  
These sensitivities resonate with debates analysed in Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age, 
with the theme of entitlement to ‘protection’ in terms of accessing shield laws being central to my 
study. 
 
After the end of the Cold War in 1989, the Organisation’s General Conference set the objective “to 
render more operational the concern of the Organisation to ensure a free flow of information at 
international as well as national levels, and its wider and better-balanced dissemination, without any 
obstacle to the freedom of expression, and to strengthen communication capacities in the developing 
countries, so that they may participate more actively in the communication process” (UNESCO 2008). 
Within the framework ‘Communication in the Service of Humanity’, UNESCO committed itself to 
programmes that promoted and monitored the exercise of free expression, supported media pluralism 
and diversity, and emphasised professional and material exchange.  
 
The research focus shifted again in 2001, following a meeting of experts at Leicester University who 
advocated for a “critical and qualitative research tradition” and “an interest in new development 
paradigms” in the context of a “compelling interest in UNESCO’s policy research”, according to 
UNESCO’s own account. (UNESCO 2008 p.220) A decade ago, among its key research interests, UNESCO 
listed: ‘infoethics’ and universal access to information and knowledge; gender and ICTs; press freedom 
and freedom of expression in the information society; and education, particularly media literacy and 
training in and for the information society. (UNESCO 2008 p.221) UNESCO researches communications 
as a social process “…not merely as a technical imposition on society, an entertainment industry, means 
of advertising campaigns, nor as a mass media extension of the human voice or pen”. (UNESCO 2008 
p.230) According to the Organisation: “That is UNESCO’s strength - most probably also one reason for 
the controversies into which [it] has on occasions been drawn.” (UNESCO 2008 p.231) 
4.3 The challenges of producing global research for UNESCO amid 
complex geopolitics  
It is noteworthy that the US formally withdrew from UNESCO again in 2017, along with Israel, after 
halting its contribution of fees from 2011 in response to the Organisation’s formal recognition of 
Palestine. The bill for US arrears was over US$500m (Coningham 2017) by the time the country 
withdrew. The Organisation is in significant financial peril as a result, and that has a direct bearing on its 






UNESCO’s current Director of Freedom of Expression and Media Development, Guy Berger, has (2013) 
written about the structural difficulties and constraints of commissioning and managing research 
projects within the Organisation. He commissioned Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age, and 
he is responsible for the flagship UNESCO series World Trends in Freedom of Expression and Media 
Development. While the first edition of World Trends was still in production, he analysed the logistical 
difficulties involved in a global freedom of expression mapping exercise for a book on digital era 
journalism and citizenship. The first challenge he identified as: “…financial resources to pay for this 
exercise, in a context of severe budgetary constraints at UNESCO following the suspension of the USA’s 
membership fee payments in the wake of the recognition of Palestine as a Member State of the 
Organization”. (Berger 2013 p.140) The issue of funding constraints on the Division’s commissions has 
also been raised by the IPDC and echoed by UNESCO’s Communication and Information Commission. 
These constraints were certainly in evidence during the production of Protecting Journalism Sources in 
the Digital Age (which fed the second edition of World Trends in Freedom of Expression and Media 
Development in 2015 and the major Keystones report of the same year).88 
 
Secondly, Berger identified the challenge of inadequate ‘knowledge resources’, particularly as regards 
quality and equality of data sources:  
 
Another issue has been a different kind of resources – the raw materials for the knowledge 
operation. It is very evident that data and information on these matters is very unevenly generated 
around the world, and its linguistic variation is also substantial. (Berger 2013 p.140) 
 
He also noted the impacts of budgetary constraints on research in terms of UNESCO’s internal 
resources: “One amelioration would have been the UNESCO Institute of Statistics to promote the 
collection of standard global data on media, but this has been put on hold due to budget cuts.” (Berger 
2013 p.140)  
 
Further, Berger (2013) said that the issue of data accessibility and the lack of universal standards on data 
collection (including a lack of gender specific information) created problems for the project. “Even 
where basic facts are available…there is still often a problem about being able to work off secondary 
sources.” (Berger 2013) This is also a point relevant to the impact of ‘geopolitical realities’ on the 
production of UNESCO commissioned and published research. Where secondary sources (e.g. 
international NGOs) are relied upon, there are political considerations as well as exceptionally high 
standards of verification. “It goes without saying that a document like this needed to be firmly fact-
based, and that projections for future trends had to be based on a solid analysis of developments over 
the past five years,” Berger wrote. (Berger 2013 p.140) Again, these were very substantial issues with 
                                                             





Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age, a project which required review of data covering a 
nine-year period, and one hampered by the absence of available data and a lack of transparency in 
many States.  
 
The logistics of gathering expertise for a global research task as complex as the World Trends report 
were also problematic, according to Berger. Even though there was a budget to engage regional experts 
across a range of focal points (not the case with regard to Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital 
Age), along with international topic experts in cross-cutting areas89, “Identifying the researchers and 
their tracking down sufficient data has not been an easy task,” he acknowledged. (Berger 2013 p.140) 
This created further difficulties in the gathering, aggregation and synthesis of data to enable 
identification of solid patterns and trends across very diverse regions. “The research requires 
acknowledgement of many contradictory and partial developments,” adding to the complexity of the 
data analysis process. (Berger 2013 p.140) The much larger budget (compared with Protecting 
Journalism Sources) for this project enabled the gathering of the regional experts at UNESCO 
headquarters in Paris to assist with the process of collectively discerning trends from the draft reports 
but that was not a straightforward process either.  
 
4.3.1 Negotiating global trends from the perspective of the Global 
South 
Issues reflecting geopolitical realities were encountered during the research processes involved in the 
production of UNESCO’s World Trends in Freedom of Expression 2014 and 2015 reports, as well as during 
the production of Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age, highlighting the need for an open 
discussion about the challenges of conducting such research involving Member States. I will critically 
reflect in detail on the challenges, stresses and tensions involved in the production of the major artefact 
later in this exegesis (Chapter 6), but it is worth noting here the findings of an award-winning paper 
(Reid & Posetti 2017) that I wrote with South African media studies academic Dr Julie Reid, one of the 
regional experts engaged by UNESCO to work on the 2013-2014 World Trends project. This paper, titled: 
The caveats of studying trends in freedom of expression and media development globally, with a 
snapshot of Africa: a misunderstood continent90, was produced for a UNESCO-convened panel at the 
2017 conference of the International Association of Media and Communications Research (IAMCR) on 
Analyzing World Trends in Media Freedom and Development in Cartagena, Colombia. UNESCO’s Guy 
Berger was the panel moderator91. The paper problematised the process of deriving ‘global trends’ 
applicable to the Global South from a dataset dominated by Global North experiences and 
                                                             
89 Note: The editor of the report, Dr Courtney Radsch, then with UNESCO, recalls that the budget was not sufficient 
to pay researchers adequately. See Chapter Six. 
90 This paper was awarded ‘Best Paper’ by the International Communications Section of the International Association 
of Media and Communications Research (IAMCR) in 2017. 







While the research contributions of global media trends reports, such as those produced by 
UNESCO, have value in providing evidence-based summaries of regional phenomena, such 
reporting mechanisms are not without their shortcomings. … it is clear that while 
comprehensive data sets can be produced in developed contexts, such as Europe and North 
America, a lack of reliable, streamlined, continent-wide and up-to-date data sets in other 
regions result in knowledge gaps. These gaps, caused by factors such as a lack of transparency 
on the part of some States, and the underdevelopment of Internet access, present problems 
with regard to the synthesis and analysis of data and, consequently, they can result in 
incomplete snapshots of regions. (Reid & Posetti 2017)  
 
The paper also challenged assumptions about the applicability to the Global South of normative values 
connected to press freedom and media production prevalent in the Global North. 
 
Researchers ought to explore how to reconcile the fact that many of the commonly assumed 
normative values for media behaviour within democratic and/or Global North contexts cannot 
be assumed as universally applicable to all regions. (Reid & Posetti) 
 
Thirdly, the paper noted the vexed nature of the geopolitical landscape and the sensitivity of many 
UNESCO Member States to identification and criticism in UNESCO publications mean that: 
…researchers and authors trying to navigate the assessment and reporting of 
global trends in media development and freedom of expression under contract to 
the Organization can, ironically, struggle with the impacts of ‘diplomacy’ within the 
UN system, where the research intersects with politically sensitive issues. (Reid & 
Posetti 2017) 
As the paper explained:  
The combination of political and bureaucratic impediments can: cause delays in the 
completion of research and publication; increase workloads on research teams; 
create tension between UNESCO and research contractors; result in avoidance of 
naming States in official publications, or elimination from publication of reported 
experiences of citizens and other actors within States where State-based sources of 
data are not available to verify claims, or there is a limited number of alternative 
sources publicly available. (Reid & Posetti 2017) 
These challenges include political sensitivities of individual Member States which, without proper 





media development. Without clear explanation and guidance from UNESCO, such concerns could risk 
leading to self-censorship and other impacts.  
 
Ultimately, there may be a requirement to remove certain details, such as the name of a 
sensitive country or a contentious quote, from a report in the interests of achieving publication. 
In turn, this process risks leading to conflict between researchers and the Organization or its 
representatives. This presents a tri-fold risk involving ethical challenges, ‘frustration-fatigue’ on 
the part of researchers [and possibly UNESCO staff dealing with researchers ‘outside the tent’], 
and workloads that might far exceed the monetary value of the contract which limits the 
possibility of outsourcing work connected to research and review processes. (Reid & Posetti 
2017) 
 
A range of related issues was canvassed in two other academic papers based on research for UNESCO 
presented at IAMCR in 2017. One, by noted US media studies scholar Prof Monroe Price, focused on the 
Political Economy of Preparing Global Reports for UNESCO (Price 2017) and it was delivered at the same 
panel. Price, one of the lead researchers on the third edition of UNESCO’s World Trends in Freedom of 
Expression and Media Development 2017/2018 (UNESCO 2018d)92, discussed “challenges encountered, 
such as searching for comparable data across regions and over time”. (Price 2017) He also noted that 
“Changed geopolitical alliances also affect trends and perceptions of trends, and international norms, 
themselves, can be in flux.” (Price 2017) And he asked: “How do definitions of UNESCO’s basic 
framework for reflecting press freedom, based on media freedom, independence, and pluralism, reflect 
various visions of the role of speech in society, and what tensions does that produce for the writing and 
diffusion of such a study?” (Price 2017) 
 
Meanwhile, during another UNESCO IAMCR (2018) session arranged as a global consultation with media 
scholars on UNESCO’s ‘Internet Universality Indicators’ project93 (UNESCO 2018c) flowing from the 
umbrella ‘Internet Study’ under which Protecting Sources was conceived, Prof Gabriel Kaplún presented 
a paper titled Media and internet indicators: social legitimacy and transformative capacity, Uruguay 
assessment based on a research commission from UNESCO. “In Uruguay, between 2013 and 2015, we 
conducted a national study using the UNESCO Media Development Indicators. The process was very 
enriching for all the participants, but also very complex” (Kaplun 2017), Kaplun and his co-authors 
wrote. He analysed the processes based on a documentary review and testimonies of some of the 
participating actors, presented some of the learning outcomes, emphasising methodological and 
operational issues along with the potential and weaknesses of the project. During the presentation, he 
expressed the research group’s frustration with UNESCO review processes and prolonged delays in 
                                                             
92 Note: Dr Julie Reid, co-author of the paper discussed in detail above was also contracted by UNESCO to work on 
World Trends in Freedom of Expression and Media Development 2017/2018 
93 Note: I was contracted to manage a small consultation phase of this project involving engagement with 





publishing the study, which was still forthcoming at the time of writing. 
 
4.4 Conclusion and summary 
 
I have argued in this chapter that the production of Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age was 
undertaken in the context of a difficult and protracted history of conflict connected to UNESCO-
commissioned research on freedom of expression issues. It is noteworthy that up until undertaking the 
detailed analysis presented in this chapter, I was unaware of the depth of historic UNESCO freedom of 
expression research controversies. Analysing this history has provided new insights into the tensions and 
boundary work required for the type of research this project involved. I will return to these issues in 
Chapter Six and propose recommendations for future research undertaken for intergovernmental 
organisations94 in similarly contentious areas. 
 
However, as my paper with Dr Julie Reid concluded, it is quite important to note that these challenges 
are by no means insurmountable, nor do they negate the purposefulness of embarking upon such 
research for UNESCO. The hurdles are navigable if:  
 
… a process of open and transparent communication is adopted by UNESCO, acknowledging 
such potential obstacles and fostering trust between the parties; a collaborative approach to 
problem solving and work flowing from review processes is embraced by UNESCO officers and 
the researcher/s; there is acceptance that budgets and resources necessarily contain the scope 
of research; and if the concerns of researchers are taken seriously by UNESCO. (Reid & Posetti 
2017) 
 
It is also worth acknowledging that the high bar for information verification set by UNESCO encourages 
rigorous research standards. Similarly, despite the difficulties identified in this paper (and in this 
exegesis) in adequately mapping trends in freedom of expression and media development globally, 
UNESCO’s insistence upon equitable regional representation in research scope, and gender balance 
within research teams and research subjects, positively mandates diversity in ways that few other 
organisations or funders require.  
 
Finally, the mission of UNESCO freedom of expression research remains noble. As Berger (2013) noted: 
“The 2011 Resolution behind the research [World Trends 2014]…also included a clause that referred to 
reinforcing the need for UNESCO to promote the free flow of ideas by encouraging dialogue between 
Member States and by sensitizing governments, public institutions and civil society to strive towards 
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freedom of expression and freedom of the press as a central element in building strong democracies….” 









Chapter 5: Literature & Context C - Applying the principles of 
advocacy journalism to freedom of expression research in a 
‘networked press freedom’ era 
 
“A robust and self-aware press speaks the language of publics, appreciates its 
public-making role, and eloquently articulates why it works to create some publics 
over others. This kind of press is one of democracy’s most powerful and essential 
institutions.” (Annany 2018)  
“The term ‘media freedom’ in a more holistic sense certainly involves the notion of 
allowing journalists and editors to do their work freely and independently, but it 
also involves the freedom of the ordinary person to access and respond to that 
work. If the idea of media freedom is applied to media producers only, with no 
regard to the audience, then only a small part of the mass communications chain is 
being considered while what is in a digital world arguably the more crucial part, is 
being ignored. The entirety of the media chain does not only involve media 
producers, but includes the audience, so the notion of media freedom needs to be 
applied to the whole chain, not only part of it.” (Reid 2015) 
In this chapter I will analyse the scholarship on alternative models of journalism and digital activism 
which helps explicate the hybrid model for negotiating freedom of expression rights in the networked 
public sphere, demonstrated by this PhD project. Theories and concepts considered include three broad 
clusters of scholarship. The first group of theories concerning activist, advocacy, development and peace 
journalism question the traditional separation of professional journalism practice from social change 
advocacy.  Public, participatory and social journalism furthers this debate by breaching the serration of 
professional journalism from audiences. Finally, emerging digital political practices provide an 
understating of a networked public sphere which enables civic agency. The defence and public 
communication of freedom of expression rights demand a convergence of these modes and such a 
convergence is also implicated in what I am describing as ‘networked source protection’. 
 
5.1 Extending the role of watchdog journalism: reconstructing 
professional norms to deal with a 21st century freedom of expression 
crisis 
As Annany (2018) argues: “A robust and self-aware press speaks the language of publics, appreciates its 
public-making role, and eloquently articulates why it works to create some publics over others. This kind 





Rosenstiel (2014), Schudson (2001) and others have observed, ongoing adherence to a misunderstood 
ideal of objectivity, anchored in 20th Century American journalism traditions, has hampered public 
interest journalism undertaken in pursuit of democratic ideals. Judith Lichtenberg’s (1996) explanation 
of the role of objectivity in journalism is pertinent to accepting journalism’s role in advocating for 
freedom of expression rights: “[An] objective investigator may start out neutral (more likely, she is 
simply good at keeping her prior beliefs from distorting her inquiry), but she does not necessarily end up 
neutral.” (Lichtenberg 1996) In the case of reportage on the right of journalists to protect their 
confidential sources and defend legitimate journalistic practices and processes against intrusions 
frequently justified on national security grounds, such an understanding is essential. ‘Watchdog 
journalism’95 at times requires the lens to be turned inwards and the reflective practice conversation 
needs to be had in the public domain in the interests of maintaining open societies where the state, not 
the citizen, is rendered transparent.  
 
Rosen (2003) has cast journalism as the “ghost of democracy in the media machine” but as Annany 
(2018) argues, “The press actually limits its authority and relevance when it tries to retain the illusion of 
independence.” This problem is effectively illustrated in news coverage of climate change. As Boykoff 
and Boykoff’s (2004; 2007) studies of reportage on climate change debates by the New York Times, the 
Washington Post, the Los Angeles Times, and the Wall Street Journal demonstrated, faux balance is 
often executed by news journalists, with the juxtaposition of widely accepted, peer reviewed science 
that establishes the legitimacy of climate change against the unproven and self-interested claims of big 
oil companies, conservative think tanks and industry organisations. Boykoff and Boykoff (2004) conclude 
that: “This bias, hidden behind the veil of journalistic balance,” creates “both discursive and real political 
space for the U.S. government to shirk responsibility and delay action.” 
 
5.1.1 Material publics and an informed democracy 
 
In this context, it is important to acknowledge that journalists can be the bridge to accessing ‘material 
publics’ & activating them. According to Marres (2012 p.31), ‘material publics’ are groups affected by 
issues but removed from the platforms that exist to address the issues. That is to say, they are 
“strangers who do not have at their disposal shared locations, vocabularies and habits for the resolution 
of common problems” Marres (2012 p. 46). As Annany (2018) explains it, “…the problem that material 
publics face is that they do not necessarily know what affects them and what is relevant to the 
conditions they share together—and they do not have control over the communication structures they 
would need to gain such knowledge” (Annany 2018). Annany also applies this theory to climate change 
reporting: “Even if you think you are unaffected by climate change (or do not believe it exists), its 
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sociomateriality is inescapable. You are embedded in—and implicated by—relationships that make it a 
relevant public issue” (2018 p. 116). In expounding his theory of ‘networked press freedom’,96 Annany 
argues that: “…issues stay dormant, invisible, and seemingly irrelevant until people recognize that 
humans and nonhumans—the social and the material—together make groups into publics” (2018 p. 
136). Citing Meiklejohn (1948), he argues that the main purpose of the first amendment is to ensure 
that all citizens understand the issues critical to their daily life: “That is why no idea, no opinion, no 
doubt, no counterbelief, no belief, no relevant information may be kept from them” (Annany 2018 p. 
136; Meiklejohn 1948 p. 89).  
 
Dahl (1989) contends that democracy is based on an informed citizenry (Dahl, 1989 p.93) and Schudson 
(2015) has written about the need for both journalism and informed citizens to hold the powerful to 
account. “Without access to information we cannot be informed, and a society without informed 
citizens cannot be called a democracy. In modern democracies, the people hold government 
accountable not just on election day but continuously” (Schudson, 2015 p. 25). Going further, Keane’s 
(2009) model of monitory democracy requires informed citizenry to become agents for transparent, 
accountable governance in open societies. In the 21st century, that requires citizens to be informed on 
issues in the public interest even if they don’t find popularity with audiences, such as climate change, 
privacy and surveillance, and related press freedom issues. And monitory democracy is dependent upon 
a networked form of press freedom that defends confidentiality of communications involving those 
seeking to share verifiable information in the public interest. As Schudson argues: “If assembly 
democracy is linked to the spoken word and representative democracy to print culture, today’s 
democracy - what Keane calls ‘monitory democracy’ – emerges with the rise of multimedia society” 
(2015 p. 234). 
5.1.2 Journalism protections and safety, and an informed democracy  
 
This means that the press needs to explicate issues in the public interest. In the context of serious 
threats to the democratic system upheld in part by the pillar of press freedom, they need to advocate 
for protections that enable public engagement, agency and interactivity with freedom of expression 
rights - even if they’re oblivious to the potential impacts of their erosion. “The very best and most self-
reflective journalists do not shy away from seeing their work as part of democratic culture and respond 
maturely to critical and constructive critiques” (Annany 2018). Such recognition is an historically rooted 
journalism norm, according to Annany: “They may not have said so explicitly, or they may have fallen 
back on tropes of their own, but embedded in the profession of journalism and the missions of many 
publishers were ideas about how they thought they were helping democracies, what they defined as the 
public interest, how they knew they needed to act if they were to be anything other than just another 
business” (2018). 
                                                             





Similar issues emerge in the reportage of mass surveillance, national security overreach, data retention 
policies and their implications for confidential sources and whistleblowers, along with the public interest 
journalism that depends on them. Arguably, the urgency of this crisis for journalism and democracy 
demands an advocacy journalism approach to telling these stories. However, journalists typically retreat 
to norms that eschew industry ‘belly-gazing’ (i.e. reportage on issues central to journalism or about 
journalism practice) in mainstream media publications targeting broad audiences. This is often based on 
misconceptions about the role of journalism in press freedom advocacy, and perceptions that audiences 
are not interested in issues that threaten independent public interest journalism.  
Parallels can be drawn with the issue of journalism safety and impunity for the killers of journalists. 
Between 2012-2016, 530 journalists were killed for their work, and in 90% of cases the killers were not 
prosecuted, according to peer reviewed research conducted by UNESCO (2018). As Pukallus and 
Harrison (2015) noted, “The changing nature of international war and conflict, where journalists have 
themselves become targets, and the rising death toll combined with the issue of impunity is making 
journalism safety a major international policy concern” (Pukullus & Harrison 2015 pp 63-8). UNESCO 
leads the UN’s work in this space, developing and anchoring the ‘UN Plan of Action on the Safety of 
Journalists and the Issue of Impunity’. The Plan includes several action points connected to research and 
awareness raising: “To whatever extent possible, the public must be made aware of these challenges in 
the public and private spheres and the consequences from a failure to act” (UN 2012). In implementing 
the plan, following extensive consultation, UNESCO has acknowledged that “Efforts to sensitize the 
public as well as relevant stakeholders to the societal importance of professional journalism is key in the 
achievement of the UN Plan” (UNESCO 2014b).  
UNESCO’s Guy Berger has called on editors and journalists to report more on the problem of impunity 
for crimes again journalists but “Some say they don’t want to give journalists special treatment – to pay 
more attention to journalists than regular people” (Posetti, 2014). He summarised the objections he 
hears to covering the issues thus: 
• Journalists aren’t special, and shouldn’t be singled out 
• It would come across as self-serving 
• It will compromise our independence 
• Media should tell the story, not be the story 
• We can’t artificially skew the news 
• There aren’t journalists killed in our country 
• The public aren’t interested  
 
Evidence of the need for broader public engagement and activism on press freedom issues has been 
highlighted through a growing body of academic research on journalism safety including that from 





corruption, state violence against the press, and the lack of a free-speech culture cut across all layers, 
posing severe constraints to investigative reporting in Latin America.” Pukallus and Harrison97 (2015) 
have published preliminary research findings from a global study of the attitudes of editors and 
audiences towards the issue of the murder of journalists with impunity. A key observation from their 
research is this: “…the public may be uninformed about the scale of attacks on journalists, but that 
doesn't mean they're not interested” (Pukallus & Harrison 2015). In fact, their analysis of qualitative 
focus-group conversations involving 39 audience participants from the UK found:  
When our researchers revealed the actual numbers – how many journalists have 
been killed and how many go un-investigated – the numbers were met with 
disbelief and curiosity. The participants recognised and acknowledged their lack of 
knowledge, but at the same time wanted to know more. (Pukallus & Harrison 2015) 
5.1.3 The surveillance state and an informed democracy 
  
The citizens’ ‘right to know’ (C.f. Brooke, 2006) is paramount in the case of mass surveillance, privacy 
breaches and the implications of source confidentiality erosion for open societies. This was, of course, 
one of Edward Snowden’s primary motivations in becoming a confidential source for journalists who 
initially broke the ‘Snowden Files’ stories (before he exposed his own identity). The role of accountability 
journalism at a time when States have unparalleled powers to interfere with the ‘right to know’ 
necessarily involves overcoming barriers to reporting on issues considered too ‘inside the beltway’ for 
the attention of mainstream journalism. This is because, as Quill (2014) contends, the State can now 
meet its desire to ‘know’ “with the means to collect, monitor, and (even) predict the behaviours of their 
subjects/citizens” (Quill 2014) in an unprecedented manner.  
 
Weber’s (1946) ‘paranoid institutions’ are now on a permanent war footing – ‘the war on terror’ – 
justifying omniscient surveillance and the parallel need for scrutiny and counter offensives involving 
activist, accountability modes of journalism.98 Weber characterised the political culture of government 
institutions as insecure, paranoid and competitive with the central aim of protecting themselves at all 
costs. “Bureaucratic administration always tends to be an administration of the 'secret session'; in so far 
as it can, it hides its knowledge and action from criticism,” (Weber 1946 p. 233) he wrote. In wartime, 
layers of lies and secrets accompany the ‘official’ version of events, according to Weber. But that 
‘wartime’ environment is now perpetual in the context of national security and anti-terrorism 
overreach, highlighting the need for vigilant accountability journalism applied to the very normative and 
regulatory frameworks that support the practice of journalism in open societies, in the broader public 
                                                             
97 Note: Jackie Harrison is the first UNESCO Chair in Media Freedom, Journalism Safety and the Issue of Impunity 
(appointed 2018). She also leads the Journalism Safety Research Network (established 2016 by the University of 
Sheffield’s Centre for Freedom of the Media) 







Fundamental to ensuring the public’s ‘right to know’ about the overreach of the Surveillance State is 
investigative journalism dependent upon confidential sources – including journalism that reveals the 
machinations of security agencies and the extent of their unscrutinised reach into private conversations 
and activities in the name of ‘national security’ and ‘anti-terrorism’ measures. As academic and 
investigative journalist Prof. Heather Brooke has written: “If we are to be an informed citizenry – a 
prerequisite in a democracy – we need the agencies to avow their most intrusive un-targeted 
surveillance practices. Otherwise, they do not have a public mandate for them. In effect, they are acting 
outside the democratic system” (Brooke 2015). Richards summarises the top two threats of unchecked 
surveillance of citizens as a) the chilling of human thought and b) the abuse of power that results 
(Richards 2013). Richards also notes the flow-on effects of technological advances making mass 
surveillance operations both easier and cheaper for states and corporations, thereby increasing the 
ability “to blackmail, selectively prosecute, coerce, persuade, and sort individuals” (Richards 2013 p. 
1961). Finally, he notes that the far-reaching potential consequences of unchecked surveillance can aid 
targeted killing, concentration camps and internment (Richards 2013 p. 1957). These are issues central 
to the purpose and exercise of freedom of expression rights and the parallel right to privacy – especially 
for journalists seeking to fulfil the role of ‘watchdog’ reporter but also for citizens more broadly. And the 
‘checking mechanism’ of journalism is paramount in liberal democracies under threat. As Cohen argues, 
a society that allows “the unchecked ascendancy of surveillance infrastructures cannot hope to remain a 
liberal democracy” (Cohen 2013). 
 
Penney (2016) established the ‘chilling effect’ of unrestrained mass surveillance on the right to access 
information through a study of Wikipedia traffic involving ‘sensitive’ pages connected to terrorism 
themes following the Snowden revelations detailing the monitoring and trawling activities of the NSA 
and PRISM99. His research found “…not only a statistically significant immediate decline in traffic for 
these Wikipedia articles after June 2013, but also a change in the overall secular trend in the view count 
traffic, suggesting not only immediate but also long-term chilling effects resulting from the NSA/PRISM 
online surveillance revelations.” (Penney 2016 p. 117) The result of such deterrence in connection with 
citizens’ research on matters of security policy pertaining to terrorism would be an inevitable decline in 
the level of ‘informed’ debate and “our broader processes of democratic deliberation will be 
weakened,” according to Penney (2017). As the Global Principles on National Security and the Right to 
Information asserted: “legitimate national security interests are, in practice, best protected when the 
public is well informed about the State’s activities, including those undertaken to protect national 
security” (Open Society Foundations 2013). These principles (also known as the Tshwane Principles) 
were drafted in partnership with five international academic centres, the relevant UN Special 
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Rapporteurs and a suite of civil society organisations.  
 
As Russell (2016) contends, in the 21st century:  
Corporate battles and guerrilla wars are fought on Twitter. Facebook is the new 
Berlin, home to tinkers, tailors, spies and terrorist recruiters. [But] Journalism 
remains one of the main sites of communication power, an expanded space where 
citizens, protesters, PR professionals, tech developers and hackers can directly 
shape the news. (Russell 2016) 
Journalism has a critical – and to date under-fulfilled - role to play in educating the public about the 
threats of privacy erosion, mass surveillance and national security overreach to investigative journalism 
specifically. As Brooke wrote in her 2011 book The Revolution Will Be Digitised: Dispatches from the 
Information War: 
In the digital age we have the technological tools for a new type of democracy,  but 
the same technology can also be used for a new type of totalitarianism. What 
happens in the next ten years is going to define the future of democracy for the 
next century and beyond (Brooke 2011)  
Her critique of journalists’ approach to covering complex issues connected to the sustainability of open 
societies is also salient: “Journalists have an important role in representing and expanding the rights of 
the public, but…too few take this responsibility seriously. They are the final check on state power, but 
too often the noble goals of public enlightenment are forsaken for an easy story.” (Brooke 2016) 
 
5.2 How could journalism respond? 
 
Richards (2013) provides an instructive framework for checking surveillance law that could be applied to 
journalism in its function as a scrutineer of public policy. It involves:  
 
• An awareness that surveillance transcends the public/private divide and that much surveillance 
is outsourced to corporations.  
• Recognition that secret surveillance is illegitimate: In a democratic society, the people, and not 
the state apparatus, are sovereign. 
• Recognition that total surveillance is illegitimate.  
• Recognition that surveillance is harmful 
 
These principles could be applied to reporting the issues in conjunction with the 11-point model I 
developed for assessing the efficacy of source protection framework’s for Protecting Journalism Sources 







• Recognise the value to the public interest of source protection, with its legal foundation in the 
right to freedom of expression (including press freedom), and to privacy. These protections 
should also be embedded within a country’s constitution and/or national law  
• Recognise that source protection should extend to all acts of journalism and across all 
platforms, services and mediums (of data storage and publication), and that it includes digital 
data and meta-data  
• Recognise the potential detrimental impact on public interest journalism, and on society, of 
source-related information being caught up in bulk data recording, tracking, storage and 
collection 
• Shield acts of journalism from targeted surveillance, data retention and handover of material 
connected to confidential sources (Posetti 2017a 132-3) 
 
Additionally, the following recommendations for journalists and other media actors from Protecting 
Journalism Sources in the Digital Age are highly relevant pointers for undertaking journalism designed to 
better inform publics about the issues: 
 
• Engage with digital issues impacting on source confidentiality protection, and actively campaign 
for laws and rules that provide adequate protection  
• Explain to the public what is at stake in the protection of source confidentiality, especially in the 
Digital Age  
• Ensure that sources are aware of the digital era threats to confidentiality  
• Help audiences become more secure in their own communications, for example explaining how 
encryption works, and why it is important not to have communications security compromised 
(Posetti 2017a p.138) 
 
5.2.1 The secrecy beat: telling stories of the surveillance state 
 
Gup (2008) recommended adding a secrecy beat to newsroom agendas to achieve similar goals: “If 
nothing else, it would produce some remarkable stories, and it might just help the public grasp the 
wider implications of unchecked secrecy” (Gup 2008 p. 26). The escalation of Digital Age structural 
changes impacting on newsroom budgets and resources internationally notwithstanding (Posetti 
2018d), this would be a good way of embedding coverage of these pertinent, under-reported issues in 
newsroom contexts.  
 





to my own in reference to source confidentiality and working with whistleblowers:  
In the first year of FOI, I wrote many explanatory articles about the law with the 
aim of educating various audiences. For people to exercise their right to access 
information they must first understand they have such a right. This is what 
academics call ‘citizenship literacy’. Therefore, for a right to be effective people 
have to know of its existence and how to use it. As such, public awareness was an 
important aspect of my work. (Brooke 2016) 
As illustrated in the ‘impact timeline’ appended to this exegesis, I also produced journalism about my 
research as a feature of the ‘Participative Action Research’ model adopted for Protecting Journalism 
Sources in the Digital Age. This frequently involved the practice of making ‘content out of process’ with a 
view to educating and activating niche audiences in parallel. The explanatory role of journalism in regard 
to public education cannot be underestimated. Critical to its success is defining terms. As DaCosta writes 
“If you can’t name and describe an injustice, then you will have an extremely difficult time fighting it” 
(DaCosta 2018). Journalists are professionally adept at such functions. They can play a vital role in 
communicating the risks as a shared social experience, while also educating and informing.  
A growing number of think tanks, regulators and journalists are grappling with the 
question of how to best regulate big tech. But we won’t fix it with better public 
policy alone. We also need better language. We need new metaphors, new 
discourse, a new set of symbols to illustrate how these companies are rewiring our 
world, and how we as a democracy can respond. (DaCosta 2018) 
Stories about people’s lived experience of these complex issues are also effective interventions100 
because they illustrate the real impact of policy and political systems on everyday lives. Pukallus and 
Harrison’s (2015) research has identified the empathy engendered among audiences for the stories of 
journalists killed in the line of their work, along with associated interest in the broader social impacts of 
their targeting (Pukallus & Harrison 2015). Other relevant scholarship comes from Bartzen-Culver (2014) 
who examined an act of activist newspaper journalism pertaining to citizens’ access to broadband 
internet in Wisconsin (US) as an enabler for active digital citizenship in areas like education and 
healthcare. She noted that the case demonstrated the role of newspapers in supporting the information 
needs of communities: 
Newspapers do not merely serve as information providers, but also play a role as 
advocates within the public sphere. They define important issues facing 
communities and advocate for the best means to address those issues. In so doing, 
                                                             





they adhere to social responsibility principles and fulfil part of journalism's ethical 
role within democracy. (Bartzen-Culver 2014) 
This role is increasingly being played by the press in reference to the function of the platforms in 
democracies (as enablers and as threats to the sustainability of democracy). Debates about platforms 
and their disruptive power (and capacity to jackhammer democracy’s foundation) are increasingly 
intertwined with press freedom discussions. The function of the platforms and chat apps (e.g. Facebook, 
Twitter, Instagram, WhatsApp) in democracies and open societies is an area ripe for activist journalism 
practice in reference to freedom of expression, access to information, disinformation, digital safety, 
source protection erosion and privacy. As Annany has observed in the aftermath of the Cambridge 
Analytica scandal (C.f. Persily 2017): “Securing the press’s freedom to report safely and reliably became 
a shared concern because news organizations and social media platforms had become tightly 
intertwined” (Annany 2018). Annany further posits that news organisations could argue that: “social 
network sites should provide greater security for sources’ identities; keep some data private while 
making other information easily visible; respect shield laws and reporter privileges in site terms of 
service” (Annany 2018). However, while social journalism offers very significant opportunities to build 
communities of interest around explanatory content in this space, too many news organisations are still 
fixated on “mitigating the risks of their staff misusing social media, their audiences misunderstanding 
social media activity, and their ideals of objectivity and impartiality become subsumed by social 
media relationships.” (Annany 2018) 
 
Nevertheless, there is some evidence of emerging activism in the context of the platforms’ undermining 
of press freedom objectives. For example, the editor of Norway’s Aftenposten, Espen Egel Hansen, took 
on Facebook through his newspaper in 2016 after the social media behemoth censored the famous 
Vietnam War photograph of Kim Phuc (i.e. Nick Ut’s ‘Napalm Girl’). This story illustrated what Ibrahim 
(2017) described as Facebook asserting its ‘technological gaze’: “where its system of managing content 
can turn the sacred into puerile and the puerile into popular entertainment, flattening, and re-mapping 
content through its own moral sensibilities” (Ibrahim 2017). It also goes to the ‘boundary work’ 
identified by Johnson and Kelling involving journalists’ attempts to call Facebook to account as a news 
publisher (Johnson and Kelling 2017 pp 817-33). This episode demonstrates journalism’s important role 
in educating the public and ‘big tech’ (in parallel) about the responsibilities and functions of the 
platforms in a ‘networked press freedom’ environment. As Annany contends: 
…companies like Facebook and Google increasingly capture and monopolize 
revenue and attention [and] they consolidate the power to make publics within 
inscrutable and unaccountable sociotechnical systems, seeing public outcries as 
public relations problems to be ameliorated or endured. Such companies are not 





governing publics… technology companies are generally not as adept as the news 
industry is at talking about publics and democracy. (Annay 2018)  
 
Brooke’s (2016) responses to the problem of building awareness within journalism about threats to 
freedom of expression (in her context focused on access to information) also included running training 
courses on Freedom of Information procedures for journalists via the UK’s National Union of Journalists. 
That’s something I, too, have done internationally (from 2014-2018), as a response to source protection 
erosion and digital safety threats, drawing on my research, along with consulting to news organisations, 
and collaborations with the Australian journalists’ union MEAA on related policies. Specifically, I 
developed and rolled out a program of Digital Age source protection education for Fairfax Media 
(publisher of the Sydney Morning Herald, The Age, the Australian Financial Review et al) in Australia 
while I occupied the role of Head of Digital Editorial Capability (2016-2017). 
 
5.2.2 Truth, ethics and trust 
 
Truth, ethics and trust are interdependent in contemporary journalism’s struggle for sustainability 
(Ireton 2018). The networked public sphere (Friedland et al 2006) and the ‘rise of the audience’ are 
central, and these structural shifts will be analysed with reference to the implications for communicating 
freedom of expression issues in the next section of this literature review. But the associated ethical 
imperative is relevant to the question addressed in this section: ‘Why and how should journalism 
respond?’. Ward (2014) has called for ‘radical media ethics’ suitable for the digital era:  
The digital media revolution has created a revolution in journalism ethics. 
Established principles are under scrutiny, new practices emerge, and a previous 
professional consensus on the aims and principles of responsible journalism has 
been shattered. Journalism ethics has to be re-invented for a global, digital media. 
(Ward 2014) 
 
Central to this reinvention should be activist journalism principles applied to reportage of press freedom 
erosions in the digital era, including attacks on source protection, and the digital safety and security of 
journalism and those doing journalism. “The guiding idea is that we need serious and systematic 
responses to the situation of journalism ethics today, and such changes should be radical - not 
piecemeal or conservative” (Ward 2014). 
 
Relevant to this proposed reinvention of ethics for the digital era is the question posed by Hackett 
(2013) “What kind of journalism does democracy need?” He argues that a journalism that advocates for 





Western liberal democratic contexts to meet expectations of ‘watchdog’, public sphere, community-
building and communicative equality criteria: 
…practices and concept of press freedom need to be expanded and supplemented 
by a broader understanding and implementation of communication rights, entailing 
legal and cultural forms that support the full participation of all segments of 
society. Such a paradigm is especially appropriate for postcolonial countries dealing 
with issues of economic development and inter-ethnic conflict. (Hackett 2013) 
According to Hackett, a Communication Rights101 agenda is intended to overcome barriers to listening—
such as prejudice, hate and discrimination and to foster a social, cultural, legal and political environment 
favouring the production and sharing of social knowledge; a sense of community; and human rights 
outside the communicative domain (Hackett 2013). Integral to such an approach should be activism 
about rights, including the right to privacy, as they interact with freedom of expression rights, such as 
the ‘right to know’. And bound up with these rights is, of course, the right to protect confidential 
sources and secure communications with whistleblowers (CRIS Campaign 2005). Allern points out that 
such objectives are not antithetical to the core values of contemporary journalism: “The notion of 
journalism as a mission, a task for the benefit of society has become a central part in the ideology of 
journalism.” (Allern 2002) 
5.2.3 Recognising journalism’s role in social movements and social 
change communications 
 
Journalists practicing radical democracy may be the kind of journalists that open societies under siege 
from rising fascism and the erosion of fundamental human rights need (Downing et al 2001 p. 43-4). In 
this context, what kind of journalism should a journalist operating as a radical democrat practice? 
Hackett (2013 p 13) describes radical democrats as fulfilling ‘watchdog’ and ‘public sphere’ functions, 
while also enabling ‘horizontal communication’ between ‘subordinate groups’ (Hackett & 2006), 
counteracting power inequalities found in other social order spheres (McChesney 1999). He notes that 
by: 
…giving public voice to civil society, media can facilitate needed social change, 
power diffusion and popular mobilisation against social injustices [while]… 
Expanding the scope of public awareness and political choice by reporting events 
                                                             
101 Note: the ‘Communication Rights in the Information Society’ campaign proclaimed in 2005: “Press freedom is 
deepened and expanded, to include or facilitate such desiderata as access to relevant public, government and 
corporate information; genuine diversity as well as plurality of media organisations and content; balanced 
‘intellectual property’ regimes that do not unduly restrict users’ rights; and universal access to public media.” C.f. 
CRIS [Communication Rights in the Information Society] Campaign (2005). Assessing communication rights: A 






and voices which are socially important but outside, or even opposed to, the 
agendas of elites. (Hackett 2013) 
Such themes include the impacts of surveillance and privacy erosion explained in the context of ordinary 
citizens’ lived experience and the potential consequences as they might affect them. “Unless 
communication and information are biased toward equality, they tend to enhance social inequality,” as 
McChesney (1999) asserts. 
 
Hackett (2013) argues for the supplementation of press freedom objectives with a more expansive 
notion of ‘communication rights’ because: 
A press that is free from control by a self-serving State apparatus is fundamental. It 
is a chief means of holding governments and power-holders accountable, exposing 
and preventing corruption (one of the chief barriers to genuine social 
development), enabling a society to identify and address problems and to discuss 
and find its own path to development, engaging and developing people’s capacity 
for democratic citizenship and helping people to feel that they have a voice in 
determining their country’s future, and thereby an obligation to participate in 
building it. (Hackett 2013) 
He conceptualises such a model – enriched by ‘communications rights’ objectives, a public sphere ethos, 
and radical egalitarian models of democracy - as a ‘communicative democracy’, in which “every cultural, 
ethnic and political sector can circulate ideas and information that potentially reach every other sector 
of society” (Hackett 2013). 
 
Such media reform agendas can be considered as features of broader social movements, as Napoli  
contends (Naploi 2007 p. 21). Social movement theory has been used to analyse media reform 
campaigns such as the Communication Rights in the Information Society campaign (CRIS), studied by 
Thomas (2006). Figueroa et al (2002) outlined an integrated model for assessing Communications for 
Social Change (CSFC) more broadly: 
The model…describes an iterative process where ‘community dialogue’ and 
‘collective action’ work together to produce social change in a community that 
improves the health and welfare of all of its members. (Figueroa et al 2002) 
This model draws on inclusive interpretations of ‘development journalism’ theory along with the 
network/convergence theories of communications. “For social change, a model of communication is 
required that is cyclical, relational and leads to an outcome of mutual change rather than one-sided, 
individual change.” (Figueroa et al 2002) Re-examined in combination with Public Journalism theory, 





underpinning for the hybrid model for negotiating freedom of expression in public that sits at the core 
of this PhD project.102. 
 
5.3 Rebooting alternative media models in an era of unprecedented 
structural change 
In reassessing media freedom concepts from a Global South perspective103, South African academic Julie 
Reid (2017) has described the ‘digital revolution’ as unprecedented in the history of human mass 
communication: 
The way in which people all over the globe now interact with one another, speak, 
learn and respond, in real time, has changed remarkably and it has done so in a 
remarkably short space of time. The introduction and widespread adoption of radio 
and television was, to communications history, like landing on the moon. The 
digital revolution of the internet (most especially including social media) was like 
leaving the galaxy on the Starship Enterprise at warp speed. (Reid 2017) 
The implications for the revolution for journalism continue to be profound. The Digital Age has been 
described as a ‘golden era for journalism’ (Ryle in Posetti 2017a) by the Executive Director of the 
International Consortium of Investigative Journalists. Indeed, it has enabled access to significant data 
caches leading to ground-breaking investigative journalism (Obermayer & Obermaier 2016), new models 
of cross-border collaborative reporting, and access to treasure troves of knowledge and diverse sources 
at a mouse-click. It has also delivered unprecedented, ongoing challenges and structural changes to the 
news industry. Journalism in 2018 is facing a virtual ‘perfect storm’104 of convergent pressures. This 
media era, where the only constant is change, has been described as a “state of permanent novelty” or 
“habitus of the new” (Papacharissi & Easton 2013). 
The decade from 2000 shook much of the media world, according to Kleis Nielsen (2012), disrupting 
patterns and processes of news funding, creation, distribution, and consumption as the Digital Age took 
hold. It presented unprecedented opportunities and challenges in tandem. The digital transformation of 
the news industry and the craft of journalism is now understood as a perpetual process that is driven 
concurrently by the collapse of traditional business models, mass layoffs, changing audience behaviours 
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103 See discussion of Reid’s theory of a more audience-centred approach to media freedom later in this literature 
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(e.g. peer-to-peer distribution of content, on demand-access) and technology (Posetti, 2018a)  (like the 
advent of social media platforms and the increasing accessibility of smartphones).105 
The impacts include fragmented and disintermediated journalism. They also involve much closer 
relationships between journalists, audiences and technology. As Professor Charlie Beckett has observed: 
“The result is a challenge to established journalistic practice and the advent of new relationships 
between public and news production” (Beckett 2008). He dubbed this phenomenon ‘networked 
journalism’ (Beckett 2008). 
 
Lauk and Harro-Loit (2017) point to the challenges posed by these convergent processes to journalistic 
automony:  
The current combination of economic recession and info-technological revolution is 
drastically affecting the working environment of journalists and challenging their 
autonomy more than ever. …Periods of political and economic instability or crisis 
can bring about a break down in professional values, the loss of whole journalistic 
communities, and abrupt changes to journalistic practices, all of which have a 
detrimental impact on journalistic autonomy. (Lauk and Harro-Loit 2017) 
The journalism ‘business model’ is shifting from product to process, from a transaction to a relationship 
and from a manufacturing to a service industry.  In the process journalism is being redefined by the new 
technology and the associated development of new relationships with audiences. Ideas of temporality, 
ethics and professionalism are being challenged. The whole structure of news mediation and 
information flows is changing. As Beckett and Fenoye (2012) have explicated:  
What we are seeing is a reformation of the whole structure of news mediation and 
information flows. To be successful at communicating in this new environment 
requires different tactics. If, however, the ultimate goal is creating substantial 
social or political change, rather than simply attracting attention, then a more 
strategic approach is also needed. This must include an understanding of …the new 
relationships being forged between citizens, information and authority. (Beckett & 
Fenoye 2012) 
This new understanding is pertinent to journalism’s mission in defence of freedom of expression, the 
right to know and the right to protect confidential sources and journalistic communications. Journalism 
culture needs rebooting in response to the development of these new norms. This requires what 
Hanitzsch (2007) has referred to as a ‘deconstruction of journalism culture’. The unprecedented 
upheaval in journalism and information access described above points to the need for development of 
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hybrid models of communication for social change. But before outlining what a suitable hybrid model of 
journalism, activism and international diplomacy might look like (following a review of existing 
alternative models of journalism practice and advocacy), it is important to note the inevitable 
professional resistance to attempts to redraw the perceived boundaries of current journalism practice. 
 
This process is called ‘boundary work’ or ‘paradigm repair’. Struggles over journalism are often struggles 
over ‘boundaries’. Lewis (2015) notes that the process of setting boundaries around the profession of 
journalism, “…is to claim a kind of mapmaking authority: to succeed in marshalling the resources 
necessary to lay claim to a certain space and impose a particular vision about the character, meaning, 
and distinctiveness of that space” (Lewis 2015). Vos and Moore (2018) have identified five periods in the 
history of US journalism that help define a pattern of: paradigm experimentation, inception, 
formalization, normalization, and reconsideration. This pattern is complicated by the rapid development 
of transformative technologies as Carlson (2015) acknowledges:  
…we’ll need an approach to the boundaries of journalism that fully acknowledges 
the social and the material from multiple perspectives, allowing the range of 
human actors and nonhuman technological objects, and the interstitial spaces and 
relationships between them, to come into full view. (Carlson & Lewis 2015) 
Highly relevant to this exegesis is Coddington’s (2012) study of ‘boundary patrol’ in acts of paradigm 
repair in reference to two international newspapers’ coverage of Wikileaks in 2010/2011. According to 
the study, The New York Times worked to portray Wikileaks as being ‘out of bounds’, especially 
regarding “institutionality, source-based reporting routines, and objectivity” (Coddington 2012). This 
work, of separating journalists and journalism from audiences, sources, subversive technology, and 
‘deviant’ models of journalism, has become more urgent in the wake of ‘radical transparency’ (from 
Wikileaks to Snowden), with many mastheads and journalists seeking to reinforce their autonomy 
through distance. This was reinforced via Revers’ (2017) study comparing German and American models 
of practice that identified the shared habit of seeking to re-entrench journalism’s professional 
‘mythology’. But as Annany (2018) has argued, historically: 
The authority of interpreters was derived not from how well they dispassionately 
adhered to ideals of ritualized distance and objectivity but how well they situated 
themselves within stories and audiences. Autonomy was premised not on freedom 
from interference that corrupted the professional communicator, but on a freedom 
to interpret that, ideally, helped readers relate to stories, understand possible 
interpretations, and appreciate their shared social conditions. (Annany 2018) 
5.4 Drawing on the advocacy journalism continuum 
 





differentiate themselves from alternative models of practice. Janowitz (1975) argued that ‘advocacy 
journalism’ was antithetical to objectivity and would therefore damage the credibility of journalism as a 
profession. However, Harcup (2005) points to one of the centrepieces of mainstream journalistic 
mythology – altruistic motivation: “I’m doing this to change the world.” And that is a source of 
motivation that warrants tapping for activist journalism in the human rights space – in particular with 
regard to secure communications between journalists and their sources, a right that underpins the 
practice of independent accountability journalism. While journalism practiced within alternative press 
environments – with advocacy and activism at the core - has traditionally been placed outside the 
boundaries of acceptable mainstream journalism practice, such ‘binary opposition’ has been tested by 
research demonstrating substantial practice crossover.  
 
In his study, Harcup (2005) provides empirical evidence to support the notion of movement along what 
he terms a ‘continuum of journalistic practice’: “…suggesting that consideration of the perspectives of 
hybrid practitioners, who have a range of journalistic experiences across alternative and mainstream 
media, can inform our understanding of journalism itself” (Harcup 2005). Similarly, Fisher (2016) argues 
that attempts to define journalism in terms of its separation from ‘advocacy’ are flawed because there is 
a strong strong tradition of advocacy within reporting: “…each work of journalism falls along a 
continuum of advocacy, ranging from subtle displays at one end, to overt at the other” (Fisher 2016). 
 
Alternative models of journalism practice grouped under the (broad) umbrella of ‘advocacy journalism’ 
(Waisbord 2008) are frequently focused on social policy issues and social justice causes. They can be 
classified according to the following taxonomy. 
 
5.4.1 Activist journalism 
 
Activist journalism involves the use of journalistic research practices and storytelling techniques within 
activist settings. But as Simon (2015) has explained, the lines between activism are now increasingly 
blurred, so much so that Russell (2016) has written that the interplay of activists and journalists has 
resulted in the transformation of journalism: “Journalists and activists from countries around the world 
cross digital streams and end up updating media practices and strategies.” (Russell 2016) A case study 
analysis by Barnard (2017) of the social media activation of this process during the #Ferguson protests in 
the US illustrates this point. He identifies the role of social media platforms in reporting and bolstering 
social change movements at the intersection of journalistic and activist practice: “While the traditions of 
objective journalism and affective activism persist, notable exceptions occurred, especially following 
acts of police suppression. The networked communities of professional and activist Twitter users were 






5.4.2 Alternative journalism 
 
Alternative journalism refers to the practice of journalism within ‘alternative media’ (sometimes called 
Indymedia), for example the South African anti-apartheid press of the 1970s and 1980s (C.f. Switzer & 
Adhikari, 2000) and community radio in developing contexts. As Atton (2003) has explained, alternative 
journalism can be understood in the context of alternative media that challenge the mainstream 
media’s institutionalised and professionalised practices: 
…alternative media privileges a journalism that is closely wedded to notions of 
social responsibility, replacing an ideology of ‘objectivity’ with overt advocacy and 
oppositional practices. Its practices emphasize first person, eyewitness accounts by 
participants; a reworking of the populist approaches of tabloid newspapers to 
recover a ‘radical popular’ style of reporting; collective and antihierarchical forms 
of organization which eschew demarcation and specialization – and which 
importantly suggest an inclusive, radical form of civic journalism. (Atton 2003) 
Rodriguez (2001) expounded an early theory of ‘citizens’ media’ in this space as a precursor to Gillmor’s 
(2004) ‘citizen journalism’. However, ‘alternative journalism’ continues to be practiced by professionally 
trained journalists affiliated with a cause or organisation, as Forde (2011) has documented. 
5.4.3 Development journalism 
 
In its early iterations, ‘development journalism’ was understood as applying critical reporting to state 
development projects, according to Ogan (1980), who also acknowledged that it was a contentious 
theory of journalism that involved serving “the development goals of a government”. In 2009, Jan 
Voordouw, a former Director with the Panos Network that works with journalists in developing contexts, 
described ‘development journalism’ as: “Community journalism (designed) to achieve larger objectives - 
social justice, improving health, education, bringing people together” (George 2009). While, Waisbord 
(2012) expounds: “One could argue that a journalism that contributes to participation, citizens’ 
expression and social justice...is not linked to the position of countries in the ‘Human Development’ 
index. Rather, it is a requirement for democracy without adjectives and geographical boundaries.” 
(Waisbord 2012) (See also: Wilkins 2012, Servaes & Malikhao 2012, Servaes 2009 and Waisbord 2014). 
‘Development journalism’ theory was at the core of the New World International Communication Order 
debate that caused such controversy for UNESCO in the late 1970s and early 1980s, per the earlier 
discussion in this exegesis. 
5.4.4 Interpretative journalism 
 
Is generally understood as an increasingly prevalent opinionated form of journalism practice that is 





perceived as a particular issue in political reporting, as McNair (2000) and Johnson and Graham (2013) 
have observed. It can be unsderstood as journalist-led (rather than source-led) reporting and it is 
frequently associated with analytical styles of journalism present in long form current affairs and 
documentary. It may or may not involve the journalist as a story participant adopting first person 
narrative e.g. Gonzo Journalism (Mosser 2012), New Journalism (Wolfe 1973). Salgado and Strömbäck 
(2011) have devised a methodology for analysing content to determine the level of ‘interpretation’ in a 
story with reference to story formats. 
5.4.5 Peace journalism 
 
Peace journalism theorises that most journalism produced about war and conflict is inflammatory, and 
unwittingly fuels further violence. Alternative modes of practice suggested are summarised by Lynch & 
McGoldrick (2005) as: “when editors and journalists make choices – of what to report, and how to 
report it – that consider opportunities for society at large to consider and value non-violent responses to 
conflict.”  (Lynch & McGoldrick 2005; See also: Hanitzsch 2007; Kempf 2007; Galtung & Lynch 2010). The 
17-point model for better practice devised by Lynch and McGoldrick is now applied to the reporting of 
politics, human rights and other potentially incendiary issues, as Youngblood (2017) has explicated. 
5.4.6 Crusaders and muckrakers: at the fringes of the mainstream 
 
‘Crusading journalism’, or ‘campaigning journalism’ (sometimes called ‘muckraking’) is usually situated 
within the mainstream tradition of ‘accountability journalism’ with a mission. Serrin and Serrin (2002) 
have documented the history of practice in US journalism, tracing its pivotal role in achieving 
progressive social policy outcomes and reform. It does not pretend to wear the mask of ‘objectivity’, 
instead favouring transparent practice. Resonantly, US academic David Weinberger (2009) has written 
“Transparency is the new objectivity.” However, ‘crusading journalism’ incorporates many of the 
normative practices associated with the traditions grouped under ‘advocacy journalism’, as described 
above. Waisbord (2008) has mapped the development of ‘advocacy journalism’ globally in parallel with 
the development of activists who use the news media to promote their causes. Ultimately, he contends 
that it is “unthinkable that journalism is anything but advocacy journalism.” (Waisbord 2008) 
 
The lines have further blurred with the entry of new actors: professional advocates who no longer need 
to rely on traditional news media gatekeepers (Bruns 2005) to draw attention to their cause, instead 
adopting journalistic storytelling methods for internet-enabled self-representation. Many of these actors 
are not just exploiting the Digital Age’s lowering of the bar to publishing and audience development to 
produce their own content for peer-to-peer distribution, they’re filling a void left by declining legacy 
media. Organisations from Amnesty International to Human Rights Watch and Greenpeace are hiring 
journalists and training their advocates and activists in journalistic methods to undertake investigative 





in response to the convergent crises outlined above. Kalcsics (2011) identified this trend in a study for 
Oxford University’s Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism:  
 
[Aid agencies have begun] turning themselves into reporters for the mainstream media, 
providing cash-strapped foreign desks with footage and words gratis. While there is an 
increasing void in foreign reporting by the conventional media, there is a hugely competitive 
compassion market… humanitarian agencies have become slicker, PR-focused media 
operations, which want to feed a content-hungry disaster news market. (Kalcsics 2011) 
  
As this convergence of investigative public sphere functions remains a work in progress, journalists 
making the move to activist organisations can find themselves at the receiving end of professional 
backlash – often performed publicly in the networked public sphere that is a hallmark of the social 
media era. Vine (2017) has studied one such case in New Zealand involving an experienced broadcast 
journalist who joined Greenpeace. He suggested that “advocacy journalism with strict ethical guidelines 
produced from within an organisation with a known agenda, may serve the public interest more ably 
than a fragmented mainstream journalism compromised by less obvious biases” (Vine 2017). Often, 
these actors collaborate with and work alongside ‘citizen journalists’ (Gillmor 2004) in order to bring 
verifiable information produced in the public interest to light. As a result of these developments, the UN 
has expanded the scope of protective legal instruments and normative frameworks (including source 
protection) originally designed to cover professional journalists to non-professional producers of public 
interest information. (Posetti 2017a) 
5.4.7 Public and participatory journalism 
 
Several other models of journalism are worth considering in the context of a hybrid model – at the 
intersection of journalism and human rights advocacy - for negotiating freedom of expression in public. 
The first three models are related: ‘public journalism’, ‘participatory/participative journalism’, and 
‘collaborative journalism’. Public journalism emerged in the early 1990s in the US, driven substantially 
by NYU journalism professor Jay Rosen. He initiated projects designed to “redefine journalism in the 
spirit of, and on behalf of, the public.” (Rosen 1993) Rosen’s ‘Project on Public Life and the Press’, 
became recognised as “a model for embracing a civic professionalism and taking on a civic identity” 
(Rosen 1993). Rosen (2000) further developed the theory, challenging conceptions of ‘othered’ 
audiences, instead “Seeing people as citizens rather than spectators, readers, viewers, listeners or 
an undifferentiated mass. Starting where citizens start, but not ending where citizens end.” And the 
process that flowed from this method was a collaborative one: “Identifying issues of public concern 
through direct inquiry with citizens” (Rosen 2000).  As part of this movement, several news organisations 
entered collaborations with communities. Annany (2018) has observed that “Some newspapers 
invented new organizational forms, reporting techniques, and principles of audience engagement to 





they served.” (Annany 2018; see also: Glasser & Craft 1996; Glasser 1999).  
 
The ‘public journalism movement’ marked the beginning of an historic realignment of journalism with 
audiences and the ‘citizens’ agenda’. The mainstreaming of the internet in the late 1990s, followed 
quickly by the advent of social media in the early 2000s delivered augmented models of public 
journalism that enabled easy discovery and integration of ‘user generated content’ (UGC) and 
collaborative research and production processes that characterise ‘citizen journalism’, ‘participatory 
journalism’ and community centred models of ‘collaborative journalism’. These methods that allowed 
the construction of communities on social platforms enabled the crowdsourcing of story ideas, realtime 
access to witness accounts of events, and conveyed raw lived experiences direct to newsrooms (Posetti 
2013). Wall (2017) contends that participatory journalism modes are now standard from the journalism 
classroom to the newsroom. 
5.4.8 Slow journalism to solutions journalism  
 
Three other models to note are also inter-related: ‘solutions journalism’, ‘constructive journalism’, and 
‘slow journalism’. ‘Solutions journalism’ grew out of the ‘peace journalism’ movement and it, in turn, 
inspired the more recently emerging Danish model of ‘constructive journalism’. These models have the 
same objectives, summarised by Wenzel (2016): “Solutions journalism explores responses to systemic 
social problems—critically examining problem solving efforts that have the potential to scale. 
Proponents of this genre of journalism believe these types of stories offer a pathway to engaging 
audiences” (Wenzel et al 2016). He described preliminary research that indicated news consumers are 
more likely to seek and share stories that are solutions-oriented. This approach can function as a 
meaningful intervention in local communities historically stigmatized, under-represented or ‘othered’ by 
daily news coverage. Wenzel noted that many of the participants in his study were enabled to “envision 
a way to become personally involved in community problem solving” (Wenzel et al 2016) – indicating 
that the practice could help deliver agency to alienated news consumers.  ‘Constructive journalism’ is 
the name given to a theoretically and methodologically similar concept popularised by prominent 
Danish editor Ulrik Haagerup in his 2014 book Constructive Journalism: How to save the media and 
democracy with journalism of tomorrow. As noted by Mast et al (2018) theory and scholarship 
surrounding ‘constructive journalism’ is fledgling but it has identifiable roots in positive psychology.  
 
Finally, the emerging concept of ‘Slow journalism’ is worth considering – and it has parallels with 
‘solutions’ and ‘constructive’ journalism. ‘Slow journalism’ has its origins in the pushback against the 
instantaneous news cycles of the social media age that are characterised (for many audiences) by 
information overload and filter failure (Shirky 2009). It suggests a more investigative, longform, 
considered, methodical, reflective and explanatory approach to issues, events and characters. Drok and 





want journalism to be more investigative, inclusive, co-operative and constructive,” which they posit as 
the theoretical building blocks for future research. 
 
The agenda-setting role of investigative journalism is also worth re-examing in the context of these 
collective theories. As Olsen (2008) demonstrated in her analysis of Danish investigative documetaries, 
stories that generate significant public debate often mobilise and engage civil society, and judge 
perpetrators of perceived offences, in a manner that could be construed as activist. Ultimately, Carey’s 
(1997) concept of ‘principled sense-making’ could help aid the collective appreciation of the shared 
social impacts involved with the erosion of freedom of expression rights like source protection and 
privacy. He contended that journalism was not simply “reporting that put the words and actions of 
others into simpler language” but principled sense-making that “invested the ordinary with significance” 
and helped audiences “come to terms with old realities in new ways.” (Carey 1997) 
 
5.5 The rise of social media  
 
The Digital Age removed barriers to publication, as described by Gillmor (2004) and signalled, as Rosen 
(2006) put it, “the shift of the tools of production to the people formerly known as the audience.” They 
became co-producers, of content, including news - a function and practice described as ‘produsage’ by 
Bruns (2008). They initially built audiences via email and chat-rooms before social media platforms 
dramatically amplified their reach. In many countries, by the mid-2000s, Twitter and Facebook had 
joined YouTube as social media mainstays, influencing the practices and professional identities of 
journalists - especially regarding verification, audience engagement, and the clash of the personal and 
public spheres that occur on social platforms, as I have previously demonstrated (Posetti 2009), and the 
distribution of content. As individuals formed networks built around trust, peer-to-peer distribution of 
content (particularly on Facebook) began to challenge traditional methods of content dissemination.  
 
Users curated their own content streams - including content from news services, journalists and other 
reliable information providers - without mediation. As a result of distribution via ‘trust networks’ (users 
and peers), inaccurate, false, malicious and propagandistic content masquerading as news found 
increased traction (Ireton & Posetti 2018). For example, researchers Bakir and McStay (2017) have 
discovered that both emotive content, and content shared by a friend or family member is more likely 
to be redistributed on social media.  
5.5.1 Crowdsourcing 
 
Benefits of audience-networked journalism include the ability to crowdsource diverse sources, 
undertake collaborative verification – a process described by Garcia de Torres (2017), Hermida (2012) 
and me (Posetti, 2013) - and build loyal audiences supported by direct engagement between the 





Ahva & Heikkila (2016). They also empower the audience to ‘talk back’ in order to correct the record 
where reporters are in error, or to contribute collaboratively to research. Journalists and audiences can 
now bypass arbitrary restrictions and censorship, which were previously a fetter on democracy (Posetti, 
2018c). 
 
Journalists’ engagement with audiences and information sources via social media channels can also be 
seen as a noteworthy new feature of accountability frameworks that aid self-regulation and enable 
journalists to build appreciation for the purposefulness of their role in open societies. These interactions 
allow journalists to publicly and swiftly respond to valid critiques of their work, to instantly correct 
errors and to increase the transparency of their practice by ‘making content out of process’ (Posetti 
2013). There is also the (not uncomplicated) advantage of increased transparency of news sources. As 
Marwick and Boyd (2011) have written, reporters can quickly learn much more about sources than they 
might ever have revealed in an interview, simply because both audiences and journalists are brought 
together by social media platforms that collapse contexts. Additionally, there is the risk that in forging 
relationships with potential sources on social platforms, confidential sources will be inclined to expose 
themselves inadvertently in insecure digital environments.  
 
Guardian Editor-In-Chief Katherine Viner has assessed that “Facebook has become the richest and most 
powerful publisher in history by replacing editors with algorithms.”(Viner 2017) The social platforms 
have been hailed as ‘the new gatekeepers’ by Bell and Owen (2017), although they remain reluctant to 
accept responsibility for traditional publishing oversights - including verification and curation - despite 
making decisions to censor some content in a manner that undermines media freedom (Hindustan 
Times 2016). Efforts by the platforms to address disinformation and misinformation are evolving rapidly 
but their resistance to a) responding adequately, on a global scale, and b) taking publisher-style 
responsibility for the social and democratic impacts risks them becoming used as factories for 
‘information disorder’ and online abuse (Posetti 2017b), further complicating their relationships with 
journalists and audiences in the networked press freedom environment. 
5.5.2 Digital activism 
 
Pre-social media, Wall (2003) summarised the impact of the digital revolution 1.0 on activist journalism: 
“Activist journalism has greatly benefited from the internet, which has created [for activist 
journalists]…a new means of creating and distributing their own versions of events, while combining 
that information with mobilising messages designed to prompt immediate responses” (Wall 2003). 
Channelling McLuhan (1964), Wall observed that: “It’s difficult to separate the movement from the 
medium.” That observation would become even more astute in the social media era. 
 
The social web enabled the citizen/audience engagement objectives of public journalism to be leveraged 





constituents, prompt action & create movement identities” (Russell 2016 p.115). She contends that: 
“Ultimately, digital activist journalism represents a new phase in social movement communications and 
in the definition of news itself.” (2016, p 122) 
 
Social media now play a new role in brokering media activists ‘meaning construction’ and ‘identity 
building processes’ according to Milan (2015), who identified the ‘politics of visibility’ as being central, 
along with the interactive elements of shared identity. One interesting study highlighting the 
regenerative influence of advocacy journalism on mainstream practice comes from Harlow and 
Sallaveira (2016). From an examination of ‘native media’ in Latin America, the authors found that the 
highest impact sites are attempting to “renovate traditional, outdated modes of journalism, serving as 
alternatives to mainstream media and aiming to change society.” (Harlow and Sallaveira 2016). They 
determined that the sites’ “emphasis on using innovative, digital techniques is important for re-
conceptualizing not just the role of journalism in a digital era, but also journalism’s relationship 
to alternative media and activism.” 
 
An investigative reporter from the UK’s Channel 4 reflected on the value of social media era online 
activists to political communication, following the first viral campaign #Kony2012, acknowledging that: “I 
think we could learn something from them about how to get a message across, and how to talk to a 
generation that has stopped bothering to read newspaper and watch TV news” (Hilsum 2012). That’s a 
view shared by McNutt and Goldkind (2015) whose investigation of ‘e-activism’ (also called 
‘cyberactivism’ (McCaughey & Ayres 2003), ‘cyberadvocacy’ (McNutt & Appenzeller 2004), ‘electronic 
advocacy’ (McNutt & Boland 1999), and ‘digitally-enhanced social change’ (Earl & Kimport 2011) 
highlighted the sort of cues journalists, UNESCO and civil society organisations working to advance press 
freedom rights could profitably respond to:  
 
Activists can combine community organizing, demonstrations, lobbying and electoral strategies with e-
mail campaigns, social media efforts and sophisticated data analysis. Campaigns can also be waged 
completely online. This creates a situation where you have…hybrid efforts using a mix of technology 
tools and traditional social change tools (McNutt & Goldkind 2015).  
 
However, in the context of an exegesis focused on mitigating the risks and threats posed to investigating 
journalism via the ‘surveillance state’, it is important to acknowledge the dystopian perspective. As 
Brooke (2012) wrote: “We have the technology to build a new type of democracy but equally we might 
create a new type of totalitarianism.” Morozov (2011) also wrote presciently on the ways in which 
secretive, authoritarian and hierarchical regimes were countering the promise of the ‘age of openness’ 
in the first blush of the digital revolution. Cyberutopians106 “did not predict how useful it [the Internet] 
                                                             





would prove for propaganda purposes, how masterfully dictators would learn to use it for surveillance, 
and how sophisticated modern system of Internet censorship would become.” (Morozov, 2011) 
 
5.6 Towards a hybrid journalism model 
 
As part of an earlier research project in 2007, I developed a hybrid journalism model, borrowing from 
several of the theories discussed above, designed to produce more nuanced, resonant journalism about 
Muslim women (Posetti 2007). My objective was to counter the perpetuation of negative, inflammatory 
stereotypes in news coverage through an intersectional model that has broad enough applicability to 
reference here, as I work towards a hybrid alternative model for communicating freedom of expression 
issues. In this decade-old project, I proposed the exploration of a convergent model that drew on 
‘participatory reporting’, ‘public journalism’, ‘advocacy journalism’ and ‘peace journalism’ that could 
also be seen as inspiration for a hybrid model of journalism that aids public awareness of human rights 
threats connected to privacy and freedom of expression. These approaches in combination have the 
capacity to address the shortcomings of traditional expressions of Western journalism – including 
misapprehensions about ‘objectivity’: 
 
Participatory reporting can take the form of mainstream journalists embedding themselves in 
stories or making their experience central to their report... Advocacy journalism is more 
controversial in Western media culture because it eschews established (if outdated) notions of 
objectivity and instead involves subjective reporting and support or promotion of a particular 
cause. There are dangers inherent in such an approach - it’s a short walk from advocacy 
journalism to propaganda. (Posetti 2007) 
 
But I acknowledged that advocacy journalism had played an important role in democratisation and the 
advancement of social justice: 
 
For example, in the coverage of the civil rights movement in the US and in resistance to South 
African apartheid. …it may also be time to re-visit the ‘peace journalism’ model of reporting 
which aims to frame stories in a way that focuses on analysis and elicits a more considered 
response [and] a greater focus on the causes and consequences of problems – encouraging 
better understanding of alternative perspectives on the part of the audience. (Posetti 2007) 
 
On the basis of this research, in 2010 I proposed a model for revamping Australian political journalism 
education in the form of a hybrid model, industry-partnered student journalism project (Posetti 2010) to 
address audience apathy towards election coverage. I put a similar plan into action in 2011 with the 
#ReportingRefugees project, which repurposed public journalism for the social media era in a 





Corporation (ABC). The objective was to educate and inform audiences while involving them in the 
framing of the content via crowdsourcing, and allowing them to collaborate on mythbusting processes 
designed to address inflammatory and racist coverage of the issues (Posetti & Powles 2013). Both of 
these projects informed my approach to developing an intersectional model to build a community of 
interest around Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age. 
5.6.1 The process of hybridisation 
 
This process of hybridisation is not unique to journalism. The internet has delivered such intersectional 
transformation to political parties, interest groups and other powerbrokers through what Chadwick 
(2007) termed ‘organisational hybridity’ based on “the selective transplantation and adaptation of 
digital network repertoires previously considered typical of social movements” (Chadwick 2007). A 
decade later, Chadwick (2017) concluded that “New communication technologies have reshaped media 
and politics.” According to what he described as a ‘hybrid system’: 
 
Power is wielded by those who create, tap, and steer information flows to suit their goals and in 
ways that modify, enable, and disable the power of others, across and between a range of older 
and newer media… the clash of media logics causes chaos and disintegration but also surprising 
new patterns of order and integration. (Chadwick 2017) 
 
Chadwick posited that “hybridity is creating emergent openness & fluidity as grassroots activist groups 
and even lone individuals now use newer media to make decisive interventions in the news-making 
process.” 
 
Russell (2016) identified this hybridisation as it manifests in the media – with particular relevance to this 
exegesis – as a product of “hacktivist sensibilities”. She contended that the media is being “hacked and 
recoded” by “influential vanguard members working inside and outside journalism” (Russell 2016 p 15), 
noting that “professional journalism norms have long been challenged by alternative or radical media 
products and practices” (Russell 2016 p 15).  In this category are ‘hacker-journos’ and ‘programmer-tech 
wizards’, whom she said “resemble digital age muckrakers in the ways they combine the libertarian and 
utopian hacker ethics 80s & 90s with the high calling of ‘journalism as civic watchdog…who do 
journalism to effect change” (Russell 2016 p 48). With particular pertinence to the practice of journalism 
in the era of source protection erosion, Russell concludes that this self-identified group of journalists: 
 
…aims to recode media power by making the workings of governments and corporations more 
transparent, empowering news orgs with digital tools and platforms that shape the material 
that outlets produce and that they believe will better foster an informed and active citizenry. 






Arguably, this is evidence of an emergent journalism sensibility at the intersection of media activism and 
journalism innovation. Media anthropologist Jon Postill (2015) has identified “A Global techno 
libertarian vanguard” of hackers, lawyers and journalists working collaboratively to defend reporting 
based on confidential sources and information provided by whistleblowers. This work includes the 
participatory development of encryption software. Such an approach was identified in Protecting 
Journalism Sources in the Digital Age by Gavin Millar QC who chairs a program at Goldsmith’s University 
in London devoted to providing investigative reporters with ‘safe’ laptops to avoid detection. (Posetti 
2017a p. 22-23) 
 
5.6.2 Networked press freedom  
 
As Starr (2012) has declared:  
 
The digital revolution has been good for freedom of expression because it has increased the 
diversity of voices in the public sphere. The digital revolution has been good for freedom of 
information because it has made government documents and data directly accessible to more 
people and has fostered a culture that demands transparency from powerful institutions. But 
the digital revolution has both revitalized and weakened freedom of the press. (Starr 2012 
p.234) 
 
‘Press freedom’ is most frequently defined in the literature, in the news, and in civil society discourse in 
terms of the institutional news media’s separation and protection from overt interference and threats 
(C.f. Hocking 1948; Czepek & Hellwig 2009; Anderson, 2001; Bezanson 2010; Reid 2017; Annany 2018). 
The term ‘media freedom’ is considered by many to be a more inclusive term than ‘press freedom’ (with 
its print-era connotations and overtly professional orientation), however both terms can be generally 
and collectively summarised, as Reid (2017) asserts: 
…as pointing to rights of media workers and producers, editors and journalists, to 
produce and disseminate media content freely, and without interference or fear of 
interference from the centres of power, whether that be: (1) the government, 
political actors, organs of the state; (2) corporates, big business, including but not 
exclusively media owners; or (3) in some countries, criminal elements, warlords, 
terrorist organisations or drug cartels (Reid 2017) 
That is to say, press freedom is generally constructed in terms of the press’ rights to be free from fetters, 
intrusions and threats to independence in order to enable producers of verifiable information shared in 







However, in light of the ‘digital revolution’ and its rendering of the networked public sphere, all of the 
previously discussed theory and models of journalism practice now need to be viewed through the lens 
of Annany’s (2014, 2018) theory of ‘networked press freedom’ in order to consider a new, intersectional 
model for negotiating and communicating freedom of expression in public. He argues that it is time to 
recast and reconfigure Emerson’s (1970) concept of freedom of expression to serve democratic ideals & 
reimagine norms. His theory suggests that the nature of the networked era press freedom struggle 
demands a more collaborative approach and redefinitions, along with new practices: 
Democratic self-governance requires both an individual right to speak and a public 
right to hear…to highlight the idea that liberty is a collective achievement, not only 
an individual right—a dual reading of autonomy…just as individual liberty requires 
conditions of collectivity, so too does the press’s institutional freedom. (Annany 
2018) 
Central to this idea is the concept of the press designing collaborations that ensure a public ‘right to 
hear’, not just a right for the autonomous press to ‘speak’. It’s a concept that seems familiar when 
considered in light of ‘public journalism’, ‘solutions journalism’, ‘advocacy journalism’, ‘interpretive 
journalism’, and other ‘journalisms’ designed to grant audiences agency, as the press reconfigures its 
ideal of autonomy in the networked public sphere. According to Annany, journalists are both 
‘professional communicators’ who distance themselves from audiences and stories through the 
performance of ‘objectivity’ rituals, and ‘individual interpreters’ who craft stories designed to be 
meaningful and accessible to audiences, as Carey (1969) described. Annany’s view is that the press must 
earn its freedom through an interactive process of determining what kind of publics it wants to co-
create. For the press to claim ‘freedom from’ (e.g. political interference) it must also assert (on behalf of 
its audiences) the ‘freedom to’ listen/hear, and consider its position in reference to its duty to engage 
with others: “the press earns its own freedom by helping to ensure the autonomy of its constituents” 
(Annany 2018). And to do that, it must interactively describe, inform, relate to, and contribute to the 
education of other citizens, while simultaneously listening to them. This requires the press to walk a fine 
line in order to claim its autonomy, according to Annany: 
 It must distinguish itself from others, while simultaneously acknowledging that 
much of its work happens with others. What does press freedom mean today, given 
that news production spans so many different actors, norms, practices, and 
technologies? Rather than simply being about distance from others, networked 
press autonomy might better be understood as a set of moves and orientations – 
separations and dependencies through which the press negotiates its uniqueness, 






This applies not just to audiences but to technology: devices, platforms, algorithms, and Artificial 
Intelligence. Annany relates the concept of networked press freedom directly to journalists’ 
relationships with their sources, through a careful balancing act involving: 
…the freedom to cultivate relationships with sources but the need to negotiate with 
their interests and agendas for being sources; the power to invite sources into 
stories or broadcasts but the ethical duty to quote them directly or let them speak; 
the ability to construct balance and shape debates by combining sources with 
different viewpoints but the ultimate professional obligation to bracket your own 
interpretations (Annany 2018) 
The interplay of socio-technical factors identified by Annany as central to the theory of ‘networked press 
freedom’ is also relevant to source protection strategies within news organisations and it manifests in 
several different ways. For example, through the deployment of technologies like PGP, encrypted apps 
and Tor networks that anonymise traffic, along with other practices like password security and secure 
drop boxes, journalists are negotiating relationships with, and separations from sources, technology, 
audiences and hostile actors. As the Snowden story and the Panama Papers demonstrated, journalists’ 
ability to recognise threats from external forces and mitigate them via defensive digital strategies 
enabled their relationships with key confidential sources. As Annany has observed, “It is professionally 
beneficial for them to be close to sociotechnical security cultures, but such proximity brings personal 
risks. There is no one right distance that ensures both autonomy and security.” (Annany 2018) 
 
The interdependency of journalists, audiences and technology also makes journalists more vulnerable to 
targeted attack, including hacking, disinformation campaigns designed to mislead and pollute the news 
ecosystem, and harassment (Posetti 2018b; Ireton and Posetti 2018). Annany (2018) points out that the 
platforms (e.g. Google, Facebook and Twitter) have alerted journalists and worked with news 
organisations to improve digital defences, but it is this interdependency that makes the news 
organisations vulnerable. “In the case of the Twitter hacks, news organizations’ closeness to the 
platform—relying on its security infrastructure to archive and deliver news—meant that they shared in 
the platform’s security vulnerabilities. After the attacks, Twitter warned news organizations that more 
attacks were likely to come and asked news organizations to help thwart them.” (Annany 2018) 
 
Arguably, networked press freedom also necessitates the implementation of several of the 
recommendations from Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age, including the need to inform 
the public about the impacts of source protection erosion and educate sources and whistleblowers in 
defensive digital strategies like encrypted communications. Such an approach, viewed through the lens 






5.6.3 A more audience-centred approach to media freedom  
 
Reid’s (2015; 2017) theory of counter-mythologising media freedom effectively extends the concept of 
‘networked press freedom’ as an enabler of the right of publics to hear. She contends that, especially in 
the Global South, the rights of audiences to hear/listen need to be considered from the perspective of 
diverse (frequently economically disadvantaged) publics’ capacities to access information. She suggests 
reconceptualising media freedom to include three key elements: 
 
• Media freedom involves the freedom of media producers to “speak”, otherwise known as 
freedom of expression. 
• It involves the freedom to access the media - considering media freedom from the 
perspective of the audience and not only the media producer.  
• Media freedom includes the freedom to respond to content which is carried in the media, 
which includes ordinary media users’ ability to produce media content of their own.  
 
Reid’s main contention is that media freedom theories and strategies that focus exclusively or primarily 
on the rights of media professionals to collect and disseminate content is limiting and counter-
productive because “The communicative chain of media messaging does not end once content is 
published.” Her point being that news consumers in a networked public sphere now consume, share, 
augment, comment on and critique content (frequently in realtime) via social media, within news 
websites’ digital feedback facilities, and through blogs, memes and other means after the content is first 
published. They also perform as collaborators on story research, verification and production in the social 
media age (Bruns 2008; Posetti 2009; Posetti 2013). 
 
According to Reid (2015), then: 
The term ‘media freedom’ in a more holistic sense certainly involves the notion of 
allowing journalists and editors to do their work freely and independently, but it 
also involves the freedom of the ordinary person to access and respond to that 
work. If the idea of media freedom is applied to media producers only, with no 
regard to the audience, then only a small part of the mass communications chain is 
being considered, while what is in a digital world arguably the more crucial part, is 
being ignored. The entirety of the media chain does not only involve media 
producers, but includes the audience, so the notion of media freedom needs to be 
applied to the whole chain, not only part of it.  
 
Finally, in addition to recognising the right of diverse publics to hear, speak, reply, and access 





explained (2018), in much of the Global South, the cost of accessing public interest information is 
prohibitive and the distribution of such content is inequitable and frequently not suitably linguistically 
diverse. “Under such conditions, individuals’ access to the media is entirely determined by how much 
money they have, where they live, and which language/s they speak” (Reid 2011). So, media freedom is 
not just about what people are permitted to say publicly, but also about what content they are 
permitted to access, the standard and availability of essential communications infrastructure, what 
languages such information is available, and what they can afford to access. The importance of this last 
point cannot be overemphasised. As Abrahams and Pillay (2014) reported from a study of media users in 
South Africa, while buying data bundles for mobile communications was viewed as essential by most 
participants, it was so expensive that they found themselves having to choose between feeding their 
families and being able to access digital communications. 
 
This approach to reconceptualising media/press freedom theories for the networked public sphere, with 
an emphasis on audience freedoms, is instructive for the purpose of developing a new hybrid model for 
the global communication of freedom of expression rights – both through journalism and via direct 
engagement with audiences. It implies a responsibility to engage networked publics in the defence of 
freedom of expression rights connected to the practice of journalism, and a need to communicate the 
threats that source protection erosion poses to the media freedom rights of audiences (potential 
sources among them). But it also makes it incumbent upon journalists, civil society and UNESCO to 
factor the media freedom rights of audiences into their research and reporting on, and advocacy for, 
freedom of expression rights internationally.  
 
5.7 Conclusion and summary 
 
In this chapter I have reviewed a number of different models of journalism which underpin the approach 
to the intersectional work of this PhD project. I argue that there are a range of advocacy models of 
journalism - from development journalism to peace journalism, from public journalism to solutions 
journalism - which have at their heart, a desire to facilitate social change. I have also described earlier 
projects that I have been involved with and which also sought to draw on these participatory, public 
models of journalism to work for social change. These models, like the one described in this PhD project, 
can help to build engaged communities through a process of ‘making content out of process’, which in 
turn can begin to dissolve the traditional barriers between news producer and consumer. I concluded by 
looking at recent work describing a model of ‘networked press freedom’ (Annany 2018) and audience-
centric media freedom (Reid 2017) which also highlights the interdependence of journalists, audiences 
and technology. Viewed collectively, these theories provide an historic anchor and a scholarly 
framework for the holistic Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age project which brings together 
journalism, academic research, policy development and audience engagement to publicly negotiate 













Chapter 6: ‘Collective Deconstruction’ - A Critical Reflective Practice 
Account 
 
“The challenge of being able to do rigorous and meaningful research while not pissing 
off any States involves an inherent tension that cannot be resolved.”  - Dr Courtney 
Radsch, Advocacy Director, Committee to Protect Journalists and former UNESCO 
Senior Project Officer. 
“I find it really problematic when the Organisations don’t stand up for their mandate, 
and if that means standing up in the face of State pressure, they should do it!”  - UN 
Special Rapporteur, Prof. David Kaye 
“For a serious investigative journalism nerd, who counts All the President’s Men among 
her favourite films, there was an appealing element of intrigue to all this. A kind of 
journalism romance. That romance was in part environmental.” – Julie Posetti 
What follows is a Critical Reflective Practice account of the production and publication of UNESCO’s 
Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age, and the themes at its core. It adopts a narrative non-
fiction form and it is a product of a process that I identify as ‘cooperative deconstruction’. This description 
casts the interviewees informing this account as co-creators of knowledge and, in some instances, as 
contributors to a process of collaborative deconstruction/reconstruction of shared experiences with the 
objective of reaching a common or collective understanding. This practice acknowledges the value of fluid 
research ‘conversations’ around contested meanings of events and/or experiences present in individual 
recollections in forging, through a process of ‘interactive unpacking’, what could be understood as 
negotiated memory.107 
 
Here, I will enact and facilitate the intersection of theory drawn from feminist and analytic 
autoethnography, journalism studies, and Critical Reflective Practice108, enabling an interplay of voices 
and characters. This hybrid storytelling exercise is part textual catharsis, part narrative non-fiction, part 
reportage. It also seeks to document the practice of an intersectional model for negotiating freedom of 
expression in public, in the ‘networked press freedom’ (Annany 2018) environment. I situate myself 
within this interplay of voices, and the tensions explored, and although I have enjoyed and been 
stimulated by the ‘interactive unpacking’ during the interview process, this exegesis is of course my own 
and the final responsibility for its analysis is also mine. Finally, this exegesis demonstrates the lived 
experience of a journalist-researcher, recognising that the private/personal and public/professional 
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‘interactive unpacking’ and ‘negotiated memory’ does not indicate a willingness on behalf of all interviewees to self-
identify as contributors to these processes and/or outcomes. The interviewees do not have co-responsibility for my 
analysis and conclusions, nor do they necessarily agree with them. 





spheres are inseparable and overlapping. 
 
The book at the core of this PhD project was really a ‘labour of love’ in the service of journalism – an 
intense experience that developed close relationships and threatened to derail others. Its backstory is 
about: the process of conducting contentious research for an intergovernmental organisation in an age 
of mass surveillance and ‘strongman politics’; fraught working environments; interwoven personal and 
professional relationships; the value of practice-led research and; the importance of public 
conversations about difficult issues fundamental to freedom of expression rights. Ultimately, it’s a 
backstory that helped deliver a complex study about intersecting threats to freedom of expression and 
privacy – a study that has so far delivered impacts that extend from a newsroom in Pakistan to citations 
in the European Court of Human Rights and a UN General Assembly Resolution. It also sits at the centre 
of this exegesis which, in turn, features the voices of key actors associated with the book’s production. 
The interviewees contributing to this process, which I am describing as ‘cooperative deconstruction’,109 
are: 
 
• Dr. Guy Berger: Director of Freedom of Expression and Media Development at UNESCO. Berger 
commissioned Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age and we have collaborated on 
journalism education and research projects over the past decade. As Head of School at Rhodes 
University’s School of Journalism and Media Studies in South Africa, Prof. Berger invited me 
three times to be embedded as a visiting academic. My last Rhodes placement immediately 
preceded his move to UNESCO in 2011. I have since collaborated with him on two UNESCO 
book projects110 in addition to Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age, a consultancy 
connected to the UNESCO Internet Universality Indicators study (UNESCO 2018c), and a range 
of conference panels.  
• Prof. David Kaye: UN Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to 
Freedom of Opinion and Expression. As I was finalising the UNESCO study in 2015, he involved 
me (as an expert contributor) in the research process leading to his Report to the UN General 
Assembly on the protection of whistleblowers and confidential sources (Kaye 2015b). He 
subsequently championed publication of Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age and 
cited it in his September 2015 Report in its ‘forthcoming’ state. We have sat on several 
international conference panels together. 
• Dr. Courtney Radsch: Advocacy Director at the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ). She was 
previously a Senior Project Officer within UNESCO’s Freedom of Expression and Media 
Development Division, and she edited the first edition of the Organization’s flagship study 
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110 These are: Posetti, J. (2017). Fighting Back Against Prolific Online Harassment: Maria Ressa in L. Kilman (Ed) 
An Attack on One is an Attack on All Paris: UNESCO http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0025/002593/259399e.pdf  







World Trends in Freedom of Expression and Media Development (UNESCO 2014c) – it was 
published the year my book was commissioned. The second edition of that World Trends report 
(UNESCO 2015b) featured a major extract from my study. Radsch ran a CPJ campaign on the 
implications of NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden’s revelations for investigative journalism in 
parallel with my UNESCO research commission, and we collaborated on a conference 
presentation at the Online News Association in Chicago in 2014 as both projects were 
commencing. 
• James Risen: Prominent US investigative journalist who is a former National Security Editor and 
CIA correspondent at The New York Times, where he worked on the Snowden Files. He is now 
Senior National Security correspondent with The Intercept. He was involved in a 10-year legal 
struggle with consecutive US governments who sought to compel him to reveal his source/s for 
a book on a national security bungle. His case is featured in Protecting Journalism Sources in the 
Digital Age (Posetti 2017a p88). 
 
6.1 A project takes shape: “No action can be taken on problems that 
remain hidden”  
 
It was the middle of a hot Paris summer in 2014 when the contract for Protecting Journalism Sources in 
the Digital Age was signed by UNESCO and the World Association of News Publishers (WAN-IFRA). The 
air was thick with tension even before the research began.  
 
Relationships: their interweaving; their traversing of the personal/private and professional/public 
spheres and; the strain they come under in the context of highly pressurised, contentious projects are a 
central theme of the backstories accompanying this exegesis and the book at its core. I will reflect on 
these issues later, but first I want to map the genesis of the book. 
 
Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age was commissioned by UNESCO when I was based in ‘the 
city of light’ as Research Fellow and Research Editor with WAN-IFRA and the World Editors Forum (WEF), 
on secondment from my position as a journalism academic at the University of Wollongong (UOW) in 
Australia. From Wollongong to Paris, I had gone in February 2014. It was quite the trajectory; from the 
campus of a working-class industrial city in Australia to one of the world’s most iconic capitals. Ten of 
my UOW journalism students also made the journey on a national grant I’d secured to support 
international student mobility. Two-by-two they came, to work at my side researching and reporting on 
the future of journalism from the privileged perspective of a global organisation with deep connections 
to newsrooms around the world, and roots in the freedom of expression challenges of World War Two.   
 





Expression and Media Development Guy Berger on research essentially triggered by Edward Snowden’s 
revelations. He was seeking input from international editors and investigative journalists as he 
commenced work on a large project examining the state of privacy and freedom of expression online. 
That project – which ultimately led to the commissioning of my book – was mandated by 195 UNESCO 
Member States via a Resolution that had been moved by Brazil. It declared, in part: “…privacy is 
essential to protect journalistic sources, which enable a society to benefit from investigative journalism, 
to strengthen good governance and the rule of law, and such privacy should not be subject to arbitrary 
or unlawful interference.” (UNESCO 2013a) 
 
Berger brought the Resolution to my attention in my WAN-IFRA Editor-Research Fellow capacity, 
suggesting that it deserved greater attention as it offered significant value as an endorsement of the 
role of investigative journalism to societies, underscoring the importance of protecting confidential 
sources. I agreed to interview him about the potential impact of this Resolution, and the research 
project that it mandated, with a view to facilitating the contribution of editors and investigative 
journalists via a story for the WAN-IFRA website I edited. Berger was especially interested in their views 
on the free expression-privacy nexus, “particularly as it plays out in cyberspace.” (Posetti 2014) 
 
In an interview published as part of my story, Berger made clear his concerns about the importance of 
confidential source protection: 
 
Posetti: Why is privacy essential to the protection of journalists' sources? 
Berger: Whistleblowers will fear contacting journalists if they have reason to doubt 
confidentiality. The effect? Less news about corruption or abuse will enter the 
public domain, and everyone will be information poorer. No action can be taken on 
problems that remain hidden. All this is why many countries have laws which shield 
journalists from having to reveal their sources. 
Posetti: What are the potential consequences if sources' privacy is subjected to 
"arbitrary or unlawful interference"? 
Berger: If there is no adequate protection, this has a ‘chilling’ effect in that people 
do not feel safe to speak to the press. This is why it is a key journalistic ethic to 
shield sources from being exposed, sometimes even sustained by reporters at great 
personal cost and in the face of a legal process. It is especially the untoward 
pressures, however, which put the reputation of the profession at greatest risk. 
(Posetti 2014) 





Digital Age’111 which was held in response to the historic UN Resolution of the same name passed in 
December 2013 (UN News 2013). In turn, that Resolution was informed by former Special Rapporteur on 
the Right to Freedom of Expression and Opinion, Frank La Rue. La Rue, who would ultimately join 
UNESCO as the Assistant Director General for Communication and Information and assume 
responsibility for publishing Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age, issued a salient warning at 
the experts’ seminar: “If we pitch national security against human rights, we'll end up losing both.” 
The following month, I entered discussions with Berger about a potential research collaboration with 
UNESCO on issues pertaining to journalism in the ‘post-Snowden’ era. These discussions began in the 
context of my editorship of the flagship World Editors Forum research report: Trends in Newsrooms 
2014 (Posetti 2014d) which identified the number one global issue of concern for journalists as: The 
Urgent Need to Shield Journalism in the Age of Surveillance (Posetti 2014c). As a feature of this Trends in 
Newsrooms chapter, I published an extended interview with Berger, which included his observations on 
one of the key themes, the capacity for mass surveillance to undercut legal source protection 
frameworks: 
Posetti: With the benefit of UNESCO’s global view, what is the future for journalism 
based on confidential sources post-Snowden? 
 Berger: Just because it is technically possible in many cases to uncover journalists’ 
sources, does not mean that this is legitimate in terms of law or practice. By 
strengthening the social limits on surveillance, the technological threat to 
confidentiality can be mitigated. Increasing numbers of countries have laws 
protecting the confidentiality of journalists’ sources, which demonstrates a 
recognition of why this confidentiality is valuable for the public interest. This is a 
trend that needs encouragement.  
Posetti: What prospect is there to engage with States, nationally and 
internationally, to ensure that surveillance has boundaries, is transparent, has 
independent oversight and recourse, and also offers protection to whistle-blowers?  
Berger: Governments themselves need to take the wider view: intrusion into the 
confidentiality of sources may yield short-term results for some state agencies, but 
in the longer term the impact is to cramp the extent of public information 
generated by journalists. Even spy agencies have an interest in sources and the 
public at large trusting the media, as this situation produces far more quality 
information that is relevant to intelligence, than even the biggest agency could 
generate through its own covert efforts. This and other arguments should be made 
                                                             





to legislators, oversight agencies, prosecutors, police, military and so on. (Posetti 
2014c)  
These perspectives were situated in the context of alarming testimony from some of the world’s best-
known editors and cybersecurity experts. Janine Gibson, then the Editor of The Guardian’s US edition, 
led the paper’s US coverage of the Snowden Files. She told me that the impact of his revelations could 
not be over-stated: “… the implications are so profound and so hard to talk about without sounding like 
a member of the ‘tin foil hat brigade’, but it is going to become one of the most preoccupying issues for 
journalists and should be more urgently [addressed].” (Posetti 2014d) The Suddeutsche Zeitung’s then 
Deputy Editor-in-Chief, Wolfgang Krach112, told me that the Snowden case had a two-pronged impact on 
journalism: “I think on one hand it will encourage more journalists than before to investigate before 
putting any trust or faith in the authorities. On the other hand, it is bound to change our journalistic 
behaviour; we have to re-think completely our dealing with sources, with people and whistleblowers 
who give us information.” (Posetti 2014d) 
Alan Pearce, journalist and author of Deep Web for Journalists: Comms, Counter-Surveillance, Search, 
told me that the threat to journalism posed by state surveillance was extreme: “Any reasonable 
intelligence agency is capable of tapping phones, intercepting email and following our every move – 
both online and in the real world.” (Posetti 2014d) The chapter also quoted Guardian Editor-In-
Chief Alan Rusbridger113 who said that it was nearly impossible for journalists to maintain the 
confidentiality of their sources because of the threat posed by surveillance. "Every journalist should 
understand that there is no such thing as confidential digital communication. None of us have 
confidential sources,” he said (Posetti 2014d). Krach, who would go on to deliver the Panama Papers 
investigation to the International Consortium for Investigative Journalism (ICIJ) in 2016, as Editor-in-
Chief of the German broadsheet Suddeutsche Zeitung, pointed to the need to revert to analogue era 
communications on sensitive investigations: “We are a leading newspaper with a strong team of 
investigating journalists; we have to be sure of our sources. The Snowden case revealed new and 
unbelievable things... The bitter experience for us is that we’ve been much too naive in dealing with our 
sources.” (Posetti 2014d) These themes and experiences were reflected in the major case study on the 
global investigative journalism implications of source protection erosion featured in Protecting 
Journalism Sources in the Digital Age (Posetti 2017a pp103-120).114 
Trends in Newsrooms 2014 was launched during WAN-IFRA’s World News Congress in Turin, Italy, in 
June 2014. During that conference I anchored an on-stage interview with Berger in the course of which I 
                                                             
112 Note: Krach is now Editor-in-Chief of the SDZ, which famously delivered the global investigative project The 
Panama Papers in 2016. That project was based on a mass data-dump involving a pseudonymous source calling 
himself ‘John Doe’ who insisted on using heavily encrypted digital communications to interact with journalists. 
113 Note: Rusbridger is now Chair of the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism at the University of Oxford, 
where I am currently employed as Senior Research Fellow 
114 These themes are also now starting to emerge in the academic literature that I analysed alongside my own research 





announced a World Editors Forum global survey on the impacts of mass surveillance on investigative 
journalism (Posetti 2014b). That survey was intended to feed the over-arching UNESCO internet study 
referenced earlier in this chapter and the data emerging from it was later included in the corpus for 
Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age. Following the conference, I began collaborating with 
Berger on the design of a research project to examine the status of legal source protection frameworks 
internationally, under the umbrella of the larger UNESCO study. That research was commissioned 
through a contract with WAN-IFRA. The major expected research output was a report under the working 
title of ‘UNESCO Internet Study: Privacy and Journalists’ Sources’115. I was appointed by WAN-IFRA to 
lead the project, which eventually evolved into Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age. 
Ultimately, I became both the project’s Chief Researcher and the book’s author. 
 
6.1.1 Defining the scope: “You’re doing ‘God’s work’ for the 
profession here” 
 
It was a project that was always going to exceed its budget in in labour, blood, sweat and tears. The 
contract116 required the mapping of developments in legal and normative source protection frameworks 
across UNESCO Member States (i.e. up to 195 countries but eventually limited by the methodology to 
121 States) extending across a nine-year period. The original timeframe for completing the work was 
just three months, and the budget was only US$20,000. The final concept-note (July 2014)117, on which 
the contract between the parties was based, stated the following:  
 
The legal dimension of confidentiality, how it is defined and applied, raises a number of issues, 
several of which take on new aspects relevant to the digital age. Posed as questions, one may ask: 
 
• Since the last global survey, are there changes in the number of countries who have ‘shield 
laws’ or jurisprudence concerning journalists’ sources?  
• What is the extent to which laws shield sources from governmental actors as well as private 
companies or individuals seeking the revelation of the sources?  
• What are the patterns and processes as regards exceptions to confidentiality?  
• How are the laws or jurisprudence being applied? Are there cases that have progressed to 
court, and have past jurisprudence or other arrangements played a role? Are there 
countries where protection is solely symbolic or simply not applied? 
                                                             
115 Personal email correspondence with Guy Berger and early drafts of the research concept note and contract 
between WAN-IFRA and UNESCO, April-July 2014 (Private data collection) 
116 This is a confidential document dated August 4th, 2014 and signed by both Guy Berger and the then WAN-IFRA 
Secretary General Larry Kilman  







• How are those actors eligible for protection defined, and are they (or institutions such as 
media houses) required to be ‘licensed’ as a condition for protection with what attached 
conditions? 
• What definitions exist for eligibility to claim the protection of shield laws where they exist in 
different countries? Are they limited to professional journalists paid by mainstream media 
organisations? How does the definition of who is eligible for protection relate to the new 
range of actors producing journalism on digital platforms, and to Internet intermediaries 
who may possess information about communications with sources e.g. bloggers, social 
media users?  
• How does the definition of what is covered by protection relate to issues of metadata 
versus content, and to issues of data retention?  
• Do national laws and jurisprudence on confidentiality have any cross-jurisdictional issues – 
for instance, applying to content published on servers in a different jurisdiction, but where 
the publisher has a presence in the given national jurisdiction?  
• In an era of extensive digital footprints and surveillance by various actors, is there now a 
distinction to be made between secrecy (which may be increasingly difficult) and 
confidentiality, the latter relating to legal protections and limits on the use of any 
intercepted or retrieved digital communications? 
 
I wrote a story for the World Editors Forum/WAN-IFRA announcing the project and explaining its 
objectives and remit (Posetti 2014a). This was the beginning of the strategy to ‘make content out of 
process’. Additionally, UNESCO stipulated that the research process would require: 
 
• An overview of the issues, and review of the main international instruments in terms of 
their digital relevance or otherwise. 
• An updated audit of dispensations last examined for the 2007 survey. This mapping can be 
done on a template, allowing for quantitative tabulation of results and should indicate the 
form (e.g. Constitution; Law; and “other arrangements” such as - court jurisprudence, 
memoranda of understanding between editors’ organisations and prosecution services; 
combination of the above, other).   
• A more detailed analysis of the findings in terms of (a) application and (b) digital relevance.  
The analysis should be focused on where there has been a change or introduction of 
legislation, or cases in the recent past, that raise issues as to whether the particular 
dispensation is adequate to addressing digital questions such as: “Who is a journalist?”; the 





• Recommendations about how protection of source confidentiality can be strengthened, and 
to whom the protection should apply.118  
 
It was clearly going to be a very demanding task. The evident scale of this project and potential for 
excessive demand on WAN-IFRA’s resources spooked the organisation’s leadership (understandably, in 
retrospect), and I had to convince the World Editors Forum Executive Director and WAN-IFRA Secretary 
General to sign on to the project following bureaucratic delays UNESCO’s side. Re-reading the concept 
note four years later, in the absence of the first blushes of enthusiasm for a global research project 
produced for the UN in the service of journalism, I am genuinely surprised that we pulled it off. The 
initial delivery deadline for the study was November 2014 – just three months after the contract was 
signed. But that deadline was necessarily extended to January 2015, then March 2015, as the immense 
scope of the work became clearer to UNESCO and the project expanded. I submitted the final draft of 
the study in July 2015 - 10 months after beginning the work.  
 
In retrospect, this could have been a three-year research project with a US$200,000 budget. But I 
addressed it (and delivered it) as a ‘mission’ for journalism at a time of convergent crises confronting the 
profession, and particular challenges for investigative reporting in the post-Snowden era. Former 
Guardian Editor in Chief Alan Rusbridger told me during our 2015 interview for the study: “You’re doing 
‘God’s work’ for the profession here.”119 My then Research Assistant Angelique Lu120 is still promising to 
get that quote cross-stitched and framed as a memento of our perseverance and sense of vocational 
purpose during the project, which involved many sleepless nights and much stress. 
 
In an interview121 for this exegesis, UNESCO’s Guy Berger told me that he had not anticipated at the 
outset of the research project that the cross-cutting themes of mass surveillance, data retention and 
handover, national security and anti-terrorism overreach addressed by the study would emerge as they 
did during the course of the study. He said he thought the research process would be simpler, involving 
updating a global list of laws in a narrow area of journalistic source protection. My interviews with 
Berger for this exegesis spanned several months122, evolving into three separate conversations and 
numerous follow-up emails. From my perspective the process became a kind of ‘cooperative 
deconstruction’123 of the book’s genesis and production.  
                                                             
118 Finalised research commission ‘concept note’ dated July 2014, emailed to me by UNESCO on July 23rd, 2014. 
119 Interview with Alan Rusbridger for Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age, conducted at The Guardian, 
January 2015 
120 Lu, a journalism/law graduate who was one of my travelling UOW interns, went on to complete a BBC Journalism 
traineeship and she is now a reporter with the ABC in Sydney 
121 Research interview a) conducted with Guy Berger, 2017  
122 Two of these interviews were conducted face-to-face, one was via Skype  
123 Note: my deployment of the terms ‘cooperative deconstruction’, ‘collaborative deconstruction/reconstruction’, 
‘interactive unpacking’ and ‘negotiated memory’ does not indicate a willingness on behalf of Berger or other 
interviewees to self-identify as contributors to these processes and/or outcomes. The interviewees do not have co-





6.1.2 Defining resources: “There was no time, there was no money” 
 
The propensity for issues like resource limitations and budget cuts (Berger 2013) to impact on UNESCO-
commissioned research was highlighted by Guy Berger in our interviews. He also acknowledged that 
there was an underestimation on his side about the complexity of issues I was studying for Protecting 
Journalism Sources in the Digital Age, and the number of other sensitive themes that it would intersect 
with. “There’s ambition to do lots of things, but there’s also perhaps an underestimation about how 
complex these things turn out to be. That also tends to drag out the process,” 124 he said.  
 
Advocacy Director with the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), Courtney Radsch was a senior 
project officer at UNESCO, working to Berger in the Freedom of Expression and Media Development 
Division from 2012 to mid 2014. Dr Radsch told me that she experienced a lack of clarity around the 
mandated purpose of UNESCO research in terms of objectives, which led to increased risk of 
politicisation in the absence of easily justifiable methodologies and outputs in accordance with 
projected impacts. That resonated with me. In the previously cited paper that I wrote with Reid (Reid & 
Posetti 2017), we pointed to issues regarding clarity of communications, context and guidance in 
connection with both the report Reid contributed to, World Trends in Freedom of Expression and Media 
Development 2014 (UNESCO 2014c, edited by Courtney Radsch), and Protecting Journalism Sources in 
the Digital Age. Berger also highlighted the need for improved communications and guidance, 
particularly involving researchers commissioned for the first time to produce studies for UNESCO. 
“There could have been better communication all along,”125 he acknowledged, in reference to my 
project. That’s a judgement that applies to me as the Chief Researcher, as well as to UNESCO. 
 
This puts into context the sometimes-fraught email exchanges I had with UNESCO staff during the 10-
month research process, as my own stress and impatience grew in connection with the project. Key 
tensions I experienced concerned: the lack of clarity surrounding communications; my attempts to 
balance intersecting (and at times conflicting) identities as journalist/freedom of expression 
activist/UNESCO project researcher/WAN-IFRA consultant/academic; laborious UNESCO requirements 
and processes; and bureaucratic delays. It is also now clear to me that UNESCO’s (noble) research 
ambitions and impressive intellectual leadership are frequently mismatched by extremely limited 
budgets and resources, and sometimes hobbled by geopolitical realities.  
 
Helpful, too, in deconstructing my experiences of researching and producing Protecting Journalism 
Sources in the Digital Age, are the insights of Courtney Radsch in her capacity as the inaugural editor of 
the flagship UNESCO publication World Trends in Freedom of Expression and Media Development 2014. 
                                                             






She also coordinated the complex research process underpinning the study,126 and in doing so she 
experienced many of the issues that would become familiar to me. Among these issues was the 
difficulty of trying to identify global trends in the face of inconsistent access to data internationally, and 
budgetary restrictions that meant that the ability to commission comprehensive field research across 
five UNESCO regions (each with their own diversities), or access private research databanks was 
extremely limited. “There was no time, there was no money,” she told me.127  
 
While the World Trends budget was significantly higher than the budget supporting Protecting 
Journalism Sources in the Digital Age, with 27 experts hired to cover seven thematic and cross-cutting 
issues across each of the five UNESCO regions, “It was not sufficient, and the individual authors of each 
chapter essentially did it for free,” Radsch said128. One of the biggest struggles I faced in managing my 
project was the fact that I had to rely heavily on the goodwill of collaborating researchers and research 
assistants – many of whom were interns and receiving only a stipend from WAN-IFRA129. I felt exploited 
at times by the process - I was working ridiculous hours, and too often through the night. But it was my 
choice to undertake the work and I was prepared to make sacrifices as the author – the one who would 
derive most from the book’s publication. I was much more concerned about those working to me. At the 
same time, I was juggling myriad other journalism and research projects for WAN-IFRA and WEF, and the 
perceived donation of labour to UNESCO, along with multiple (necessary) project deadline extensions, 
quickly became an issue, fanning internal tensions surrounding the project.  
 
I’ll return to process later but first, back to Paris… 
 
6.1.3 Baguettes, security threats, and a window on the Marais: “Did I 
tell you about the time…” 
 
What fuelled completion of Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age – other than adrenalin, a 
prodigious newsroom-born work ethic, a sense of mission, close collaboration with committed research 
assistants, a resourceful UNESCO project manager on loan from the Swedish state, Berger’s intellectual 
leadership, and an awful lot of cheap French wine? Perhaps it was the view from my dining table-cum-
work bench over-looking the historic Paris district known as the Marais? Or the sounds of irrepressible 
Parisian life pumping below, summer and winter, day and night, in the bustling, colourful district that 
drew me in even when I wanted to throw my laptop out the window? Maybe it was the smell of all that 
                                                             
126 Note: I reported for WAN-IFRA on the publication of the UNESCO study edited by Radsch in March 2014: 
https://blog.wan-ifra.org/2014/03/24/new-unesco-report-maps-trends-in-freedom-of-expression-and-media-
development  
127 Research Interview conducted with Dr Courtney Radsch, 2018 
128 Ibid 






fresh produce, and the taste of warm baguettes from the boulangerie at the foot of my stairs? It could 
have been the camaraderie inherently involved in teamwork on a purposeful project executed under 
enormous pressure in a romantic location. It was all of those things combined, I think. Along with a 
healthy dose of determination and a refusal to collapse at the finish line. There were also plenty of 
“laugh aloud now, because the only alternatives are insanity or sobbing” moments along the way. Such 
moments were often shared during weekend work-a-thons or ‘all-nighters’ in the presence of loyal 
interns and junior research assistants – some of whom I have since developed close friendships with.  
 
Then, there were the ‘freaky’ moments. The moments that made me wonder if I should be wearing 
Janine Gibson’s ‘tin foil hat’ for the duration of the project. The moments that delivered the best dinner 
party anecdotes. The ones involving questions like: “Did I tell you about the time I was conducting online 
research about Russia and surveillance for that UNESCO study and watched as the URL in the search bar 
inexplicably flipped upside down like it was possessed?” True story. I screen-grabbed it and sent it to a 
cybersecurity expert who worked with investigative journalists for his assessment. His response: “I have 
never seen anything like it before. It’s either the Russians or the NSA.” Then, there was the time that I 
sat in our tiny Marais apartment, madly trying to meet the first UNESCO submission deadline while 
collaboratively editing the text in Google Docs with my then research intern Alice Matthews130, when 
chunks of text referencing the NSA started moving of their own accord. Up and down the screen they 
zipped, before disappearing altogether. Fortunately, I had downloaded an earlier version of the 
manuscript and I was able to resurrect the text. Suffice it to say that I learned my lesson: do not attempt 
to store research on sensitive topics in the cloud – even if it is apparently innocuous and does not 
involve confidential sources. Especially when you’re writing about Edward Snowden, mass surveillance 
and the need to defend investigative journalism from unlawful and unwarranted intrusion… 
 
While there may well be explanations unrelated to spycraft for these mysterious happenings, the fact 
that my newly heavily-encrypted laptop then developed a number of very strange habits - including a 
mousepad that appeared to have a mind of its own, frequently causing the cursor to scroll up and down 
uncontrollably - did unnerve me slightly. By the time I submitted the final manuscript to UNESCO, I was 
only able to start my laptop via hard reboot using an encrypted external hard-drive.  
 
However, during these episodes, I couldn’t help but recall the account of Luke Harding, the Guardian 
journalist who wrote The Snowden Files: The Inside Story of the World’s Most Wanted Man (Harding 
2013) after working with a small, cloistered group of journalists on the original story. After his book was 
published, he wrote about his own likely brushes with targeted surveillance and interception: 
                                                             
130 Note: Alice Matthews was also a travelling UOW intern whose primary task during her Paris assignment was 





I was writing a chapter on the NSA's close, and largely hidden, relationship with Silicon Valley. I 
wrote that Snowden's revelations had damaged US tech companies and their bottom line. 
Something odd happened. The paragraph I had just written began to self-delete. The cursor 
moved rapidly from the left, gobbling text. I watched my words vanish. When I tried to close my 
Open Office file the keyboard began flashing and bleeping. Over the next few weeks these 
incidents of remote deletion happened several times. There was no fixed pattern, but it tended 
to occur when I wrote disparagingly of the NSA. All authors expect criticism. But criticism before 
publication by an anonymous, divine third party is something novel. I began to leave notes for 
my secret reader. I tried to be polite, but irritation crept in. Once I wrote: "Good morning. I don't 
mind you reading my manuscript – you're doing so already – but I'd be grateful if you don't 
delete it. Thank you." There was no reply (Harding 2014) 
I had written about Harding’s experiences in Trends in Newsrooms 2014 (Posetti 2014d), just before 
UNESCO commissioned Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age. A few months later, I started 
looking over my own shoulder. 
 
For a serious investigative journalism nerd, who counts All the President’s Men among her favourite 
films, there was an appealing element of intrigue to all this. A kind of journalism romance. That romance 
was in part environmental. As a researcher and practitioner with a heart for human rights and a history 
of fighting for her own freedom of expression rights (ABC News 2010; Ricketson 2009), there’s really 
nothing quite like shooting across Paris on the Metro, striding past the monuments of the well-heeled 
7th arrondissement for research meetings and events at UNESCO, in the shadow of the Eiffel Tower. 
Standing up in one of UNESCO’s grand circular chambers during a meeting of Member States in order to 
encourage contributions to my research project, unwittingly (and probably impertinently) using the 
microphone reserved for a Member State’s representative, and waving my then pre-school age 
daughter’s iPad encased in a rubber dinosaur mould to make my point, was a highlight. Despite the 
romance of UN-commissioned research having long ago faded for me, I still feel privileged when I think 
about the opportunity I was granted to do this work in the service of journalism and the human rights 
frameworks designed to defend its practice.  
 
That was a feeling cemented in January 2015, when I sat in the office of then Guardian Editor-in-Chief 
Alan Rusbridger to interview him for the study. And it was repeated in June 2015, when I flew to 
Washington DC (watching All the President’s Men on the in-flight entertainment!) to anchor a panel at 
the World News Congress where we launched the preliminary findings from Protecting Journalism 
Sources in the Digital Age with the International Consortium for Investigative Journalists’ (ICIJ) Executive 
Director, Gerard Ryle and other key actors in the field (UNESCO 2015a). The panel I sat on with UN 
Special Rapporteur David Kaye, the then OSCE Representative on Media Freedom Dunja Mijatevic, and 





Lanza at UN headquarters in New York during a session of the UN General Assembly on my birthday in 
October 2015 probably should also rate a mention (Oakford 2015). But there was something particularly 
special about the pre-launch event at the Frontline Club in London a month later. The Club showcases 
international journalists in regular talks at a venue where the profession’s luminaries gather to dine and 
drink over their ‘war stories’. It was an honour to share the stage with The Times’ Investigations Editor 
Jonathan Calvert, the BBC’s digital security guru Paul Myers, and prominent media QC Gavin Millar 
(whom I’d interviewed for the study), at an event anchored by the London Foreign Press Association’s 
President, Paola Totaro (Churchill 2015). Each of these events underscored the genuine value of the 
research, the profession’s eagerness to see it published, and the importance of curating public 
conversations around the forthcoming book – particularly as the wait for publication set in. 
 
6.2 When the final UNESCO deadline is just the beginning of a long 
bureaucratic and diplomatic dance  
 
I delivered the final manuscript to UNESCO at the end of July in 2015 - three days before I flew home to 
Australia from Paris. I’d spent a hot Parisian summer working through weekends, nights and annual 
leave, from our charming (but miniscule) fourth floor medieval apartment in Le Marais. I had ditched my 
promise to spend our final six weeks as Parisians with my long-suffering husband and daughter. Once 
again, ‘that Sources Study’ (as it had become known) took priority. I was not popular. And I was really 
disappointed about missing out on sharing these last days of our Paris adventure with them…as well as 
being gripped by ‘Mummy-guilt’. But I was contractually obliged to deliver the complex study, which had 
grown to over 80 thousand words by the final (extended) deadline: July 27th, 2015. Courtney Radsch told 
me that when the 2014 UNESCO World Trends report was finally published, she felt like she had 
completed another PhD dissertation131. She felt proud but exhausted. I felt that way too. I was 
extremely proud. And relieved. But overall, I was utterly exhausted: physically, emotionally, 
intellectually and psychologically. In a word, I felt splattered. But what I didn’t realise when I boarded 
the long flight home to Sydney on July 31st, 2015, was that it would take another 22 months for the book 
to wend its way through UNESCO’s bureaucratic processes and political review systems before it would 
actually be published. 
 
6.2.1 Diplomacy, bureaucracy and freedom of expression research for 
UNESCO: “Yes, one had to tread delicately…” 
 
                                                             





When the book was finally published and launched during UNESCO World Press Freedom Day 
celebrations in Jakarta in May 2017, it was touted as a study “three years in the making” (UNESCO 
2017a). But the bulk of the work was done at high-speed, under great pressure, in a 10-month window, 
as described above. The next two years were spent negotiating publication, seeking opportunities to 
publish extracts, sub-editing, and exploiting every opportunity to keep the forthcoming book in the 
public sphere - partly to ensure it stayed on the UNESCO hierarchy’s agenda. It was a constant push. 
From my perspective - as the researcher and author eagerly awaiting publication - political sensitivities, 
budget cuts, and a vast, creaking international bureaucracy contributed to the seemingly interminable 
delays which caused great frustration, and prompted those of us involved in conducting the research to 
wonder aloud if this work would ever find its way onto the desks and into the inboxes of the journalists, 
editors, lawyers, legislators and policy makers it had been designed to aid. 
 
Guy Berger told me that the UN is not a body that “names and shames”; that, he said, is the job of civil 
society organisations, while the UN engages in “quiet diplomacy”. UNESCO research on freedom of 
expression is not intended to “pass judgement”, Berger said, but rather designed to help nudge States 
towards consensus positions that build on existing UN decisions and resolutions on freedom of 
expression issues, while also pushing such knowledge into the public sphere to enable stakeholders to 
hold their governments accountable. It is about constructing knowledge and values that “stress the 
sweet spot of common foundation,” Berger said. In his assessment, the problems getting Protecting 
Journalism Sources in the Digital Age published after final submission were more to do with UNESCO’s 
stringent verification standards, and its bureaucracy, as well as a by-product of budget shortfalls and 
under-resourcing, rather than politics or censorship. “Yes, one had to tread delicately, but I don’t think 
there was any unwarranted removal of stuff that should have been there,” he said.132  
 
Diplomacy was certainly in play. I found the tensions between being an independent journalist and 
researcher, working under contract to a hybrid industry and civil society organisation with a Press 
Freedom remit (WAN-IFRA/World Editors Forum), undertaking research for UNESCO on freedom of 
expression issues that were very controversial and politically-charged, quite challenging. Berger 
disagreed with my suggestion that such tensions between UNESCO and commissioned researchers were 
perhaps more widespread than this single project.  But he acknowledged the complexities and stresses 
involved in undertaking UNESCO research – especially in the context of requirements that claims from 
non-government sources within countries be cross-referenced, verified and/or balanced through 
examination of the official records and statements of Member States (e.g. publicly available government 
statements and departmental databases) for reasons of accuracy, fairness and diplomacy. This reality 
was exacerbated by an extremely limited research budget. “It’s very hard when you’re doing a global 
study like this one because it’s one small team of people busting a gut even to get superficial 
                                                             





information,” Berger told me. 
 
This was also a point echoed by Courtney Radsch, who said that these factors compounded the problem 
of identifying global trends in the areas of freedom of expression and media development for the World 
Trends report that she edited and project-managed 2013-2014. “It becomes very difficult because if 
there’s concern about the overemphasis of Western sources but when there are no other sources, then 
you’re in this ‘catch 22’,” she said. All of this is focused on what Berger referred to as the need for 
“cautiousness”, “delicacy”, “unassailable evidence” and “complete balance”, which impacts on the style, 
narrative, tone, and argumentation within UNESCO publications.133  
 
In the case of Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age a number of quotes, cases and incidents 
that I would have been content to publish as an autonomous journalist or researcher subject to 
academic peer review were removed during the editing process. One example is the editing out of all 
quotes from Courtney Radsch, including the following excision: “…journalists (are) being caught up in 
essentially spycraft, getting surveilled and targeted. And there is so little transparency about this whole 
‘Five Eyes’ system and the fact that so many technology companies and related internet companies are 
based in the US, or members of the ‘Five Eyes’ nations.” Radsch’s statements about US government 
surveillance of journalists internationally (as documented by the Snowden Files) and her references to 
the torture of bloggers and activists in Syria for their passwords were also edited out134. Additionally, 
caveats were applied to some aspects of the research that I felt were unnecessary, such as the repetitive 
UNESCO-inserted statement following all mentions of device seizures that: “This example is not 
provided with the presumption that confidential journalistic data was unduly exposed.” (Posetti 2017a 
p83135). These subtractions and additions were features of a multi-stage process of editing and review 
typically undertaken at UNESCO – one designed to ensure verification standards are met and to address 
political ‘sensitivities’. The more contentious the content, the higher up the political hierarchy a draft 
document goes, until publication approval is granted. 
 
I worked through the (ironic, from my perspective) freedom of expression implications of such processes 
and decisions with Berger during our interviews and email exchanges connected to this exegesis. He 
maintained that the contractual nature of the research (for Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital 
Age) reduced autonomy, but it did not affect freedom of expression rights:  
I don’t think freedom of expression is the issue in these kinds of relationships. It’s 
not like your freedom of expression is taken away from you, you still have that, but 
you’ve entered voluntarily into a contract, and all contracts have conditions.136  
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While I had to defend the research against suggestions from within WAN-IFRA that such decisions could 
be perceived as UNESCO censorship of research with which the organisation was associated, I do not 
believe that the end product reflected direct censorship, nor do I feel that it compromised my 
professional integrity or ethical standards. I agree with Berger that in the case of Protecting Journalism 
Sources in the Digital Age, UNESCO’s editing did not affect the essential integrity of the research, nor did 
it dilute the findings and recommendations designed to help limit source protection erosion globally. 
 
That does not necessarily apply to all UNESCO projects and publications, however, and navigating these 
stresses and risks to publication can be difficult and complex. As Berger told me, the politics of freedom 
of expression advocacy and research at UNESCO is historically “sensitive”. In fact, it can be traced back 
to the New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) controversy which I documented 
earlier in this exegesis. These ‘sensitivities’ can manifest at the level of multiple political reviews by the 
UNESCO hierarchy, and they can require deft footwork and argument on the part of senior UNESCO 
bureaucrats, answerable to the UNESCO Director General’s office, regarding potentially delicate issues. 
Berger described this as a process of “forwards and backwards”, involving respect for those who 
ultimately “carry the can” for UNESCO publications, and whose view of the political landscape includes 
perspectives on how seemingly innocuous issues could become “explosive” or weaponised in the 
context of a particular geopolitical issue. If a UNESCO employee feels that the process or a specific 
decision by the hierarchy compromises their ethics or personal integrity, “then ultimately, one can 
always leave,” Berger said.   
 
In the case of Protecting Journalism Source in the Digital Age, the system of internal political review at 
the level of the Assistant Director General for Communication and Information (then Frank La Rue) and 
the Director General’s office began after external peer review of the final draft and the process of 
subediting. It continued for many months, in parallel with multitudinous competing priorities, and it felt 
to me like a filibuster, leading to increasing tensions as publicly promoted publication dates were 
superseded - again and again. At several junctures, I put in writing to senior UNESCO staff, including 
Frank La Rue, that I was concerned that the study would be buried, and I continued to insist on its 
urgent publication. 
6.2.2 When do interventions to respond to political ‘sensitivities’ 
amount to censorship? “To criticise an individual state is not allowed” 
 
In contrast to the position that freedom of expression is generally not an issue in UNESCO’s 
commissioned research publications because they are a product of a contractual agreement to produce 
a body of work in line with Organizational requirements, not acts of autonomous research or journalism, 





me that she did experience what she felt was ‘censorship’ at the highest levels. Prior to joining UNESCO, 
Radsch occupied a senior position at the US-based civil society organisation, Freedom House, and she 
left UNESCO to become the Advocacy Director for the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ). She 
highlighted the inherent difficulties and ironies involved in navigating the publication of research on 
freedom expression issues inside what is ostensibly the UN’s only organisation with a freedom of 
expression mandate. “The challenge of being able to do rigorous and meaningful research while not 
pissing off any States involves an inherent tension that cannot be resolved,” Radsch said.137 This, she 
said, is partly because, at UNESCO:  
To criticise an individual state is not allowed, especially if that individual state is 
important and influential…It’s much easier to critique or mention a small state with 
relatively little political sway than it is to criticise a large, important government, 
whether that’s the United States, or China, or Russia.138 
Radsch was refreshingly candid about her experiences as a UNESCO employee coordinating a research 
project focused on freedom of expression issues. She said that she had experienced “editorial 
intervention of a political nature”139 with regard to the report she edited and project-managed while 
working for UNESCO: World Trends in Freedom of Expression and Media Development 2014. This 
happened in the course of multiple high-level political reviews of the draft report, which included 
detailed discussions over specific words and redactions, Radsch said. According to Radsch, specific 
Member States were not to be named to avoid geopolitical ‘sensitivities’. This is an argument used by a 
number of UN bodies to justify exclusion of Member States’ names in a range of contexts140. In the case 
of World Trends in Freedom of Expression and Media Development 2014 (which Radsch edited), the 
names of most Member States and almost all supporting references were edited out of the main global 
report prior to publication.141 This amounted to what Radsch said was the loss of a “treasure trove” of 
hundreds of references that would have aided researchers internationally. She found this process 
extremely “frustrating” and “disappointing”. 
 
However, Radsch’s critique of UNESCO research review processes was counter-balanced by respect for 
the Organization’s capacity for impact and its ability to influence Member States in the freedom of 
expression realm (in terms of developing norms and capacity-building), alongside appreciation for its 
historic role as a high-calibre international ‘think-tank’: a role she would like to see reinforced.  
 
These issues are not limited to the Freedom of Expression and Media Development Division at UNESCO. 
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In mid 2016, there were reports of the censorship of commissioned research on the impacts of climate 
change on UNESCO World Heritage listed sites, in response to demands from Australia. According to 
documents and statements obtained by The Guardian, Australia had insisted on the removal of all 
references to Australian sites, including the endangered Great Barrier Reef. UNESCO obliged, reportedly 
“whitewashing” the study of all references to Australian sites and changing the report’s title, in line with 
Australia’s objections. (Readfearn 2016) The Australian Department of Environment confirmed that it 
had made the demands, and UNESCO eventually added a line to the press release accompanying the 
report’s release, stating: “At the request of the government of Australia, references to Australian sites 
were removed from the Report”. (Readfern 2016) One of the report’s academic peer reviewers, 
Professor Will Steffen, said he was “astounded” by the ‘censorship’. “Perhaps in the old Soviet Union 
you would see this sort of thing happening, where governments would quash information because they 
didn’t like it. But not in Western democracies. I haven’t seen it happen before.” (Sleazak 2016) 
 
During our interview, Courtney Radsch proposed a potential solution to what she had described as “an 
inherent tension” associated with UNESCO-commissioned research on freedom of expression issues 
within the context of an increasingly politicised organisation. She suggested a “shield” or “barrier” was 
needed between the Organization’s political hierarchy and its subject matter experts and consultant 
researchers, to preserve the independence and integrity of research processes and outputs. This is an 
interesting idea, and one that would be valuable to both UNESCO’s mandated research agenda and 
researchers undertaking work for the Organization in the sensitive freedom of expression realm – 
particularly when those researchers are affiliated with civil society organisations. It would also help 
boost trust in the independence of UNESCO’s research outputs with such organisations and the news 
media. But whether it is a realistic proposition in the context of the UNESCO ‘realpolitik’ of 2018 – a time 
of Member State withdrawal, massive budget cuts and the spread of ‘strongman’ politics and illiberal 
democracy - is another question (Coningham 2017). In my assessment, it seems unlikely that Protecting 
Journalism Sources in the Digital Age would pass through UNESCO political review processes in the 
current climate without meeting increased obstacles and requirement for more significant excisions. 
 
6.2.3 When can you “name and shame” in the UN tent? “I think it can 
be frustrating working with UNESCO” 
 
While UNESCO is clearly not in the business of “naming and shaming”, such a mandate is vested in the 
UN Special Rapporteurs under the auspices of the Office of the UN Human Rights Commissioner. 





2014.142 The role of Special Rapporteur involves the embedding of unpaid subject matter experts within 
the UN. They are empowered to advocate publicly for human rights as agents of the UN, and while 
“quiet diplomacy” behind-the-scenes is a feature of the role, the Rapporteurs are required to publicly 
call out individual Member States by name in the case of violations, or where there is a need for action. 
This occurs through statements, media releases, thematic reporting to the UN, and increasingly via 
social media engagement, with the objectives of demonstrating to other Member States that breaches 
are taken seriously, and that there is solidarity with human rights defenders and victims of abuse. But 
Kaye told me that in the current environment, Member States are “constantly trying to restrain the 
work that we do”.143 And while moderate tone and balanced language are generally features of such 
public communications, Kaye said that approach is tested by States that are recidivist violators of human 
rights and freedom of expression. “It gets harder to maintain an even-tempered approach when you’re 
dealing with government’s like Erdogan’s Turkey or Bahrain,” he said.144 
 
Professor Kaye’s statements and reports on privacy, encryption, whistleblowers and confidential sources 
gave my UNESCO study impetus and ensured that it entered the realm of UN debates even before it was 
published. He cited my research in his second Report to the UN Secretary General, on the theme of 
whistleblowers and journalists’ confidential sources delivered in September 2015 (Kaye 2015b). 
 
In his interview for this exegesis, Kaye expressed concern about UN organisations appearing to censor 
events and research – especially in the context of freedom of expression work. At the time of our 
interview in May 2018, he was in the process of writing to the UN Alliance of Civilisations (UN AOC) over 
the aforementioned145 attempted censorship of a journalist’s presentation during a World Press 
Freedom Day event being staged at UN headquarters in New York. While he said nobody should be 
surprised that an organisation would respond as the UN AOC did in the face of pressure from a Member 
State, on the other hand:  
 
I find it really problematic when the Organizations don’t stand up for their 
mandate, and if that means standing up in the face of State pressure, they should 
do it!146 
He also said that he did not endorse UNESCO’s reluctance to “call out” Member States but he 
emphasised that the Special Rapporteur roles were specifically created by the UN to address the 
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inherent difficulties faced by traditionally politicised UN organisations (i.e. Member State-driven bodies 
like UNESCO) in pursuing ‘hard cases’.  
 
I think it can be frustrating working with UNESCO, but it’s also what the Organization is. That 
doesn’t mean that I’m agreeing with all the things that they do. It’s just that it’s understandable 
in a context that’s much more political than mine147 
 
This assessment makes sense to me, but it would be beneficial for these realities to be carefully and 
transparently explained to consultant researchers and civil society organisations partnering on UNESCO 
research projects ahead of commencing research and other public-facing work for UNESCO. In my 
experience, there is a reluctance to openly acknowledge the political factors in play up front, but they 
are clearly undeniable, and they require careful navigation if stakeholder trust in UNESCO statements, 
reports and research is to be maintained. If transparency is in fact the new objectivity, as Weinberger 
(2009) has asserted, this requires factoring into UNESCO’s private communications with project 
partners, and its public engagement strategy, in my view. 
 
6.4 Rebooting freedom of expression advocacy for the digital age: 
Lessons from Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age 
 
Member States and their policy makers remain the primary targets of UN initiatives in the freedom of 
expression realm, with civil society organisations, academia and the news media being significant 
secondary audiences. However, there is a much more expansive set of actors shaping the space for 
freedom of expression in 2018, according to David Kaye, who highlighted the importance of engaging 
broader publics in discussions and debates about fundamental rights. “I think now the audience is just 
much bigger,”148 Kaye said. Key members of this expanded ‘audience’ are corporate actors like internet 
intermediaries149, including Google, Facebook and Twitter. “It’s not just States that are making the rules 
these days, it’s also companies and they’re very much subject to public pressure and public visibility,” 
Kaye told me.150 He also indicated that “aggregate public opinion” is similarly important in an 
environment where policy is determined in the ‘networked public sphere’ – this approach increases in 
value in Western democracies like the US and Australia where there are no regional human rights courts 
to challenge domestic legal frameworks or judgements.  
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6.4.1 Encryption and anonymity: ““It’s very hard to get people to see 
how important anonymity can be”  
 
Kaye cited the defence of encryption as a human right as an issue that benefited significantly from broad 
public conversation about the threats to privacy posed by various States’ attempts to undermine 
encrypted communications through ‘back door’ access151. He pointed to his first thematic Report to the 
UN in his Special Rapporteur capacity as research that triggered public debate and continues to be 
widely cited by freedom of expression advocates (Kaye 2015a). The difficulty and complexity of 
advocating for encryption as a human right when the counter arguments rely on narratives of anti-
terrorism and public safety were also highlighted by Kaye: 
But the very fact that we were able to make these arguments [about encryption] in 
the context of a little bit of knowledge about the technology, and then a little bit 
more knowledge about norms is just really valuable.152 
Central to the traction gained by the encryption cause was the ability of the general public to relate to 
potential impacts at the personal level – for example, in the context of health data breaches or digital 
security for banking. However, the parallel subject of anonymity preservation, a form of protected 
freedom of expression, was much harder to navigate publicly, according to Kaye. One reason for this is 
the current portrayal of anonymity as a tool and ‘cloak’ for trolls and online harassers. “It’s very hard to 
get people to see how important anonymity can be for dissenters, the political opposition, and the 
marginalised when we keep coming up against arguments that anonymity is more of a problem than a 
benefit for people,” Kaye said. 153 
 
6.4.2 Protection for Whistleblowers: “If journalists cannot 
communicate in confidence with sources, they cannot do their jobs.” 
 
Both of these issues – anonymity and encryption - intersect with the even more complex theme of 
protection for whistleblowers and journalists’ confidential sources, which is the core subject of this 
exegesis. It is also a subject that Courtney Radsch has direct experience of advocating for, having led the 
‘Right to Report in the Digital Age’154 campaign for CPJ in 2014/2015 in response to the Snowden 
revelations. “That was really designed to leverage the attention of the public to the extent that there 
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was attention on the issues du jour and really narrow in on the impact on journalists,” she told me. The 
objective of this campaign was to highlight the impacts of mass surveillance on journalists’ safety and 
their ability to do their work, with the erosion of source confidentiality the core focus. This involved a 
hybrid strategy of direct conversations (with journalists, editors, technology companies and policy 
makers); conferences and public panel discussions designed to cross-pollinate knowledge from the tech, 
policy and journalism sectors (and encourage collaboration between Silicon Valley executives, digital 
rights activists and the mainstream press); and reportage on the issues. The specific point they sought to 
highlight in all of these interventions was this: “If journalists cannot communicate in confidence with 
sources, they cannot do their jobs.” Radsch and I collaborated on a presentation to the Online News 
Association annual conference in Chicago in September 2014, where we introduced our respective 
projects to the audience of digitally savvy reporters. 
 
6.4.3 Public facing reportage on protecting journalists: “This is 
something you have to care about.” 
 
At CPJ, public facing reportage is “critical and essential and foundational” according to Radsch. In fact, 
the organisation doesn’t advocate on issues that they don’t have reporting on. The purpose of this 
strategy is to engage the core stakeholder community of journalists, but also to enable amplification and 
production of an evidence base to support claims. In the case of the ‘Right to Report in the Digital Age’ 
campaign, the reporting undertaken by CPJ on the impacts of mass surveillance on journalists 
internationally was relied on in briefings with the White House, the Department of Justice, 
Congressional officers, the EU and tech companies. The relevant UN Special Rapporteurs were also 
included in this multi-pronged approach. Additionally, explanatory reporting was the foundation of 
alliances with industry that necessarily took source protection from an ‘inside the beltway’ issue 
concerning only elite national security and investigative journalists, to a theme worthy of broader 
coverage. The fundamental message Radsch delivered to journalists and news organisations was: “This 
is something you have to care about. It can’t just be other people fighting on your behalf. This is about 
your fundamental ability to do your job.” The results included high profile journalists signing up to an 
online petition and major news organisations like the Associated Press, Bloomberg and Al Jazeera 
partnering in the campaign. The flow-on effect was increased mainstream media coverage of the issues 
which continued in the context of more recent campaigns designed to focus attention on the related 
problem of device searches and seizures that journalists are increasingly facing at the US border under 
the Trump administration (CPJ 2017). The broad public impact of the ‘Right to Report’ campaign is 
something that Radsch told me she brought up with tech companies and policy makers when advocating 
for digital journalism safety. 
 





“niche” issue like confidential source protection compared with themes like journalism safety. He saw 
Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age as a study with a core audience comprised of: Policy 
makers within UNESCO Member States; news organisations; investigative journalists; civil society 
organisations; media lawyers and, potentially, the judiciary. UNESCO does target broader audiences in 
connection with media and information literacy initiatives, along with World Press Freedom Day 
activities and campaigns related to the murder of journalists with impunity, in the interests of 
awareness raising and developing capacity. However, Berger felt the complexity of issues connected to 
the protection of confidential sources, combined with widespread public “ignorance” about the related 
themes, meant that the study was unlikely to find broader traction. Additionally, he highlighted the 
ideological and political impediments to defending confidential source protection as an essential 
freedom of expression norm. When you speak about a journalist being asked to hand over confidential 
sources in a terror case, for the public the main question is likely to be “Why should journalists be 
exempt from helping to bring criminals to trial?”, not whether the case is threatening their own privacy 
or their right to know, according to Berger.  
 
While these factors were relevant to my strategy of ‘making content out of process’ and attempting to 
engage broader communities in debates at the heart of the study, I believed that the convergent threats 
to confidential source protection that I was identifying in the course of the research process told a story 
that demanded broader public understanding and engagement – especially if the research was to have a 
meaningful impact on policy in countries where the networked public sphere is regarded as a virtual 
constituency (Posetti 2010)155. I also concluded that in order for source confidentiality to be defended in 
the Digital Age, potential sources and whistleblowers required increased awareness of, and education 
in, secure methods of contacting journalists, along with an understanding of the potential impacts of 
privacy erosion on their safety and well-being more broadly. So, the importance of wider public 
engagement with the research, and the issues intersecting with it, grew in parallel with the process.  
 
6.4.4 Making content out of process and maximising impact: “Several 
bites at the cherry…” 
 
As a result of my conclusion that broader public conversation about the themes emerging from the 
research would be valuable (if not essential) to maximising impact, I embarked on a strategy of building 
‘communities of interest’ around the action-research process while it was underway. This extended to 
the crowdsourcing of potential research participants. For this purpose, I used social media channels, 
professional blogging and mainstream media commentary to educate core audiences about the 
complexities, and to demonstrate more broadly the potential impacts of source protection erosion on 
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journalists in connection with the public’s right to know.156 After the full study was delivered to UNESCO, 
and as we counted down the months to publication, I also began writing articles for major newspapers 
and continued speaking at high profile events about the research. Simultaneously, UNESCO’s Berger 
began speaking about the project at internet governance, media freedom and tech conferences 
internationally. 
 
Central to this strategy was our collaborative decision to incrementally publish outputs from the study 
as the UNESCO review process proceeded. In the first instance, this involved the production and 
publication of a four-page leaflet which was also published online in English and French (UNESCO 
2015c). It summarised the key findings of the research and presented the 11-point model for assessing 
the viability of a country’s legal source protection framework, and it was timed for release at the World 
News Media Congress in Washington D.C. in June 2015. Just before our Congress panel began, I 
published a story about the launch of the 11-point framework for WAN-IFRA’s website (Posetti 2015d) 
which was shared across panel participants’ social media accounts, along with those of WAN-IFRA and 
affiliated organisations. Berger also wrote a story for UNESCO’s website following the launch (UNESCO 
2015a). As a result of this collaborative public ‘noise-making’, prominent UK journalist and academic Roy 
Greenslade wrote a story for The Guardian about the research, pointing to the forthcoming book and 
asking: “In an era when whistleblowers are under attack from the authorities, and confidential sources 
are being compromised by state surveillance, how can the people who provide journalists with valuable 
information be protected?” (Greenslade 2015). 
 
Subsequently, in September 2015, UNESCO published a chapter from the forthcoming book on the 
gender dimensions of source protection as a separate leaflet (UNESCO 2015d), which I also produced a 
story about for WAN-IFRA (Posetti 2015e). Two months later, a major extract from the book was 
published in the second edition of World Trends in Freedom of Expression and Media Development: 2015 
Special Digital Focus (Posetti 2015c pp61-92). It covered the main findings, recommendations, the 
gender aspects of the research, and the 11-point framework for assessing source protection standards. 
Once again, I wrote a story for WAN-IFRA/the World Editors Forum about the publication of the chapter 
from Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age (Posetti 2015f) which was cross-published by a 
range of international media industry websites and magazines, further extending the reach. This process 
of staggered, amplified content release allowed us to keep the conversation alive during the long wait 
for publication-in-full. 
 
My strategy of ‘building content out of process’ (Posetti 2013) in combination with ‘going direct’ to 
audiences through self-representation via social media channels, and explanatory reporting for WAN-
IFRA about each phase of the research project, led to ongoing public speaking invitations. These 
                                                             





included a seat at the table with UN Special Rapporteur David Kaye during an October 2015 panel staged 
at UN headquarters in New York to coincide with his second major report – on the theme of protecting 
whistleblowers and confidential sources. That appearance triggered reportage about Protecting 
Journalism Sources in the Digital Age by Vice (Oakford 2015) and other major media outlets. Berger 
pointed out that the stretched production timeline was frustrating, but it gave us “several bites at the 
cherry” instead of “coming out in a flash” and disappearing.157  
 
Then, in 2016, I wrote a high-profile Op-Ed about the creeping threat of source protection erosion for 
The Sydney Morning Herald that was carried across Fairfax Media titles on World Press Freedom Day 
(Posetti 2016). This process served to both stimulate ongoing public conversation about the forthcoming 
book and demonstrate the expectation of widespread interest in its publication, at a time when there 
were suggestions that it might never be released.  
 
When the book was eventually published on World Press Freedom Day the following year (2017), I once 
again wrote an editorial for The Sydney Morning Herald on related themes (Posetti 2017b), and I filed 
separate pieces for The Conversation, MediaShift, WAN-IFRA, and the Global Investigative Journalism 
Network (GIJN)158. These pieces, in turn, triggered mainstream news coverage of the book’s launch, with 
stories featuring prominently in prime-time ABC news bulletins in Australia, for example (Marchese 
2017). The major push for traction culminated in an Australian launch of the book in Sydney at the end 
of November 2017159. Tickets to the public event, featuring two of Australia’s top investigative 
journalists and anchored by me, sold out and the associated hashtag #ProtectSources trended in third 
place nationally on Twitter on the night160. The University of Wollongong, the Media Entertainment and 
Arts Alliance (the national journalists’ union) and the peak industry body, The Walkley Foundation, were 
event partners, and I wrote a story for the national journalism journal Walkley Magazine to mark the 
launch. (Posetti 2017c) The packed venue, overlooking the Sydney Opera House, demonstrated the wide 
appeal of the central issues with a broad range of representatives from civil society organisations, 
academia, media outlets and the general public in attendance.  
 
6.4.5 Measuring reach and impact: “Very often you’re looking at long 
chains of causality and concatenation” 
 
For UN actors, advocacy is often focused on what Radsch described as the “long game” of influencing 
norms and standards to support the free flow of information – a long game that involves a very 
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convoluted multi-stage process of impact. But impact, reach and stakeholder engagement are vital 
ingredients in the recipe for change, and measurement of those elements is increasingly important – 
especially to funders. Berger, Kaye and Radsch all noted the difficulty of developing metrics to evaluate 
impact connected to freedom of expression research, publications and campaigns. This is partly due to 
the fact that information alone rarely leads to change, and the collaborative nature of efforts to reform 
laws and policy - which often involve coordinated and concurrent campaigns, with inputs from UN 
actors, civil society organisations and the media. As Berger put it, when examining qualitative outputs 
“very often you’re looking at long chains of causality and concatenation, along with long time 
frames.”161 
 
There’s also the need to differentiate between reach (i.e. the spread of content) and impact (i.e. 
impetus for change). But base level digital data is still a useful indicator of reach. According to UNESCO’s 
own metrics162, in the first year after publication (ending May 2018), Protecting Journalism Sources in 
the Digital Age had been downloaded approximately 10,000 times.163 Meanwhile, World Trends in 
Freedom of Expression 2015: Special Digital Focus (which featured a major extract from Protecting 
Journalism Sources) has been downloaded 10,300 times in English and another three thousand times (in 
total) in French, Arabic, Spanish and Russian between November 2015 and May 2018164. Unfortunately, 
UNESCO doesn’t routinely track the source of referrals, nor the location of downloads. Approximately 
600 printed copies of Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age have also been distributed by 
UNESCO, along with 1000 copies of the English language brochure.165 
 
Berger pointed to conversations among journalists connected to media coverage and events related to 
Protecting Sources in the Digital Age, as one indicator of its impact. Pakistani editor Zafar Abbas’ public 
testimony that he had used the draft of the book that I supplied him in 2016 to successfully stave off 
charges (which came with the risk of imprisonment), after one of his journalists at Dawn refused to hand 
over their mobile phone to security police on a source-hunting mission was also noteworthy, Berger 
said.166 Similarly, during the WAN-IFRA World News Congress in Lisbon in 2018, I was advised by a 
journalist from the South African investigative journalism centre amaBhungane, that they were using 
the book for advocacy work pertaining to investigative journalism. At the same event, a prominent Irish 
editor also told me that he would be consulting the book in the context of a tribunal investigating the 
case of a whistleblower the following week.  
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Impact within UN contexts is also relevant, and the aforementioned citation of my book pre-publication 
by UN Special Rapporteur David Kaye in his 2015 thematic report to the UN General Assembly, on 
protection of whistleblowers and journalists’ sources, was significant (Kaye 2015b). The UN Secretary 
General’s mention of my research in his Report on journalism safety to the UN General Assembly (UN 
Secretary General 2015) was also important, even more so the UN General Assembly Resolution on 
journalism safety that was carried in November 2017 (UN General Assembly 2017a). That Resolution 
recognised the value of encryption to source protection and it cited UNESCO’s World Trends in Freedom 
of Expression and Media Development 2015: Special Digital Focus that featured a major extract from my 
research. But perhaps the strongest evidence of ‘real world’ impact flowing from the book is its citation 
in a favourable 2017 judgement from the European Court of Human Rights in a source protection case 
brought by a Norwegian journalist (Becker vs. Norway, ECtHR. Application no. 21272/12). Judge 
Tsotsoria’s concurring opinion attached to the judgement reads in part:  
…we are living in the modern digital era where the legal framework of the 
protection of journalistic sources is under significant strain. This expands the risk of 
erosion, restriction and compromise in the work of journalists, with an impact on 
freedom of expression, the media and investigative journalism in particular 
[Reference: See generally, Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age, UNESCO 
publication 2017]. The Court has been a frontrunner and an advocate of judicial 
protection of journalists and their sources and in so doing it has also served as an 
inspiration for many other jurisdictions. This path should not be reversed.167 
 
Prof. David Kaye also mentioned this judgement as evidence of impact in reference to his previously 
noted Report to the UN General Assembly on protection of whistleblowers and journalists’ sources. The 
judgement references his 2015 Report, which in turn cites my study. In addition to citations in such 
judgements, mainstream media coverage, and civil society campaigns, Kaye looks for evidence of impact 
in terms of law and policy reform, and direct outcomes like the release of journalists from prison 
following interventions.  
 
At CPJ, Radsch told me that a range of metrics informs the organisation’s monitoring and assessment of 
impact and reach. In terms of impact, taking the example of advocacy connected to the murder of 
journalists with impunity, metrics examined by CPJ include an assessment of investigations and the rate 
of prosecutions connected to cases about which they have made representations. And they count the 
responses they receive from governments to their requests for information or action, along with policy 
changes that they can connect with particular campaigns. In terms of broader impact, they also look at 
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the number of conferences where their campaign themes are included, how many national news outlets 
cover their interventions, and the number of report downloads, for example. Social media metrics are 
also considered for evidence of reach (rather than impact), with attention paid to the sharing by key 
‘influencers’ and target groups. 
 
In general, the Freedom of Expression and Media Development Division of UNESCO doesn’t deploy an 
orchestrated strategy of communications, monitoring and impact/reach measurement in connection 
with its research outputs. Rather, according to Guy Berger, it has been a case of “produce it, try to 
promote it to the extent one can, and hope it becomes visible.”168 The Division is now moving towards 
integrating a holistic communications strategy from the outset for its major research output – the 
biannual World Trends report – with emphasis on shareable infographics, and a fully-fledged social 
media campaign. This is partly about addressing the disconnect between what Berger described as a 19th 
century model of book-publishing and 21st century patterns of information consumption and 
distribution.  
 
However, ongoing resourcing issues and chronic budget shortfalls experienced by UNESCO (Coningham 
2017; Berger 2013) will likely prohibit the extension of such a strategy to specialised freedom of 
expression research outputs produced by the Organization. Instead, as detailed below, responsibility for 
reach is likely to fall to commissioned authors. 
 
6.4.6 The role of social media in intergovernmental diplomacy and 
freedom of expression advocacy: “I find it just incredibly helpful in 
terms of learning what people on the ground are actually 
experiencing”  
 
The advent of social media has transformed international freedom of expression advocacy and 
diplomacy. For UN Special Rapporteur David Kaye, Twitter is valuable as a tool for visible engagement 
with broad publics, to amplify his research and statements, and to draw connections between current 
issues and human rights norms in an unmediated manner. “It’s a lot easier than the mediated space of 
the traditional media,” he said.169 He also uses the platform to monitor and track human rights abuses in 
States where data is difficult to access through official channels. This includes crowdsourcing context 
when he is researching cases. “I find it just incredibly helpful in terms of learning what people on the 
ground are actually experiencing,” he said, citing Kashmir as an example due to regular internet 
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shutdowns initiated by India in the region170. Kaye told me that he understands UN Member States are 
paying attention to his Twitter commentary, despite not engaging directly with him via the platform. 
That’s one of the reasons he leverages Twitter to influence public sphere debates, but he said this is also 
likely a factor contributing to increased sensitivities among States regarding public admonishment by 
the Special Rapporteurs. It’s imperative to call out bad behaviour and model positive developments in 
the international human rights arena according to Kaye, but there’s an essential tension associated with 
this strategy because “the State whose behaviour we hope will change may be more reluctant to 
publicly change its position in the face of what may be perceived as pressure,” he said.171 
 
Professor Kaye also highlighted the value of his Twitter activity in terms of visible engagement with civil 
society organisations – an important aspect of the role that he said he had not fully appreciated at the 
outset. Additionally, Kaye pointed to the purpose of his social media activity in the context of 
“meaningful public debates that could influence outcomes”172. While clearly underlining the 
effectiveness of active social media use in his work, Kaye acknowledged the increased workload it 
entails, and he was also cognisant of the risks. “The risk is being too quick to complain about state 
behaviour and getting it wrong, and that can undermine the credibility of the entire system. I think that 
can be very risky,”173 he said. Kaye’s realisation of some of the risks associated with realtime diplomacy 
in the context of ‘networked freedom of expression’ mirror the findings of my earlier research regarding 
journalists’ initial uptake of Twitter and its evolving purpose as a tool for monitoring breaking news, 
crowdsourcing, audience development, content distribution, and public identity construction. The 
inherent risks I identified in 2009 included the ‘speed imperative’ associated with the medium that can 
lead to sharing inaccurate content with the associated risk of damaging credibility, impacts on 
verification norms and standards, and the time imposts associated with realtime audience engagement 
(c.f. Posetti, 2009a, 2010, 2013). 
 
For Courtney Radsch, social media strategy is an essential component of CPJ campaigns. For example, 
the hashtag #RightToReport was deployed to help aggregate conversations around the ‘Right to Report 
in the Digital Age’ campaign and enlist the support of high-profile backers. I have devised and executed a 
range of social media campaigns connected to journalism and research projects since 2009, at the 
national and international levels. In the case of Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age, for the 
purpose of building ‘community around content’ and amplifying the ‘content made from process’ 
(Posetti 2013), I used Facebook and Twitter extensively to ‘go direct’ to audiences (bypassing traditional 
gatekeepers) alongside my published reportage connected to the research. I used Instagram sparingly, 
in line with the need to differentiate the platforms according to the type of content available, and I 
avoided integrating other platforms due to capacity limitations. I deployed the hashtag #ProtectSources 
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and it was well-adopted, trending in Australia at number three position on Twitter on the night of the 
national book launch in November 2017 mentioned earlier.  
 
While being cautious not to engage in high-risk conversations – recognising the risks involving internet 
intermediary use highlighted by my UNESCO research – I connected with international journalists, NGOs, 
human rights defenders, media lawyers and academics working in the area of whistleblowing and source 
confidentiality from the time the research commenced in 2014. This strategy, which continues in the 
context of a research project devising new ethical guidelines and principles for journalists working with 
whistleblowers that I’m currently leading for Blueprint for Free Speech (Posetti 2018a)174, was important 
in terms of sustaining interest in the research during the long wait for publication of the book in full. It 
also allowed us to plug the research into what Berger described as “hot issues” connected to the 
themes, and it led directly to invitations to speak at conferences and events about the research, 
including the preliminary launch at the Frontline Club in London. That invitation came via Facebook. This 
effort also paid off in connection with distributing the e-book once it was published.  
 
I organised a ‘Facebook Live’ interview with UNESCO to mark the official launch of Protecting Journalism 
Sources in the Digital Age at the global World Press Freedom Day conference in Jakarta in May 2017. The 
archived video of that interview175 has had over three and a half thousand views, while the post has 
been ‘liked’ 72 times and shared 18 times. Unfortunately, while Berger, Kaye and many other UN 
officials tweeted links to the book and associated stories, UNESCO’s official Twitter (@UNESCO) account 
failed to tweet it at all, perhaps indicating a disconnected distribution strategy within the Organization.  
 
But the best indicator of digital reach and impact achieved by the book is probably this retweet176 -from 
Edward Snowden himself: 
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I was alerted to Snowden’s retweet announcing the book’s launch and linking to the e-book when my 
mobile phone began issuing incessant alerts via Twitter - a month after posting the original tweet, in 
which I’d tagged Snowden to draw his attention to the research. At the time of writing, the tweet had 
garnered 423,243 impressions (i.e. it was ‘seen’ by that many Twitter users), 300 likes, 280 retweets and 





But, arguably more significant than the reach of this post, was the symbolism of Snowden’s apparent 
endorsement of the study via a retweet. This was research produced for, and published by, the UN and 
his distribution of the study served to legitimise it in the eyes of privacy activists, members of digital 
rights and ‘hacktivist’ communities, investigative journalists and others who may have been sceptical 
about the research due the documented history of UN `Member States’ sensitivities and UNESCO 
cautiousness involving research publications.  
 
                                                             
177 Note: These metrics are visible only to me as the Twitter account holder responsible for the original tweet. 





This story also has a potent corollary – a personal anecdote that demonstrates a broader challenge 
when it comes to navigating freedom of expression in public, one underscored by UNESCO’s Berger 
regarding the difficulty of gaining traction for such complex issues. On the day my tweet was sent viral 
by Edward Snowden, my mother and sister were seated opposite me at my dining table. When I laughed 
in delight and surprise upon discovering the identity of the ‘influencer’ who had propelled my tweet, I 
said to them: “Oh my goodness! Edward Snowden just retweeted my book!” They both replied in 
unison: “Who’s Edward Snowden?” 
 
6.5 Storytelling for freedom of expression: “Journalists in the US have 
realised that press freedom isn’t a given.” 
 
Broader public awareness and engagement is critical to addressing persistent widespread ignorance and 
disinterest regarding issues like privacy, encryption, anonymity and their confluence with the 
sustainability of investigative journalism, and freedom of expression rights. These include: Journalists’ 
right to protect their sources; whistleblowers’ right to share information in the public interest; and the 
public’s right to access information. Explanatory journalism, audience engagement, accessible and 
relatable case studies, content that reaches people where they are most likely to find it, character-
driven narratives and clarion communications adopting popular formats are essential to this process.   
 
The historic reluctance of professional journalists to produce reflective practice for public consumption, 
and report on issues central to journalism – from the imprisonment and murder of journalists with 
impunity to the digital security threats undermining their work – persists. But according to CPJ’s 
Courtney Radsch, it began to give in the aftermath of the Snowden revelations. There has been 
significant movement, too, on coverage of journalism safety threats as journalists increasingly become 
targets of warlords, terrorists, corrupt government actors, and ‘strongman’ political leaders - with 
attacks on the rise in the developed West. This form of activist journalism in the US has become more 
prevalent in the Trump era, as Radsch explained: “Journalists in the US have realised that press freedom 
isn’t a given. It’s actually something that they need to be vigilant about.”178 179 As Berger pointed out, 
the painstakingly balanced BBC is also now on the record as saying that they’re “neutral about 
everything except the safety of journalists”. But he said he still sees evidence of a reluctance to look 
‘inwards’ on the part of the profession. 
 
David Kaye echoed my own perspective and practice when he told me that it is really important to use 
specific stories and concrete examples to illustrate what’s at stake as a result of creeping threats of 
source protection erosion and the prospect of investigative journalism becoming unsustainable in the 
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Digital Age. “They’re extremely useful in giving people a firm example of where anonymity and 
confidentiality of sources really helped identify a major public policy problem, and did so very much in 
the public interest,” he said.180  
 
From the Pentagon Papers to Watergate, through to the Boston Globe’s investigations into child sexual 
abuse within the Catholic church and, more recently, the Snowden Files and the Panama Papers (The 
Guardian 2018), the characters and stories connected to acts of journalism based on confidential 
sources and information provided by whistleblowers have crossed the boundaries of strict non-fiction. 
They’ve also been treated as the sort of compelling, intriguing narratives that cross over into pop culture 
and are considered worthy of Hollywood blockbuster status such as All the President’s Men (1976), 
Spotlight (2015), Snowden (2016), The Post (2017), The Laundromat (forthcoming). While not all 
journalism dependent on confidential sources has a sexy backstory, the fact that films based on the 
most famous examples of such investigative reporting still find traction with large audiences is 
noteworthy when considering the potential value of reportage for mass audiences. If people flock to 
cinemas to see them, why won’t they read, watch, listen to them and like, share and comment on them 
if they’re told well, with human characters at the core, by the journalists who know them best?  
 
6.5.1 Solidarity and loneliness: “For most of the time, I didn’t get much 
attention” 
 
One such character is the prominent former New York Times journalist James Risen. Once The Times’ CIA 
correspondent and National Security Editor, he defied both the world’s most influential newspaper and 
consecutive US governments in a high-stakes struggle for independent journalism based on a 
confidential source. After working on the Snowden Files at The Times, he is now at The Intercept181 as 
Senior National Security Correspondent and director of First Look Media’s Press Freedom Defense Fund. 
In January 2018, he wrote his own story, which began like this: 
I was sitting in the nearly empty restaurant of the Westin Hotel in Alexandria, 
Virginia, getting ready for a showdown with the federal government that I had 
been trying to avoid for more than seven years. The Obama administration was 
demanding that I reveal the confidential sources I had relied on for a chapter about 
a botched CIA operation in my 2006 book, “State of War.” I had also written about 
the CIA operation for the New York Times, but the paper’s editors had suppressed 
                                                             
180 Research interview with David Kaye, May 2018 






the story at the government’s request. It wasn’t the only time they had done so. 
(Risen 2018) 
I interviewed Risen for this exegesis three months later, during the International Journalism Festival in 
Perugia, Italy. I had written about his case in Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age - as I 
watched it progress through the courts. I had also requested an interview with him for the book, but he 
was embroiled in the legal tussle and facing the threat of jail for refusing to reveal his source/s at the 
time, so he understandably declined. It had taken nearly a decade of legal struggle to stave off attempts 
to compel Risen to reveal his source/s in connection with the leak investigation triggered by his 2006 
book. The Bush administration began the battle, but by the time Risen was finally forced into court 
himself in January 2015, the Obama Administration had prosecuted three times as many leak cases 
involving journalists and whistleblowers as all previous administrations combined.  
As I walked past the photographers into the courthouse that morning…I saw a 
group of reporters, some of whom I knew personally. They were here to cover my 
case, and now they were waiting and watching me. I felt isolated and alone. (Risen 
2018) 
Risen’s sense of loneliness stemmed in part from the fact that he had been ‘hung out to dry’182 by The 
New York Times and there was scant coverage of his years-long ordeal when he most needed journalism 
to serve him as the subject of a twisted story. By the time he took the stand to give evidence in 2015, 
then US Attorney General Eric Holder had begun to backtrack, in the face of public pressure and civil 
society activism, indicating that a reporter would not be forced to reveal a source on his ‘watch’ (Ellison 
2015). But the damage had already been done, with a precedent set on appeal by the Obama 
administration that defeated the reporter’s privilege in criminal cases in a district that was home to the 
Pentagon, the CIA, and the NSA. The Supreme Court ultimately refused to hear Risen’s appeal, but he 
was winning another battle on the sidelines: 
Even as I was losing in the courts, I was gaining ground in the court of public 
opinion. My decision to go to the Supreme Court had captured the attention of the 
nation’s political and media classes. Instead of ignoring the case, as they had for 
years, the national media now framed it as a major constitutional battle over press 
freedom (Risen 2018). 
That solidarity came too late, however. And in the end, the Justice Department successfully prosecuted 
the man they believed to be Risen’s source for the book – Jeffrey Sterling – based on metadata 
connected to phone calls and emails between the two. Risen never confirmed if Stirling was his source, 
but the former CIA agent served two years in jail, regardless (Mass 2018), after the state accessed 
Risen’s email metadata. To some observers, this was proof that compelling testimony from reporters 
                                                             





may no longer be necessary to reveal a confidential source, just as Courtney Radsch had predicted in her 
interview with me for Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age in late 2014. It also served to 
highlight the threats posed by data retention laws and the role of third-party intermediaries in digital 
era source protection erosion.  
 
When he reflected on his case with me during our interview in Perugia, Risen came back to the theme of 
loneliness and the sense of abandonment by colleagues that he experienced during his long legal fight:  
It was very difficult over the years because it went on for so long. For most of the 
time I didn’t get much attention. There was very little media coverage for many 
years. So, I felt lonely for a long time.183  
He highlighted the need for news organisations to back their reporters in such cases. “Sometimes you 
don’t get a lot of support from your news organisation, and that’s a real problem,” he said. “Especially 
today, because of the costs involved, very few news organisations will fully back their reporters.”184 
Risen acknowledged that digital era threats to source protection require adoption of both analogue 
methods and high-tech defences: “We’re being forced to act like spies, having to learn tradecraft and 
encryption and all the new ways to protect sources.”185 But he was clearly resentful of the need to do 
so, and also very clear that he wouldn’t sit in judgement on fellow reporters whose sources had been 
exposed by intelligence services. “You’re up against a massive machine,” he said. “I just don’t believe 
reporters should be criticised if the government still finds sources, because they have enormous 
power.”186 
 
6.5.2 Principles and guidelines for working with whistleblowers in the 
Digital Age: “First, protect your sources” 
 
I am now collaborating with Risen and a group of twenty other international investigative journalists, 
editors and human rights defenders to develop a revised set of principles and guidelines for working 
with whistleblowers in the Digital Age – a project funded by the Open Society Foundations (OSF) and 
commissioned by the NGO Blueprint for Free Speech. Following our interview, I co-anchored a research 
roundtable with Risen in Perugia, where the group reviewed the draft principles (Posetti 2018a) I had 
devised for the project. So urgent is the issue, and so intense was the conversation, that they insisted on 
continuing for an hour longer than scheduled.  
 
                                                             








These were the draft principles that emerged from this process of collaborative refinement: 
 
1. First, protect your sources 
2. Recognise the costs of whistleblowing for the whistleblower 
3. Defend anonymity when it is requested 
4. Undertake a digital risk assessment on every story involving a confidential source or 
whistleblower 
5. Take responsibility for your digital defence and data hygiene 
6. Embrace and use encryption 
7. Defend encryption as a human right connected to freedom of expression and access to 
information 
8. On sensitive stories, train your whistleblowers in basic digital security with regard to ‘data at 
rest’ 
9. On sensitive stories, train your whistleblowers in basic digital security with regard to ‘data in 
transit’ 
10. Publish original documents where possible and safe to do so 
11. Recognise the importance of data sets as ‘stories’ 
12. Publish the data sets in their entirety where resources permit and it is safe to do so 
13. Delete data provided by sources, when asked to protect the sources, consistent with ethical, 
legal and employer obligations 
14. Delete data that you no longer need, and do it securely 
15. Ensure any digital drop boxes for sources and whistleblowers offer a good level of security, and, 
for high-risk materials, anonymity and security 
16. Verify material focusing on the public interest value of the information, not on your view of the 
attitudes or opinions of the source or whistleblower 
17. Actively encourage your organisation to provide proper data security for journalists, sources 
and stored materials, along with appropriate training for journalists 
18. For high risk whistleblowers, prompt them to think through how they will cope when the story 
breaks, ahead of time 
19. Understand the country, regional and international legal and regulatory frameworks for 
protecting confidential sources and whistleblowers 
20. Explain the risks of digital exposure to your sources/whistleblowers in line with your ethical 
obligations to protect them 
 
The reporters, editors and human rights defenders in that conference room were clearly invested in the 
issues and recognised the importance of reportage on the theme, along with the associated value in 
broader public conversation about the intersecting issues. Importantly, they also found Risen’s story 





which will be published in a handbook at the end of 2018187. 
 
6.5.3 Implications for development of a hybrid model to negotiate 
freedom of expression in public: “It’s a debate that has to happen in 
public, not just in litigation”  
 
UN Special Rapporteur David Kaye told me that he sees “total value in a public discussion”188 about the 
erosion of source confidentiality in the post-Snowden era because governments and prosecutors are 
clearly influenced by public opinion, and where there is a strong consensus on the value of independent 
public interest journalism that protects sources, it has an important impact on judges too: 
So, it’s a debate that has to happen in public, not just in litigation. If you do it just in 
litigation, it becomes a kind of technical issue and I think these things should be 
seen bigger public issues about the health of our democracy, rather than just 
‘person x deserves to protect her source’ 189 
While recognising the value of mainstream media coverage and social media amplification of Protecting 
Journalism Sources in the Digital Age in terms of educating journalists and potential sources, helping to 
activate civil society, and promoting a knowledge resource that might aid lawyers and influence 
legislators and policy makers, UNESCO’s Guy Berger remained unconvinced about the viability of 
achieving broad public conversations about such complex and “niche” research.  
 
Nevertheless, Berger told me that he planned in future to make it a clause in commissioned authors’ 
contracts that they would be responsible for promoting their work for UNESCO because: “If you hadn’t 
promoted this [Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age] as much as you did, we wouldn’t have 
had nearly as much promotion.”190 That’s a strategy that makes sense for a resource-stretched Division 
frequently entering into partnerships with civil society organisations that have a journalism advocacy 
remit and capacity to build powerful narratives around research. But I would go further and suggest that 
UNESCO develop a model of project ‘linkage’ partners to support such a process in the context of 
freedom of expression research. This could involve projects designed to partner academic researchers 
with civil society organisations and a media outlet, with a view to leveraging the input of a range of 
communities with specialist knowledge and facilitating broad public conversation around the research. 
Similar models already exist within the realm of national research funding frameworks in several 
countries.  
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6.6 Conclusion and summary 
 
In this narrative non-fiction account, drawing on Critical Reflective Practice and analytic 
autoethnography, I have interwoven my own story of the production of Protecting Journalism Sources in 
the Digital Age, with the experiences and reflections of four key informants: the Director of the UNESCO 
division who commissioned the major artefact; the UN Special Rapporteur with responsibility for 
promoting and defending freedom of expression internationally and doing the “naming and shaming” 
that many UN agencies seek to avoid; a civil society activist and former UNESCO employee who shared 
rare and valuable ‘insider’s’ insights; and finally a crusading journalist who has himself been a victim of 
source protection erosion and the profession’s failure to publicly defend its own in this territory. This is 
what I call a ‘cooperative deconstruction’191.   
 
I must also convey my own self-assessment: while I regret allowing frustration to bubble over at times 
during the research and production of the UNESCO study, I believe I worked as hard as I could, and to 
the best of my capacity to lead a high-impact piece of international policy research to fruition. I learned 
much – both about my own capacities and limitations, and the centrality of relationship-building and 
maintenance to the successful execution of high-intensity research projects. But most importantly, I 
acquired significant expertise on some of the most pressing issues confronting 21st century investigative 
journalism, along with a passion to continue researching and reporting on these themes. This ultimately 
led to my conceptualisation of ‘networked source protection’, and the development of an intersectional 
model of policy development, advocacy and journalism appropriate for negotiating freedom of 
expression in the networked public sphere, as outlined in this exegesis. 
 
Intergovernmental politics, frustrating UN bureaucracy, and diplomatic ‘sensitivities’ notwithstanding, I 
remain proud of Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age and pleased with what it has achieved 
to date. I hope that it has a long and meaningful shelf-life but, moreover, that it inspires future 
scholarship, freedom of expression activism, and journalism about the pressing issues it addresses. I feel 
honoured to have worked with talented, committed colleagues within UNESCO, the academy, and WAN-
IFRA/The World Editors Forum to bring the project underpinning my PhD dissertation to eventual 
fruition. 
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This action research-modelled exegesis (Phillips 2014) has provided detailed critical and scholarly 
context for the commissioning, production, dissemination and impact of my study for UNESCO, 
Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age (Posetti 2017a). This has been achieved through an 
analytical interweaving of academic research with high-level industry and NGO-commissioned reports 
on the themes at the heart of the book, and key original research findings and recommendations drawn 
from my study. This approach is complemented by a narrative non-fiction inspired Critical Reflective 
Practice (C.f. Niblock 2007; Fook 2007; Fook & Askeland 2009; Lawrence 2011; Burns 2013) account 
which uses elements of analytic autoethnography (Anderson 2006) to synthesise my experiences of 
producing the major artefact, and learnings from the project, with field observations, reportage, and a 
process I’m calling ‘cooperative deconstruction’. 
 
As I have argued, this PhD project, comprising the UNESCO-published book (the major artefact) and its 
multiple associated outputs and events, along with this exegesis, highlights development of an 
intersectional model of policy development, advocacy and journalism for the negotiation of freedom of 
expression rights in public. The study undertaken at the heart of this project entailed: peer-reviewed 
research on a global scale; journalistic methods and outputs; political communication and diplomacy; 
audience engagement, and the leveraging of a networked public sphere as components of Participative 
Action Research which did not end at the point of publication. This exegesis is, in fact, another 
component of an unfolding process.  
 
The major artefact192 was produced through a series of overlapping, rigorous research methods 
common to both journalism and academic policy research (and intensified in the context of sensitive UN 
geopolitics and associated verification demands), but these traditional methods were enhanced by 
connective and participatory strategies which sought to ‘make content out of process’ and 
simultaneously build engaged audiences to enhance the impact of the study. This connective process 
also underpins the methodology of this exegesis (Hamilton & Jaaniste 2010; Lindgren & Phillips 2011) in 
both situating the work of the project in a broader scholarly context, and through its unique approach to 
what I call ‘cooperative deconstruction’ employed as part of the critical reflective process. To this end, I 
have interwoven my own Critical Reflective Practice ‘story’ of the production processes with the 
experiences and reflections of four key informants: the UNESCO Director who commissioned this 
                                                             





research (Dr Guy Berger); a UN Special Rapporteur with responsibility for promoting and defending 
freedom of expression internationally and doing the “naming and shaming” that many UN agencies seek 
to avoid (Prof. David Kaye); another, who is both a civil society activist and former UN employee who 
shared rare and important insights (Dr Courtney Radsch); and finally a crusading journalist who has 
himself been a victim of source protection erosion and the profession’s failure to publicly defend its own 
in this territory (James Risen).  
 
The ultimate aim of the exegetical component is to reflect on and aid the future navigation and 
negotiation of freedom of expression advocacy through high-impact research undertaken by academics, 
journalists, intergovernmental organisations and civil society groups. The PhD project as a whole, serves 
as an intervention in support of protecting confidential sources, recognised as a central tenet of 
journalism practice and essential to the sustainability of investigative journalism, at time when the 
practice of accountability journalism globally is facing unprecedented Digital Age threats and myriad 
other converging pressures. 
 
7.1.1 Introducing the concept of ‘networked source protection’  
 
The additional research undertaken for this exegesis, via a review of extensive academic, civil society 
and indsutry research relevant to digital safety and security issues intersecting with legal and normative 
frameworks designed to support the principle of source protection (published up to August 2018), has 
allowed me to demonstrate that the trends identified in Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age 
have, in fact, become more entrenched and increasingly global in their manifestation since the book was 
submitted to UNESCO for publication in mid 2015. (c.f. Bell & Taylor 2017; Bradshaw 2017; Carter 2017; 
Couldry 2017; Eide 2016; Eide & Kunelius 2018; Fernandez 2017; Glowacka et al 2018; Heikkila 2016; 
Heikkila & Kunelius 2017; Gardner 2016; Kaye 2015b; MacGregor et al 2016; MacGregor et al 2017; 
Nolan 2015; Rogers & Eden 2017; Townend & Danbury 2017; Walker 2017; Wasserman 2017) In 
combination with critical analysis of convergent theories on ‘advocacy journalism’ (Harcup 2005; 
Waisbord 2008) ‘activist journalism’ (Russell 2016; Barnard 2017), ‘networked journalism’ (Beckett 
2008), digital citizenship (Hinz & Brown 2017), and the concepts of ‘networked press freedom’ (Annany 
2018) and audience-inclusive media freedom (Reid 2015), this assessment has led me to propose the 
notion of ‘networked source protection’. 
 
This concept can be understood as a form of participative source protection, one which: recognises the 
shared responsibilities for defensive digital security tactics between journalists, news publishers, 
confidential sources and whistleblowers; requires adjustment of professional journalism ethics in 
response to Digital Age source protection erosion which makes promising confidentiality increasingly 





practices to improve their capacity to make secure contact and protect their identities; understands the 
capacity of journalism to help innoculate the ‘herd’ (i.e. broader society) against the effects of mass 
surveillance, data retention and national security overreach, along with the benefits of encryption, 
through engaging reportage and storytelling about the issues.  
 
7.1.2 Realpolitik and UNESCO’s fraught history of freedom of 
expression research  
 
I have argued that the production of Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age was undertaken in 
the context of a difficult and protracted history of conflict and controversy connected to UNESCO-
commissioned research on freedom of expression issues (Nordenstreng 1999, 2012, 2013; McKenna 
2013; Hackett 2013). It is noteworthy that up until undertaking the detailed historical analysis presented 
in this exegesis, I was unaware of the depth and contemporary resonance of UNESCO freedom of 
expression research controversies. Analysing this history has provided new insights into the tensions and 
boundary work required for the type of research undertaken by this project.  
 
However, as my paper with Dr Julie Reid (2017) concluded, it is quite important to note that these 
challenges are by no means insurmountable, nor do they negate the purposefulness of embarking upon 
such research for UNESCO. The hurdles are navigable if:  
 
… a process of open and transparent communication is adopted by UNESCO [and contracted 
researchers], acknowledging such potential obstacles and fostering trust between the parties; a 
collaborative approach to problem solving and work flowing from review processes is embraced 
by UNESCO officers and the researcher/s; there is understanding and acceptance that budgets 
and resources necessarily contain the scope of research; and if the concerns of researchers are 
taken seriously by UNESCO [and the context of the research is understood by the researchers]. 
(Reid & Posetti 2017) 
 
It is also worth acknowledging that the high bar for information verification set by UNESCO encourages 
rigorous research standards. Similarly, despite the difficulties identified in adequately mapping trends in 
freedom of expression and media development globally, UNESCO’s insistence upon equitable regional 
representation in research scope, and gender balance within research teams and research subjects, 
mandates diversity in ways that few other organisations or funders require. Noteworthy too, are the 
prestige and potential global impact of UNESCO research commissions in the realm of freedom of 
expression and media development – they may be problematic to undertake, but they can also be high-





the international level. 
 
7.1.3 Implications for UNESCO 
 
Based on the original research and critical analysis undertaken for this exegesis, I have concluded that it 
is time for UNESCO to consider a ‘separation of church and state’, or a ‘shield’ between commissioned 
researchers and authors, UNESCO subject matter experts, and the political hierarchy of the Organization 
– especially in the area of freedom of expression. This could help to ensure the independence of its 
research to enable defence of the integrity and credibility of such research into the future in the context 
of concerns about ‘censorship’. Such a model was proposed by former UNESCO employee Dr Courtney 
Radsch in a research interview for this exegesis. It could involve, for example, an external panel of 
experts (with rotating membership, including academics and civil society representatives) appointed by 
UNESCO to peer review research publications with a mandate to approve publication (without necessity 
for sign off by the Director-General) and provide an avenue for dispute resolution in problematic cases.  
 
To address the potential for tension and conflict connected to UNESCO’s collaborations with consultant 
researchers and partner organisations, in part caused by concerns about the implications of geopolitics 
on research outputs, improved communications with collaborators focused on explicating specific 
UNESCO requirements and processes would be beneficial. This could involve transparency about 
geopolitical realities and political sensitivities as they affect qualitative research, and a process of 
education about the complex and fraught history of the Organization’s research in the freedom of 
expression domain, in order to provide important contextual understanding for contemporaneous 
sensitivities and interventions. 
 
UNESCO-commissioned research in the freedom of expression and media development space would 
also benefit from increased budgets and resourcing to enable appropriate funding of valuable research 
projects central to defending core rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
particularly in the context of attacks on such rights in Western democratic settings as populism and neo-
fascism spread. Alternatively, reducing the number of commissioned research projects to enable more 
sustainable practices in the context of contracting budgets might be necessary. Similarly, funding models 
that are adjustable for contingencies in the case of important research undertaken on emerging issues 
at critical times, that may grow in complexity as the research unfolds, would be advantageous. 
Additionally, the resourcing of research projects needs to incorporate capacity for diplomatic 
engagement with UNESCO Member States, their legislators and policy-makers, to ensure practical tools 
emerging from the research, such as the 11-point model framework for legal source protection 
benchmarking presented in Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age, can find impact and 





budget allocations connected to the training and development of key actors targeted through the 
research, such as journalists, civil society organisations, law enforcement agencies and the judiciary.  
 
With regard to impact, the Freedom of Expression and Media Development Division’s approach to the 
distribution of commissioned research and audience engagement connected to it could also be 
improved through capacity building and embedding integrated communications strategies incorporating 
a ‘networked’ approach to commissioning, production and dissemination. 
 
7.1.4 Implications for UNESCO-commissioned researchers 
 
There are parallel responsibilities for UNESCO-commissioned researchers and civil society organisations 
to consider based on this exegetical analysis. Firstly, they need to be aware of the complexities of 
undertaking research for intergovernmental organisations – particularly where Member States are 
involved as primary stakeholders. Invariably, such projects will involve frustrating bureaucratic 
processes, serious realpolitik, and very high standards regarding compliance with Organizational style, 
verification, gender diversity and regional representation. This requires a preparedness for flexible, 
adaptable, collaborative approaches to the work, and clear communication about capacity limitations, 
misunderstandings, and knowledge gaps from the outset. To this end, contracted researchers should 
ensure that they keep UNESCO staff informed, in writing, if and as the project escalates in complexity, 
sensitivity, or difficulty. This might entail going higher in the Organizational structure for clarity, as and 
when required. Researchers have a responsibility to insist on open/responsive communications and be 
prepared to reciprocate as required. They would also benefit from ‘self-education’ regarding the history 
and impact of UNESCO research in the freedom of expression realm. 
 
It is also important to keep sight of the ‘big picture’ in the context of bureaucratic obstacles and 
geopolitical sensitivities: the end goal can be meaningful freedom of expression research with real policy 
impact and widespread public knowledge-sharing. Part of this process should involve recognising that 
UNESCO staff are frequently under-resourced and overloaded, which limits their capacities. 
 
7.1.5 Implications for the journalism profession 
 
There are significant implications for journalism and journalists flowing from this PhD project. These 
include the recommendations from the major artefact pertaining to the need to renovate ethical 
principles and investigative journalism practices associated with confidential sources and whistleblowers 
to ensure they’re fit for the Digital Age (Banisar 2007, 2008; Paliwala 2013; Heikkila & Kunelius 2017; 
Lashmar 2017; Carter 2017; Bradshaw 2017; McGregor et al 2017, 2017). Additionally, there is a need to 





recognition of the shared responsibility for training, education, and knowledge-sharing in the context of 
Digital Age source protection erosion and networked publics.  
 
It is now time for professional norms and values to accommodate activist and explanatory approaches 
to freedom of expression issues in the interests of sustaining ongoing public debate central to the 
defence of open societies, and the future of accountability journalism that is dependent upon 
confidential communications with sources and whistleblowers. This involves appreciation that a range of 
‘journalisms’ on the ‘advocacy continuum’ (Harcup 2005; Fisher 2016) can aid journalism about freedom 
of expression issues, including the human rights to privacy and encryption, and reportage on journalism 
safety and the murder of journalists with impunity. 
 
Similarly, audiences need to be involved in the co-production of freedom of expression rights which are 
shared, especially in the ‘networked press freedom’ era, recognising that media freedom now needs to 
be understood as a collaborative process that acknowledges audience engagement and rights (Reid 
2015). Reportage about these themes that deploys storytelling devices such as ‘lived experience’ case 
studies designed to humanise complex technical issues connected to source protection erosion and the 
right to encrypt, can help deepen impact and broaden community education. 
 
One approach could involve considering the value of UNESCO-commissioned research projects as 
knowledge resources, and reporting on the potential implications at the international, regional and 
State levels. In particular, consideration could be given to undertaking a review of States’ performance 
against the 11-point framework contained in Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age. 
Importantly, journalists and news organisations can be aided in holding States and the UN accountable 
regarding responsibilities for practicing, maintaining, and strengthening international freedom of 
expression rights by leveraging UNESCO-commissioned research like the major artefact. 
 
7.1.6 Implications for the academy 
 
This PhD project has the potential to inspire academic research that progresses the work at the core, 
mapping Digital Age threats to source protection frameworks internationally. This could involve research 
collaborations with journalists, news outlets, and civil society organisations to periodically update the 
status of legal source protection frameworks, demonstrating the intersections with a range of other 
Digital Age issues, including national security overreach, mass surveillance and data retention/handover. 
Alternatively, such collaborative research groups could assess individual countries’ legal and normative 
source protection frameworks (or lack thereof) against the 11-point model presented in Protecting 
Journalism Sources in the Digital Age within their regions. 
 





and journalists’ confidential sources in the Digital Age. In the context of a ‘networked public’ model, the 
rights and protections of sources and journalists must inevitably be considered and researched together 
in the context of ‘networked source protection’.  
 
In summary: collaboration and strategic cross pollination of ideas and actors; engaged social media 
practice; activist journalism and hybrid models of advocacy are essential elements for the navigation 
and public negotiation of freedom of expression rights in the ‘networked press freedom era’. So, too, 
are well-informed interactive publics, independent research and explanatory journalism, and increasing 
the capacity of UNESCO to commission and produce world-class, well-resourced international research 
on freedom of expression and media development that has the potential to impact on States, regional 
intergovernmental organisations and courts. Central to this goal are increased funding and resources for 
UNESCO’s critically important role in freedom of expression research and knowledge sharing, especially 
regarding journalism safety and security, and improved capacities within UNESCO’s Freedom of 
Expression and Media Development Division for project management, audience development, and 
strategic communications practices. More pertinent still, might be organisational review and reform to 
ensure the independence and ongoing credibility of UNESCO research publications in this space, 
including consideration of Dr Courtney Radsch’s recommendation for the provision of a ‘shield’ to 
defend such work against undue political interference and/or hypersensitivities. 
 
Finally, I would like to repeat that the mission of UNESCO freedom of expression research remains noble 
and relevant. As Berger (2013) noted: “The 2011 Resolution behind the research [World Trends 
2014]…also included a clause that referred to reinforcing the need for UNESCO to promote the free flow 
of ideas by encouraging dialogue between Member States and by sensitizing governments, public 
institutions and civil society to strive towards freedom of expression and freedom of the press as a 




Drawing on research for this exegesis, and reflecting on the major artefact, I have aggregated a set of 
recommendations relevant to: 
 
o UNESCO 
o UNESCO-commissioned researchers 
o The journalism profession 
o The academy as it engages with UNESCO research 
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These recommendations are explicated in the conclusion above, but they are also curated below in 
bullet-point form to facilitate clarity and accessibility. 
 
7.2.1 Recommendations for UNESCO 
 
o UNESCO-commissioned research in the freedom of expression space would benefit from:  
- Introduction of a research publishing model designed to ‘separate church and 
state’ (i.e. commissioned researchers, internal Subject Matter Experts, and 
UNESCO political review processes) or create a ‘shield’ for commissioned 
researchers/authors and SMEs to protect them from overt interference by the 
Organization’s political hierarchy in research production and publication 
processes. This could enable defence of the integrity and credibility of such 
research into the future 
- A structural review of UNESCO research commissioning/publication processes 
focused on achieving the outcomes identified directly above 
- Increased budgets and resourcing to enable appropriate funding of valuable 
research projects central to defending core rights enshrined in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, especially as they relate to journalism safety and 
security 
- Funding models that are adjustable for contingencies in the case of important 
research undertaken on emerging issues at critical times that may grow in 
complexity as the research unfolds  
- Increased capacities for strategic, audience-engaged communications connected 
to research outputs and related publications 
- Embedding integrated communications strategies incorporating a ‘networked’ 
approach to commissioning, production and dissemination e.g. UNESCO could 
develop a model of project ‘linkage’ partners to support freedom of expression 
research. This could involve projects designed to partner academic researchers 
with civil society organisations and a media outlet, with a view to facilitating 
broader traction for its research outputs 
 
o UNESCO’s collaborations with consultant researchers and partner organisations could 
benefit from: 
- Improved communications with researchers, focused on explicating specific 
UNESCO requirements/processes  





- A process of education about the complex and fraught history of the 
Organization’s freedom of expression research, in order to provide important 
contextual understanding for contemporaneous sensitivities and interventions 
 
o The resourcing of research projects needs to incorporate capacity for diplomatic 
engagement with UNESCO Member States, their legislators and policy-makers, to ensure 
tools such as the 11-point model framework presented in Protecting Journalism Sources in 
the Digital Age can find impact and traction  
 
o UNESCO’s freedom of expression research with would benefit from budget allocations 
connected to the training and development of key actors targeted through commissioned 
research 
 
7.2.2 Recommendations for UNESCO-commissioned researchers 
 
 
o Be aware of the complexities of undertaking research for intergovernmental organisations 
– particularly where Member States are involved. Invariably, such projects will involve 
frustrating bureaucratic processes, serious realpolitik, and very high standards regarding 
compliance with organisational style, verification, gender diversity and regional 
representation  
o Expect to confront a steep ‘learning curve’ and the need for acculturation if you’re a first-
time UNESCO-commissioned researcher. Self-education about UNESCO processes, politics, 
and the history of commissioned research in the area will likely be necessary 
o Be prepared to be flexible, adaptable, collaborative, and clear about capacity 
limitations/misunderstandings/knowledge gaps from the outset 
o Ensure that you keep UNESCO staff informed, in writing, if/as the project escalates in 
complexity, sensitivity, or difficulty, and go higher in the Organizational structure for clarity 
as/when required 
o Do not lose sight of the ‘big picture’ in the context of bureaucratic obstacles and 
geopolitical sensitivities: the end goal can be meaningful freedom of expression research 
with policy impact and valuable public knowledge sharing 
o Recognise that UNESCO staff are frequently under-resourced and overloaded, limiting 
capacities 







7.2.3 Recommendations for the journalism profession 
 
 
o Recognise the need for training, education, and knowledge-sharing in response to 
‘networked source protection’ requirements (e.g. changes in practices regarding 
communications with confidential sources and whistleblowers; shifting ethical standards 
and principles)  
o Recognise the need to report in an activist and explanatory manner around freedom of 
expression issues to sustain ongoing public debate around these issues in the interests of 
defending open societies and the future of journalism  
o Engage audiences in the co-production of freedom of expression rights which are shared, 
especially in the ‘networked press freedom’ era, recognising that press/media freedom 
now needs to be understood as a collaborative process involving audience engagement 
and rights 
o Appreciate that a range of ‘journalisms’ on the ‘advocacy continuum’ can aid journalism 
about freedom of expression issues, including the human rights to privacy and encryption, 
and reportage on journalism safety/the murder of journalists with impunity 
o Use reportage and storytelling devices such as ‘lived experience’ case studies to humanise 
complex/technical issues connected to source protection erosion and the right to encrypt 
to help inoculate the ‘herd’. 
o Consider the value of UNESCO-commissioned research projects as knowledge resources, 
and report on the potential implications at the international, regional and State levels. In 
particular, consider undertaking a review of States’ performance against the 11-point 
framework contained in Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age 
o Hold States and the UN accountable regarding international freedom of expression rights – 
using UNESCO-published research as part of the process 
 
7.2.4 Recommendations for the academy 
 
o Academic researchers have an opportunity to research the lived experience of 
whistleblowers and journalists’ sources in the Digital Age. In the context of a ‘networked 
public’ model, the rights and protections of sources and journalists must inevitably be 
considered and researched together in the context of ‘networked source protection’ 
o Journalists, academics and civil society organizations could collaborate on assessments 
against the 11-point framework proposed in Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital 
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Appendix 1: Situating Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age 
on an international timeline of source protection relevant actions and 
project impacts (2013-2018) 
 
The purpose of the timeline that follows is to demonstrate the evolution, trajectory and impact of the 
book. It situates the major artefact connected to this exegesis, Protecting Journalism Sources in the 
Digital Age (appended to this exegesis as Appendix 9.2), and its associated  suite of secondary artefacts, 
including reportage, social media engagement, and events (see exemplars in the introduction at) within 
the recent history (2013-2018) of international developments in the normative and legal frameworks 
that defend source confidentiality as an essential freedom of expression right. 
 
Collectively positioned on this timeline, these artefacts work as a chronological visualisation of the 
intersectional model for negotiating freedom of expression in public that my PhD project produced as an 
act of Participatory Action Research. 
 
The timeline begins with the Report to the UN Human Rights Commission from the former UN Special 
Rapporteur Frank La Rue that underpinned UN responses to the Snowden revelations, ultimately leading 
to the commissioning of Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age 
Impact Timeline 2013-2018194 
 
● June 2013: ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur (Frank La Rue) on the Promotion and Protection 
of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression’ to the Human Rights Council 
(A/HRC/23/40) 
 
This Report states: “Journalists must be able to rely on the privacy, security and anonymity of their 
communications. An environment where surveillance is widespread, and unlimited by due process or 
judicial oversight, cannot sustain the presumption of protection of sources”. It further notes: “States 
cannot ensure that individuals are able to freely seek and receive information or express themselves 
without respecting, protecting and promoting their right to privacy.” (UN HRC 2013) 
                                                             






● July 2013: UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay spotlighted the right to privacy 
in protecting individuals who reveal human rights implicated information 
 
In the aftermath of Snowden’s revelations, Pillay said: “[Edward] Snowden's case has shown the need to 
protect persons disclosing information on matters that have implications for human rights, as well as the 
importance of ensuring respect for the right to privacy.” She added that national legal systems must 
ensure avenues for individuals disclosing violations of human rights to express their concern, without 
fear of reprisals.  
Pillay declared that the right to privacy, the right of access to information, and freedom of expression 
are closely linked. “The public has the democratic right to take part in public affairs and this right cannot 
be effectively exercised by solely relying on authorized information.”  
This point is relevant to source protection because much investigative journalism is dependent upon 
‘unauthorised’ sources - that is, sources who have not been cleared by government, organisational or 
corporate agencies to comment. 
Pillay also explicitly pointed to the need for people “to be confident that their private communications 
are not being unduly scrutinised by the State”. (UN News 2013b) 
● November 2013: 37th session of the UNESCO General Conference passes a  
Resolution on ‘Internet-related issues: including access to information and knowledge, freedom of 
expression, privacy and ethical dimensions of the information society’  
 
This resolution formally recognised the value of investigative journalism to society, and the role of 
privacy in ensuring that function. “…(P)rivacy is essential to protect journalistic sources, which enable a 
society to benefit from investigative journalism, to strengthen good governance and the rule of law, and 
that such privacy should not be subject to arbitrary or unlawful interference," the resolution states in 
part (UNESCO 2013). It is this resolution that mandated the commissioning by UNESCO of the report 
‘Internet Study: Privacy and Journalists’ Sources’. That report ultimately became the book at the core of 
this exegesis: Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age 
 
• December 2013: United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) adopted a resolution on the Right 
to Privacy in the Digital Age (A/RES/68/167) 
 
Resolution 68/167 was co-sponsored by 57 Member States and it called upon all States to “…respect and 
protect the right to privacy including in the context of digital communication. … To take measures to put 
an end to violations of those rights and to create the conditions to prevent such violations, including by 
ensuring that relevant national legislation complies with their obligations under international human 






The Resolution expressed ‘deep concern’ “…at the negative impact that surveillance and/or interception 
of communications, including extraterritorial surveillance and/or interception of communications, as 
well as the collection of personal data, in particular when carried out on a mass scale, may have on the 
exercise and enjoyment of human rights”.  
 
It also called upon States: “To review their procedures, practices and legislation regarding the 
surveillance of communications, their interception and the collection of personal data, including mass 
surveillance, interception and collection, with a view to upholding the right to privacy by ensuring the 
full and effective implementation of all their obligations under international human rights law” and “To 
establish or maintain existing independent, effective domestic oversight mechanisms capable of 
ensuring transparency, as appropriate, and accountability for State surveillance of communications, 
their interception and the collection of personal data,” emphasising the need for States to ensure the 
full and effective implementation of their obligations under international human rights law. 
 
● February 2014: the UN hosted an international expert seminar on the Right to Privacy in the 
Digital Age (Geneva) 
 
During this seminar, Frank La Rue (then UN Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the 
Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression), called for a special United Nations mandate for protecting 
the right to privacy. “Privacy and freedom of expression are not only linked, but are also facilitators of 
citizen participation, the right to free press, exercise of free opinion, and the possibility of gathering 
individuals, exercising the right to free association, and to be able to criticise public policies.” 
 
• February 2014: Collaboration begins on source protection research with UNESCO’s Director of 
Freedom of Expression and Media Development, Dr Guy Berger 
 
As WAN-IFRA and World Editors Forum Research Fellow and Editor, I interviewed Berger for a story 
about a major research project UNESCO was commencing on online privacy and freedom of expression, 
with a view to engaging international editors and investigative journalists in the research. I published 
the story with the headline UNESCO calls for editors' input in online privacy study (Posetti 2014)  
 
• March 2014: UNESCO World Trends in Freedom of Expression and Media Development report 
published 
The threat posed to journalism by mass surveillance was underlined in this inaugural edition of 
UNESCO’s flagship global report edited by one of my interviewees for both Protecting Journalism 
Sources in the Digital Age and this exegesis: Dr Courtney Radsch (then with UNESCO). It highlighted the 





limit legitimate debate and to curtail dissenting views in the media, while also underwriting expanded 
surveillance, which may be seen to violate the right to privacy and to jeopardize freedom of expression”. 
This report further noted that: 
National security agencies across a range of countries have gained access to journalists’ documents, 
emails and phone records, as well as to massive stores of data that have the potential to enable 
tracking of journalists, sources and whistleblowers. (UNESCO 2014c) 
 
• April 2014: European Union Court of Justice judgement (Ireland Data Retention Directive)  
 
In its judgment declaring the Data Retention Directive invalid , the Court observed that communications 
metadata “taken as a whole may allow very precise conclusions to be drawn concerning the private lives 
of the persons whose data has been retained”. (Digital Rights Ireland Ltd C-293/12 v Minister for 
Communications et al Ireland, 8 April 2014, Directive 2006/24/EC) This judgement is significant in 
relation to the role of metadata in identifying confidential sources and the threat posed by data 
retention to source protection. 
 
• April 2014 Declaration of the Committee of Ministers, Council of Europe (COE) on the protection 
of journalism and safety of journalists and other media actors adopted:  
 
This Declaration stated: A favourable environment for public debate requires States to refrain from 
judicial intimidation by restricting the right of individuals to disclose information of public interest 
through arbitrary or disproportionate application of the law, in particular the criminal law provisions 
relating to defamation, national security or terrorism. The arbitrary use of laws creates a chilling effect 
on the exercise of the right to impart information and ideas and leads to self-censorship. Furthermore, 
the Committee of Ministers also directly addressed the implications of mass surveillance for source 
protection: “Surveillance of journalists and other media actors, and the tracking of their online activities, 
can endanger the legitimate exercise of freedom of expression if carried out without the necessary 
safeguards, and it can even threaten the safety of the persons concerned. It can also undermine the 
protection of journalists’ sources.” The Committee also agreed to consider further measures regarding 
the alignment of laws and practices concerning defamation, anti-terrorism and protection of journalists’ 
sources with the European Convention on Human Rights.  
 
• May 2014: I enter discussions with UNESCO’s Director of Freedom of Expression and Media 
Development about producing research on the issues pertaining to journalism ‘post-
Snowden’195 
 
                                                             





These discussions occurred in the context of my editorship of the flagship WAN-IFRA/World Editors 
Forum report Trends in Newsrooms 2014 which included a chapter on investigative journalism post-
Snowden (Posetti 2014c) 
 
• May 2014 Stichting Ostade Blade v The Netherlands in the ECtHR (Application no. 8406/06)  
 
In this case, the Court rejected a Dutch magazine’s application against a police raid under Article 10 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights. This judgement demonstrates the narrow circumstances in 
which source protection laws can be legitimately over-ridden in the public interest. The magazine’s 
informant (a person who made a bomb threat in a letter published by the magazine) was not motivated 
by the desire to provide information which the public were entitled to know, according to the Court. 
According to the judgement: “his purpose in seeking publicity through the magazine Ravage was to don 
the veil of anonymity with a view to evading his own criminal accountability”. 
 
• May 2014: Council of the European Union - EU Human Rights Guidelines on Freedom of 
Expression: Online and Offline 
 
These guidelines included the following pertinent statements: “States should protect by law the right of 
journalists not to disclose their sources in order to ensure that journalists can report on matters in the 
public interest without their sources fearing retribution. All governments must allow journalists to work 
in a free and enabling environment in safety and security, without the fear of censorship or restraint.” 
The EU will “support the adoption of legislation that provides adequate protection for whistle-blowers 
and support reforms to give legal protection to journalists’ right of nondisclosure of sources”. 
 
• June 2014: I launched a WAN-IFRA/World Editors Forum survey on the impacts of mass 
surveillance on investigative journalism during a panel discussion with UNESCO’s Director of 
Freedom of Expression and Media Development Guy Berger at the World News Congress in 
Turin196 
 
This survey, originally intended to feed UNESCO’s overarching ‘internet study’, later fed the data corpus 
for Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age, which in turn unformed the overarching UNESCO 
study. I wrote a story for WAN-IFRA about the research to begin the process of engaging potential 
participants and ‘making content out of process’: One Year on: What’s the impact of the Snowden-effect 
on your newsroom?  
 
                                                             
196 Posetti J 2014b, ‘One Year on: What’s the impact of the Snowden-effect on your newsroom?’ World News 
Publishing Focus, 20 June, accessed at: http://blog.wan-ifra.org/2014/06/20/one-year-on-whats-the-impact-of-the-






• June 2014: Trends in Newsrooms 2014 launched at World News Congress in Turin, Italy – 
featuring my essay about digital era source protection threats and newsroom responses 
 
I was Editor of WAN-IFR/World Editors Forum’s flagship annual industry research report Trends in 
Newsrooms 2014 (Posetti 2014d). The number one trend identified in 2014 was The Urgent Need to 
Shield Journalism in the Age of Surveillance (Posetti 2014c)197 
 
• June 2014: I begin collaborating with UNESCO on the design of a research project to examine 
the threat to source confidentiality posed by mass surveillance and other Digital Age 
threats198 
 
This research plan (designed by UNESCO’s Guy Berger and me) was ultimately commissioned as a report 
under the working title of UNESCO Internet Study: Privacy Journalists’ Sources. It later evolved into 
Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age (Posetti 2017a) 
 
● July 2014: Summary of the Human Rights Council panel discussion on the safety of 
journalists: Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(A/HRC/27/35) 
 
The summary noted that the emergence of new forms of journalism (including social networks and 
blogs) has led to “greater vulnerability of the media, including illegal interference in the personal lives 
and activities of journalists. Such interference was to be condemned and the independence of the 
traditional and digital media supported”. (UN HRC 2014) 
• July 2014: ‘The right to privacy in the digital age: Report of the Office of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Human Rights’ (A/HRC/27/37)  
 
The UN General Assembly mandated this report on protection and promotion of the right to privacy in 
the context of domestic and extraterritorial surveillance and/or the interception of digital 
communications and the collection of personal data, including on a mass scale. 
 
The Report found that in the digital era, communications technologies have enhanced the capacity of 
“Governments, enterprises and individuals to conduct surveillance, interception and data collection”.  
                                                             
197 This report is appended to the exegesis as a secondary artefact.  





It also acknowledged that:  
Concerns have been amplified following revelations in 2013 and 2014 that suggested that, 
together, the National Security Agency (NSA) in the United States and General Communications 
Headquarters (GCHQ) in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland have 
developed technologies allowing access to much global internet traffic, calling records, 
individuals’ electronic address books and huge volumes of other digital communications 
content. (UN OHCHR 2014) 
The Report quoted the UN Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom 
of Expression and Opinion, who said that technological advancements mean that States’ effectiveness in 
undertaking surveillance is no longer limited by factors such as scale or the duration of an operation: 
The State now has a greater capability to conduct simultaneous, invasive, targeted and broad-
scale surveillance than ever before. In other words, the technological platforms upon which 
global political, economic and social life are increasingly reliant are not only vulnerable to mass 
surveillance, they may actually facilitate it.  
The Report continued: “The chilling effect on confidential sources, given the risk of profiling and 
exposure posed by the combination of data retention and the implications of big data analysis, is 
therefore further exacerbated.” 
It also stated: “…the onus is on the Government to demonstrate that interference is both necessary and 
proportionate to the specific risk being addressed. Mass or ‘bulk’ surveillance programmes may thus be 
deemed to be arbitrary, even if they serve a legitimate aim and have been adopted on the basis of an 
accessible legal regime”. In other words: 
…it will not be enough that the measures are targeted to find certain needles in a haystack; the 
proper measure is the impact of the measures on the haystack, relative to the harm threatened; 
namely, whether the measure is necessary and proportionate. 
Citing a European Court of Human Rights ruling, the report declared the onus should be on the State to 
ensure that any interference with the right to privacy, family, home or correspondence is authorised by 
laws that “…are sufficiently precise, specifying in detail the precise circumstances in which any such 
interference may be permitted, the procedures for authorising, the categories of persons who may be 
placed under surveillance, the limits on the duration of surveillance, and procedures for the use and 
storage of the data collected; and provide for effective safeguards against abuse”. This prompts the 
question: Should journalists be excluded from mass surveillance? Is this feasible? And how would 
journalists/journalism be defined for the purpose of considering such exemptions? Protecting Journalism 
Sources in the Digital Age includes such a recommendation within the model framework for assessing 





• August 4th 2014: Contract signed between UNESCO and WAN-IFRA/World Editors Forum to 
produce a global report on ‘Privacy and Journalists’ Sources’199 
This research project quickly evolved into Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age200 
• September 2014: WAN-IFRA/World Editors Forum announce UNESO source protection 
research collaboration 
I wrote a story about the research collaboration and assumed the dual role of Chief Researcher and 
study author: World Editors Forum Commissioned to Conduct Study on Protection Of Journalists’ Sources 




• September 2014: Resolution adopted by the UN Human Rights Council on the Safety of 
Journalists (A/HRC/27/L.7) 201 
 
The resolution acknowledged “the particular vulnerability of journalists to becoming targets of unlawful 
or arbitrary surveillance and/or interception of communications, in violation of their rights to privacy 
and to freedom of expression”. (UN HRC 2014b)202  This observation has direct application to the issues 
of source protection and the safety of journalists and their sources. 
 
• October 2014: Protecting Sources - official UNESCO study survey launched 
 
 We launched the main survey underpinning Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age and 
commenced a social media campaign to engage participants. I also wrote a story about the launch for 
WAN-IFRA:  ‘Is it possible to protect journalists’ sources in the digital age?’, survey asks (Posetti 2014e) 
 
• November 2014: UNESCO International Program for the Development of Communication 
(IPDC) Council decision 
In 2014, the IPDC’s 39 Member-State council welcomed the UNESCO Director-General’s Report on the 
Safety of Journalists and the Danger of Impunity, which states that it uses the term ‘journalists’ to 
designate the range of “journalists, media workers and social media producers who generate a 
                                                             
199 Contract between UNESCO and WAN-IFRA signed by Dr Guy Berger & WAN-IFRA Secretary General Larry 
Kilman. 
200 Posetti J (2014a) World Editors Forum Commissioned to Conduct Study on Protection Of Journalists’ Sources in 
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202 See also Posetti, J (2018a) Combatting harassment: When journalists and their sources become targets in Irecton, 





significant amount of public-interest journalism”. (Posetti 2017a p38) The Council also reaffirmed the 
importance of condemnations of “the killings of journalists, media workers and social media producers 
who are engaged in journalistic activities and who are killed or targeted in their line of duty”. (Posetti 
2017a p.38) This underlines my finding that a broad range of actors producing journalism in the public 
interest should be entitled to claim access to legal source protection frameworks where they exist. 
 
• December 2014: UN General Assembly Resolution on the safety of journalists and the issue of 
impunity (A/RES/69/185) 
 
This UNGA resolution is relevant to source protection in the Digital Age, as it reiterates two observations 
pertinent to the implications of mass surveillance and questions of defining acts of journalism: 
Acknowledging that journalism is continuously evolving to include inputs from media 
institutions, private individuals and a range of organisations that seek, receive and impart 
information and ideas of all kinds, online as well as offline, in the exercise of freedom of opinion 
and expression, in accordance with article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, thereby contributing to the shaping of public debate (Reaffirming the 2013 UNGA 
Resolution 163 above). 
Acknowledging also the particular vulnerability of journalists to becoming targets of unlawful 
or arbitrary surveillance or interception of communications in violation of their rights to privacy 
and to freedom of expression (Reaffirming the UN HRC resolution of 2014 above). (UN GA 2014) 
 
• March 2015: Council of Europe Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Report on Mass 
Surveillance 
  
This Report, prepared by Rapporteur Pieter Omtzigt, on the impact of mass surveillance on human 
rights, addressed the implications for journalistic source protection in the context of freedom of 
expression and access to information. He stated: When authors, journalists or civil society activists are 
reluctant to write, speak, or pursue research about certain subjects (e.g. the Middle East, criticisms of 
the government post-9/11, the Occupy movement, military affairs, etc.), or to communicate with 
sources or friends abroad for fear that they will endanger their counterparts by so doing, this does not 
only affect their freedom of speech, but also everyone else’s freedom of information (COE 2015 p.25). 
The Report also connected the detainment of Guardian journalist Glen Greenwald’s partner to the 
impact of surveillance. Greenwald was Snowden’s original confidante and court documents reveal that 
both Greenwald and his partner were under surveillance due to suspicion that they were transporting 
data associated with Snowden’s files. According to the Report, the Brazilian citizen had his mobile 






•  2015: CoE Resolution and Recommendation on mass surveillance  
 
The Council of Europe Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights unanimously adopted a Resolution, 
and a Recommendation, based on the Report discussed above, on April 21st 2015. The Resolution 
included the following statements:  
 
The Parliamentary Assembly is deeply concerned about mass surveillance practices disclosed since June 
2013 by journalists to whom a former US national security insider, Mr. Edward Snowden, had entrusted 
a large amount of top-secret data establishing the existence of mass surveillance and large-scale 
intrusion practices hitherto unknown to the general public and even to most political decision-makers. 
In the context of this concern, the Resolution makes the following additional points:  
 
The surveillance practices disclosed so far endanger fundamental human rights, including the 
rights to privacy (Article 8 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), freedom of 
information and expression. These rights are cornerstones of democracy. Their infringement 
without adequate judicial control also jeopardizes the rule of law.  
 
It is also worried by the collection of massive amounts of personal data by private businesses 
and the risk that these data may be accessed and used for unlawful purposes by state or non-
state actors.  
 
The Assembly is also deeply worried by the extensive use of secret laws, secret courts and secret 
interpretations of such laws, which are very poorly scrutinized. Relevantly, the associated 
Recommendation proposed by the Committee invited the CoE Council of Ministers to consider:  
 
Addressing a recommendation to Member States on ensuring the protection of privacy in the 
digital age and internet safety in the light of the threats posed by the newly disclosed mass 
surveillance techniques 
 
• March 2015: UNESCO publishes Building Digital Safety for Journalism book 
 
This UNESCO study (produced as part of a series which includes Protecting Journalism Sources in the 
Digital Age was published) underlines the growing threats confronting digital journalists and provides a 
framework to help defend such journalism. In my report for WAN-IFRA (Posetti 2015g) about the study, I 
identified 12 key challenges recommendations within the book, which included this statement: “State 
and non-state actors can use location tracking technology to identify media actors – and their sources – 






• May 2015: UNESCO World Press Freedom Day Riga Declaration references source protection 
and surveillance203  
 
This participants’ declaration “Ensure that surveillance and data collection regimes show respect for the 
privacy of journalists and protect the confidentiality of sources”. I was present at this event in Latvia and 
contributed to the framing of the declaration. 
 
• May 2015: Report on Encryption, Anonymity and the Human Rights Framework by UN Special 
on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, David 
Kaye for UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) A/HRC/29/32 (Kaye 
2015a)  
 
This report from the new Special Rapporteur emphasised the essential roles played by encryption and 
anonymity. According to Kaye, these defences – working separately or together - create a zone of 
privacy to protect opinion from outside scrutiny. With particular relevance to Protecting Journalism 
Sources, he highlighted the value of anonymity and encryption to journalists seeking to protect their 
confidential sources and their communications with them. “Journalists, researchers, lawyers and civil 
society rely on encryption and anonymity to shield themselves (and their sources, clients and partners) 
from surveillance and harassment,” Kay reported. A related issue addressed by Kaye was a trend 
involving States seeking to combat anonymity tools, such as Tor, proxies and VPNs, by denying access to 
them. Such moves can directly undermine attempts to protect confidential journalistic sources in the 
context of digital communications. 
Kaye also acknowledged that many States recognise the lawfulness of maintaining the anonymity of 
journalists’ sources. However, he reported that: “States often breach source anonymity in practice, even 
where it is provided for in law,” highlighting the pressures on journalists that undermine these legal 
provisions – either directly, or progressively. 
Another issue the Special Rapporteur also noted was the increasing prevalence and impact of 
compulsory SIM card registration on confidential communications, including those between journalists 
and their sources: “Such policies directly undermine anonymity, particularly for those who access the 
Internet only through mobile technology. Compulsory SIM card registration may provide Governments 
with the capacity to monitor individuals and journalists well beyond any legitimate government 
interest.”  
Kaye concluded that States should support and promote strong encryption and anonymity, and he 
specifically recommended strengthened legal and legislative provisions to enable secure journalistic 
                                                             







communications. “Legislation and regulations protecting human rights defenders and journalists should 
also include provisions enabling access and providing support to use the technologies to secure their 
communications.”  
 
• May 2015 - East African Court of Justice (EAJC) judgement on Burundi Press Law (Burundian 
journalists’ union v the Attorney General of the Republic of Burundi, Reference No.7 of 2013) 
 
In this judgement, the EAJC ruled Articles 19 & 20 of Burundi’s 2013 Press Law violated democratic 
principles and should be repealed. Article 20 of the 2013 Press law obligates journalists to “reveal their 
sources of information before the competent authorities in situations where the information relates to 
State security, public order, defence secrets and the moral and physical integrity of one or more 
persons”. However, the judges upheld the challenge originally brought by the Burundi Journalists Union, 
referring to the need for proportionality and necessity with regard to exceptions to source protection – 
even in cases of national security. They cited the Goodwin vs. UK judgment (2002, European Court of 
Human Rights) which states: “Protection of journalistic sources is one of the basic conditions for press 
freedom .... Without such protection, sources may be deterred from assisting the press in informing the 
public on matters of public interest. As a result, the vital public watchdog role of the press may be 
undermined and the ability of the press to provide accurate and reliable information may be adversely 
affected.” The judges in the Burundi case explained their position thus: …because whereas the four 
issues named are important in any democratic state, the way of dealing with State secrets is by enacting 
other laws to deal with the issue and not by forcing journalists to disclose their confidential sources…. As 
for the issue of moral and physical integrity of any person, the obligation to disclose a source is 
unreasonable and privacy laws elsewhere can be used to deal with the matter. There are in any event 
other less restrictive ways of dealing with these issues. They concluded: “We have no hesitation in 
holding that Article 20 does not meet the expectations of democracy and is in violation of Articles 6(d) 
and 7(2) of the Treaty.” 
 
• Trends in Newsrooms 2015 (featuring a chapter based on Protecting Journalism Sources in the 
Digital Age) launched in Turin, Italy (EVENT) 
 
This major industry report (appended in full to this exegesis) which I edited for WAN-IFRA, featured an 
essay based on my research for Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age titled Source Protection 
Erosion: The Rising Threat to Investigative Journalism. I wrote a story based on the chapter for WAN-
IFRA (in order to extend impact), available here: https://blog.wan-ifra.org/2015/07/01/source-






• June 2015: UNESCO publishes 11-point framework for Member States’ assessment of legal and 
regulatory environments pertaining to source protection (an excerpt from the forthcoming 
Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age)204 
This extract from Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age was published as a preview of my 
forthcoming book, as part of the strategy of building a community of interest around the publication and 
developing public sphere debates.  
I also wrote a story for WAN-IFRA about this launch, extending the concept of ‘building content out of 




• June 2015 Preliminary launch of Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age findings, 
World News Congress, Washington D.C. (EVENT) 
I organised a panel discussion at WAN-IFRA’s global conference to launch the preliminary findings from 
the research. I led the panel, which also featured Dr Guy Berger (UNESCO), Amy Mitchell (Pew Research 
Center) Gerard Ryle (ICIJ) and media lawyer Charles Tobin (the latter two had been expert interviewees 
for the study). We used this event as an action-research opportunity, feeding the comments from the 
experts into the final dataset for analysis. It also marked the beginning of a series of events to further 
‘make content out of process’ and ‘build communities of interest’ around the study 
- Guy Berger wrote a story for the UNESCO website, extending the reach: 
http://www.unesco.org/new/en/communication-and-information/resources/news-and-in-
focus-articles/all-news/news/unesco_research_is_previewed_at_editors_congress/  
- As a result of this ‘noise-making’ prominent Guardian columnist and academic Prof Roy 
Greenslade (Greenslade 2015) reported on the preview of the findings: ‘How can journalists 





• June 2015: London launch of Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age preliminary 
findings at the Frontline Club (EVENT) 
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As above, this event served the purpose of action-research and high-value community engagement. It 
was organised by the London Foreign Press Association in collaboration with WAN-IFRA and me. The 
Frontline Club showcases international journalists in regular talks at a venue where the profession’s 
luminaries gather to dine and drink over their ‘war stories’. I was joined on the panel by The Times’ 
Investigations Editor Jonathan Calvert, the BBC’s digital security guru Paul Myers, and prominent media 
QC Gavin Millar (whom I’d interviewed for the study), at an event anchored by the London Foreign Press 
Association’s President, Paola Totaro. The Frontline Club wrote a story about the event: 
https://www.frontlineclub.com/under-surveillance-protecting-journalistic-sources/  
 
• July 2015: I was invited as an expert to a consultation staged in Vienna by UN Special 
Rapporteur David Kaye  
This international experts' meeting served as a research roundtable for Prof Kaye’s forthcoming Report 
on whistleblowers and journalists’ sources presented to the UN in September this year. 
 
• July 27th, 2015: Final version of Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age submitted to 
UNESCO for approval and publication  
Research undertaken for the study ceased on this date – the date the final manuscript was delivered to 
UNESCO205. However, another 22 months passed until the study was finally published in full. 
• July 2015: UNESCO study Keystones to foster inclusive knowledge societies published206 
This finalised UNESCO study, which was fed by my research for Protecting Journalism Sources in the 
Digital Age, proposed to UNESCO’s 195 Member States that they: “Recognise the need for enhanced 
protection of the confidentiality of sources of journalism in the digital age”. This statement was also 
contained in the Outcome Document of the “Connecting the Dots: Options for Future Action” 
conference convened by UNESCO in 3-4 March 2015. Responses to the survey attached to this study 
signalled the importance of UN positions on the issue of journalistic source protection and relevant 
responses were incorporated into the dataset for my UNESCO book.  
• September 2015: UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to 
freedom of opinion and expression, David Kaye submits report on protection of whistleblowers 
and sources to the UN General Assembly (Cites Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital 
Age) A/70/361 (Kaye 2015b)  
This major report focused specifically on the need to protect journalists’ sources and whistleblowers in 
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the digital era (Kaye 2015b). It cites Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age (which was still 
forthcoming at the time) on a number of occasions. For example, here: 
 
Everyone depends upon well-sourced stories in order to develop informed opinions about matters of 
public interest. Professional reporting organizations emphasize that named sources are preferable to 
anonymous ones. Nonetheless, reporters often rely upon, and thus promise confidentiality to, 
sources who risk retaliation or other harm if exposed. [Posetti 2015] Without protection, many 
voices would remain silent and the public uninformed.207 
 
As well as here: 
 
…any person or entity involved in collecting or gathering information with the intent to publish or 
otherwise disseminate it publicly should be permitted to claim the right to protect a source’s 
confidentiality. Regular, professional engagement may indicate protection, but its absence should 




Protection must also counter a variety of contemporary threats. A leading one is surveillance. The 
ubiquitous use of digital electronics, alongside government capacity to access the data and footprints 
that all such devices leave behind, has presented serious challenges to confidentiality and anonymity 
of sources and whistle-blowers. [Posetti 2015]208 
 
• September 2015: UNESCO publishes another extract from Protecting Journalism Sources in the 
Digital Age on gender dimensions of source protection 
 
I continued the pattern of writing stories about developments in the production process, building 
interest as the collaboration with UNESCO moved into the territory of collectively ‘making content out of 
process’. See the WAN-IFRA story here: https://blog.wan-ifra.org/2015/09/18/gender-dimensions-of-
protecting-journalism-sources-in-the-digital-age  
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• October 22, 2015: I presented the key findings and recommendations from Protecting 
Journalism Sources in the Digital Age on a panel with UN Special Rapporteur Prof David Kaye 
at UN HQ in New York209 210 (EVENT) 
This special side panel (organised by the Austrian delegation to the UN and civil society organisation 
Article 19) was staged at United Nations headquarters in New York during the 70th session of the UN 
General Assembly. UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of 
opinion and expression, David Kaye, spoke on the panel, sharing details of his report (later presented to 
the UN GA) on digital threats to whistleblowers and sources. I spoke about my forthcoming UNESCO 
study. This event was sponsored by the Austrian permanent mission to the UN – which drew on the 
content to inform its co-sponsorship of the 2016 UN HRC Resolution on the Safety of Journalists (see 
details in timeline entry below). 
- Vice reported on my study in response to this event: 
https://news.vice.com/article/whistleblowers-in-peril-as-government-policies-shaft-press-
freedoms (Oakford 2015) 
• November 2015: UNESCO publishes World Trends in Freedom of Expression and Media 
Development 2015: Special Digital Focus, featuring a major excerpt from Protecting Journalism 
Sources in the Digital Age 
This second edition of the flagship UNESCO World Trends report featured a major extract from my 
UNESCO study, which summarised key global trends, findings and recommendations from the research. 
The chapter also presented the 11-point framework211 for assessing source protection dispensations in 
the digital age previewed during the World News Congress in Washington DC in June 2015. The 
framework embeds significant recommendations, as follows (Posetti 2015c): 
1. Recognise the value to the public interest of source confidentiality protection, with its legal 
foundation in the right to freedom of expression (including press freedom), and to privacy. These 
protections should also be embedded within a country’s constitution and/or national law,  
2. Recognise that source protection should extend to all acts of journalism, and across all platforms, 
services and mediums (of data storage and publication), and that it includes digital data and meta-
data,  
3. Recognise that source protection does not entail registration or licensing of practitioners of 
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4. Recognise the potential detrimental impact on public interest journalism, and on society, of 
source-related information being caught up in bulk data recording, tracking, storage and collection,  
5. Affirm that State and corporate actors (including third party intermediaries) who capture 
journalistic digital data must treat it confidentially (acknowledging also the desirability of the 
storage and use of such data being consistent with the general right to privacy),  
6. Shield acts of journalism from targeted surveillance, data retention and handover of material 
connected to confidential sources,  
7. Define exceptions to all the above very narrowly, so as to preserve the principle of source 
protection as the effective norm and standard,  
8. Define exceptions as needing to conform to a provision of “necessity” and “proportionality” — in 
other words, when no alternative to disclosure is possible, when there is greater public interest in 
disclosure than in protection, and when the terms and extent of disclosure still preserve 
confidentiality as much as possible,  
9. Define a transparent and independent judicial process with appeal potential for authorised 
exceptions, and ensure that law-enforcement agents and judicial actors are educated about the 
principles involved,  
10. Criminalise arbitrary, unauthorised and wilful violations of confidentiality of sources by third 
party actors,  
11. Recognise that source protection laws can be strengthened by complementary whistleblower 
legislation.  
Particularly noteworthy as evidence of shifting UN attitudes regarding digital journalism safety and 
source protection are publication of points 2, 4, 6, 9, and 10 above.  




• December 2015: 38th UNESCO General Conference Resolution 38C/53212 endorses principles on 
protecting journalism sources in the Digital Age  
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The recommendations of the UNESCO study Keystones to foster inclusive Knowledge Societies: Access to 
information and knowledge, Freedom of Expression, Privacy and Ethics on a Global Internet (see timeline 
entry above) were endorsed at the 38th General Conference of UNESCO’s Member States in November 
2015213. My research for Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age was commissioned to feed this 
study and it was cited therein as a forthcoming UNESCO book. Two clauses of this Resolution pertinent 
to my work are: 
 
4.4 Recognise the role that anonymity and encryption can play as enablers of privacy protection 
and freedom of expression and facilitate dialogue on these issues. 
 
6.2 Recognize the need for enhanced protection of the confidentiality of sources of journalism in 
the digital age; 
 
• April 2016 International Journalism Festival panel, Italy (EVENT) 
 
Originally intended as a launch event, when the book’s publication continued to be delayed, this panel 
instead engaged high-ranking international journalists (including Der Spiegel’s Marcel Rosenbach, 
Heather Brooke, and Dan Gillmor) in a discussion about the preliminary findings. Once again, there was 
very significant interest in the book’s urgent publication.  
 
- Event video available here: https://media.journalismfestival.com/programme/2016/protecting-
journalism-sources-in-the-digital-age  
 
• May 2, 2016: My World Press Freedom Day Op Ed in the Sydney Morning Herald carried across 
Fairfax Media metropolitan mastheads 
Posetti, J (2016) Threats to Investigative Journalism Creep Close with Erosion of Source Protection in The 
Sydney Morning Herald: https://www.smh.com.au/opinion/threats-to-investigative-journalism-creep-
closer-with-erosion-of-source-protection-20160502-gojvco.html [Accessed: 17/7/18] 
 
• May 2016 UNESCO World Press Freedom Day panel – Helsinki (EVENT) 
 
I previewed the detailed findings and recommendations of Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital 
Age at this major UNESCO conference in Helsinki, on a panel of journalists and human rights defenders, 
organized by Article 19. 
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• May 3, 2016: UNESCO World Press Freedom Day Finlandia Declaration214 referencing source 
protection in the Digital Age 
I previewed the detailed findings and recommendations of Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital 
Age at this major UNESCO conference in Helsinki. The declaration endorsed by the conference included 
a call to UNESCO Member States to: 
 
To ensure that legal frameworks are in place to protect the identity of confidential sources of 
journalism against direct and indirect exposure, and to protect whistleblowers. 
 
• September 2016: Resolution on Safety of Journalists adopted by UN Human Rights Council 
A/HRC/RES/33/2  
 
This is an important development in the UN’s attention to source protection erosion, and digital era 
threats to journalism safety more broadly. But it is also significant in the context of situating Protecting 
Journalism Sources in the Digital Age on a timeline of UN developments in the space. Firstly, the 
resolution – adopted on September 29th, 2016 - acknowledges the 2015 UNESCO book World Trends in 
Freedom of Expression and Media Development215 which published the core themes and findings of 
Protecting Sources:  
 
Welcoming the important work of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization for the safety of journalists, and taking note with appreciation of its 2015 
publications entitled World Trends in Freedom of Expression and Media Development and 
Building Digital Safety for Journalism… 
 
Pertinently, in paragraph 12 of the resolution, States are called upon to: 
 
…protect in law and in practice the confidentiality of journalists’ sources, in acknowledgement 
of the essential role of journalists in fostering government accountability and an inclusive and 
peaceful society, subject only to limited and clearly defined exceptions provided in national legal 
frameworks, including judicial authorization, in compliance with States’ obligations under 
international human rights law;  
 
And in paragraph 13, the resolution emphasises that: 
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…in the digital age, encryption and anonymity tools have become vital for many journalists to 
exercise freely their work and their enjoyment of human rights, in particular their rights to 
freedom of expression and to privacy, including to secure their communications and to protect the 
confidentiality of their sources, and calls upon States not to interfere with the use of such 
technologies, with any restrictions thereon complying with States’ obligations under international 
human rights law.  
 
• November 2016: UN General Assembly Resolution on the Privacy in Digital Age 
A/C.3/71/L.39216 
 
This resolution is important to the evolution of UN responses to Digital Era source protection erosion 
and associated surveillance impacts in a range of ways. 
 
Firstly, while noting the need for existing offline rights to privacy & freedom of expression captured by 
instruments like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant for Civil and 
Political Rights, it stresses: 
 
…the importance of full respect for the freedom to seek, receive and impart information, 




…unlawful or arbitrary surveillance and/or interception of communications, as well as the 
unlawful or arbitrary collection of personal data, as highly intrusive acts, violate the right to 
privacy, can interfere with the right to freedom of expression and may contradict the tenets of a 
democratic society, including when undertaken on a mass scale.  
 
It notes in particular that: 
 
…surveillance of digital communications must be consistent with international human rights 
obligations and must be conducted on the basis of a legal framework, which must be publicly 
accessible, clear, precise, comprehensive and non-discriminatory and that any interference 
…privacy must not be arbitrary or unlawful, bearing in mind what is reasonable to the 
pursuance of legitimate aims. 
 
It also emphases that States must respect international human rights obligations regarding the right to 








…when they intercept digital communications of individuals and/or collect personal data and 
when they require disclosure of personal data from third parties, including private companies 
 
Further, it expresses ‘deep concern’:  
 
…at the negative impact that surveillance and/or interception of communications, including 
extraterritorial surveillance and/or interception of communications, as well as the collection of 
personal data, in particular when carried out on a mass scale, may have on the exercise and 
enjoyment of human rights. 
 
Additionally, it notes that:  
 
…while concerns about public security may justify the gathering and protection of certain 
sensitive information, States must ensure full compliance with their obligations under 
international human rights law. 
 
While reaffirming that: 
 
…States must ensure that any measures taken to combat terrorism are in compliance with their 
obligations under international law, in particular international human rights, refugee and 
humanitarian law. 
 
It also calls for the establishment and/or maintenance of: 
 
…independent, effective, adequately resourced and impartial judicial, administrative and/or 
parliamentary domestic oversight mechanisms capable of ensuring transparency, as 
appropriate, and accountability for State surveillance of communications, their interception and 
the collection of personal data. 
 
Along with:  
 
…adequate legislation, with effective sanctions and remedies, that protects individuals against 
violations and abuses of the right to privacy, namely through the unlawful and arbitrary 
collection, processing, retention or use of personal data by individuals, governments, business 






While calling on States to refrain from:  
 
…requiring business enterprises to take steps that interfere with the right to privacy in an arbitrary or 
unlawful way. 
 
All of the above issues and concerns were directly addressed in reference to investigative journalism 
impacts and source protection erosion in my UNESCO book chapter and the full study (a finalised draft 
version of which was already in the possession of the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and 
protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression David Kaye who cited it in his report to the 
UN GA A/70/361 the previous year, as acknowledged in the text of this resolution). 
 
• November 2016: UNESCO publishes study on Privacy Free Expression and Transparency: 
Redefining their boundaries in the Digital Age217  
This study references and overlaps with Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age (which has been 
approved for publication but would not be published for another six months). It suggests that: “The 
protection of the confidentiality of sources of journalism in the digital age could be specifically provided 
for, including through revised legislation where appropriate”. The study also recommends recognition of 
the “need for enhanced protection of the confidentiality of sources of journalism in the digital age”. 
 
• November 2016 Invited expert for a major European Commission meeting in Brussels to speak 
about Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age (which was still ‘forthcoming’) (EVENT) 
 




• December 2016: UNESCO publishes report on Human Rights and Encryption218  
This study provides an overview of encryption as an increasingly essential element of the journalism and 
communications landscape, helping to guarantee confidentiality, access to information, privacy, 
authenticity, and anonymity. It explains that limitations on encryption need to be carefully scrutinized. It 
acknowledges that limitations on encryption potentially interfere with the right to freedom of 
expression. The study addresses the relevance of encryption to human rights in the media and 
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communications  field, along with with the legality of interferences, and it offers recommendations for 
state practice and other stakeholders, calling for strong recognition at the international level. 
 
• April 2017: International Jouralism Festival panel discussion presenting defensive strategies 
for defending confidential journalistic communications (EVENT) 
 
Second attempt at launching the book at this major journalism event was postponed when publication 
was delayed again (although the book was finally launched two weeks later). Instead, I spoke about 
strategies to defend journalism against digital security threats, based on my research. In harms way – 
newsrooms on the frontline video available here:  
https://media.journalismfestival.com/programme/2017/in-harms-way-newsrooms-on-the-front-line  
 
• May 2017 UNESCO publishes Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age219  
The book was finally published on April 27th and officially launched by UNESCO during World Press 
Freedom Day (May 3rd) commemorations in Jakarta. The study examined the state of source protection 
in 121 countries and included findings from nearly 40 qualitative interviews and 135 survey respondents. 
In its launch statement, UNESCO described the book as a “benchmark study three years in the making” 
(UNESCO 2017a) which: 
 …identifies new developments that impacted on the confidentiality of journalists’ sources 
between 2007 and 2015 - such as digital surveillance, data retention practices, device seizures 
and national security and anti-terrorism laws. The result is that many existing laws to protect 
confidentiality are becoming outdated and risk becoming ineffective. Caution is expressed in the 
book that without revisions to reverse erosions of confidentiality, the future of investigative 
journalism could come under threat – leaving many stories of corruption and abuse hidden from 
public view. The study proposes an 11-point assessment tool for establishing the effectiveness of 
legal source protection frameworks. 
According to Carter220 (2017) Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age represents “a 
comprehensive research study and policy paper…that compiles references to the journalistic privilege 
and statements by U.N. actors that could support the privilege …[and] a comprehensive eleven- part 
legal framework for development and review of national journalistic privilege” 
 
Associated launch outputs produced by me: 
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1. Posetti, J (2017b) It’s getting harder to report the truth in a post-Trump world, in The Sydney 
Morning Herald: https://www.smh.com.au/opinion/its-getting-harder-to-report-the-truth-in-a-
posttrump-world-20170430-gvvlyw.html [Accessed: 28/8/18] 
2. The Conversation (By Julie Posetti): http://theconversation.com/unesco-report-surveillance-
and-data-collection-are-putting-journalists-and-sources-at-risk-77038 
3. WAN-IFRA/World Editors Forum A (By Julie Posetti): https://blog.wan-
ifra.org/2017/05/04/why-we-need-urgent-reforms-to-protect-sources 
4. WAN-IFRA/World Editors Forum B (By Julie Posetti): https://blog.wan-
ifra.org/2017/05/01/truth-in-the-age-of-trump-why-things-are-much-much-more-difficult 
5. Global Investigative Journalism Network (By Julie Posetti): https://gijn.org/2017/05/29/the-
eroding-state-of-source-protection/  
6. Mediashift: http://mediashift.org/2017/05/will-take-protect-journalism-sources-digital-age/ 
 
Selected Media coverage: 
 
1. ABC Radio  - Triple J “Hack” (Youth current affairs): 
http://www.abc.net.au/triplej/programs/hack/whistleblower-press-freedom-are-under-threat-
around-the-world/8491026 
2. Der Standard (in German): http://derstandard.at/2000056860330/Investigativer-Journalismus-
ist-wie-Kakerlaken-nichts-wird-ihn-umbringen 
3. Rappler (in Bahasa): http://www.rappler.com/indonesia/berita/168607-ancaman-jurnalisme-
investigasi-digital 
4. Rappler (in English): https://www.rappler.com/trending/%20Julie%20Posetti 
5. ABC News/Current Affairs online: 
http://www.abc.net.au/triplej/programs/hack/whistleblower-press-freedom-are-under-threat-
around-the-world/8491026 
6. European Journalism Observatory (EJO) A (English): http://en.ejo.ch/digital-news/protecting-
journalism-sources-in-the-digital-age 
7. European Journalism Observatory (EJO) B (Italian): http://it.ejo.ch/liberta-di-stampa/come-
proteggere-le-fonti-nellera-digitale 




10. BBC World Service, Newsroom (Live interview with Julie) 





12. ABC Radio News (one of the lead stories nationally on Tuesday May 2nd in prime-time 
breakfast bulletins - including interview with Julie) 
http://www.abc.net.au/newsradio/content/s4662803.htm 
13. The Wire (India) https://thewire.in/132391/surveillance-data-collection-putting-journalists-
sources-risk/ 




16. IJNET (ICFJ): http://ijnet.org/en/blog/unesco-publishes-report-protecting-journalism-sources-
world-press-freedom-day 
 
UNESCO launch activity: 
 
1. UNESCO A: http://en.unesco.org/news/unesco-releases-new-publication-protecting-
journalism-sources-digital-age 
2. UNESCO B: http://en.unesco.org/news/launch-new-unesco-study-confidentiality-journalism-
sources 





1. University of Wollongong: http://media.uow.edu.au/releases/UOW231748 
2. WAN-IFRA/World Editors Forum: http://www.wan-ifra.org/press-releases/2017/05/01/new-
study-surveillance-national-security-legislation-and-data-retention-la 
 
• May 1st, 2017 The Sydney Morning Herald publishes my Op Ed on source protection threats in a 
post-Trump world 
 
It’s getting harder to report the truth in a post-Trump world, in The Sydney Morning Herald: 
https://www.smh.com.au/opinion/its-getting-harder-to-report-the-truth-in-a-posttrump-world-







• May 4th, 2017 UNESCO World Press Freedom Day declaration referencing source protection 
and defensive strategies to prevent interception221  
 
This World Press Freedom Day declaration (carried the day after the launch of Protecting Journalism 
Sources in the Digital Age) referenced the importance of source protection and digital era threats posed 
to it in the following clauses: 
 
18. Observing with concern the global trend to disproportionately limit freedom of expression in 
the name of national security and the fight against terrorism, as well as through 
disproportionate use of legislation and state security apparatus;  
 
19. Emphasising the importance, for democratic civic and political life, of high-quality public-
interest journalism, including investigative journalism, respecting professional and ethical 
standards and enjoying protection of confidentiality of sources, and recognising that such 
journalism represents a public good for all members of society;  
 
20. Appreciating the importance of respect for the confidentiality of communications as a 
prerequisite for independent journalism, and the protection of journalists and their sources; 
 
34. Recognise the legitimacy of the use of encryption and anonymisation technologies; 
 
69. Highlight the importance of the protection of confidentiality of journalists’ sources in the 
digital age 
 
• June 2017: Edward Snowden shares Protecting Journalism Sources on Twitter 
 
The man who blew the whistle on the NSA and initially operated as a confidential journalistic source to 
make world-changing revelations (revelations that eventually triggered the commissioning of Protecting 
Journalism Sources in the Digital Age) shared the study with his Twitter followers, sending my original 
tweet viral as a retweet.  
 
                                                             
221 UNESCO (2017c) Jakarta Declaration, World Press Freedom Day: 







• June 2017: WAN-IFRA launch of Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age at the World 
News Congress, Durban, South Africa (EVENT) 
 
• June 2017: I spoke about the freshly published book on a high-level panel at the UN’s World 
Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) in Geneva (EVENT) 
 
I sat on this UNESCO-convened panel with UN Special Rapporteur David Kaye and Assistant Director 
General Frank La Rue. I presented the major findings and recommendations from Protecting Journalism 
Sources in the Digital Age to a packed room of international diplomats and civil society representatives  
 
• August 2017: UN Secretary General’s Report on Safety of Journalists and the Issue of Impunity 
(Cites Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age) A/72/290222 
 
This Report from the UN Secretary General to the UN General Assembly references my study by name as 
an example of UNESCO work in the space that addresses gender themes (Protecting Journalism Sources 
in the Digital Age includes a section on ‘Gender Dimensions Arising’223).  
 
• October 5th, 2017: European Court of Human Rights judgment (Becker vs. Norway, ECtHR. 
Application no. 21272/12) cites Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age 
 
                                                             
222 UN Secretary General (2017) The safety of journalists and the issue of impunity: Report of the Secretary-General: 
https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N17/245/44/PDF/N1724544.pdf?OpenElement [Accessed 
20/11/17] 





Source protection case brought by a Norwegian journalist Judge Tsotsoria’s concurring opinion attached 
to the judgement reads in part:  
 
…we are living in the modern digital era where the legal framework of the protection of 
journalistic sources is under significant strain. This expands the risk of erosion, restriction and 
compromise in the work of journalists, with an impact on freedom of expression, the media and 
investigative journalism in particular [Reference: See generally, Protecting Journalism Sources in 
the Digital Age, UNESCO publication 2017]. The Court has been a frontrunner and an advocate 
of judicial protection of journalists and their sources and in so doing it has also served as an 
inspiration for many other jurisdictions. This path should not be reversed.224 
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{"itemid":["001-177349"]}  
 
The judgement also cites UN Special Rapporteur Prof David Kaye’s 2015 report to the UN General 
Assembly on protection of whistleblowers and sources that in turn references the pre-publication 
version of Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age. 
 
• November 2017: Official Australian launch of Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age 
(EVENT) 
 
Public Australian launch of Protecting Journalism Sources at the University of Wollongong’s (UOW), 
inner-city campus overlooking Sydney harbour. Tickets for the event sold out and #ProtectSources (the 
hashtag associated with the book) trended in third place nationally on the night. The launch represented 
a collaboration between the Media Entertainment and Arts Alliance, The Walkley Foundation, UOW and 
me. Two prominent Australian investigative journalists (Paul Farrell and Elise Worthington) joined me on 
the panel, alongside a digital security expert (Peter Tonoli). 
 
I wrote this story about source protection based on the study for the peak Australian investigative  
journalism body, The Walkley Foundation: https://medium.com/the-walkley-magazine/protecting-
sources-in-the-digital-age-3aa5959abeb  
 
• November 2017: UNESCO General Conference Resolution on Strengthening UNESCO 
Leadership in the Implementation of the UN Plan of Action on Safety of Journalists and the 
Issue of Impunity 
 
                                                             
224 European Court of Human Rights (5th Section). Judgement in the case of Becker vs. Norway (Application no. 
21272/12). Issued 5 October 2007 in Strasbourg. Available at: 





During debate on this Resolution before the UNESCO Communication and Information Commission, 
convened within the General Conference, the Chair of the Commission Dr Martin Hadlow noted that: 
 
Many delegates informed the Commission of work undertaken in their countries related to the 
adoption of access to information laws, the safety of journalists, protection of journalists’ 
sources, journalism education…225 
 
• December 2017: UN General Assembly Resolution A/C.3/72/L.35 (recognises source protection 
and references my research)226 
Described as “significant” by civil society organisations227, this United Nations General Assembly 
Resolution integrates strong language from HRC resolution 33/2 on protecting digital security: 
…making clear that trust in technology and the confidentiality of communications is key to 
journalists and their confidential sources of information staying safe. Importantly, and in 
another first for the UNGA, it recognises anonymity and encryption tools as “vital” for 
journalists, and calls on states to not interfere with their use.228 
Specifically, the Resolution acknowledges: 
 
…the particular risks with regard to the safety of journalists in the digital age, including the 
particular vulnerability of journalists to becoming targets of unlawful or arbitrary surveillance or 




Calls upon States to ensure that measures to combat terrorism and preserve national security or 
public order are in compliance with their obligations under international law and do not 
arbitrarily or unduly hinder the work and safety of journalists. (13) 
 
While emphasising that: 
 
                                                             
225 Hadlow, M (2017) Oral Report by the Chairperson of the Communication and Information Commission to the 
Plenary (39 C/INF.31) Note: this report is not publicly available in full, but it was sent to me by Dr Hadlow to inform 
my analysis of UNESCO processes. See next section about issues concerning UNESCO’s historic role in 
commissioning freedom of expression research. 
226 UN General Assembly (2017a) Resolution on the safety of journalists and the issue of impunity A/RES/72/175: 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/72/175  [Accessed 17/7/18]. 
227 C.f. Article19 (2017) UNGA Resolution Calls for an end to Attacks on Women Journalists 






…in the digital age, encryption and anonymity tools have become vital for many journalists to 
freely exercise their work and their enjoyment of human rights, in particular their rights to 
freedom of expression and to privacy, including to secure their communications and to protect 
the confidentiality of their sources, and calls upon States not to interfere with the use of such 
technologies and to ensure that any restrictions thereon comply with States’ obligations under 
international human rights law (14) 
 
However, as Article19 observed, the Resolution did not carry through language from an earlier draft 
replicating the very strong position of the Human Rights Council’s 2016 Resolution on source protection 
in context of the safety of journalists (A/HRC/RES/33/2) 
 
Unfortunately, the final resolution was not as comprehensive on the measures States must take 
in response to digital threats to journalists’ safety as it could have been. Strong language calling 
for States to protect the confidentiality of journalists’ sources in law was removed from the 
draft resolution in revisions leading up to adoption, due to opposition from a minority of States. 
That language, taken verbatim from HRC resolution 33/2, would have reflected in clear terms 
the international standard that judicial authorisation be required for States to take measures to 
reveal a journalist’s confidential source, and UNGA endorsement of that principle would have 
been significant. 
 
Nevertheless, the Resolution specifically ‘recalls’ the work in World Trends in Freedom of Expression and 
Media Development 2015: Special Digital Focus on the theme (which includes my chapter with strong 
recommendations for digital age source protection) and read in conjunction with the UN GA 2016 
Resolution on Privacy in the Digital Age (A/C.3/71/L.39), it provides a significant boost to UN recognition 
of source protection as fundamental tenet of freedom of expression rights enshrined in international 
law (in the context of Digital Age threats) at the highest level. 
 
• March 2018: UNESCO Publishes World Trends in Freedom of Expression and Media 
Development 2016-2018229 
The third report in this flagship series references Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age and 
identifies the ongoing threats posed via mass surveillance, targeted surveillance, and source protection 
erosion. It also identified ‘global backsliding’ in terms of respect for freedom of expression, media 
diversity, and journalistic safety and independence. 
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• April 2018: Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age showcased at the International 
Journalism Festival (EVENT: panels) 
 
Three x panels + roundtable (UNESCO story) 
 
• May 3rd 2018 (World Press Freedom Day): New project, Working With Whistleblowers in the 
Digital Age launched via European Journalism Observatory 
 
Posetti, J (2018a) Working with whistleblowers in the Digital Age: new guidelines at the European 
Journalism Observatory (EJO): https://en.ejo.ch/specialist-journalism/working-with-whistleblowers-in-
the-digital-age [Accessed: 15/05/18] 
 
• May 2018: Accra Declaration230- UNESCO World Press Freedom Day declaration recognising 
source protection threats and combative measures 
The declaration indicates mindfulness of: 
 
…the particular difficulties of protecting, in the digital era, confidential journalistic sources, which 
is a pre-requisite for independent journalism; 21. Alarmed at the proliferation of laws restricting 
freedom of expression in the name of protecting national security and combating extremism and 
terrorism which fail to respect relevant international standards. 
 
It calls on UNESCO Member States to: 
 
35. Recognise in law the right of journalists to protect the secrecy of their confidential sources of 
information and ensure that such protection extends to cover digital surveillance and other ways 
in which sources might be exposed;  
 
42. Refrain from conducting untargeted or indiscriminate surveillance, which is inherently 
disproportionate and is a violation of the rights to privacy and freedom of expression. 
 
And it calls on UNESCO to: 
 
60. Support training and capacity building to journalists in the area of digital safety and 
security, including the use of open and other technologies enabling such benefits as anonymity, 
encryption 7 and material (content) security with a view, among other things, to preventing 
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digital surveillance of their work and digital attacks on their devices, and protecting their 
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Foreword
UNESCO is pleased to release this comprehensive study of changes that impact on legal 
frameworks that support protection of journalistic sources in the digital age. This research 
responds in part to a UNESCO resolution by the 38th General Conference held in 2015 as well 
as the CONNECTing the Dots Outcome Document adopted by our 195 Member States that 
same year. More specifically, the present publication was elaborated in an effort to address 
option 6.2 of the Outcome Document which recommends that UNESCO “recognize[s] the 
need for enhanced protection of the confidentiality of sources of journalism in the digital 
age”.
In accordance with this mandate, UNESCO has developed a new approach to Internet 
and freedom of expression issues regarding safety, privacy, transparency, encryption, hate 
speech, radicalization and source protection. This is the framework of Internet Universality, 
and the Internet governance principles of Human Rights, Openness, Accessibility, and Multi-
stakeholder Participation.  The protection of confidentiality of journalists’ sources relates 
especially to the right to freedom of expression (and the correlatives of press freedom and 
access to information), and the right to privacy.
While the rapidly emerging digital environment offers great opportunities for journalists to 
investigate and report information in the public interest, it also poses particular challenges 
regarding the privacy and safety of journalistic sources. These challenges include: mass 
surveillance as well as targeted surveillance, data retention, expanded and broad anti-
terrorism measures, and national security laws and over-reach in the application of these. 
All these can undermine the confidentiality protection of those who collaborate with 
journalists, and who are essential for revealing sensitive information in the public interest 
but who could expose themselves to serious risks and pressures.  The effect is also to chill 
whistleblowing and thereby undermine public access to information and the democratic 
role of the media. In turn this jeopardizes the sustainability of quality journalism.
The present research provides a comprehensive review of developments that can impact 
on the legal frameworks that support protection of journalistic sources. Interviews, panel 
discussions, thematic studies and a review panel ensured the input of legal and media experts, 
journalists and scholars. This in-depth study thus seeks to assess the evolution of protective 
legal frameworks over the eight years from 2007-2015, and provides recommendations for 
the future of journalistic source protection.
The study found that the legal frameworks that protect the confidential sources of 
journalism are under significant strain in the digital age. This context is leading journalists 
to adapt their work methods in an effort to shield their sources from exposure. A majority 
of the States examined have protections for journalistic sources which now merit revision 
and strengthening.
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A further finding is that all stakeholders have a crucial role to play in the introduction, 
development or updating of better legal safeguards for all acts of journalism, including 
for whistleblowers. The research also provides recommendations on journalistic source 
protection, starting with independent oversight on surveillance and data retention, through 
to the development of education and training programs in digital safety.
A major output of the study is an 11-point assessment tool for measuring the effectiveness 
of legal source protection frameworks in the digital era. In this way, the research serves as 
guidance for UNESCO, Member States and other stakeholders to promote and implement 
more protective frameworks for the confidentiality of journalistic sources. We further 
hope that this publication will prove valuable in framing the debate on the new forms of 
journalism and in encouraging public understanding of these issues.
This research is published as part of a publications series on Internet Freedom that was 
begun in 2009 and that has strived to develop an Internet Universality framework.
The work for the study was conducted for UNESCO by WAN-IFRA, the global news publishing 
association that houses the World Editors Forum (WEF). UNESCO would like to thank WAN-
IFRA and the author, Julie Posetti, affiliated with the University of Wollongong (Australia), as 
well as the other academic researchers, research assistants, experts, journalists, lawyers and 
other interviewees who have contributed to the production of the text.
Frank La Rue
Assistant Director-General  




This Study, which covers 121 UNESCO Member States, represents a global benchmarking 
of journalistic source protection in the Digital Age. It focuses on developments during the 
period 2007-2015.  
The legal frameworks that support protection of journalistic sources, at international, 
regional and country levels, are under significant strain in 2015. They are increasingly at 
risk of erosion, restriction and compromise - a development that is seen to represent a 
direct challenge to the established universal human rights of freedom of expression and 
privacy, and one that especially may constitute a threat to the sustainability of investigative 
journalism.
In many of the countries examined in this Study, it was found that legal source protection 
frameworks are being actually or potentially:
• Overridden by national security and anti-terrorism legislation
• Undercut by surveillance – both mass and targeted 
• Jeopardised by mandatory data retention policies and pressure applied to third party 
intermediaries - like ISPs, telcos, search engines, social media platforms - to release data 
which risks exposing sources 
• Outdated when it comes to regulating the collection and use of digital data, such as 
whether information recorded without consent is admissible in a court case against 
either a journalist or a source; and whether digitally stored material gathered by 
journalistic actors is covered by existing source protection laws.
• Challenged by questions about entitlement to claim protection - as underscored by 
the questions: “Who is a journalist?” and “What is journalism”? 
Several of these categories intersect and overlap, especially in the cases of national security, 
surveillance and data retention.
These findings are based on an examination of the legal source protection frameworks in 
each country, drawing on academic research, online repositories, reportage by news and 
human rights organisations, more than 130 survey respondents and qualitative interviews 
with nearly 50 international experts and practitioners globally. The study was commissioned 
as part of the research for an overarching global UNESCO Internet Study, mandated in 2013 
by UNESCO’s General Conference of 195 Member States in Resolution 52. This mandate 
called for a comprehensive and consultative study of four dimensions of the Internet as 
relevant to the remit of UNESCO.  Covering access to information and knowledge, freedom 
of expression, privacy and the ethical dimensions of the information society, this wider 
study was published as Keystones to foster inclusive Knowledge Societies (UNESCO 2015). 
Resolution 52 also specifically noted “that privacy is essential to protect journalistic sources, 
which enable a society to benefit from investigative journalism, to strengthen good 
governance and the rule of law, and that such privacy should not be subject to arbitrary or 
unlawful interference” (UNESCO 2013). 
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This study covers the period 2007-2015, and builds on a 2007 study produced by Privacy 
International (Banisar 2007).
Of the 121 Member States studied here, developments that impact on source protection 
in practice, or in potential, have occurred in 84 (69%) countries since 2007, the date of 
the Privacy International review of source protection laws. However, these changes were 
not evenly dispersed around the world. The UNESCO region reflecting the most notable 
developments was the Arab States, where 86% of countries examined demonstrated shifts. 
Latin America and the Caribbean followed closely behind, with developments in legal 
protections for journalists’ sources recorded in 85% of the States studied. In Asia and the 
Pacific, 75% of States exhibited notable changes, while 66% of European and North American 
States also demonstrated developments since 2007. Finally, changes were identified in 56% 
of African countries examined.
Significant changes in the offline realm of source protection are more prominent in Africa 
and the Arab States, but they are not limited to these regions. Digital developments were 
found to be most prevalent in Latin America, Asia, Europe and North America. 
While traditional legal frameworks for source protection remain strong in some states, 
and are progressing in others, they are under significant risk from a combination of 
developments. These are caused, for the most part, by digital disruption, and by overreach 
in measures that are introduced in the name of national security or combatting crime. The 
Study assesses that unless journalistic communications are recognised, surveillance is made 
subject to checks and balances (both mass and targeted); data retention laws are limited; 
accountability and transparency measures (applied to both States and corporations) are 
improved, confidence in the confidentiality of sources could be seen to be weakened. The 
result could be that much public interest information, such as that about corruption and 
abuse, will remain hidden from public view.
Many journalists are now significantly adapting their work in an effort to shield their sources 
from exposure, sometimes even seeking to avoid electronic devices and communications 
altogether. At the same time, the cost of the digital era source protection threat is very 
significant - in terms of digital security tools, training, reversion to more labour intensive 
analogue practices, and legal advice. Regardless, such tactics may be insufficient if legal 
protections are weak, anonymity is forbidden, encryption is disallowed, and sources 
themselves are unaware of the risks. The impact of these combined factors on the production 
and scope of investigative journalism based on confidential sources is significant. 
Where source protection is compromised, the impacts can include: 
• Pre-publication exposure of journalistic investigations which may trigger cover-ups, 
intimidation, or destruction of information,
• Revelation of sources’ identities with legal or extra-legal repercussions on them, 
• Sources of information running dry, 
• Self-censorship by journalists and citizens more broadly. 
If confidential sources are to confidently make contact with journalists, this Study proposes 
five conditions for consideration: 
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• Systems are put in place for transparency and accountability regarding data retention 
policies and surveillance (including both mass surveillance and targeted surveillance) 
– as recommended by the UN General Assembly,
• Steps are taken by States to adopt, update and strengthen source protection laws and 
their implementation for the digital era, 
• Training is provided to journalistic actors in regard to digital safety and security tactics, 
• Efforts are made to educate the public and sources in Media and Information Literacy, 
including secure digital communications, 
• There is recognition of the application of source protection laws to acts of journalism 
that encompass digital reporting processes (e.g. phone calls, emails, messaging apps, 
and hand written notes), along with published content – both digital and non-digital.
A major recommendation of this study is consideration of an 11-point assessment tool for 
measuring the effectiveness of legal source protection frameworks in the digital age. The 
11 points were developed through consultation with 31 international experts in media law, 
freedom of expression, ICTs, and investigative journalism practice. 
On the basis of this output, a model legal source protection framework should:
1. Recognise the value to the public interest of source confidentiality protection, with its 
legal foundation in the right to freedom of expression (including press freedom), and 
to privacy. These protections should also be embedded within a country’s constitution 
and/or national law, 
2. Recognise that source protection should extend to all acts of journalism, and across all 
platforms, services and mediums (of data storage and publication), and that it includes 
digital data and meta-data, 
3. Recognise that source protection does not entail registration or licensing of 
practitioners of journalism, 
4. Recognise the potential detrimental impact on public interest journalism, and on 
society, of source-related information being caught up in bulk data recording, tracking, 
storage and collection, 
5. Affirm that State and corporate actors (including third party intermediaries) who 
capture journalistic digital data must treat it confidentially (acknowledging also the 
desirability of the storage and use of such data being consistent with the general right 
to privacy), 
6. Shield acts of journalism from targeted surveillance, data retention and handover of 
material connected to confidential sources, 
7. Define exceptions to all the above very narrowly, so as to preserve the principle of 
source protection as the effective norm and standard, 
8. Define exceptions as needing to conform to a provision of “necessity” and 
“proportionality” — in other words, when no alternative to disclosure is possible, when 
there is greater public interest in disclosure than in protection, and when the terms 
and extent of disclosure still preserve confidentiality as much as possible, 
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9. Define a transparent and independent judicial process with appeal potential for 
authorised exceptions, and ensure that law-enforcement agents and judicial actors 
are educated about the principles involved, 
10. Criminalise arbitrary, unauthorised and willful violations of confidentiality of sources 
by third party actors, 
11. Recognise that source protection laws can be strengthened by complementary 
whistleblower legislation. 
This Study concludes that law-makers, journalists, editors and publishers among others can 
play an important role in promoting public understanding of these issues, and in advocating 
for change.
A summary leaflet of this publication is available at: http://www.unesco.org/fileadmin/
MULTIMEDIA/HQ/CI/CI/pdf/protecting_journalism_sources_in_digital_age.pdf 
A summary is also available as a chapter in UNESCO’s report World Trends in Freedom of 





“…Privacy is essential to protect journalistic sources, which enable a society to benefit from 
investigative journalism, to strengthen good governance and the rule of law, and…such 
privacy should not be subject to arbitrary or unlawful interference…” (UNESCO Resolution 
on Internet-related issues, November 2013).
Internationally, source protection laws are increasingly at risk of erosion, restriction and 
compromise in the digital era, a development that can be seen to challenge the rights to 
freedom of expression and privacy (Article 12; Article 19 UDHR, Article 19 ICCPR 1976). 
Journalists rely on source protection to gather and reveal information in the public interest 
from confidential sources. Such sources may require anonymity to protect them from 
physical, economic or professional reprisals in response to their revelations. There is a strong 
tradition of legal source protection internationally, in recognition of the vital function that 
confidential sources play in facilitating ‘watchdog’ or ‘accountability’ journalism. While 
professional journalistic practice entails multi-sourcing, verification and corroboration, 
confidential sources are a key component of this practice. Without confidential sources, 
many acts of investigative story-telling - from Watergate to the major 2014 investigative 
journalism project ‘Offshore Leaks’ undertaken by the International Consortium of 
Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) (Guevara et al, 2014) - may never have surfaced. Even reporting 
that involves gathering opinions in the streets, or a background briefing often relies on trust 
that a journalist respects confidentiality where this is requested.
There is a globally established ethical obligation upon journalists to avoid revealing the 
identity of their confidential sources. In some cases, it is also a legal right, or even a legal 
requirement. In Sweden, protection of confidential sources is so strong that journalists can 
be prosecuted for revealing their identities (Hendler 2010). However, in many cases, the 
legal situation does not grant recognition of such confidentiality and journalists can still be 
legally compelled to identify their sources or face penalties, prosecution and imprisonment. 
Exceptions to legal protection might include circumstances involving grave threats to 
human life, when a journalist is accused of committing a crime, or if s/he witnesses a serious 
crime. Where the legal line is drawn, and how it is interpreted, varies around the world but 
the principle that sets confidentiality as the norm, and disclosure as the exception, is the 
generally accepted standard. 
The value to society of protecting the confidentiality of sources is widely recognised as 
greatly offsetting occasional instances of journalists abusing the confidentiality privilege to, 
for example, invent sources. Such scandals invariably come to light, and they are strongly 
condemned by journalists’ professional organisations that stress the requirement to only 
rely on anonymous sources when it is necessary to do so to protect the source from 
exposure, in the course of public interest journalism. Accordingly, free expression standards 
internationally uphold the confidentiality principle. This principle shields the journalist 
directly by recognising their professional obligation not to disclose the identity of the 
source, and it shields the source indirectly through the journalist’s commitment. However, 
this principle works in practice only if the identity of the confidential source cannot be easily 
discovered by other means, and if there are limits on the use of identifying information if it 
does become known. 
Journalists do not encourage or condone law-breaking, or unsanctioned leaking, but they 
do have a duty to consider the public interest significance of publishing the resulting 
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information, and in maintaining confidentiality accordingly, in order not to jeopardize the 
flow of such information which is vital to accountability journalism.
The need to protect the confidentiality of sources is justified largely in terms of ensuring a 
free flow of information, especially in regard to information derived from whistleblowers.1 
Without this, a ‘chilling effect’ is likely, with holders of sensitive information being reluctant 
to come forward. As another knock-on effect, when media outlets or individuals doing 
journalism know or suspect that they will be put under pressure to reveal sources, they 
may become less likely to seek or subsequently use information supplied on condition of 
confidentiality, with concomitant shrinkage of public interest content as a result. 
The implications of the digital era
The current digital environment poses particular challenges to traditional legal protections 
for journalists’ sources. While protective laws and/or a reporter’s commitment shielded the 
identity of sources in the analogue past, in the age of digital reporting, mass surveillance, 
mandatory data retention, and disclosure by third party intermediaries, this traditional 
shield can be penetrated. 
Technological developments and a change in operational methods of police and 
intelligence services are redefining the legal classification of privacy and journalistic privilege 
internationally (Podkowik 2014). In addition, aided by rapid technological advancement, law 
enforcement and national security agencies have shifted from a process of detecting crimes 
already committed, to one of threat prevention in the post-September 11 environment. In 
the digital age, it is not the act of committing (or suspicion of committing) a crime that may 
result in a person being subject to surveillance, but the simple act of using certain modes 
of communication – such as mobile technology, email, social networks and the Internet 
(Podkowik 2014; Banisar 2008). As a result, journalistic communications are increasingly 
being caught up in the nets of law enforcement and national security agencies as they 
trawl for evidence of criminal activity, terrorism and national security threats, and conduct 
leak investigations.
Parallel to these digital developments, over the past eight years increasingly restrictive 
anti-terrorism and national security legislation has been enacted, actually or potentially 
overriding existing legal protections, including ‘shield laws’ (see definitions and discussions 
of these key terms in section 4.1 below). This arises from moves to broaden the scope of 
‘classified’ information and exceptions to coverage, and to criminalise all disclosure of ‘secret’ 
information  (including in some cases, the publication thereof ) irrespective of public interest 
or whistle-blowing considerations. The result of the increasing risk to both journalists and 
their sources is a further constraining, or “chilling”, of public interest journalism dependent 
upon confidential sources.
In this digital and security-driven context, it becomes important to extend legal source 
confidentiality protection to all acts of journalism, not just to issues of identification after 
the publication of content based on confidential communications, but also to related prior 
1 Martin (1983) describes whistleblowing as disclosure by an employee of his (sic) employer’s improper 
activities and whistleblowers as “…merely ordinary employees who feel so troubled by their employer’s 
conduct that they feel compelled to take action” (Martin, M “Protecting the Whistleblower from Retaliatory 
Discharge”, 16 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 727 (1983) p1. Available at: http://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/fac_
schol/372). Whistleblowing may, however, be wider than this, covering public interest issues more broadly 
than employers’ conduct.
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digital reporting processes and journalistic communications with sources. Additionally, it is 
important to debate which journalistic actors qualify for source protection in the digital era 
– and where there is a need to answer questions like ‘Who can claim entitlement to source 
confidentiality protection laws?’
There are also new questions now facing courts, legislators, media lawyers and journalists. 
In the analogue era, these were: 1) Can a journalist be forced to reveal the confidential 
source of published information by a court? 2) Can journalists and news organisations 
be the subject of targeted surveillance and search and seizure operations? Now, the key 
questions are increasingly: 1) Do the processes of automatically intercepting and collecting 
communications through mass surveillance and mandatory data retention which enable 
subsequent analysis via technologically advanced tools (e.g. Programs that give intelligence 
agencies access to third party intermediary data stores) constitute a breach of recognition of 
a right to withhold the identity of sources? 2) Can the effects of such potential interference be 
minimised or limited through introducing or updating legal source protection frameworks 
that engage with these challenges? It is the new implications of the digital age that are the 
main focus of exploration in this study
1.1. Background to the Study
As elaborated later in these pages, the issue of confidentiality of journalists’ sources has 
become a subject of attention within the United Nations. In particular, in November 2013, 
a UNESCO Resolution mandated the Organisation to undertake a comprehensive study on 
Internet-related issues. It declared that: “Privacy is essential to protect journalistic sources, 
which enable a society to benefit from investigative journalism, to strengthen good 
governance and the rule of law, and that such privacy should not be subject to arbitrary or 
unlawful interference” (UNESCO 2013). The research contained in this publication fed into 
the comprehensive study, and is published here in elaborated detail. 
1.2. Issues and purpose of the research
The purpose of this Study is to provide quantitative data and qualitative analysis around 
the world linked to protection of journalists’ sources in the digital age (UNESCO: 2014 a). As 
indicated earlier, its findings have informed the overarching global UNESCO Internet Study 
(UNESCO: 2014 b; UNESCO: 2015). 
The research was conducted by WAN-IFRA, the global news publishing association that 
houses the World Editors Forum (WEF). The author, Julie Posetti, led the project as WAN-IFRA 




2.1. Research methods deployed
A combination of quantitative and qualitative methodologies was adopted for this study. 
i. Structuring the research
An eight-year-old report commissioned by Privacy International called Silencing Sources: 
An International Survey of Protections and Threats to Journalists’ Sources (Banisar 2007) was 
intended to be used as the baseline data set for this study, which was commissioned in 
mid-2014. However, this approach proved complex, as the 2007 report did not provide a 
complete public data set. 
As a result, the researchers applied a process of ‘datafication’ to the 2007 report. This process 
involved hand-mining and keyword searching the document to a) identify every country 
mentioned in the report and b) establish which countries required additional research to 
strengthen the available data, thereby enabling an updated benchmarking of the 2007 
research. The result was the development of an Excel database that listed each country 
identified in the 2007 report, along with the different kinds of legal protections applicable 
globally (e.g. constitutional protections, state-based laws, memoranda of understanding).
There were 124 territories identified through the ‘datafication’ of the Privacy International 
report (see section 14.1, Appendix i).  The limitation of the research to UNESCO Member 
States reduced the number of countries selected for examination in this Study to 121. It is 
this sub-set of countries (see section 14.2, Appendix ii), which constitutes the focus for the 
research presented here.
ii. Environmental Scan
Once the initial data set was established, each country was assigned to a researcher or 
research assistant, according to language capacity, for commencement of a qualitative 
mapping exercise, known as an Environmental Scan. In total, there were five academic 
researchers commissioned to work on this project, along with 11 research assistants. 
The languages spoken by the researchers also totalled 11: English, Chinese, Portuguese, 
Spanish, French, Italian, Russian, Arabic, Vietnamese, Tagalog and German. Where countries 
were assigned to researchers without relevant language skills, the research was conducted 
targeting English language sources and replicating the search in a second language where 
possible. The process of undertaking the Environmental Scan involved:
a. Preparing a literature review (focused on scholarly books, journals and major reports)
b. Online searches of legal, legislative, and relevant NGO databases in each country
c. Online searches of news websites
d. Contacting WAN-IFRA member organisations and affiliates for input
e. Contacting sources in countries
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Data collection began on August 1st 2014 and ended on July 20th 2015, when the study 
was submitted to UNESCO.
Issues arising 
There are two important observations to make about the efficacy of the Environmental 
Scan process when applied globally:
a. In some countries there are issues with availability of information, resulting in limitations 
in terms of what data could be collected
b. In some contexts there is limited information that is published online, which further 
constrained the research in all 121 countries.
iii. Preliminary Analysis of country data
Once each country was examined via the Environmental Scan process, the assigned 
researcher or research assistant produced a  ‘country overview’, identifying any developments 
relevant to confidential source protection that had occurred in the legal/regulatory/
judicial/journalistic environment of that country regarding source protection since 2007, 
and noting specific digital dimensions. This allowed the author and research assistants to 
then code the documents produced to further narrow the data corpus to a narrower subset 
of countries where developments had been identified since 2007. 
Ultimately, developments pertaining to legal protections for journalists’ sources were 
recorded in 84 out of the 121 countries (69%) studied. These countries were then divided 
into UNESCO regional groups, as follows:
i. Africa
ii. Arab States
iii. Asia and the Pacific
iv. Europe and North America
v. Latin America and the Caribbean
iv. Surveys
A set of online survey questions (see 14.4, Appendix iv) was developed by the author, 
in consultation with academic members of a Review Panel that was set up to assist this 
Study (see below, Posetti 2014a). These questions were qualitative in nature and designed 
to engage members of the journalistic, academic, legal, freedom of expression and online 
communities globally. Specifically, they were asked to: pinpoint shifts in the legal and 
regulatory environment pertaining to source protection since 2007; identify key experts/
actors for future qualitative interviews; and suggest potential case studies. This survey was 
launched in October 2014 and it continued until January 2015.
The relevant results of an earlier online survey, developed by the author, and launched 
during the World Editors Forum (WEF) in Turin (Italy) in June 2014, were synthesised with 
the data from the survey (as described above) distributed in connection with this UNESCO-
commissioned Study. The earlier WEF survey targeted editors and investigative journalists, 
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and it was designed to feed a submission to the over-arching UNESCO Internet Study. It 
asked for evidence of the impact of the ‘Snowden-Effect’ on newsrooms globally, in terms 
of changes in training and practice in reference to source protection, along with broader 
digital safety issues (Posetti 2014b). The results of the WEF survey usefully expanded the 
corpus of data examined in this Study as regards the impacts on investigative journalism, 
and editorial processes and practices, related to challenges posed to legal source protection 
frameworks in the digital era.
Further, relevant survey data from the over-arching UNESCO Internet Study Survey was 
provided to the author for examination. Question number 9 of that survey asked: “To what 
extent do laws protect digitally interfaced journalism and journalistic sources?” (UNESCO 
2014b). The author analysed these responses and synthesised the data with that flowing 
from the two surveys referenced earlier, to produce a complete data set.
In addition to the issues identified in reference to the Environmental Scan process, it 
is acknowledged that the online nature of the surveys may have discouraged some 
participants, particularly in light of the subject matter. It is possible that some potential 
participants may have been concerned about the monitoring and interception of their 
online communications and therefore elected not to take part in the survey.
Nevertheless, 134 people from 35 countries - representing every UNESCO region - 
responded to the combined surveys. The survey data was scanned for evidence of changes 
to legal source protection frameworks, and digital dimensions, which had not been 
captured in the Environmental Scan process. Such relevant data was used to augment the 
regional overviews presented below, assist in the identification of expert actors, and in the 
development of the thematic studies.
v. Qualitative interviews
Dozens of key actors with legal, journalism, and freedom of expression expertise were 
identified through the Environmental Scan and survey processes. Ultimately, 49 interviewees 
were selected from 22 countries (see 14.5, Appendix v) on the basis of relevant expertise, 
and with the goal of achieving regional and gender balance. The author developed nine key 
qualitative questions to be put to each expert actor for consistency (See 14.6, Appendix vi). 
Long form, semi-structured qualitative interviews were then conducted by the researchers 
and research assistants (as assigned in accordance with language capacity), with the 
selected interviewees. These interviews were conducted via telephone, Skype, email and 
face-to-face between November 2014 and March 2015. They were recorded, transcribed 
and coded before being analysed by the author. These interviews served the purpose of 
deepening the research and forming the foundation of the thematic studies. 
vi. Panel Discussions
The author convened two panel discussions on this research during its final phase. The first 
panel, staged in Washington DC during the World Editors Forum in June 2015 (Greenslade 
2015; Posetti 2015d), featured the author and the following experts:
1. Gerard Ryle (Executive Director, International Consortium of Investigative Journalists)
2. Charles Tobin (US attorney specialising in source protection)
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3. Amy Mitchell (Director of Journalism Research, Pew Research Centre)
4. Guy Berger (Director of Freedom of Expression and Media Development, UNESCO)
The second panel convened to discuss this Study was hosted jointly by the London Foreign 
Press Association and the Frontline Club in London, in July 2015 (Churchill 2015). The 
panellists were:
1. Jonathan Calvert (Editor, Insight, The Sunday Times)
2. Gavin Millar QC (Barrister specialising in media law, including source protection)
3. Jeremy Myers (BBC Internet Research Specialist)
4. Julie Posetti (Author of this study Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age; 
WAN-IFRA; University of Wollongong)
The contributions of the panellists during both sessions were leveraged to update and 
strengthen this Study’s analysis during the final phase of research. Subsequent presentations 
of the draft research during 2015 at the Stockholm Internet Forum and the Internet 
Governance Forum elicited comments from a further range of participants from other parts 
of the world, and this feedback has enriched the published version of this study.
vii. Thematic Studies
Many potential case studies were identified in the Environmental Scan and survey 
processes. Ultimately, three thematic studies were selected for in-depth analysis to ensure 
representation of key issues and reflection of regional and linguistic diversity. The thematic 
studies draw on the detail of 134 international survey respondents and 49 qualitative 
interviews (as explained in detail earlier).
The thematic studies featured in this Study are:
a. The impact of source protection erosion in the digital era on the practice of investigative 
journalism globally. 
b. Sweden: How a State with one of the oldest and strongest legal source protection frameworks 
is responding and adapting to emerging digital transformation and associated threats. 
c. Model assessment tool for international legal source protection frameworks. 
viii. Review Panel
A Review Panel comprising eight experts in journalism, freedom of expression, ICTs and 
media law from around the globe was established by the author, in consultation with 
UNESCO, for the purposes of providing expert advice and feedback on research outputs. 
Their feedback was incorporated into the Study (See 14.5, Appendix v).
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3.  Key findings 
1. The issue of source protection has come to intersect with the issues of mass 
surveillance, targeted surveillance, data retention, the spill-over effects of anti-
terrorism/national security legislation, and the role of third party Internet companies 
known as “intermediaries”
2. Legal and regulatory protections for journalists’ sources are increasingly at risk of 
erosion, restriction and compromise  
3. 84 UNESCO Member States out of 121 studied (69%) for this report demonstrated 
developments relevant to the protection of confidentiality of journalistic sources, 
mainly with actual or potential impact, between 2007 and mid-2015
4. Individual states face a need to introduce or update source protection laws
5. Source protection laws need to cover journalistic processes and communications with 
confidential sources – including telephone calls, social media, messaging apps, and 
emails – along with published journalism that depends on confidential sources
6. Transparency and accountability regarding both mass and targeted surveillance, and 
data retention, are critically important if confidential sources are to be able to continue 
to confidently make contact with journalists
7. Without substantial strengthening of legal protections and limitations on surveillance 
and data retention, investigative journalism that relies on confidential sources will be 
difficult to sustain in the digital era, and reporting in many other cases will encounter 
inhibitions on the part of potential sources
8. It is recommended to define ‘acts of journalism’, as distinct from the role of ‘journalist’, 
in determining who can benefit from source protection laws 
9. To optimise benefits, source protection laws should be strengthened in tandem with 
legal protections extended to whistleblowers, who constitute a significant set of 
confidential journalistic sources, 
10. Journalists are increasingly adapting their practice in an effort to partially shield their 
sources from exposure, but steps to limit anonymity and encryption undermine these 
adaptations.
11. The financial cost of the digital era source protection threat is significant (in terms of 
digital security tools, training, and legal advice), as is its impact on the production and 
scope of investigative journalism based on confidential sources
12. There is a need to educate both journalists and citizens in digital safety 
13. Journalists and others who rely on confidential sources to report in the public interest 
may need to train their sources in secure methods of contact and information-sharing
3.1. Identification of key themes
The data collated via the Environmental Scan process and qualitative interviews, many of 
which are referenced later, confirmed the existence of five key overlapping and inter-related 
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trends affecting the legal protection of journalists’ sources in the digital age. These themes 
are visible in many legislative changes and incidents affecting journalists, as noted in Part 7 
below. They are also reflected in the deliberations of regional courts, such as the European 
Court of Human Rights. It emerges from all these sources that the issue of confidentiality of 
journalistic sources in the digital age is bound up with:
i. The ‘trumping effect’ of national security/anti-terrorism legislation
ii. The role of mass surveillance and targeted surveillance in undercutting legal protections
iii. The role of third party intermediaries and data retention 
iv. Changes in entitlement to protection – Who is a journalist?/What is journalism?
v. Additional categories: Two other sub-themes emerged from the data.
 – Other digital dimensions (e.g. seizure of digital equipment; threats to anonymity 
and encryption)
 – Non-digital developments in source protection (e.g. legislative and case law 
developments not pertaining to the digital environment)
3.2. Analysis of key themes
i. The ‘trumping effect’ of national security/anti-terrorism 
legislation
In 2007, Banisar (p64) noted that: “A major recent concern…is the adoption of new anti-
terrorism laws that allow for access to records and oblige assistance. There are also problems 
in many countries with searches of newsrooms and with broadly defined state secrets acts 
which criminalise journalists who publish leaked information”. 
The problem has grown in the intervening years, as a parallel to digital development, and 
occurs where it is un-checked by measures designed to preserve fundamental rights to 
freedom of expression and privacy, as well as accountability and transparency. In practice, 
this leads to what can be identified as a ‘trumping effect’, where national security and anti-
terrorism legislation effectively take precedence over legal and normative protections 
for confidential journalistic sources (see Campbell 2013). Further, the classification of 
information as being protected by national security or anti-terrorism legislation has the 
effect of increasing the reluctance of sources to come forward.
One particular risk is signalled in a 2008 Council of Europe (CoE) report that stated: 
“Terrorism is often used as a talisman to justify stifling dissenting voices in the way that 
calling someone a communist or capitalist were used during the Cold War” (Banisar 2008). 
According to the COE report, following the 2001 terrorist attacks, many European countries 
adopted new laws or expanded the use of old laws to monitor communications.
Further perspective on the issue has come from Gillian Phillips, Director of Editorial Legal 
Services of The Guardian who has specifically referenced the implications of governments 
invoking national security and anti-terrorism measures that interfere with protections for 
journalists and their sources. Calls for unlimited monitoring and use of modern surveillance 
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technologies to access all citizens’ data, directly challenge journalists’ rights to protect their 
confidential sources, she said (Nolan 2015) 
Interviewed for this study, the Director of the Centre for Law and Democracy in Canada, 
Toby Mendel, said that the main issue is the redefinition of national security in the current 
climate. “The problem is not so much new rules…but a changing understanding of national 
security. In particular, when national security becomes equated with the risk of terrorist 
actions, which can theoretically be undertaken by anyone, the issue becomes far more 
generalised, and so the risk to source protection becomes far more serious” (Mendel 2014).
Privacy International’s Tomaso Falchetta, also speaking to this study’s researchers, highlighted 
a major problem with regard to the impact of anti-terrorism and national security legislation 
on journalistic source protection: 
…Most laws regulating interception and surveillance do not specifically recognise additional 
rights for journalists. This is particularly so with regards to counter-terrorism legislation that 
provides for expansive powers of state surveillance without making provisions for protection 
of journalists’ sources. Traditional national security laws and new counter-terrorism laws 
adopted in numerous countries give authorities extensive powers to demand assistance from 
journalists, intercept communications, and gather information. (Falchetta 2015)
Falchetta also observed that, in many countries, journalists are held liable for the publication 
of information that they have received when it is judged to be in violation of state secrets 
acts or criminal codes. 
While anti-terrorism legislation could be justifiably used in limited cases to override source 
protection laws, the existence of arbitrary or broad nature of such laws can put journalistic 
source confidentiality at risk.  This complexity is evident in Australia, where national 
security and anti-terrorism grounds have been invoked to classify information on asylum 
seeker arrivals and detention, requiring most journalism undertaken on boat arrivals and 
immigration detention centres to be dependent upon confidential sources. However, as 
elucidated later in this study, revelation of any such classified information has now been 
criminalised (Farrell 2015b), exacerbating the chilling effect. Journalists have been reported 
to the Australian Federal Police by Australian government agencies with requests that the 
police assist with identifying the sources of the leaks (Farrell 2015a). 
Like other experts interviewed about themes for this study, USA journalist and press 
freedom advocate Josh Stearns acknowledged that there are, in limited circumstances, 
security reasons for compelling journalists to reveal their sources. He cautioned, however, 
that “too often the blanket of national security is thrown over things that probably aren’t a 
good fit or it is used too expansively” (Stearns 2014)
A report by The Guardian in 2015, based on files leaked by Edward Snowden, highlighted 
the potential controversy in this area. It stated that that a UK Government Communications 
Headquarters (GCHQ) information security assessment had listed “investigative journalists” 
alongside terrorists and hackers in a threat hierarchy (Ball 2015). 
In Africa, ARTICLE 19’s Henry Maina told the researchers that journalists and bloggers are 
frequently targeted in the context of national security measures (Maina 2015). Former 
Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression at the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights, Dr Catalina Botero, told this study that the role played by investigative journalism 
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in the fight against terrorism and organised crime is being undermined in Latin America 
through deployment of national security laws to the detriment of source protection:
You need to protect journalists in order to fight organised crime because you need [their 
work] to know what’s going on. Sometimes in the Americas, journalists are more and better 
informed than the authorities. So you need them to fight against organised crime and at the 
same time you are using these kinds of laws to threaten them. We’re killing one of the most 
important tools that governments need to fight organised crime, and you’re not winning 
anything because spying on journalists is not going to give you any tool to fight against 
organised crime. (Botero 2015)
She stated that some governments use tools to block and threaten and spy on journalists. 
“Not because of security reasons, but because of the need to control what’s going on in the 
public sphere” (Botero 2015). 
Globally, these issues point to the need for law reform according to Media Legal Defence 
Initiative CEO Peter Noorlander. “Existing national security and search and seizure laws 
should be amended to strengthen source protection,” he told this study (Noorlander 2015). 
Other issues related to national security impact on whether a society provides for 
anonymity and encryption, which are enablers of the right to privacy, and which each 
have great relevance to the confidentiality of journalistic sources. Linked to these are 
real-name registration systems for electronic communication, which potentially expose 
reporters and their communications with sources to scrutiny. There is also a potential 
chilling effect on sources who may prefer to make contact with reporters via anonymous or 
pseudonymous accounts.  This presents risks and difficulties for journalists trying to interact 
with confidential sources online – sources who may choose to make contact via journalists’ 
personal social media accounts, including private and direct messaging. The same applies 
to the legal regime concerning encryption, which is also sometimes affected by national 
security considerations.
ii. The role of mass surveillance and targeted surveillance in 
undercutting legal protections
This theme is highlighted by a range of scholars (Fuchs 2013; Eubanks 2014; Giroux 
2015) who have warned that surveillance is a broader problem than the impingement of 
individual privacy. Adrejevic (2014) has argued that it represents a fundamental alteration 
to the power dynamics of society:
…Surveillance should be understood as referring to forms of monitoring deeply embedded 
in structural conditions of asymmetrical power relations that underwrite domination and 
exploitation. 
As discussed throughout this study, protection of journalistic sources is undercut if 
information leading back to sources is swept up through both mass surveillance and 
unchecked targeted surveillance deployed by States and other actors. Different kinds 
of physical surveillance have historically impacted on source protection, but digital 
data has enabled a higher magnitude of surveillance, and the advent of cheap storage 
and processing power makes bulk surveillance feasible and far-reaching. Director of the 
Canadian-based Centre for Law and Democracy, Toby Mendel told this study that digital 
surveillance undercuts source protection because it gets around legal controls on exposing 
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sources via indirect means (Mendel 2014). ARTICLE 19’s Henry Maina told this study there 
were some countries where the deployment of surveillance techniques was a means of 
intercepting information that can be used to incriminate reporters (Maina 2015). Experts 
interviewed for this study indicated that surveillance could be legitimate, and pointed 
to the “Necessary and Proportionate” conditions put forward by civil society groups2, but 
expressed concern about cases when there was a lack of legality, independent oversight, 
transparency or consideration for journalistic confidentiality. 
Definitions
Mass surveillance can be defined as the broad, arbitrary monitoring of an entire or 
substantial fraction of a population (EFF 2015).  According to former UN Special Rapporteur 
on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Expression and Opinion, 
Frank La Rue, States can achieve almost complete control of telecommunications and 
online communications “…by placing taps on the fibre-optic cables, through which the 
majority of digital communication information flows, and applying word, voice and speech 
recognition…” (UNGA HRC 2013). 
Privacy International’s Tomaso Falchetta described the particular risks of mass surveillance 
to researchers on this study: “Mass digital surveillance is inherently untargeted, thereby 
collecting all types of information, often greater than those obtained by other legal means. 
The surveillance is likely to result in the interception of information about other sources, 
research on pending stories, and the personal life of the journalist” (Falchetta 2015). 
A report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, Ben Emmerson, has outlined 
that States can gain access to the telephone and email content of an effectively unlimited 
number of users and maintain an overview of Internet activity associated with particular 
websites. “All of this is possible without any prior suspicion related to a specific individual 
or organisation. The communications of literally every Internet user are potentially open for 
inspection by intelligence and law enforcement agencies in the States concerned“ (UN Doc 
A/69/397). 
There is also concern about the extent of targeted surveillance, according to Emmerson’s 
report: “Targeted surveillance…enables intelligence and law enforcement agencies to 
monitor the online activity of particular individuals, to penetrate databases and cloud 
facilities, and to capture the information stored on them“ (UN Doc A/69/397).
In 2013, the Monk School of Global Affairs’ Citizen Lab research group at the University of 
Toronto discovered command and control servers for FinFisher software (also known as 
FinSpy) backdoors, in a total of 25 countries, including 14 countries in Asia, nine in Europe 
and North America, one in Latin America and the Caribbean, and one in Africa (Marquis-
Boire et al. 2013). This software is exclusively sold to governments and law enforcement 
agencies (Blue 2014).
The practice of ‘outsourcing’ the interception of citizens’ communications to allied countries’ 
national security agencies, in order to avoid domestic privacy and freedom of expression 
laws, may heighten the risks for journalistic source protection. 
Additionally, several experts interviewed for this Study pointed out the lack of transparency 
connected to surveillance practices that target journalists, or catch them in the net. 
2  https://necessaryandproportionate.org/
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Belgian Media Law professor Dirk Voorhoof told this Study’s researchers: “When it comes to 
monitoring online communications, the practices that are breaching the rights (associated 
with) protection of journalists’ sources almost become invisible, and these practices are 
often to be situated in the nearly invisible actions of security and intelligence services”. He 
described the lack of transparency, and associated lack of enforcement of source protection 
laws in the digital environment as a problem for democracy (Voorhoof 2015).
Trends in surveillance of journalists and their communications
A 2008 Council of Europe report (Banisar 2008) detailed what it described as a “worrying 
trend in the use of both authorised and unauthorised electronic surveillance to monitor 
journalists by governments and private parties to track their activities and identify their 
sources”. According to the report, most such incidents are not related to countering 
terrorism but they are authorised under the broad powers of national laws or undertaken 
illegally, in an attempt to identify the sources of journalistic information. 
These laws expand surveillance in a number of ways, according to the CoE study, such as:
1. Extending the range of crimes that interception is authorised for;
2. Relaxing legal limitations on approving and conducting surveillance including 
allowing for warrantless interception in some cases;
3. Authorising the use of invasive techniques such as Trojan horse and remote keystroke 
monitoring to be used;
4. Increased demand for identification of users of telecommunications services.
One case of the direct undercutting of confidential source protection by mass surveillance 
came in July 2015, in the context of a German parliamentary investigation into the 
surveillance of German citizens in 2011. During the course of questioning, a German 
intelligence chief revealed that Der Spiegel journalists had also been under surveillance and 
that an official from the service of an ally had revealed the identity of one of the journalists’ 
confidential sources to the German government (Tapper 2015).  
Documents linked to Edward Snowden, published by The Guardian in 2015, posited that 
the UK’s GCHQ (Government Communications Headquarters) had syphoned emails from 
some of the world’s top news organisations – the BBC, The Guardian, Le Monde, Reuters, The 
New York Times and The Washington Post among them – for internal distribution (Ball 2015).
Meanwhile, a US editor who responded anonymously to the first of three surveys connected 
to this study (Posetti 2014d) argued that mass surveillance meant that newsrooms could 
not protect the anonymity of sources anymore, and that sources could also expose 
themselves through their electronic communications.3 Similar concerns were expressed by 
Indonesian investigative journalist with TEMPO magazine, Wahyu Dhyatmika, and Pakistani 
investigative journalist Umar Cheema. In the Philippines, investigative journalist Marites 
Danguilan-Vitug, a co-founder of that country’s Centre for Investigative Journalism, told 
the researchers that she believed her phone had been bugged, causing her to introduce 
additional security measures.
3 Such concerns have led to the defensive alteration of journalistic practices. See Thematic Study 1, and Part 
9.e of this Study.
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Founder of the Arabic Media Internet Network Daoud Kuttab told this study that he 
now operates on the assumption that everything he does is “being watched” and that 
governments and security services have access to his communications, and those of many 
other media actors in his region.
Mexican journalist, and World Editors Forum Special Adviser on Journalists’ Safety, Javier 
Garza Ramos said that journalists now operated under the assumption that they were 
under surveillance.  (Garza 2015). 
Also in an interview for this study, the editor of a major newspaper in the People’s Republic 
of China (PRC), said surveillance undermined his confidence in his ability to protect his 
sources (Yuan Zhen4 2015). 
US journalist Josh Stearns told this study that traditionally, journalists sought to protect 
sources through shield laws5, and that many of these were now dated (Stearns 2014). 
According to Polish law academic Jan Podkowik (2014), surveillance undertaken without 
a journalist’s consent should be considered as an act of interference with the protection 
granted by Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. He  proposed in a 2014 
paper that interference with journalistic confidentiality by means of secret surveillance 
should be recognised at least as equally onerous (or even more onerous) as searches of a 
home or a workplace. “… it seems that in the digital era, it is necessary to redefine the scope 
of the protection of journalistic privilege and to include in that scope all the data acquired 
in the process of communication, preparation, processing or gathering of information that 
would enable the identification of an informant,” Podkowik wrote. 
iii. The role of third party intermediaries and data retention 
A third theme that emerges from the literature, surveys, expert interviews and legal 
developments is that of data retention by third parties. Compounding the impacts of 
surveillance on source protection and confidential source-dependent journalism globally 
is the interception, capture and long term storage of data by third party intermediaries6. If 
ISPs, search engines, telcos, and social media platforms, for example, can be compelled to 
produce electronic records (stored for increasingly lengthy periods under mandatory data 
retention laws) that identify journalists’ sources, then legal protections that shield journalists 
from disclosing confidential sources may be undercut by backdoor access to the data. 
A 2014 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights Report, The Right to Privacy in 
the Digital Age (see detailed discussion of this report in section 5.1 b below) concludes that 
there is a pattern of:
…increasing reliance of Governments on private sector actors to retain data ‘just in case’ it is 
needed for government purposes. Mandatory third-party data retention – a recurring feature 
of surveillance regimes in many States, where Governments require telephone companies 
4 This is a pseudonym
5 Shield laws offer journalists the legal right not to disclose their sources
6 In the UNESCO publication Fostering Freedom Online: The Role of Internet Intermediaries (MacKinnon et al 
2014), the authors cite the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) definition 
of Internet intermediaries as entities that ‘bring together or facilitate transactions between third parties 
on the Internet. They give access to, host, transmit and index content, products and services originated by 
third parties on the Internet or provide Internet-based services to third parties.’ Most definitions of Internet 
intermediaries explicitly exclude content producers.
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and internet service providers to store metadata about their customers’ communications 
and location for subsequent law enforcement and intelligence agency access – appears 
neither necessary nor proportionate (OHCHR 2014).
Privacy International legal officer Tomaso Falchetta told researchers attached to this 
study that: “there is a growing trend of delegation by law enforcement of quasi-judicial 
responsibilities to Internet and telecommunication companies, including by requiring 
them to incorporate vulnerabilities in their networks to ensure that they are ‘wire-tap ready’” 
(Falchetta 2015). He pointed in this regard to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights’ 
report on the right to privacy in the digital age (UN doc. A/HRC/27/37, 30 June 2014).
Limited judicial oversight of access to data is also an issue globally. 
Mandatory data retention
Increasingly, States are introducing mandatory data retention laws. Such laws require 
telecommunications and Internet Service Providers to preserve communications data for 
inspection and analysis, according to a report of the Special Rapporteur on Promotion 
and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism 
(23 September 2014) (UN Doc A/69/397). In practice, this means that data on individuals’ 
telecommunication and Internet transactions are collected and stored even when no 
suspicion of crime has been raised (EFF 2011). 
Australia’s Press Council Chair, Professor David Weisbrot has said that mandatory data 
retention legislation that fails to protect journalistic communications risks “crushing” 
investigative journalism:
I think that whistleblowers who are inside governments or corporations will definitely not 
come forward because their confidentiality and anonymity will not be guaranteed. If they 
came forward, a journalist would have to say ‘I have to give you some elaborate instructions 
to avoid detection: don’t drive to our meeting, don’t carry your cell phone, don’t put this on 
your computer, handwrite whatever you’re going to give me’ (Meade 2015) 
Senior Lawyer with Australia’s Law Institute of Victoria, Leanne O’Donnell, told this study 
that the country has had no exemption for journalistic communications in data retention 
policies. She added that there were also no protocols that could assist ISPs, and other 
companies to determine if official handover requests apply to journalistic communications. 
There had been, therefore, no legal provision or practical protection for journalistic data, she 
stated7 (O’Donnell 2015). 
The issue of access to journalistic data raises transparency issues. UK QC Gavin Millar, Chair 
of the Centre for Investigative Journalism at Goldsmith’s University in London, told this 
study that the process of accessing journalists’ data under the Regulation of Investigatory 
Powers Act (RIPA) in the UK involves judges, but not the journalists (Millar 2015).8
Metadata risks
Some of the data collected under these policies is known as metadata. Metadata is data that 
defines and describes other data. For the ISO (International Organisation for Standardisation) 
standard, metadata is defined as data that defines and describes other data and processes. 
7 See discussion about new data retention legislation in Australia in the regional overviews section of this 
study
8 See part 9.3.2.c below for further discussion about transparency issues
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(ISO/IEC FDIS 11179-1, 2004). In other words, as the Electronic Frontier Foundation’s Peter 
Eckersley has put it, “Metadata is information about what communications you send 
and receive, who you talk to, where you are when you talk to them, the length of your 
conversations, what kind of device you were using and potentially other information, like the 
subject line of your emails” (EFF 2014). Metadata may also include geolocation information.
Advocates of long-term metadata retention insist that there are no significant privacy 
or freedom of expression threats.9  However, even when journalists encrypt the content, 
they may neglect the metadata, meaning they still leave behind a digital trail when they 
communicate with their sources. This data can easily identify a source, and safeguards 
against its illegitimate use are frequently limited, or non-existent (Noorlander 2015).
The need to include the metadata attached to journalistic communications in any limitations 
applied to the reach of data retention laws is also highlighted by the legal and legislative 
developments, along with a range of associated incidents identified later in this study. The 
Media Legal Defence Initiative director Peter Noorlander told the researchers that many 
legislators do not realise the very real threat to privacy and media freedom posed by the 
collection of metadata (Noorlander 2015). In an interview for this study, the Tow Center’s 
Susan McGregor called for legislation in the USA to declare metadata private because of 
what it reveals about people’s personal lives.
iv. Changes in entitlement to protection – Who is a journalist?/
What is journalism?
These questions are persistent and complex. On the one hand, broadening the legal 
definition of ‘journalist’ to ensure adequate protection for citizen reporters (working on and 
offline) is logical, and in some countries case law is catching up gradually on this issue of 
redefinition. However, on the other hand, it opens up debates about classifying journalists, 
and even about licensing and registering those who do journalism - debates that are 
particularly potent where there is a history of controls over press freedom.
Various scholars (c.f. Russell 2014), journalism organisations (Society of Professional 
Journalists 2013) and press freedom advocacy groups (Stearns 2013) have all recently 
recognised this change in the landscape and proposed that sources of journalism should 
be protected from legal repercussions by whistleblowing laws, for example, and not limiting 
the protection to journalists alone . In many dispensations without strong press freedom 
overrides, however, journalists themselves are liable for publication of leaked information, 
irrespective of source confidentiality issues. In such cases, they too need protection in 
terms of public interest defences being recognised in law and by the courts. In other words, 
confidentiality protection as such does not necessarily shield publication, even where it 
does assist sources to avoid identification.  The significance of this is that where there are 
no other protections to complement confidentiality protection, there can nevertheless be 
a chilling of disclosures of public interest information. 
Many stakeholders have argued in favour of legal protections being defined in connection 
with ‘acts of journalism’, rather than through the definition of the professional functions 
of a journalist. These have bearings on the protection of both journalists and sources in 
the digital age. In December 2013, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution which 




outlined a broad definition of journalistic actors that acknowledged that: “…journalism is 
continuously evolving to include inputs from media institutions, private individuals and 
a range of organisations that seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, 
online as well as offline, in the exercise of freedom of opinion and expression” (UNGA 2013: 
A/RES/68/163).
In 2014, the intergovernmental Council of UNESCO’s International Program for the 
Development of Communications (IPDC) welcomed the UNESCO Director-General’s Report 
on the Safety of Journalists and the Danger of Impunity, which uses the term ‘journalists’ 
to designate the range of “journalists, media workers and social media producers who 
generate a significant amount of public-interest journalism” (UNESCO 2014).
Many legal definitions of ‘journalist’ have been evaluated as overly narrow, as they tend to 
emphasise official contractual ties to legacy media organisations, may demand a substantial 
publication record, and/or require significant income to be derived from the practice of 
journalism. This leaves confidential sources relied upon by bloggers and citizen journalists 
largely unprotected, because these producers of journalism are not recognised as ‘proper 
journalists’, even when their output is clearly public interest journalism. Such definitions 
also exclude the growing group of academic writers and journalism students, lawyers, 
human rights workers and others, who produce journalism online, including investigative 
journalism.
There are many parallels between investigative journalism and the work undertaken by 
human rights organisations – organisations that depend upon confidential sources for 
information about human rights abuses. Such organisations now also often publish 
directly to audiences and are arguably engaged in ‘acts of journalism’. This has  bearing on 
a controversy in 2015 in which Amnesty International objected to having been a subject  of 
surveillance (Amnesty International 2015a, 2015b).
The Arabic Media Internet Network’s Dauoud Kuttab does not want to limit entitlement to 
source protection to recognised journalists, but to extend it to citizens as well (Kuttab 2015). 
Egyptian Media Studies Professor Rasha Abdullah said that source protection needs to be 
accessible to a broad range of communications actors: “It should apply to anyone who has 
information to expose, particularly in the age of digital media” (Abdullah 2014). However, 
for Arab Reporters for Investigative Journalism’s (ARIJ) Rana Sabbagh, “There is a difference 
between reporting the news, writing an editorial, and being an activist” (Sabbagh 2015). 
Nevertheless, she stated that: “…credible bloggers who are using reliable documents and 
are exposing corruption and injustice have to have some form of protection”.
USA media lawyer Charles Tobin is also in favour of a broad definition of journalism as a 
response to  the rise of citizen journalists and bloggers (Tobin 2014). In 2013, the USA’s Society 
of Professional Journalists passed a unanimous motion that “strongly rejects any attempts 
to define a journalist in any way other than as someone who commits acts of journalism”. 
Karen Russell (2014), in her analysis of attempts to define “journalist” in the context of USA 
shield law debates,  argued that: “Shield laws should be designed to protect the process 
through which information is gathered and provided to the public, not the status of the 
individual or institution collecting it”. She noted that a number of jurisdictions in the USA 
already define journalism in such a way. In the state of Nebraska, for example, the shield 
law states “[n]o person engaged in procuring, gathering, writing, editing, or disseminating 
news or other information to the public” shall be required to disclose a confidential source 
or information provided by that source in any federal or state proceeding.
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In the view of USA journalist Josh Stearns:  “we need to look at the acts of journalism rather 
than defining a particular type of person…defining an act is safer and more consistent with 
how media is created and consumed today, and (it) provides a stronger basis for protection.” 
He further told this study that: “Even those who are blessed with journalism jobs and would 
fit all the qualifications that would protect such a person under law may not act in such a 
way as deserves protection. By orienting around an act, and protection of an act, we then 
hopefully establish actions that are for the public interest and have all these sets of qualities 
rather than just protect a person who automatically lumps in and excludes people who 
should otherwise be included” (Stearns 2014) 
Moving the framework to a protection of ‘acts of journalism’ rather than limiting it to the 
work of professional journalists is a conceptual shift, according to Stearns in a 2013 report:
While there is an emerging consensus on protecting acts of journalism, how we define those 
acts is contested terrain. It raises questions about whether there is indeed an act of journalism 
we can differentiate from other acts. Given how much flux exists in the journalism world, how 
can we create boundaries around an idea while leaving enough flexibility to account for an 
unknown future?
Central to these debates is the deployment of a ‘public interest test’ as a measure for assessing 
the entitlement for a journalistic actor to claim access to source protection frameworks. The 
term ‘in the public interest’10, as it applies to acts of journalism, is not clearly defined and it is a 
complex concept (see discussion in Thematic Study 3). It may, in some cases, have the effect 
of inadvertently excluding certain acts of journalism from source protection provisions. This 
concept may need further interrogation in reference to the development of shield laws, and 
it points to the need for a case-by-case assessment of the specific journalistic acts for which 
confidentiality is sought. 
3.3. Key themes analysis: Summary
The four themes above are the key digital era issues emerging from the research undertaken 
for this study. They are distinct, though inter-related, themes for understanding the evolving 
regulatory environment and the regional analyses that follow below. In a nutshell, they are 
patterns in terms of which: 1) source protection laws are at risk of being trumped by national 
security and anti-terrorism legislation that increasingly broadens definitions of ‘classified 
information’ and limits exceptions for journalistic acts, 2) The widespread use of mass and 
targeted surveillance of journalists and their sources undercuts legal source protection 
frameworks by intercepting journalistic communications, 3) Expanding requirements for 
third party intermediaries to mandatorily retain citizens’ data for increasingly lengthy periods 
of time further exposes journalistic communications with confidential sources 4) debates 
about digital media actors’ entitlement to access source protection laws where they exist, 
while being more prominent in Western contexts, are intensifying around the world. These 
themes inform the regional catalogue of developments affecting legal source protection 
frameworks – including legislative changes, judicial precedents, incidents and revelations – 
10 Moore (2007) Argues that public interest journalism has two elements: 1. “…it is as a watchdog, holding 
the powerful to account, exposing fraud, deceit, corruption, mismanagement and incompetence… This 
watchdog role is (also) important…because those in power know they’re being held to account”.  2. 
“This is the responsibility to inform, explain and analyse. Public- interest journalists find, digest and distil 
information that helps the public form views and make decisions“ (Moore, M “Public interest, media 
neglect” in British Journalism Review (Sage) vol. 18 no.2, June 2007.)
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that follow. Also examined below are other digital aspects such as the seizure of technical 
equipment and legal developments not linked specifically to digital dimensions. 
It is relevant to begin examining the way in which international regulations and norms 
impact on these themes, especially from the vantage point of looking at those developments 
that have a close bearing on the confidentiality of source protection. 
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4.  International Regulatory and Normative Environments
“There is widespread recognition in international agreements, case law and declarations that 
protection of journalists’ sources [are] a crucial aspect of freedom of expression that should 
be protected by all nations” (Banisar 2007: p13).
As elaborated later in this study, the United Nations (including UNESCO), Organisation of 
American States, African Union, Council of Europe, and the Organization for Security and 
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) have specifically recognised journalists’ right to protect their 
sources. Further, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has found in several cases 
that it is an essential component of freedom of expression. 
As Banisar (2007: 13) noted, the international instruments concur that the protection of 
sources is “indispensable” and a “basic condition for press freedom. Such protection is 
viewed as necessary to ensure the free flow of information - an essential element of several 
international human rights agreements. “Without it, the media will not be able to effectively 
gather information, and provide the public with information, and act as an effective 
watchdog”. The presumption made is that “exceptional circumstances” are required to justify 
disclosure of journalists’ confidential sources. Accordingly, the need for  information about 
the source must be judged as essential, and only in cases where there is a ‘vital interest’ can 
disclosure be justified.
The terms of this Study required a review of existing global and regional instruments 
(including laws, statements and declarations) to identify any changes in law, and within the 
normative environment, along with an assessment of their digital relevance in 2015. 
The global instruments assessed for relevance to source protection are grouped under the 
jurisdiction of:
• United Nations (including UNESCO)
• European institutions:  
a) The Council of Europe (CoE), including the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR)  
b) European Union (EU), including the European Court of Justice
• Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)
• Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
• Organisation for American States (OAS)
• African Union (AU)
This study will focus on mapping developments between 2007-2015 that are relevant to 
journalistic source protection, while identifying emerging digital dimensions in evidence.
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4.1. United Nations Actors
a. Resolutions
• 2012:  Resolution adopted by the UN Human Rights Council (A/HRC/RES/20/8) on the 
promotion, protection and enjoyment of human rights on the Internet that recognise 
the need to uphold people’s rights equally regardless of environment
The resolution affirmed that: “the same rights that people have offline must also be 
protected online”. This represents important support for extending legal source protection 
provisions for analogue journalistic processes to the digital realm.
• 2012: Human Rights Council resolution (A/HRC/RES/21/12 on the safety of journalists.
This Resolution stressed “the need to ensure greater protection for all media professionals 
and for journalistic sources” (UN Human Rights Council, 2012).
• 2013: Resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly (A/RES/68/163) on the Safety of 
Journalists and Issue of Impunity (2013) 
This resolution acknowledges that “…journalism is continuously evolving to include inputs 
from media institutions, private individuals and a range of organisations that seek, receive 
and impart information and ideas of all kinds, online as well as offline, in the exercise of 
freedom of opinion and expression, in accordance with article 19 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights thereby contributing to the shaping of public debate” 
(UN GA 2013). 
This resolution is directly relevant to this study in two ways: a) It acknowledges shifts in 
definitions of ‘journalism’ that are relevant to debates about who is entitled to invoke source 
protection, and b) it acknowledges the value of journalism to the public interest.
It further noted with appreciation the UN Plan of Action on the Safety of Journalists and 
Issue of Impunity. In turn, it is significant that the Plan states:
Efforts to end impunity with respect to crimes against journalists must be associated with 
the defence and protection of human rights defenders, more generally. In addition, the 
protection of journalists should not be limited to those formally recognised as journalists, but 
should cover others, including community media workers and citizen journalists and others 
who may be using new media as a means of reaching their audiences. 
• In November 2013, the 37th session of the UNESCO General Conference passed a 
Resolution on ‘Internet-related issues: including access to information and knowledge, 
freedom of expression, privacy and ethical dimensions of the information society’ 
(UNESCO 2013).
This resolution formally recognised the value of investigative journalism to society, and 
the role of privacy in ensuring that function. “…(P)rivacy is essential to protect journalistic 
sources, which enable a society to benefit from investigative journalism, to strengthen good 
governance and the rule of law, and that such privacy should not be subject to arbitrary or 
unlawful interference,” the resolution reads in part.
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• In December 2013 the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) adopted a resolution 
on the Right to Privacy in the Digital Age. (A/C.3/68/167)
Resolution 68/167 was co-sponsored by 57 Member States and it called upon all States to “…
respect and protect the right to privacy including in the context of digital communication. 
… To take measures to put an end to violations of those rights and to create the conditions 
to prevent such violations, including by ensuring that relevant national legislation complies 
with their obligations under international human rights law”. 
The Resolution expressed ‘deep concern’ “…at the negative impact that surveillance and/or 
interception of communications, including extraterritorial surveillance and/or interception 
of communications, as well as the collection of personal data, in particular when carried out 
on a mass scale, may have on the exercise and enjoyment of human rights”. 
It also called upon States: “To review their procedures, practices and legislation regarding 
the surveillance of communications, their interception and the collection of personal data, 
including mass surveillance, interception and collection, with a view to upholding the 
right to privacy by ensuring the full and effective implementation of all their obligations 
under international human rights law” and “To establish or maintain existing independent, 
effective domestic oversight mechanisms capable of ensuring transparency, as appropriate, 
and accountability for State surveillance of communications, their interception and the 
collection of personal data,” emphasising the need for States to ensure the full and effective 
implementation of their obligations under international human rights law (OHCHR 2014).
The General Assembly further requested the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights to submit a report on “the protection and promotion of the right to privacy in the 
context of domestic and extraterritorial surveillance and/or the interception of digital 
communications and the collection of personal data, including on a mass scale”. The 
Assembly, in line with the 2012 Human Rights Council resolution (UN Doc. A/HRC/RES/20/8), 
also affirmed: “That the same rights that people have offline must also be protected online, 
including the right to privacy”.
Through its calls to protect the right to privacy, including in the context of digital 
communications, this UNGA resolution is relevant to source protection. The right to 
privacy online applies also to journalists, and it can be invoked to support investigative 
journalism via their dealings with confidential sources. Whistleblowers – a prominent 
subset of journalists’ confidential sources – are more likely to communicate with journalists 
directly online if journalists can rely on their right to privacy to help shield their professional 
communications. 
• 2014: Resolution adopted by the UN Human Rights Council (A/HRC/RES/27/5) on the 
Safety of Journalists 
The resolution acknowledged “the particular vulnerability of journalists to becoming targets 
of unlawful or arbitrary surveillance and/or interception of communications, in violation of 
their rights to privacy and to freedom of expression”. 
This observation has direct application to the issues of source protection and the safety of 
journalists and their sources.
• December 2014: UN General Assembly Resolution on The safety of journalists and the 
issue of impunityfreedoms  (A/RES/69/185)
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This UNGA resolution is relevant to this study, as it reiterates two observations pertinent to 
the implications of mass surveillance and questions of defining acts of journalism:
Acknowledging that journalism is continuously evolving to include inputs from media 
institutions, private individuals and a range of organisations that seek, receive and impart 
information and ideas of all kinds, online as well as offline, in the exercise of freedom of 
opinion and expression, in accordance with article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, thereby contributing to the shaping of public debate (Reaffirming the 
2013 UNGA Resolution 163 above)
Acknowledging also the particular vulnerability of journalists to becoming targets of 
unlawful or arbitrary surveillance or interception of communications in violation of their 
rights to privacy and to freedom of expression (Reaffirming the UN HRC resolution of 2014 
above).
b. Reports, recommendations, statements and comments 
• July 2011: Office of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights UN Human 
Rights Committee, General Comment no. 34 
This comment recognises protection of all forms of expression and the means of their 
dissemination, including electronic and Internet-based modes of expression. 
 …Freedom of opinion and freedom of expression are indispensable conditions…essential 
for any society. They constitute the foundation stone for every free and democratic society, 
and form the basis for the full enjoyment of a wide range of other human rights. A free, 
uncensored and unhindered press or other media is essential in any society to ensure freedom 
of opinion and expression and the enjoyment of other Covenant rights. This implies a free 
press and other media able to comment on public issues and to inform public opinion 
without censorship or restraint.
• 2012: Carthage Declaration - participants at the UNESCO World Press Freedom Day 
conference:
This declaration highlights the significance of the challenges posed by Internet 
communications to the maintenance of freedom of expression and privacy rights essential 
to the practice of investigative journalism.
Noting the Report to the Human Rights Council of 2011 by the UN Special Rapporteur for 
Freedom of Opinion and Expression with respect to access to Internet and the right of all 
individuals to freedom of expression, including through the Internet (A/HRC/17/27)
Calls on UNESCO to:
Coordinate dialogue among Member States and other stakeholders on the  human rights 
implications of social networks and new media for freedom of expression, privacy, and 
personal data protection.
• June 2013: ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur (Frank La Rue) on the Promotion and 
Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression’ to the Human Rights 
Council (A/HRC/23/40)
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This Report states: “Journalists must be able to rely on the privacy, security and anonymity of 
their communications. An environment where surveillance is widespread, and unlimited by 
due process or judicial oversight, cannot sustain the presumption of protection of sources”. 
It further notes: “States cannot ensure that individuals are able to freely seek and receive 
information or express themselves without respecting, protecting and promoting their 
right to privacy.” (La Rue 2013).
This statement highlights the relationship between the rights to freedom of expression, and 
access to information and privacy that underpins source protection.
• In July 2013, the then UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay spotlighted 
the right to privacy in protecting individuals who reveal human rights implicated 
information. 
“[Edward] Snowden’s case has shown the need to protect persons disclosing information 
on matters that have implications for human rights, as well as the importance of ensuring 
respect for the right to privacy,” Pillay said (UN 2013 b). She added that national legal systems 
must ensure avenues for individuals disclosing violations of human rights to express their 
concern, without fear of reprisals. 
Although the protection of journalistic confidentiality does not necessarily encompass 
protection of the source’s act of disclosure, fear of reprisal is a factor that affects a source’s 
confidence in a journalist’s commitment to keep confidentiality. In this way, an increased 
fear of reprisal can increase the ‘chilling effect’. 
Pillay declared that the right to privacy, the right of access to information, and freedom of 
expression are closely linked. “The public has the democratic right to take part in public affairs 
and this right cannot be effectively exercised by solely relying on authorized information”. 
This point is relevant to source protection because much investigative journalism is 
dependent upon ‘unauthorised’ sources - that is, sources who have not been cleared by 
government, organisational or corporate agencies to comment.
Pillay also explicitly pointed to the need for people “to be confident that their private 
communications are not being unduly scrutinised by the State”. 
The consequence of an absence of such confidence represents a ‘chilling effect’ on sources 
that could, in turn, lead to the freezing of the ‘information pipe’. 
Pillay’s statement has added relevance to source protection as Edward Snowden initially 
made his revelations to Guardian journalist/blogger Glenn Greenwald and The Washington 
Post as a confidential source (Greenwald 2014).
• In February 2014, the UN hosted an international expert seminar on the Right to Privacy 
in the Digital Age (Geneva) 
During this seminar, Frank La Rue (then UN Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and 
Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression), called for a special United 
Nations mandate for protecting the right to privacy. “Privacy and freedom of expression 
are not only linked, but are also facilitators of citizen participation, the right to free press, 
exercise of free opinion, and the possibility of gathering individuals, exercising the right to 
free association, and to be able to criticise public policies,” he said.
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• July 2014 - Summary of the Human Rights Council panel discussion on the safety of 
journalists: Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights 
The Summary noted that: “A recurrent issue raised during the discussion was the question of 
whether the current legal framework was sufficient for ensuring the safety and protection 
of journalists and media workers. The issue was looked at in terms of both the physical 
protection against threats and violence and protection against undue interference, 
including legal or administrative” (UN HRC: 2014). 
Further, the summary noted that the emergence of new forms of journalism (including 
social networks and blogs) has led to “greater vulnerability of the media, including illegal 
interference in the personal lives and activities of journalists. Such interference was to be 
condemned and the independence of the traditional and digital media supported” (UN 
HRC 2014, p11).
These points are relevant to journalists’ right to receive and report information obtained 
from confidential sources in the public interest, without interference. 
According to the Summary, the then UN HRC Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and 
Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Frank La Rue, stated that 
privacy and anonymity of journalists were also vital elements to ensuring press freedom. 
Speakers also noted that: “bloggers, online journalists and citizen journalists played an 
important role in the promotion of human rights... [and] stated that the protection of 
journalists should cover all news providers, both professional and non-professional”. This is 
relevant to the issue of the application of legal protection for journalists’ sources. 
Finally, the meeting heard that national security and anti-terrorism laws should not be used 
to silence journalists (UN HRC 2014 a p15). 
• 2014 UNESCO World Trends in Freedom of Expression and Media Development report 
The threat of surveillance to journalism is underlined in this global report which highlights 
the role of national security, anti-terrorism and anti-extremism laws as instruments “…used 
in some cases to limit legitimate debate and to curtail dissenting views in the media, while 
also underwriting expanded surveillance, which may be seen to violate the right to privacy 
and to jeopardize freedom of expression” (UNESCO: 2014c).
This report further notes that:
National security agencies across a range of countries have gained access to journalists’ 
documents, emails and phone records, as well as to massive stores of data that have the 
potential to enable tracking of journalists, sources and whistleblowers 
• July 2014: ‘The right to privacy in the digital age: Report of the Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights’
The UN General Assembly mandated this report on protection and promotion of the right to 
privacy in the context of domestic and extraterritorial surveillance and/or the interception 
of digital communications and the collection of personal data, including on a mass scale 
(OHCHR: 2014 p1).
36
The Report found that in the digital era, communications technologies have enhanced the 
capacity of “Governments, enterprises and individuals to conduct surveillance, interception 
and data collection”. 
It also acknowledged that: 
Concerns have been amplified following revelations in 2013 and 2014 that suggested 
that, together, the National Security Agency (NSA) in the United States and General 
Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland have developed technologies allowing access to much global internet 
traffic, calling records, individuals’ electronic address books and huge volumes of other digital 
communications content. 
It is evident that the risks posed by these emerging digital dimensions to the preservation 
of legally enshrined protections for journalists’ confidential sources are significant. 
The Report quoted the UN Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the 
Right to Freedom of Expression and Opinion, who said that technological advancements 
mean that States’ effectiveness in undertaking surveillance is no longer limited by factors 
such as scale or the duration of an operation:
The State now has a greater capability to conduct simultaneous, invasive, targeted and 
broad-scale surveillance than ever before. In other words, the technological platforms upon 
which global political, economic and social life are increasingly reliant are not only vulnerable 
to mass surveillance, they may actually facilitate it. (OHCHR 2014 p3)
The Report also acknowledged that the problem of surveillance is widespread globally: 
“Examples of overt and covert digital surveillance in jurisdictions around the world have 
proliferated, with governmental mass surveillance emerging as a dangerous habit, rather 
than an exceptional measure”. 
Further, there are also flow-on factors affecting third party intermediaries, according to the 
Report:
Governments reportedly have threatened to ban the services of telecommunication and 
wireless equipment companies unless given direct access to communication traffic, tapped 
fibre-optic cables for surveillance purposes, and required companies systematically to disclose 
bulk information on customers and employees. Furthermore, some have reportedly made 
use of surveillance of telecommunications networks to target political opposition members 
and/or political dissidents. There are reports that authorities in some States routinely record 
all phone calls and retain them for analysis, while the monitoring by host Governments of 
communications at global events has been reported. Authorities in one State reportedly 
require all personal computers sold in the country to be equipped with filtering software 
that may have other surveillance capabilities. Even non-State groups are now reportedly 
developing sophisticated digital surveillance capabilities. Mass surveillance technologies 
are now entering the global market, raising the risk that digital surveillance will escape 
governmental controls. 
The Report also stated: “Practices in many States have…revealed a lack of adequate national 
legislation and/or enforcement, weak procedural safeguards, and ineffective oversight, all 
of which have contributed to a lack of accountability for arbitrary or unlawful interference 
in the right to privacy” (OHCHR 2014: pp15-16). 
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There are clear implications for source protection in the context of such unchecked 
surveillance and data retention. 
The risks of ‘big data’ are also highlighted in the Report: “…a reality of big data is that once 
data is collected, it can be very difficult to keep anonymous. While there are promising 
research efforts underway to obscure personally identifiable information within large data 
sets, far more advanced efforts are presently in use to re-identify seemingly ‘anonymous’ 
data. Collective investment in the capability to fuse data is many times greater than 
investment in technologies that will enhance privacy”. Furthermore, the Report noted that 
“…focusing on controlling the collection and retention of personal data, while important, 
may no longer be sufficient to protect personal privacy”, in part because “big data enables 
new, non-obvious, unexpectedly powerful uses of data” (OHCHR: 2014 p6).
The issue of metadata collection (e.g. data that indicates patterns of behaviour - such 
as the number of calls between two individuals and the timing of the calls, rather than 
the content) is also highly relevant to source protection: “The aggregation of information 
commonly referred to as ‘metadata’ may give an insight into an individual’s behaviour, 
social relationships, private preferences and identity that go beyond even that conveyed by 
accessing the content of a private communication,” (OHCHR: 2014 p7), the Report continued: 
“The chilling effect on confidential sources, given the risk of profiling and exposure posed 
by the combination of data retention and the implications of big data analysis, is therefore 
further exacerbated.
The Report further proposed that: “…Even the mere possibility of communications 
information being captured creates an interference with privacy, with a potential chilling 
effect on rights, including those to free expression and association“ (OHCHR: 2014 p7) It 
also stated: “…the onus is on the Government to demonstrate that interference is both 
necessary and proportionate to the specific risk being addressed. Mass or ‘bulk’ surveillance 
programmes may thus be deemed to be arbitrary, even if they serve a legitimate aim and 
have been adopted on the basis of an accessible legal regime”. In other words, 
…it will not be enough that the measures are targeted to find certain needles in a haystack; 
the proper measure is the impact of the measures on the haystack, relative to the harm 
threatened; namely, whether the measure is necessary and proportionate. (OHCHR: 2014 
p9).
The Report concluded that there is a pattern of governments increasingly relying on private 
sector actors to retain data (often in the context of mandatory data retention legislation 
that is a common feature of surveillance programs) ‘just in case’. It stated that such measures 
are neither ‘necessary’, nor ‘proportionate’.
Citing a European Court of Human Rights ruling, the report declared the onus should 
be on the State to ensure that any interference with the right to privacy, family, home or 
correspondence is authorised by laws that “…are sufficiently precise, specifying in detail the 
precise circumstances in which any such interference may be permitted, the procedures for 
authorising, the categories of persons who may be placed under surveillance, the limits on 
the duration of surveillance, and procedures for the use and storage of the data collected; 
and provide for effective safeguards against abuse” (OHCHR: 2014, p10). This prompts the 
question: Should journalists be excluded from mass surveillance? Is this feasible? And how 
would journalists/journalism be defined for the purpose of considering such exemptions? 
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As observed in the report, there is an emerging practice of States to outsource surveillance 
tasks to others. “There is credible information to suggest that some governments have 
systematically routed data collection and analytical tasks through jurisdictions with weaker 
safeguards for privacy. Reportedly, some governments have operated a transnational 
network of intelligence agencies through interlocking legal loopholes, involving the 
coordination of surveillance practice to outflank the protections provided by domestic legal 
regimes…States have also failed to take effective measures to protect individuals within 
their jurisdiction against illegal surveillance practices by other States or business entities, in 
breach of their own human rights obligations” (OHCHR: 2014 p10). 
“If there is uncertainty around whether data are foreign or domestic, intelligence agencies 
will often treat the data as foreign (since digital communications regularly pass ‘off-shore’ 
at some point) and thus allow them to be collected and retained”. The result is significantly 
weaker – or even non-existent – privacy protection for foreigners and non-citizens in a 
country, as compared with those of citizens (OHCHR: 2014, p12). The practice of States 
sharing their intelligence and bypassing limits on surveilling their own citizens themselves 
has evident implications for journalists, especially foreign correspondents and journalists 
conducting international investigations.
The role of third party intermediaries is also referenced in this report. “…Given the growing 
role of third parties, such as Internet service providers, consideration may also need to be 
given to allowing such parties to participate in the authorisation of surveillance measures 
affecting their interests, or allowing them to challenge existing measures“ (OHCHR: 2014 
p13). 
This is an important new dimension relevant to journalists’ source protection, as there are 
increasing pressures on third party intermediaries which may have access to journalists’ 
‘private’ digital dealings with confidential sources (such as search engines, ISPs, telcos, and 
social networks) to hand data over to governments and corporations – in the context of 
either court proceedings or extra-judicial approaches. This process is increasingly formalised. 
As telecommunications service provision shifts from the public sector to the private 
sector, there has been a “delegation of law enforcement and quasi-judicial responsibilities 
to Internet intermediaries…The enactment of statutory requirements for companies to 
make their networks ‘wiretap-ready’ is a particular concern, not least because it creates an 
environment that facilitates sweeping surveillance measures” (OHCHR p15).
The report also stated: “On every continent, Governments have used both formal legal 
mechanisms and covert methods to gain access to content, as well as to metadata” (OHCHR: 
2014, p14).
• November 2014: UNESCO International Program for the Development of 
Communication (IPDC) Council decision
In 2014, the IPDC’s 39 Member-State council welcomed the UNESCO Director-General’s 
Report on the Safety of Journalists and the Danger of Impunity, which states that it uses 
the term ‘journalists’ to designate the range of “journalists, media workers and social media 
producers who generate a significant amount of public-interest journalism”.   The Council 
also reaffirmed the importance of condemnations of “the killings of journalists, media 
workers and social media producers who are engaged in journalistic activities and who are 
killed or targeted in their line of duty”. 
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• July 2015: UNESCO study “Keystones for the Internet”
The finalised UNESCO study, which was informed by preliminary research flowing from 
‘Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age’, proposed to UNESCO’s 195 Member 
States that they: “Recognise the need for enhanced protection of the confidentiality of 
sources of journalism in the digital age” (UNESCO 2015). This was also contained in the 
Outcome Document of the “Connecting the Dots: Options for Future Action” conference 
convened by UNESCO in 3-4 March 2015. (The point was endorsed at the 38th General 
Conference of UNESCO’s Member States in November 2015 as part of the overall options 
for a comprehensive agenda of UNESCO’s approach to Internet issues.) Responses to the 
survey attached to this study signalled the importance of UN positions on the issue of 
journalistic source protection. 
• May 2015: UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) Report 
on Encryption, Anonymity and the Human Rights Framework by UN Special on the 
Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, David 
Kaye (Kaye 2015)
This report from the new Special Rapporteur emphasises the essential roles played by 
encryption and anonymity. According to Kaye, these defences – working separately or 
together - create a zone of privacy to protect opinion from outside scrutiny. He noted the 
particular importance of the role they play in hostile political, social, religious and legal 
environments. “Where States impose unlawful censorship through filtering and other 
technologies, the use of encryption and anonymity may empower individuals to circumvent 
barriers and access information and ideas without the intrusion of authorities”. With 
particular relevance to this study, he highlighted the value of anonymity and encryption 
to journalists seeking to protect their confidential sources and their communications with 
them. “Journalists, researchers, lawyers and civil society rely on encryption and anonymity 
to shield themselves (and their sources, clients and partners) from surveillance and 
harassment”. 
A related issue addressed by Kaye is a trend involving States seeking to combat anonymity 
tools, such as Tor, proxies and VPNs, by denying access to them. Such moves can directly 
undermine attempts to protect confidential journalistic sources in the context of digital 
communications.
Kaye also acknowledged that many States recognise the lawfulness of maintaining the 
anonymity of journalists’ sources. However, he reports that: “States often breach source 
anonymity in practice, even where it is provided for in law”, highlighting the pressures on 
journalists that undermine these legal provisions – either directly, or progressively.
Another issue the Special Rapporteur also noted is the increasing prevalence and impact 
of compulsory SIM card registration on confidential communications, including those 
between journalists and their sources: “Such policies directly undermine anonymity, 
particularly for those who access the Internet only through mobile technology. Compulsory 
SIM card registration may provide Governments with the capacity to monitor individuals 
and journalists well beyond any legitimate government interest.” 
Kaye concluded that States should support and promote strong encryption and anonymity, 
and he specifically recommended strengthened legal and legislative provisions to enable 
secure journalistic communications. “Legislation and regulations protecting human rights 
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defenders and journalists should also include provisions enabling access and providing 
support to use the technologies to secure their communications.” 
Summary 
United Nations actors have been much engaged in debate about the implications of the 
emerging digital age threats to legal source protection frameworks. They have commissioned 
research, initiated inquiries and formulated resolutions relevant to the issues at the core of 
this study, namely the impacts of surveillance, national security/anti-terrorism legislation, 
data retention, the role of third party intermediaries, and shifts in entitlement to access 
protections connected to redefinitions of journalism. 
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5.  Regional Instruments of Human Rights Laws and Normative 
Frameworks
5.1. European institutions
“The recognition of protection of journalistic sources is fairly well established in Europe both 
at the regional and domestic levels. For the most part, the protections seem to be respected 
by authorities…and direct demands to [expose] sources seem more the exception than the 
common practice” (Banisar: 2007). However, as Banisar also noted when he wrote: 
...There are still significant problems. Many of the national laws are limited in scope, or in the 
types of journalists that they protect. The protections are being bypassed in many countries 
by the use of searches of newsrooms and through increasing use of surveillance. There has 
also been an increase in the use of criminal sanctions against journalists, especially under 
national security grounds for receiving information from sources.
Since then, European organisations and law-making bodies have made significant attempts 
at a regional level to identify the risks posed to source protection in the changing digital 
environment, and to mitigate these risks. 
a.  European Court of Human Rights (Ecthr) and European Union 
Court of Justice Judgements
• November 2007: European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) - Tillack v Belgium 
(20477/05) 
This case, which dates back to 2002, involved a leak investigation targeting an investigative 
journalist. Investigators seized 16 crates of papers, two boxes of files, two computers, 
four mobile telephones and a metal cabinet from the journalist’s home and workplace 
with judicial approval. The journalist argued in the case that the judicial authorities were 
prohibited from taking measures or decisions intended to force journalists or organs of the 
press to reveal their sources.
The ECtHR found that the reasons cited for the searches were not sufficient to justify the 
seizure of the journalists’ material, noting the quantity of documents and other items seized. 
Its judgment concluded that the authorities acted disproportionately and breached the 
journalist’s right to freedom of expression enshrined in Article 10 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights. The Court made the following statement about the importance of source 
protection in its judgement:
… the right of journalists not to disclose their sources cannot be considered a mere privilege 
to be granted or taken away depending on the lawfulness or unlawfulness of their sources, 
but is part and parcel of the right to information, to be treated with the utmost caution. 
This applies all the more in the instant case, where the suspicions against the applicant were 
based on vague, unsubstantiated rumours, as was subsequently confirmed by the fact that 
he was not charged (par 65)
• February 2008: European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) Guja v. Moldova (14277/04) 
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This judgement found in favour of Jacob Guja, the former head of the Press Department 
of the Moldovan Prosecutor General, who had served as a whistleblower to a newspaper 
regarding cases of alleged political interference with the justice process, supplying two 
letters from public officials to journalists. In the course of a 2003 leak investigation that 
followed publication of stories based on the letters, Guja admitted that he was the source, 
and was dismissed from his position shortly afterwards. In February 2008 the Court ruled 
that that Guja acted in good faith as a confidential source and ordered he be reinstated to 
his position. This was the first such whistleblower case to reach the ECtHR. However, after 
being briefly reinstated, Guja was once again dismissed. At the time of writing, his case was 
under review by the CoE’s Committee on the Execution of Judgements (Noorlander 2014). 
• December 2009:  European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) Financial Times ltd and 
others v. The United Kingdom (821/03)
In 2009, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) ruled that the Financial Times, The 
Guardian, The Times, The Independent and Reuters were right to protect their sources by 
rejecting a UK High Court order for them to turn over leaked documents connected to 
a takeover bid involving a brewing company. The company began action to seize The 
Guardian’s assets. The publishers argued that they were obliged to protect their sources 
and cited their freedom of expression rights under Article 10 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights. The ECtHR ultimately ruled that:
 …the threat of damage [to the company] through future dissemination of confidential 
information and in obtaining damages for past breaches of confidence were, even if 
considered cumulatively, insufficient to outweigh the public interest in the protection of 
journalists’ sources…
• September 2010: European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), Grand Chamber Appeal - 
Sanoma Uitgevers B.V. v The Netherlands 
 In a landmark Grand Chamber judgement, the ECtHR declared illegal the seizure by the 
Dutch police of a journalist’s CD of photographs, which identified confidential sources. 
The Court had ruled in 2003 that although the seizure could have a ‘chilling effect’ on press 
freedom, the police were pursuing a legitimate aim in seizing the CD because it contained 
relevant information that could lead to the identification of alleged criminals. The publisher 
subsequently appealed the case to the Grand Chamber and it found that the seizure was 
not lawful because it breached Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
It also found that independent oversight was lacking in the case, leading to an absence of 
adequate legal safeguards to ensure an independent assessment as to whether the interest 
of the criminal investigation overrode the public interest in the protection of journalistic 
sources (NJCM 2010). 
In its judgement, the Grand Chamber stated: 
The right of journalists to protect their sources is part of the freedom to “receive and impart 
information and ideas without interference by public authorities” protected by Article 10 of 
the Convention and serves as one of its important safeguards. It is a cornerstone of freedom 
of the press, without which sources may be deterred from assisting the press in informing the 
public on matters of public interest. As a result, the vital public-watchdog role of the press 
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may be undermined and the ability of the press to provide accurate and reliable information 
to the public may be adversely affected.
In its conclusion, the Grand Chamber also highlighted that:
…orders to disclose sources potentially have a detrimental impact, not only on the source, 
whose identity may be revealed, but also on the newspaper or other publication against 
which the order is directed, whose reputation may be negatively affected in the eyes of future 
potential sources by the disclosure, and on members of the public, who have an interest in 
receiving information imparted through anonymous sources 
It also made specific statements on the importance of independent judicial oversight as a 
safeguard in processes that lead to access to journalistic communications:
First and foremost among these safeguards is the guarantee of review by a judge or other 
independent and impartial decision-making body. The requisite review should be carried out 
by a body separate from the executive and other interested parties, invested with the power to 
determine whether a requirement in the public interest overriding the principle of protection 
of journalistic sources exists prior to the handing-over of such material and to prevent 
unnecessary access to information capable of disclosing the source’s identity if it does not.
• November 2012: European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) Telegraaf Media Nederland 
Landelijke Media b.v. and others v. the Netherlands (Application no. 39315/06)
The complaint in this case was brought by a Dutch newspaper and two of its journalists. The 
journalists had been under investigation after publishing stories in De Telegraaf about the 
circulation of state secrets, in the form of documents from the Netherlands’ secret service 
(AIVD). AIVD lodged a criminal complaint concerning unlawful disclosure of State secrets 
and an order was sought to force the journalists to hand over documents connected to the 
relevant stories. Those documents were initially sealed to prevent finger print analysis while 
legal challenges ensued. The journalists were jailed for three days in 2006, after refusing 
to answer questions of a judge in a criminal hearing involving three people charged with 
involvement in leaking the AIVD documents. 
Further, according to the ECtHR judgement, the journalists were placed under surveillance 
by security operatives from the time the leak investigation began. “The present case is 
characterised precisely by the targeted surveillance of journalists in order to determine from 
whence they have obtained their information,” the judgement reads. The surveillance orders 
were not the subject of independent oversight or judicial review according to the Court. 
Importantly, in terms of securing source confidentiality rights in the context of surveillance 
used against journalistic actors, the court noted the importance of prior independent review 
of surveillance requests as they apply to journalistic actors. It stated: “Moreover, review post 
factum, whether by the Supervisory Board, the Committee on the Intelligence and Security 
Services of the Lower House of Parliament or the National Ombudsman, cannot restore the 
confidentiality of journalistic sources once it is destroyed.”
Ultimately, the Court found that the journalists’ rights under both Articles 8 and 10 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights had been violated: “…the law did not provide 
safeguards appropriate to the use of powers of surveillance against journalists with a view 
to discovering their journalistic sources”.
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• April 2014: European Union Court of Justice judgement (Ireland Data Retention 
Directive)
The Court observed, in its judgment declaring the Data Retention Directive invalid, that 
communications metadata “taken as a whole may allow very precise conclusions to be 
drawn concerning the private lives of the persons whose data has been retained” (Digital 
Rights Ireland Ltd C-293/12 v Minister for Communications et al Ireland, 8 April 2014, Directive 
2006/24/EC). This judgement is significant in relation to the role of metadata in identifying 
confidential sources and the threat posed by data retention to source protection.
• May 2014 Stichting Ostade Blade v The Netherlands in the ECtHR (Application no. 
8406/06) 
In this case, the Court rejected a Dutch magazine’s application against a police raid under 
Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. This judgement demonstrates the 
narrow circumstances in which source protection laws can be legitimately over-ridden in 
the public interest. 
The police raid has been conducted with a Court-approved warrant for the purpose 
of obtaining a letter published by the magazine which claimed responsibility for a 
bomb attack. The Court acknowledged that the magazine’s right to “receive and impart 
information” had been interfered with through the order to hand over the original letter and 
the subsequent raid when the magazine refused to comply with that order. However, the 
Court held that the author of the letter was not a “journalistic source,” stating that not “every 
individual who is used by a journalist for information is a ‘source’”. So, in this case, protection 
was found to extend only to the journalist.
On the question of necessity, the Court noted that the letter was sought as a possible lead 
towards identifying those suspected of having carried out bomb attacks. Nevertheless, 
the Court reiterated the importance of the press as “public watchdog” and the importance 
of ensuring that individuals remain free to disclose to the press information that should 
properly be accessible to the public. 
The question of the source’s motive was also at issue in this case. The magazine’s informant 
was not motivated by the desire to provide information which the public were entitled to 
know, in the view of the Court. According to the judgement: “his purpose in seeking publicity 
through the magazine Ravage was to don the veil of anonymity with a view to evading his own 
criminal accountability.”
b.  Council of Europe (COE) Resolutions, Declarations, Statements, 
Comments, Recommendations, Report and Guidelines
• September 2007: Guidelines of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe 
on protecting freedom of expression and information in times of crisis adopted 
These guidelines (CoE 2007) recommended that Member States adopt Recommendation 
No. R (2000)7 (CoE 2000) into law and practice. In March 2000, the Council of Europe’s 
Committee of Ministers had adopted that Recommendation on the “right of journalists 
not to disclose their sources of information”. The following principles were appended to 
Recommendation No. R(2000)7: 
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• Principle 1 (Right of non-disclosure of journalists) 
Domestic law and practice in Member States should provide for explicit and clear protection 
of the right of journalists not to disclose information identifying a source in accordance with 
Article 10 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(hereinafter: the Convention) and the principles established herein, which are to be considered as 
minimum standards for the respect of this right. 
• Principle 2 (Right of non-disclosure of other persons) 
Other persons who, by their professional relations with journalists, acquire knowledge of 
information identifying a source through the collection, editorial processing or dissemination of 
this information, should equally be protected under the principles established herein. 
• Principle 3 (Limits to the right of non-disclosure) 
a. The right of journalists not to disclose information identifying a source must not be subject 
to other restrictions than those mentioned in Article 10, paragraph 2 of the Convention. 
In determining whether a legitimate interest in a disclosure falling within the scope of 
Article 10, paragraph 2 of the Convention outweighs the public interest in not disclosing 
information identifying a source, competent authorities of member States shall pay 
particular regard to the importance of the right of non-disclosure and the pre-eminence 
given to it in the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, and may only order a 
disclosure if, subject to paragraph b, there exists an overriding requirement in the public 
interest and if circumstances are of a sufficiently vital and serious nature. 
b. The disclosure of information identifying a source should not be deemed necessary unless it 
can be convincingly established that: 
i. reasonable alternative measures to the disclosure do not exist or have been exhausted 
by the persons or public authorities that seek the disclosure, and 
ii. the legitimate interest in the disclosure clearly outweighs the public interest in the non-
disclosure, bearing in mind that: 
 – an overriding requirement of the need for disclosure is proved, 
 – the circumstances are of a sufficiently vital and serious nature, 
 –  the necessity of the disclosure is identified as responding to a pressing social need, and 
 – member States enjoy a certain margin of appreciation in assessing this need, but this 
margin goes hand in hand with the supervision by the European Court of Human Rights. 
c. The above requirements should be applied at all stages of any proceedings where the right 
of non-disclosure might be invoked. 
• Principle 4 (Alternative evidence to journalists’ sources) 
In legal proceedings against a journalist on grounds of an alleged infringement of the honour 
or reputation of a person, authorities should consider, for the purpose of establishing the truth 
or otherwise of the allegation, all evidence which is available to them under national procedural 
law and may not require for that purpose the disclosure of information identifying a source by 
the journalist. 
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• Principle 5 (Conditions concerning disclosures) 
a. The motion or request for initiating any action by competent authorities aimed at the 
disclosure of information identifying a source should only be introduced by persons or 
public authorities that have a direct legitimate interest in the disclosure. 
b. Journalists should be informed by the competent authorities of their right not to disclose 
information identifying a source as well as of the limits of this right before a disclosure is 
requested. 
c. Sanctions against journalists for not disclosing information identifying a source should only 
be imposed by judicial authorities during court proceedings which allow for a hearing of 
the journalists concerned in accordance with Article 6 of the Convention. 
d. Journalists should have the right to have the imposition of a sanction for not disclosing their 
information identifying a source reviewed by another judicial authority. 
e. Where journalists respond to a request or order to disclose information identifying a 
source, the competent authorities should consider applying measures to limit the extent 
of a disclosure, for example by excluding the public from the disclosure with due respect to 
Article 6 of the Convention, where relevant, and by themselves respecting the confidentiality 
of such a disclosure. 
• Principle 6 (Interception of communication, surveillance and judicial search and seizure) 
a. The following measures should not be applied if their purpose is to circumvent the right 
of journalists, under the terms of these principles, not to disclose information identifying a 
source: 
i. interception orders or actions concerning communication or correspondence of 
journalists or their employers, 
ii. surveillance orders or actions concerning journalists, their contacts or their employers, or 
iii. search or seizure orders or actions concerning the private or business premises, 
belongings or correspondence of journalists or their employers or personal data related 
to their professional work. 
b. Where information identifying a source has been properly obtained by police or judicial 
authorities by any of the above actions, although this might not have been the purpose of 
these actions, measures should be taken to prevent the subsequent use of this information 
as evidence before courts, unless the disclosure would be justified under Principle 3. 
• Principle 7 (Protection against self-incrimination) 
The principles established herein shall not in any way limit national laws on the protection 
against self-incrimination in criminal proceedings, and journalists should, as far as such laws 
apply, enjoy such protection with regard to the disclosure of information identifying a source. 
A question of particular relevance to this study is how such principles might extend to online 
conduct. The definitions attached to Recommendation (2000)7 include the following detail 
which addresses this question:
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c. the term “information identifying a source” means, as far as this is likely to lead to the 
identification of a source:
i. the name and personal data as well as voice and image of a source,
ii. the factual circumstances of acquiring information from a source by a journalist,
iii. the unpublished content of the information provided by a source to a journalist, and
iv. personal data of journalists and their employers related to their professional work.
In regards to the definition of a journalist, the Recommendation states that the laws 
should protect “any natural or legal person who is regularly or professionally engaged 
in the collection and dissemination of information to the public via any means of mass 
communication”. 
The CoE’s 2007 guidelines that reference Recommendation R(2000)7 further recommended 
that: 
With a view, inter alia, to ensuring their safety, media professionals should not be required 
by law-enforcement agencies to hand over information or material (for example, notes, 
photographs, audio and video recordings) gathered in the context of covering crisis situations 
nor should such material be liable to seizure for use in legal proceedings.
• 2010: Report on the protection of journalists’ sources from the Council of Europe (CoE) 
Parliamentary Assembly 
This Report pointed directly to the core issues examined in this study. It stated: 
“The protection of journalists’ sources of information is a basic condition for both the full 
exercise of journalistic work and the right of the public to be informed on matters of public 
concern. In a large number of cases, public authorities have forced, or attempted to force, 
journalists to disclose their sources, despite the clear standards set by the European Court of 
Human Rights and the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe”.
The Report also highlighted the need to limit exceptions to legal source protection 
provisions. “The disclosure of information identifying a source should therefore be limited 
to exceptional circumstances where vital public or individual interests are at stake and 
can be convincingly established”. It referenced the emergence of threats to journalistic 
source protection in the digital age: “The confidentiality of journalists’ sources must not be 
compromised by the increasing technological possibilities for public authorities to control 
the use by journalists of mobile telecommunication and Internet media”. 
Further, it recommended that: “Member states which have not passed legislation specifying 
the right of journalists not to disclose their sources of information should pass such 
legislation in accordance with the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights and the 
Committee of Ministers’ recommendations”.
• 2011: Council of Europe Human Rights Commission issues discussion paper on 
Protection of Journalists from Violence (CoE HRC 2011) 
This Report by the CoE Commissioner for Human Rights directly linked journalistic source 
protection to journalists’ safety. “Practical guarantees of nondisclosure of confidential 
48
sources of journalists are also a tool to avoid unnecessary risks of the profession” (CoE HRC 
2011).
It also referenced a 1996 European Court of Human Rights judgement [Goodwin v. the 
United Kingdom (27 March 1996)] that “[p]rotection of journalistic sources is one of the basic 
conditions for press freedom ... Without such protection, sources may be deterred from 
assisting the press in informing the public on matters of public interest. As a result, the 
vital public-watchdog role of the press may be undermined and the ability of the press to 
provide accurate and reliable information may be adversely affected”. The Court concluded 
in that case that, in the absence of “an overriding requirement in the public interest”, an 
order to disclose sources would “violate the guarantee of free expression enshrined in 
Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)”. 
It was this case that led the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers to adopt 
Recommendation No. R (2000)7 (See earlier discussion in this section) on the right of 
journalists not to disclose their sources of information. The CoE discussion paper reaffirmed 
that the basic protections of confidentiality of journalists’ sources were not undercut by 
security efforts, recalling a declaration (2005) that member states should not undermine 
protection of sources in the name of fighting terrorism, and noting that “the fight against 
terrorism does not allow the authorities to circumvent this right by going beyond what is 
permitted [Article 10 of the ECHR and Recommendation R (2000) 7]” (See explanation of 
Recommendation R (2000)7 above).
• 2011: Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly adopted Recommendation 1950 on 
the protection of journalists´ sources. (CoE 2011) 
This Recommendation reaffirmed the centrality of source protection to democratic 
journalistic function: 
Recalling Committee of Ministers Recommendation No. R (2000) 7 on the right of journalists 
not to disclose their sources of information, the Assembly reaffirms that the protection of 
journalists’ sources of information is a basic condition for both the full exercise of journalistic 
work and the right of the public to be informed on matters of public concern, as expressed 
by the European Court of Human Rights in its case law under Article 10 of the Convention. 
It also acknowledged the existence of violations of the principles of source protection 
in Europe. Specifically, this 2011 recommendation noted broad exceptions to source 
protection in Hungary and called on the Government to amend the law which it described 
as being:
…overly broad and thus may have a severe chilling effect on media freedom. This law sets 
forth neither the procedural conditions concerning disclosures, nor guarantees for journalists 
requested to disclose their sources. 
Additionally, this Recommendation required that exceptions to source protection laws be 
narrowly designed to prevent widespread demands from authorities for source revelation:
Public authorities must not demand the disclosure of information identifying a source unless 
the requirements of Article 10, paragraph 2, of the Convention are met and unless it can be 
convincingly established that reasonable alternative measures to disclosure do not exist, or 
have been exhausted, the legitimate interest in the disclosure clearly outweighs the public 
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interest in the non-disclosure, and an overriding requirement of the need for disclosure is 
proved.
The legitimate interest referred to above is specified in Article 10 (freedom of expression) 
paragraph 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights [1953 1. Assembly debate on 
25 January 2011 (4th Sitting) see Doc. 12443, report of the Committee on Culture, Science 
and Education).  Text adopted by the Assembly  on 25 January 2011 (4th Sitting)]. This 
invokes national security rather broadly, which is seen by some observers to undercut 
legal frameworks for source protection globally. However, the CoE Recommendation does 
nevertheless did add stronger limits to any exceptions to source confidentiality protection 
to correspond to:
… exceptional circumstances where vital public or individual interests are at stake and 
can be convincingly established. The competent authorities, requesting exceptionally the 
disclosure of a source, must specify the reasons why such vital interest outweighs the interest 
in the non-disclosure and whether alternative measures have been exhausted, such as other 
evidence. If sources are protected against any disclosure under national law, their disclosure 
must not be requested.
The Recommendation also pointed to the importance of confidential sources within the 
police and judiciary, and the right of journalists not to disclose them. “Where such provision 
of information to journalists was illegal, police and judicial authorities must pursue internal 
investigations instead of asking journalists to disclose their sources”.  The problem of data 
retention in connection with source protection is also referenced in the Recommendation: 
Referring to the European Union’s Directive 2006/24/EC of 15 March 2006 on the 
retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly 
available electronic communications services or of public communications networks, 
the Assembly insists on the need to ensure that legal provisions enacted by member 
states when transposing this directive are consistent with the right of journalists not to 
disclose their sources under Article 10 of the Convention and with the right to privacy 
under Article 8 of the Convention. 
Importantly, the Recommendation highlights the importance of applying the principles of 
confidential information sharing to third party intermediaries: 
In so far as Article 10 of the Convention protects the right of the public to be informed on 
matters of public concern, anyone who has knowledge or information about such matters 
should be able to either post it confidentially on third-party media, including Internet 
networks, or submit it confidentially to journalists. 
This is relevant to the emerging threat of pressure applied to third party intermediaries to 
hand over data to authorities or litigants, thereby circumventing source protection laws. 
According to the Recommendation: 
The Assembly reaffirms that the confidentiality of journalists’ sources must not be 
compromised by the increasing technological possibilities for public authorities to control 
the use by journalists of mobile telecommunication and Internet media. The interception 
of correspondence, surveillance of journalists or search and seizure of information must 
not circumvent the protection of journalists’ sources. Internet service providers and 
telecommunication companies should not be obliged to disclose information which may 
lead to the identification of journalists’ sources in violation of Article 10 of the Convention.
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The Recommendation also indicated the need to extend source protections to non-
traditional media platforms in line with changes in professional practice, publishing and 
distribution modes, the role of social media, and participatory audiences and sources: 
In the same manner as the media landscape has changed through technological convergence, 
the professional profile of journalists has changed over the last decade. Modern media rely 
increasingly on mobile and Internet-based communication services. They use information 
and images originating from non-journalists to a larger extent. Non-journalists also publish 
their own or third-party information and images on their own or third-party Internet media, 
accessible to a wide and often undefined audience. Under these circumstances, it is necessary 
to clarify the application of the right of journalists not to disclose their sources of information.
Nevertheless, the Recommendation took the position that bloggers and social media actors 
are not journalists and therefore should not be able to claim access to source protection 
laws:
The right of journalists not to disclose their sources of information is a professional privilege, 
intended to encourage sources to provide journalists with important information which they 
would not give without a commitment to confidentiality. The same relationship of trust does 
not exist with regard to non-journalists, such as individuals with their own website or web 
blog. Therefore, non-journalists cannot benefit from the right of journalists not to reveal their 
sources.
This conflation of ‘journalism’ with ‘journalists’ could, in effect, exclude a significant number 
of important journalistic actors – such as academic or legal bloggers, activists with human 
rights organisations who use social media as platforms to share information imparted 
confidentially in the public interest, journalism educators and their students.
On a different issue, the synergies between whistleblower protections and legal frameworks 
designed to protect journalists from being compelled to reveal their sources were also 
recognised in the Recommendation:
With regard to the right of every person to disclose confidentially to the media, or by 
other means, information about unlawful acts and other wrongdoings of public concern, 
the Assembly recalls its Resolution 1729 (2010) and Recommendation 1916 (2010) on the 
protection of “whistle-blowers” and reaffirms that member states should review legislation in 
this respect to ensure consistency of domestic rules with the European standards enshrined 
in these texts.
Finally, the Assembly recommended that the Committee of Ministers call on all their 
Member States to: 
• Legislate for source protection 
• Review their national laws on surveillance, anti-terrorism, data retention, and access to 
telecommunications records
• Co-operate with journalists’ and media freedom organisations to produce guidelines 
for prosecutors and police officers and training materials for judges on the right of 
journalists not to disclose their sources
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• Develop guidelines for public authorities and private service providers concerning the 
protection of the confidentiality of journalists’ sources in the context of the interception 
or disclosure of computer data and traffic data of computer network 
• 2014 Declaration of the Committee of Ministers on the protection of journalism and 
safety of journalists and other media actors adopted:
This Declaration stated: 
A favourable environment for public debate requires States to refrain from judicial 
intimidation by restricting the right of individuals to disclose information of public interest 
through arbitrary or disproportionate application of the law, in particular the criminal law 
provisions relating to defamation, national security or terrorism. The arbitrary use of laws 
creates a chilling effect on the exercise of the right to impart information and ideas, and leads 
to self-censorship.
Furthermore, it declared that “…prompt and free access to information as the general 
rule and strong protection of journalists’ sources are essential for the proper exercise of 
journalism, in particular in respect of investigative journalism”.
The Committee of Ministers also directly addressed the implications of mass surveillance 
for source protection: “Surveillance of journalists and other media actors, and the tracking 
of their online activities, can endanger the legitimate exercise of freedom of expression if 
carried out without the necessary safeguards, and it can even threaten the safety of the 
persons concerned. It can also undermine the protection of journalists’ sources”.
The Committee also agreed to consider further measures regarding the alignment of laws 
and practices concerning defamation, anti-terrorism and protection of journalists’ sources 
with the European Convention on Human Rights.
• January 2015: Council of Europe Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Report 
on Mass Surveillance/Resolution and recommendation 
This Report, prepared by Rapporteur Pieter Omtzigt, on the impact of mass surveillance on 
human rights, addressed the implications for journalistic source protection in the context 
of freedom of expression and access to information. He stated: 
When authors, journalists or civil society activists are reluctant to write, speak, or pursue 
research about certain subjects (e.g. the Middle East, criticisms of the government post-9/11, 
the Occupy movement, military affairs, etc.), or to communicate with sources or friends 
abroad for fear that they will endanger their counterparts by so doing, this does not only 
affect their freedom of speech, but also everyone else’s freedom of information. (COE, Omtzigt 
2015 p25) 
The Report also connected the detainment of Guardian journalist Glen Greenwald’s partner 
to the impact of surveillance. Greenwald was Snowden’s original confidante and court 
documents reveal that both Greenwald and his partner were under surveillance due to 
suspicion that they were transporting data associated with Snowden’s files. According to 
the Report, the Brazilian citizen had his mobile phone, laptop, DVDs and other items seized. 
• January 2015: CoE Resolution and Recommendation on mass surveillance
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The Council of Europe Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights unanimously adopted 
a Resolution, and a Recommendation, based on the Report discussed above, on January 
26th 2015. The Resolution included the following statements: 
The Parliamentary Assembly is deeply concerned about mass surveillance practices disclosed 
since June 2013 by journalists to whom a former US national security insider, Mr. Edward 
Snowden, had entrusted a large amount of top secret data establishing the existence of mass 
surveillance and large-scale intrusion practices hitherto unknown to the general public and 
even to most political decision-makers.
In the context of this concern, the Resolution makes the following additional points:
• The surveillance practices disclosed so far endanger fundamental human rights, including 
the rights to privacy (Article 8 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)), freedom of 
information and expression. These rights are cornerstones of democracy. Their infringement 
without adequate judicial control also jeopardizes the rule of law.
• It is also worried by the collection of massive amounts of personal data by private businesses 
and the risk that these data may be accessed and used for unlawful purposes by state or 
non-state actors. 
• The Assembly is also deeply worried by the extensive use of secret laws, secret courts and 
secret interpretations of such laws, which are very poorly scrutinized.
Relevantly, the associated Recommendation proposed by the Committee invited the CoE 
Council of Ministers to consider:
• Addressing a recommendation to Member States on ensuring the protection of privacy in 
the digital age and internet safety in the light of the threats posed by the newly disclosed 
mass surveillance techniques
c.  Council of the European Union Resolutions, Declarations, 
Reports and Guidelines
• May 2014: Council of the European Union - “EU Human Rights Guidelines on Freedom 
of Expression: Online and Offline” 
These guidelines included the following pertinent statements:
States should protect by law the right of journalists not to disclose their sources in order 
to ensure that journalists can report on matters in the public interest without their sources 
fearing retribution. All governments must allow journalists to work in a free and enabling 
environment in safety and security, without the fear of censorship or restraint.
The EU will “support the adoption of legislation that provides adequate protection for 
whistle-blowers and support reforms to give legal protection to journalists’ right of non-
disclosure of sources”.
5.2 The Americas
Regarding Latin America, Banisar (2007) wrote:
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There are also important declarations from the Organisation of American States (OAS). Few 
journalists are ever required to testify on the identity of their sources. However direct demands 
for sources still occur regularly in many countries, requiring journalists to seek legal recourse 
in courts. There are also problems with searches of newsrooms and journalists’ homes, 
surveillance and the use of national security laws. (Banisar, 2007: 81)
In 1997, the Hemisphere Conference on Free Speech staged in Mexico City adopted the 
Chapultepec Declaration. Principle 3 states:
No journalist may be forced to reveal his or her sources of information. (Chapultepec 
Declaration 1997) 
Building on the Chapultepec Declaration, in 2000 the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights (IACHR) approved the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression 
as a guidance document for interpreting Article 13 of the Inter American Convention of 
Human Rights. Article 8 of the Declaration states: 
Every social communicator has the right to keep his/her source of information, notes, personal 
and professional archives confidential. (Organisation of American States 2000) 
The application of the term ‘social communicator’ has resonance with the ‘who is a journalist?’ 
debate in reference to shield laws. There are noteworthy developments with regards to the 
status of the above regional instruments since 2007:
• Guatemala 2013: (The then) President Otto Pérez Molina expressed interest in signing 
the Declaration of Chapultepec, however he later suspended the signing. 
• Venezuela 2013: announced its withdrawal from the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights (IACHR) and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. 
In 2013, the Inter American Commission on Human Rights report Violence Against Journalists 
and Media Workers: Inter American Standards and National Practices on Prevention, Protection 
and Prosecution of Perpetrators by the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of 
Expression provided the following definition of journalists relevant to debates about source 
protection entitlement: 
 …journalists are those individuals who observe and describe events, document and analyse 
events, statements, policies, and any propositions that can affect society, with the purpose 
of systematizing such information and gathering facts and analyses to inform sectors of 
society or society as a whole. Such a definition of journalists includes all media workers and 
support staff, as well as community media workers and so-called “citizen journalists” when 
they momentarily play this role. Such definition also includes persons who might be using 
new communications media as a tool to reach the public, as well as opinion makers who are 
targeted for the exercise of their right to freedom of expression. (Botero 2013 p2) 
5.3. Africa
Article 9 of the African Charter of Human Rights gives every person the right to receive 
information and express and disseminate opinions (Banisar, 2007:20). The 2002 Declaration 
of Principles on Freedom of Expression in Africa, released by the African Commission on 
Human and People’s Rights, provided guidelines for member states of the AU on protection 
of sources:
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XV Protection of Sources and other journalistic material
Media practitioners shall not be required to reveal confidential sources of information or 
to disclose other material held for journalistic purposes except in accordance with the 
following principles:
• The identity of the source is necessary for the investigation or prosecution of a serious crime, 
or the defence of a person accused of a criminal offence;
• The information or similar information leading to the same result cannot be obtained 
elsewhere;
• The public interest in disclosure outweighs the harm to freedom of expression;
• And disclosure has been ordered by a court, after a full hearing.
Noteworthy developments since 2007:
• April 2013 - Model Law on Access to Information in Africa by the Special Rapporteur 
on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information at the African Commission on 
Human and People’s Rights was circulated.
An information officer may refuse a request if the information: “(c) Consists of confidential 
communication between a journalist and her or his source”.
• May 2015 - East African Court of Justice (EAJC) judgement on Burundi Press Law 
(Burundian journalists’ union v the Attorney General of the Republic of Burundi, 
Reference No.7 of 2013)
In this judgement, the EAJC ruled Articles 19 & 20 of Burundi’s 2013 Press Law violated 
democratic principles and should be repealed. 
Article 20 of the 2013 Press law obligates journalists to “reveal their sources of information 
before the competent authorities in situations where the information relates to State 
security, public order, defence secrets and the moral and physical integrity of one or more 
persons”. However, the judges upheld the challenge originally brought by the Burundi 
Journalists Union, referring to the need for proportionality and necessity with regard to 
exceptions to source protection – even in cases of national security. They cited the Goodwin 
vs. UK judgment which states:
Protection of journalistic sources is one of the basic conditions for press freedom .... Without 
such protection, sources may be deterred from assisting the press in informing the public 
on matters of public interest. As a result, the vital public watchdog role of the press may be 
undermined and the ability of the press to provide accurate and reliable information may be 
adversely affected”.
The judges in the Burundi case explained their position thus: 
…because whereas the four issues named are important in any democratic state, the way of 
dealing with State secrets is by enacting other laws to deal with the issue and not by forcing 
journalists to disclose their confidential sources… . As for the issue of moral and physical 
integrity of any person, the obligation to disclose a source is unreasonable and privacy laws 
elsewhere can be used to deal with the matter. There are in any event other less restrictive 
ways of dealing with these issues.
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They concluded: “We have no hesitation in holding that Article 20 does not meet the 
expectations of democracy and is in violation of Articles 6(d) and 7(2) of the Treaty”
5.4 Asia and the Pacific 
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) adopted a Human Rights Declaration 
in November 2012 with general provisions for freedom of expression and privacy (ASEAN 
2012). Reservations have, however, been voiced regarding the wording of provisions on 
human rights and fundamental freedoms in relation to political, economic and cultural 
systems and the Declaration’s provisions on “balancing” rights with individual duties as well 
as an absence of reference that legitimate restrictions of rights must be provided by law 
and conform to strict tests of necessity and proportionality (UN 2012; OHCHR (UN) 2012a; 
OHCHR (UN) 2012b). 
5.5. Inter-regional institutions
a.  Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)
The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media (RFOM) regularly issues statements and 
comments regarding breaches and threats to legal source protection frameworks. Several 
of these statements are referenced in the Regional Overviews section below, in the context 
of specific incidents. Additionally, the following recommendations are relevant:
• June 2011 Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) – Representative 
on Freedom of the Media: Vilnius Recommendations on Safety of Journalists (OSCE 
2011)
This set of recommendations included the following point relevant to source protection in 
connection with journalism safety: “Encourage legislators to increase safe working conditions 
for journalists by creating legislation that fosters media freedoms, including guarantees 
of free access to information, protection of confidential sources, and decriminalising 
journalistic activities.”
b.  The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD)
• April 2013 draft report published: “CleanGovBiz Integrity in Practice, Investigative 
Media” (OECD 2013)
This Report asked the questions: “Are journalists guaranteed to keep their information 
sources private? If so, how is this ensured?” It acknowledged that: “It can be dangerous for 
members of the public to provide journalists with information, especially if that information 
denounces serious misbehaviour or pertains to corruption. That is why people often only 
agree to speak up anonymously. The journalists can then use the information but will not 
make the name of this source public.”
The Report argued that forcing a journalist to reveal a source in such cases would be a short 
sighted approach in many cases: “…once a corruption case has been brought to light by 
a journalist, law enforcement has an incentive to discover the anonymous source(s). While 
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the source might indeed be valuable for the case in question either by providing additional 
information or through being a witness in court forcing the journalist to reveal the source 
would often be short-sighted.”
The Report, which also cited the CoE Committee of Ministers’ Recommendation R(2000)7, 
pointed out the broader risks of unmasking journalists’ confidential sources:
With chances being high that anonymity might be lifted, less people will risk disclosing 
information to journalists in the future. Revealing sources limits the ability of people to impart 
information and reduces the ability of the public to receive information, both of which are 
rights granted by Article 19 the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Journalistic sources 
should therefore be protected by law. 
Further, the Report stipulated that such protection “should not only include the journalists’ 
contact persons but also their own workspace and research”. And it argued that: “Exceptions 
should only be granted by a judge and only for key witnesses and serious crimes,” highlighting 
the importance of clearly specifying restrictions, “so that journalists can reliably inform their 
potential sources about the risks involved”. 
5.6. Regional Instruments of Human Rights Law - conclusion
Significant progress has been made in the European regional context with regards to 
addressing the emerging threats to legal source protection environments in the digital era. 
In Latin America and Africa, there is some recognition of the extent of gaps in addressing 
legislative and normative environments regarding source protection in digital contexts. 
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6.  Overviews by UNESCO Region
Ultimately, developments with  actual or potential relevance to legal and regulatory 
environments regarding protections for journalists’ sources were recorded in 84 out 
of the 121 countries (69%) studied for this report, during the period 2007-2015. These 
developments were identified through a process of studying 121 UNESCO member States 
in accordance with the methodology outlined earlier in this Study. They have been analysed 
with a particular emphasis on digital dimensions and the key identified themes of:
a. The overriding or ‘trumping effect’ of National Security/Anti-terrorism legislation
b. The potential of surveillance (mass and targeted) in undercutting legal protections
c. The potential of third party intermediaries and data retention
d. Changes affecting entitlement to protection – Who is a journalist?/What is journalism?
e. Other digital dimensions (e.g. risk of confiscation of electronic equipment which may 
include confidential source information)
f. Anonymity issues
g. Other dimensions 
This study has not conducted an in-depth assessment of national security/anti-terrorism 
laws in every case. Therefore, it should not be inferred that every such law automatically 
translates into a threat to source protection. The problem arises when such laws may 
expressly override legal source protection frameworks or are used to justify access to 
journalistic communications where such access is not independently assessed as to whether 
it is ‘necessary or proportionate’, and where definitions of national security are overly broad 
and can allow for abuse. 
This study further does not presume that all changes affecting surveillance, data retention 
and third parties necessarily impact on the confidentiality of journalistic sources, but that 
these may have significance for strengthening or weakening such confidentiality.  Likewise, 
with the legal definitions of journalists and journalism. Therefore, the references below to 
any developments in these areas are primarily to draw attention to issues that in principle 
can have a bearing on confidentiality. Accordingly, States and other actors seeking to 
protect such confidentiality are alerted to the range of issues within the ecosystem of 
journalism and its sources.
It is also necessary to note that factors such as confiscation of digital devices and issues of 
anonymity in a society are signalled below on the same basis, i.e. without prejudging the 
specific cases mentioned. Instead, there are examples of developments uncovered by this 
research that point to the kind of changes that may be of direct or indirect relevance to 
source protection.  The research does not go into issues of the legality of confiscation of 
journalists’ equipment in any instance listed below, but rather signals these instances on 
the basis that any confiscation per se may have implications for digital confidentiality issues 
concerning journalists’ sources. 
Further research into each country studied is recommended in order to assess the full 
impact of all issues pertaining to source protection in each case.  Under the constraints of 
time and budget, it was not possible to evaluate the extent to which any change registered 
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was indeed of relevance to source protection. The reported information is therefore not 
necessarily representative of trends in any society. 
Overall, the information below does not purport to assess whether a particular given 
development was positive, negative or ambiguous for source confidentiality protection, 
whether in practice or in potential. Nevertheless, the information provided is a pointer to 
the range of intersecting developments within UNESCO regions, which developments have 
bearing for source protection issues in the digital age. The data is thus indicative of potential 
issues, and does not make any claim to be a comprehensive assessment. 




iii. Asia and the Pacific
iv. Europe and North America
v. Latin America and The Caribbean. 
6.1. Africa
“In Africa, there exists a relatively strong recognition of the right of journalists to protect their 
sources, at national, sub-regional as well as continental levels. However, and by and large, 
this recognition has not yet resulted in a critical mass of legal provisions” (Banisar, 2007: 53).
This study has identified relevant developments with direct or potential relevance to 
source protection trends between 2007-2015 in 18 out of 32 countries11 (56%) that have 
been examined in the Africa region.






















In 2007, Banisar identified the source protection issues in Africa as follows:
In the lion’s share of African countries, there is no legal protection of sources whatsoever. In 
many of the countries that fall under this category, journalists have been subject to criminal 
and civil sanctions, harassment and torture to force them to reveal their sources. In a few 
cases, courts have ruled in favour of journalists [who are] being prosecuted by governments 
for refusing to name sources. Yet this jurisprudence, however positive, has not necessarily 
led to protection laws being put in place. …Overall, even where national protections are 
strong on paper, the tendency in practice is for these laws to be flouted – often by security 
and intelligence services who intimidate journalists through raiding of newsrooms and 
surveillance. (Banisar 2007: 53)
In 2015, source protection laws in Africa remain limited. The data collected for this study 
show that legal developments affecting source confidentiality and its protection in Africa 
over the past eight years were largely non-digital. As elaborated below, since 2007, Kenya 
and Niger have introduced a form of legal protection for journalists’ sources, while there 
is a new constitution that affects source protection in Angola. However, in several States, 
legal source protection frameworks can be seen to have been potentially at risk of erosion 
by moves to provide broad exclusions to a journalist’s right to protect their sources from 
disclosure on ‘national security’ grounds, and the criminalisation of breaches. Meanwhile, 
allegations of mass surveillance emerged as a notable theme in some countries.
a.  National security/Anti-terrorism impacts
The themes of national security and mass surveillance are surfacing across Africa. ARTICLE 
19’s East Africa representative Henry Maina told this Study’s researchers there have been 
cases in multiple countries where journalists have been compelled to disclose their sources 
in cases linked to terrorism charges (Maina 2015).
In South Africa, the Protection of State Information bill was passed in 2013 after much 
debate about the definition of national security and whether there should be limited public 
interest exception (which could apply to cases of source confidentiality). At the time of 
writing, the bill had not been signed into law by the President (Freedom House (j) 2014; 
RDM Newswire 2015; PMG). 
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In Burundi, security-based exceptions to legal protections for journalists’ sources (enshrined 
in a 2003 Press Act) were introduced during the period. A new Press Law promulgated in 
June 2013 guaranteed journalistic source protection (Burundi Press Law 2013, Article 16). At 
the same time, this is also restricted under Article 20 of the legislation, which allowed broad 
exemptions. Article 20 stated that media are required to provide, before the competent 
courts, the information revealing the source in one of the four following cases:
1. Information concerning state security offenses; 
2. Information concerning offenses relating to public order; 
3. Information concerning offenses relating to defence secrets; 
4. Information concerning offenses relating to the physical and moral integrity of a 
person or persons  
Under the Act, the National Communications Council (NCC) had the authority to issue 
warnings to journalists who failed to comply, and three NCC warnings could lead to 
suspension or deregistration. However, there were two significant developments regarding 
this law. In March 2015, the National Assembly repealed elements of the act, including 
the exceptions to source protection guarantees (Rhodes 2015). The Burundi Senate was 
considering these amendments at the time of writing. Secondly, the East African Court 
of Justice (see also regional instruments section above) ruled that sections of the 2013 
Press Law (including Article 20, which stipulated exceptions to the journalists’ privilege) 
contravened principles of democracy and accountability in the constitution of the East 
African Community (Burundian journalists’ union v the Attorney General of the Republic of 
Burundi, Reference No.7 of 2013). At the time of writing it was not possible to establish how 
the Burundi Government had responded to the judgement.
In Kenya, after a terrorist attack in 2013, journalists were asked to reveal the source of leaked 
CCTV footage which appeared to show looting soldiers. The request was later withdrawn 
and an investigation into the soldiers’ behaviour led to the sacking and imprisonment of 
those found guilty of looting (ARTICLE 19 2013a; Zadock, A 2013; Saul, H 2013; BBC 2013b). 
In Cameroon, two journalists (working for two separate newspapers) were barred by 
a military tribunal from practicing journalism, and banned from leaving the country on 
national security grounds in 2014, after they refused to hand over reporting materials from a 
confidential source.   Further hearings were pending at the time of writing and the National 
Communications Council (NCC) was investigating the actions (Ezieh 2014). 
b.  Mass surveillance and targeted surveillance 
Between 2009 and 2014, three African countries introduced laws authorising surveillance, 
without exemptions for journalistic communications. (The Security Laws (amendment) Act 
2014, Kenya; The Information and Communications Act Section 2009, 138, Gambia; Anti-
terrorism Proclamation No.652/2009, Ethiopia). 
In Uganda, following a terrorist attack in the capital Kampala in 2010, The Regulation of 
Interception of Communications Act 2010 was passed by the Ugandan Government to 
reinforce the provisions in the Anti-Terrorism Act No.14 of 2002 legislation. The two pieces 
of legislation operate in tandem, allowing the authorities to intercept and monitor letters, 
packages, bank details, calls, faxes, emails and other communications, as well as monitoring 
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meetings of any groups of persons following consent from a high court judge (s19 Anti-
Terrorism Act No. 14 2002; CIPESA 2014). Under Section 5, subsection (1)(c)(d)&(e) a 
magistrate will grant a warrant for a lawful intercept if there is a terrorist threat (Uganda, 
2002; CIPESA 2014). 
Spyware attacks in 2014 and 2015 on the US-based Ethiopian Satellite Television Service 
(ESAT), were reported by the Citizen Lab at Canada’s Munk School of Global Affairs at the 
University of Toronto, potentially putting source confidentiality as risk (Marczak et al 2015; 
CPJ 2015c). Reports on monitoring of the cell phones of two South African journalists 
surfaced between 2010 and 2014 (Duncan 2014; IOL 2015; Right to Know 2014).  
c.  Data retention and third party intermediaries
This is an issue receiving attention in Uganda, where in December 2014, the National 
Information Technology Authority of Uganda, together with the Ministry of Information 
and Communications Technology and the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, 
released the draft of a Data Protection and Privacy Bill for public consultation (Draft of 20th 
August 2014, The Data Protection and Privacy Bill of 2014). The proposed law aimed to 
safeguard the rights of individuals whose data is collected by government and both public 
and private institutions (NITA 2014; OpenNet Africa 2015; Monitor 2015). The bill stipulated 
that personal data may only be collected and processed with the prior consent of the data’s 
subject, unless an exemption is satisfied, such as for the purposes of national security (FADV 
2014). The bill would impose notification requirements of the data’s subject, which required 
the individual to be notified prior to data collection, including the nature of the data, the 
purpose for which the data is required, right to access data, right to rectify the data and 
whether the data required is discretionary or mandatory (section 9(1) (CIPESA 2014). It 
would also impose penalties on ‘data controllers’ who knowingly or recklessly obtain or 
disclose personal data (FADV 2014). 
Additionally, s79 of the Ugandan Communications Commission Act 2013 stated that 
any operator of a communications service or system who ‘unlawfully intercepts any 
communication’ between persons using that service is liable to imprisonment or a fine 
(UCC 2013). These propositions for transparency and accountability measures regarding 
data collection and handover could aid journalists in their efforts to protect their sources. 
At the same time, Section 4(2) of the legislation, which states that personal data may be 
collected or processed where the collection or processing is necessary for ‘national security’ 
is broad and could be open to misinterpretation. 
In Niger, the 2005 Computer Security and Critical Information Infrastructure Protection Bill 
mentioned in Banisar (2007: 63), which mandated ISPs to provide data to law enforcement 
agencies, failed to pass in 2011 (This Day Live, 2011).
The Angolan government introduced a cybercrime bill in 2011 that would have expanded 
the authorities’ ability to seize citizens’ personal data, without exceptions that could be 
relevant to journalistic communications. The bill won initial approval in the parliament but 
the Government later withdrew it. 
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d.  Entitlement to protection: Who is a journalist/What is 
journalism?
The 2013 Press Law in Burundi introduced new professional requirements for journalists, 
including: holding a Bachelor of Journalism, or any bachelors degree accompanied by 
completion of a training course or two years practical journalism experience. They are also 
required to have journalism as a “regular and paid principal activity” and to exercise the 
profession in “one or more newspaper companies” (Burundi Press Law 2013) This definition 
of a professional journalist could limit the range of journalistic actors claiming source 
protection. 
In Uganda, new source protection provisions introduced under Section 38 of the amended 
Press and Journalists Act (2010) (See discussion above) required a journalist to be registered 
in order to enjoy source protection. In Somalia, a draft media bill required defining the term 
‘journalist’ to include Somali nationality, journalism knowledge, and three years experience 
in the media industry (Article 24, draft media bill, NUSOJ, 2014). The Code of Conduct for the 
Practice of Journalism in Kenya’s Media Council Act 2013 is restricted to: “a journalist, media 
practitioner, foreign journalist or media enterprise”. 
e.  Other digital dimensions 
There have been a number of reported incidents of journalists’ devices being taken, 
something that as noted earlier, may have the potential for exposure of confidential sources. 
For example, in Uganda, a journalist’s laptop and mobile phone were confiscated during an 
investigation (CIPESA 2014). In Angola, computers at a newspaper were confiscated in 2012 
(CPJ 2012b; Freedom House 2013c). In Botswana, in 2014 the editor of Sunday Standard had 
his computer taken by police (ENCA 2014; CPJ 2014b; Mail & Guardian 2014).  The examples 
here, like those below, are not provided with the presumption that confidential data was 
unduly exposed in these cases but that such exposure was a risk.
f.  Anonymity issues
None were recorded in this region by the researchers during the period under study.
g.  Other dimensions
In Zimbabwe, a new Constitution adopted in 2013 contains specific provisions for the 
protection and confidentiality of journalists’ sources. Section 61.2 of the Constitution states 
that “Every person is entitled to freedom of the media, which freedom includes protection 
of the confidentiality of journalists’ sources of information” (The Constitution of Zimbabwe 
Amendment (No. 20) Act 2003). Calls have also been made to align media and access to 
information laws, provisions for the interception and monitoring of communications 
contained in the 2007 Interception of Communications Act, and provisions for criminal 
defamation contained in the Crimial Law (Codification and Reform Act) with the new 
Constitution (New Zimbabwe 2013).
In South Africa, there have been calls to amend apartheid-era legislation such as Section 
205 of the Criminal Procedure Act, under which journalists have been subpoenaed to 
reveal their sources. In 2010, two journalists were prosecuted under this law to reveal the 
identities of sources (Dibetle 2010). The case was adjourned to enable mediation between 
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the TV network, the South African National Editors Forum (SANEF) and the police (Malumo 
2010). SANEF argued that authorities in the case had not followed a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) brokered by the body in 1999, which outlined a process to follow 
in the event of authorities seeking confidential source information from journalists 
(SANEF 2010a. See also SANEF 2010b). One of the journalists subpoenaed told this study’s 
researchers that they were ultimately able to protect the identity of their sources and that 
the MOU is still in place (Said 2015)  
While South Africa has not introduced explicit protection for journalists’ sources, partly 
in response to journalists’ concerns about the risk of legislating obligations, a landmark 
ruling in 2012 (Bosasa Operation (Pty) Ltd v Basson and Another 09/29700) protected the 
confidentiality of sources relied on in a Mail and Guardian article (Global Journalist 2012.) 
The South African Constitutional Court refused to hear an appeal against the judgement in 
2013, so the ruling stands (Holmes 2013, SANEF 2012). 
In May 2013, police received a warrant to search Ugandan newpapers The Daily Monitor and 
The Red Pepper in regard to the source of a leaked letter underpinning a story (HRW 2013b; 
BBC 2013a; CPJ 2013). Also in Uganda, The Press and Journalist Act was amended in 2010 and 
now protects a journalist from revealing the identity of their confidential sources, unless s/
he has the consent of the person who gave him/her the information, or on an order of a 
court law (IFEX 2010). 
In Burundi in 2014, two journalists from two independent radio stations were asked to 
reveal their sources in terms of a summons under the 2013 Media Law. The Law contains 
provisions for disclosure where reporting is found to jeopardize moral integrity (Rhodes 
2014; Hakizimana 2014). In a separate case, in January 2015, Burundian authorities charged, 
and imprisoned for a period, the director of Radio Publique Africaine, in partial connection 
with the confidentiality of a source (CPJ 2015a; RSF 2015e; HRW 2015a).  
Rwanda introduced a new media law in 2013. The law entitles courts to compel journalists 
to reveal their sources in any legal proceedings, and not necessarily as a last resort (ARTICLE 
19 2013b). 
In Kenya, there now exists qualified protection of journalists’ sources. Kenya’s Media Council 
Act 2013 (No. 46 of 2013) states that journalists shall use identifiable sources wherever 
possible, and provides that: “Confidential sources shall be used only when it is clearly in 
the public interest to gather or convey important information, or when a person providing 
information might be harmed” (Section 45). It further states: “Unnamed sources shall not be 
used unless the pursuit of the truth will best be served by not disclosing the source, who 
shall be known by the editor and reporter” (Odera 2014).
In Niger in 2010, a clause was added to the 1999 Press Ordinance stating that: “the 
professional journalist cannot be forced to divulge their source of information” (Ordinance 
No. 2010-035). 
In Lesotho, in 2009 the Law Reform Commission was tasked by the minister of 
communications to review the media regulatory landscape, including the confidentiality of 
sources (Limpitlaw 2012). At the time of writing, no further developments had taken place. 
In Mauritius, the Media Law and Ethics in Mauritius preliminary report (2013) by Geoffrey 
Robertson QC (commissioned by the Prime Minister of Mauritius) recommended a new 
statutory provision: “No court may require a person to disclose, nor is any person guilty of 
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contempt for refusing to disclose, the source of information contained in a publication for 
which he is responsible, unless it is clearly established that such disclosure is essential in 
the interests of justice” (Government Programme 2010-2015). Additionally, it stated, “Every 
press code requires, as an ethical rule, that a journalist must protect his or her sources. 
Without such protection, many sources would not come forward to provide newsworthy 
information they would ‘dry up’, as would the supply of news” (Robertson 2013).
In Sierra Leone, when Liberia’s ex-President Charles Taylor was being tried by the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone for crimes against humanity and war crimes, an attempt was made to 
get a journalist to reveal his source during the trial. However, the presiding judge dismissed 
the request (Simon 2009).  
In Côte d’Ivoire, the Code of Ethics for Ivorian Journalists (2012) states that journalists have 
the right to protect their sources (Cote d’Ivoire Ministry of Communications, 2012). 
In Somalia, under media laws introduced in 2007, a media house must record and keep the 
voice of a ‘confidential source’ to disclose before a court (Article 25, subsection 7).
There are no source protection laws covering journalistic actors in Nigeria, according 
to Toyosi Ogunseye, Editor, The Sunday Punch, interviewed for this study in 2014.   Two 
journalists were detained in 2013 after refusing to reveal the source of a leaked document 
(Balev 2013). 
Regional Conclusion
Many of the developments above, which cover a mix of potential implications for the 
protection of source confidentiality, have relevance to both digital and non-digital issues. 
However, there is not a lot of attention in the region  that has been given to issues of 
whether to restrict or protect source confidentiality in the purely digital space – possibly in 
part because of the relatively low level of access to digital communications in the research 
period. As more users are able to regularly contribute to and access online news content, 
this may change. Meanwhile, over the period 2007-2015, 18 out of 32 countries examined 
did see various developments pertaining to source protection laws, across a number of 
relevant considerations set out above.
6.2. Arab States
The methodology applied to this study, based on updating the countries covered in the 
2007 Privacy International report means that there has not been research on a number of 
Arab States that have undergone dramatic transition since 2007. However, through this 
study’s research process, the author nevertheless noted specific developments in Tunisia12, 
Jordan, Kuwait, Palestine, Iraq, Bahrain, Lebanon, and Yemen. It is recommended that 
additional research be undertaken in each of these countries in the future.
12 Tunisia was not mentioned in the Banisar report and so the methodology applied to this study disqualifies 
it from examination. But it is noteworthy that the country introduced Decree-Law 115, article 11 of 
which introduced protections for journalists’ sources, as well as “any person involved in the preparation 
of news and information” (http://en.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/120214_observations_rsf_code_de_la_presse_
gb_-_neooffice_writer.pdf ) There are a number of exceptions to this law: where there is an investigation 
by public authorities to identify sources; a request for a journalist to disclose their sources; reasons from 
national or state security; dangers to third parties. (ibid). A breach of article 11 by an individual is liable to a 
year’s imprisonment and a fine of 120 dinars (article 14 ibid). 
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There were six countries in this region out of seven (86%) from the study data set where 






• Syrian Arab Republic (the)
Emerging themes in this region include the impact of national security legislation, mass 
surveillance, debate on what constitutes a journalist, as well as non-digital issues.
Rawda Ahmed from the Arabic Network for Human Rights commented on the situation in 
the Arab States to this Study’s researchers: “The laws in most of the Arab countries are in 
favour of source protection, yet in practice the matter is different”. She said that journalists 
are sometimes required to reveal the identity of their sources under emergency laws, or on 
the premise of fighting terrorism. (Ahmed 2015)
a.  National Security/Anti-terrorism impacts
In the Syrian Arab Republic, a new media law was introduced in 2011 (Legislative Decree 
No 108, 2011 on media law) which circumscribes the media from publishing content 
that affects ‘national security’.  In Algeria, a new media law was introduced in 2012, which 
establishes limitations on coverage of state security (Algeria, 2012; CPJ 2012a). 
b.  Mass surveillance and targeted surveillance
While Internet engagement among the Arab states remains relatively low, the increasing 
numbers of users has corresponded with three countries introducing laws regulating use of 
the Internet since 2007, with potential implications for source protection. 
In Egypt, litigation was pending (number 63055, judicial year 68) at time of writing against 
the Egyptian Ministry of Interior, challenging the Government’s Internet monitoring 
activities. Such alleged surveillance is argued to contradict Egyptian laws regulating the 
investigation of evidence, which is limited to criminal activities or illicit acts (Provision 21 of 
Criminal Procedure Law).
In regards to Sudan, the 2009 Press and Printed Materials Act states (under the section 
Rights and Immunity of a Journalist that a journalist shall enjoy protection of sources (The 
Press and Press Printed Materials Act, 2009).  At the same time, there is reported monitoring 
of online activities under the National Security Act of 2010 (Sudan, 2010; Freedom House 
2014k; Reporters Sans Frontiers, 2014g; Amnesty International 2012).
13 
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c.  Data retention/third party intermediaries 
In Morocco, article 54 of the Draft Digital Law makes online service providers responsible for 
content created by users, which could indirectly impact on source confidentiality (Rhanem 
2014).
d.  Entitlement to Protection: Who is a journalist?/What is 
journalism? 
Three of the countries studied demonstrated developments in relation to the question of 
who is entitled to claim source protection. 
In October 2014, the Moroccan Government introduced a number of bills pertaining to the 
media. Among them was the “Status of Professional Journalists” bill that contains source 
protection provisions (RSF 2014c). Article 1 of the Status of Professional Journalists Bill 
stated that professional journalists are those “whose main occupation, regular and paid” is in 
“one or more publications, newspapers or periodicals published in Morocco, in one or more 
news agencies or in one or more broadcasting organizations, whose main office is located 
in Morocco” (Dahir n° 1-95-9 du 22 ramadan 1415 (22 Février 1995) portant promulgation de 
la loi n° 21-94 relative au statut des journalistes professionnels).  
Sudan’s 2009 Press and Printed Materials Act requires journalists to enrol in the Journalists 
Roll with the National Council for Press and Publications (NCPP) (see Freedom house 2014k; 
The Press and Press Printed Materials Act, 2009). Draft amendments to the act proposed in 
2013 (Abbas 2013) would allow the authority to cancel journalists’ licenses (Abubkr 2014).  
In Algeria, under the new Code de I’Information, section 85 states that: “Professional secrecy 
is a right for the journalist and the director responsible, in accordance with laws and 
regulations” (Code de I’Information de l’Algérie 2012 Art. 85). The act defines a ‘journalist’ as 
someone whose income is solely derived from journalism. 
e.  Other digital dimensions
In Morocco in early 2015, recording equipment and other materials were confiscated from 
two French journalists (RSF 2015a). This example is not provided with the presumption that 
confidential journalistic data was unduly exposed.
f.  Anonymity issues 
In Algeria, the 1990 Code de I’Information de l’Algérie recognised the right of Editors-in-Chief 
of publications to not disclose the real name of journalists or authors who write under 
pseudonyms, except when demanded by a competent authority following an official 
complaint (Article 39). Article 86 of the new 2012 media law requires that the journalist 
reveal his or her identity to their director and does not specify any exceptions (2012 Code 
de I’Information de l’Algérie).
The Mauritanian government ratified a Cybercrime Bill in 2014 (Jedou 2014), which has 
potential to impact on source confidentiality especially as regards the banning of encryption 
(see Legal framework of the Mauritanian Information Society, 2014). 
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g.  Other dimensions
Four countries of the six reflecting developments demonstrated shifts in relation to source 
protection that are also relevant to non-digital dimensions. Morocco, Algeria and Sudan 
have been mentioned above. In Syria, a legislative decree states that the only institution 
permitted to ask a journalist to reveal her/his source is the judiciary in a secret session 
(Legislative Decree 108 for 2011). It is important to note the ongoing conflict and journalism 
safety issues in Syria, however, and concerns have been raised about the application of this 
decree (RSF 2011a).  
Regional Conclusion
Over the period 2007-2015, 6 out of 7 countries examined in this UNESCO region 
experienced developments pertaining to source protection laws, across the relevant issues 
set out above. As with the African region, many of these developments have relevance to 
both digital and non-digital dimensions of source protection, but again there was not a lot 
of attention in the region to the purely digital space in the period under study.   
6.3. Asia and The Pacific
In 2007, Banisar noted that: “A major recent concern in the region is the adoption of new 
anti-terrorism laws that allow for access to records and oblige assistance. There are also 
problems in many countries with searches of newsrooms and with broadly defined state 
secrets acts which criminalise journalists who publish leaked information”. Developments 
since 2007 highlight increasing risks to source protection.
Of the 24 countries analysed in the Asia and Pacific region for this report, 18 (75%) have 
exhibited developments since 2007 that are potentially or directly relevant to the protection 
of journalists’ sources.14







14 Myanmar was not included in this study due to the methodology based on updating only the UNESCO 
Member States identified in the 2007 Privacy International report that was adopted as baseline research. 
However, there were noteworthy developments in the country between 2007-2015. These include 1) 
Surveillance (http://en.rsf.org/burma-surveillance-of-media-and-internet-17-05-2011,40296.html); 2) 
Journalists and others have faced organized cyber-attacks and attempts to infiltrate their e-mail accounts. 
(https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2014/burma#.VPEr_MazJNI); 3) Amendments to Section 
33 of the Electronic Transactions Law (2013) which criminalise “receiving or sending” information related to 
acts detrimental to state security, law and order, national solidarity, the national economy, or the national 
culture. Iran was also not included in this Study based on the methodology of updating the original 














There are a number of areas of concern in the Asia-Pacific region which have potential or 
actual bearing on source confidentiality. 
a.  National Security/Anti-terrorism impacts
In the Asia-Pacific region, there is an emerging trend where national security case law, 
legislation and/ or policy considerations demonstrate the potential to impact on journalists’ 
source protection. 
In China, journalists do not have the right to protect their sources under the Law of 
the People’s Republic of China on Guarding State Secrets (Gov.cn 2010), nor under the 
Regulations on Secret-Keeping in Press and Publications (Xinhua 2013). China’s National 
People’s Congress considered an Anti-Terrorist Act at its meeting in March 2015. The Act 
contained a series of articles providing for legal large-scale monitoring and surveillance of 
citizens’ communications, both online and offline. It also contained legal provisions that 
would enable the imposition of substantial restrictions on the activities, movement and 
ability of citizens to associate with any person suspected of terrorism (NPC 2015). At the 
time of writing, the draft law had been circulated for comment (Hewitt 2015).  
In Macau, China, a Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), 
national security laws were enacted in 2009 with offences punishable by sentences of up to 
25 years (Macau, China: National Security Law, 2/2009). The law includes provisions covering 
state secrets (Article 5) without providing exceptions that could apply to journalists and 
whistleblowers (CECC 2009). 
In Pakistan, investigative journalist Umar Cheema was kidnapped by unknown assailants 
in his country in 2010. His abductors took away his mobile phone and some of his sources 
later advised him about harassment they had experienced following his kidnapping, he told 
researchers on this study (Cheema 2014; Perlez J 2010; CPJ 2011).
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In Australia, new anti-terrorism legislation (National Security Legislation Amendment Bill (No. 
1) 2014) could see journalists jailed for up to 10 years for reporting on ‘disallowed’ national 
security stories, including those dependent upon confidential sources (Posetti 2015b; 
Williams 2014; See also Pearson & Fernandez 2015b). In 2015 the Federal Government 
classified information pertaining to asylum seekers on national security grounds. On the 
same basis, in mid-2015, the Australian Government criminalised the leaking of such 
information (Australian Border Force Bill 2015; Farrell 2015; Barns and Newhouse 2015). 
In December 2013, Japan’s parliament passed the Act on the Protection of Specially Designated 
Secrets (Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets Act, No. 108, December 
13, 2013). The law grants heads of state organs the power to designate as state secrets 
information connected to prevention of ‘designated harmful activities’, including matters in 
the realm of counter-terrorism, foreign affairs and defence.  Unauthorized disclosure of such 
information is punishable by up to 10 years in prison (Freedom House 2014i). Whistleblowers 
and journalists found guilty of intentionally receiving such designated information can be 
jailed for up to five years under the Act (see Coliver 2014). 
In Sri Lanka, the 1973 Press Council Act prohibiting disclosure of fiscal, defence, and security 
information, was revived in 2009. In June 2012, Sri Lankan police officers with support 
of a court order searched the offices of two news websites and confiscated equipment 
(Colombo Telegraph 2012; CPJ 2012c; Farook Thajudeen T. 2012; IFEX 2012; New York Times 
2012). In 2012, the Sri Lanka Government amended the 1973 Sri Lankan Press Council Act 
so that websites would be governed by the same provisions that regulate the print media, 
which includes a prohibition on the publication of official secrets (Sri Lanka: Law No. 5 of 
1973, Press Council Law [Sri Lanka], Chapter 378, 30 May 197315). 
In 2012, Malaysia passed the Security Offences (Special Measures) Act (SOSMA) 2012. In the 
act, the term ‘security offence’ is broadly defined as ‘an act prejudicial to national security and 
public safety’ (Spiegel 2012). SOSMA prohibits the possession or publication of ‘detrimental’ 
documents, which constitutes a security offence under the legislation. The term ‘detrimental’ 
is not defined. The legislation also permits police to intercept communications without 
judicial oversight. The Public Prosecutor is also granted authority to intercept postal articles 
and messages transmitted and received if it is likely to ‘contain any information relating to 
the commission of a security offence’. (s6(1) of the Security Offences Special Measures Act; 
ARTICLE 19 2012). 
b.  Mass Surveillance and targeted surveillance
In China, communications between reporters, or with their sources via the Internet, 
or with digital devices, are subject to monitoring under Article 14 of the State Council 
Order No. 292 (2000), which grants government officials full access to information from 
providers of Internet services. In China (Hong Kong), the Interception of Communications 
and Surveillance Ordinance (ICSO Cap 589), enacted in 2006, requires a law enforcement 
agency in its application for authorization of interception or covert surveillance to state 
clearly whether journalistic material may be obtained in the operation (ICSO Cap 589 
Schedule 3, Part 1 (ix), Part 2 (x), Part 3 (x)). In 2009, the Commissioner on Interception 
of Communications and Surveillance noted several incidents involving the interception of 
phone calls in which journalistic materials were obtained inadvertently. While the law itself 
does not require an agency to report such interceptions to the panel or the Commissioner, 
15  Available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/4be018692.html [accessed 28 February 2015])
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the ICSO code of practice was amended in 2011 to require law enforcement agencies to 
notify the Commissioner of any operations that are likely to involve journalistic material or 
where such information had been obtained inadvertently. In 2013, after a two-year review 
of ICSO, the Hong Kong Government reported to the Legislative Council that it was drafting 
several legislative amendments, including one that would give the Commissioner access 
to materials produced under interception or surveillance, including journalistic material. 
However, at the time of writing, no new amendments had been introduced. 
In the Philippines, the Supreme Court declared that s12 of the Cybercrime Prevention Act 
2012 RA 10175 – which permitted the real time collection of data – was unconstitutional 
(Palatino, 2014;  Danguilan-Vitug 2014).
Indonesia passed a state Intelligence Law in 2011. Article 32 of the legislation permits 
intelligence agencies to intercept communications without prior court approval, and 
without protections that could apply to journalistic communications (Freedom House 
2013g, 2014f ).   
A law introduced in Pakistan in 2013, called the Investigation for Fair Trial Act 2013, gives 
the power to the state to intercept private communications in order to track suspected 
terrorists. 
In New Zealand, the Search and Surveillance Act 2012 (New Zeland Parliamentary Council 
Office 2012) was introduced, legalising some forms of surveillance, extending surveillance 
powers to additional government agencies, and empowering judges to determine if 
journalists would be permitted to claim privilege (under Section 68 of the 2006 Evidence 
Act) in connection with warrants issued under the Act. While the Act recognises journalistic 
privilege, it states: 
• “no privilege applies in respect of any communication or information if there is a prima 
facie case that the communication or information is made or received, or compiled or 
prepared,—
• (a) for a dishonest purpose; or
• (b) to enable or aid any person to commit or plan to commit what the person claiming 
the privilege knew, or ought reasonably to have known, to be an offence.
Also in New Zealand, the intelligence agency GCSB is reported to collect calls and Internet 
traffic in bulk and share this with the US National Security Agency (NSA), according to 
documents released by Edward Snowden and reported by The Guardian early 2015 (Manhire 
2015). 
In India, the Information Technology (Amendment) Act, 2008, allows the government 
to intercept, monitor, or decrypt computer information in the interest of “sovereignty or 
integrity of India, defence of India, security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, 
or public order, or for preventing incitement to the commission of any cognizable offence 
relating to above or for investigation of any offence” (India, 2008; HRW 2013a; Bhatia, 2015). 
Surveillance software linked to the state
As referenced earlier in this Study, in May 2013, researchers from Citizen Lab (Citizen Lab 
2013) found evidence of FinFisher servers in 25 countries, including several in the Asia-
Pacific region, which raised fears that government agencies may be using the software to 
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monitor (via backdoor access) their citizens. The deployment of such software directly can 
undermine legal protections designed to ensure confidentiality for journalists’ sources. 
c.  Data retention and Third Party Intermediaries 
In April 2015, a Pakistani parliamentary committee approved a bill that mandated service 
providers to retain data about Pakistanis’ telephone and email communications for a 
minimum of one year. Called the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act, it permits government 
authorities  access to the data of Internet users without a requirement for judicial review, 
nor any exception for journalistic communications (HRW 2015b; PEC Bill 2015; HRW 2015b; 
RSF 2015b and RSF 2015c). 
New data retention legislation in Australia demands that third party intermediaries store 
data for two years. The data retention Bill (Telecommunications and Interception Access 
Amendment Bill 2014), as it was proposed and initially approved by the Parliamentary Joint 
Committee on Intelligence and Security (APH 2015) did not provide safeguards that could 
provide for source protection. However, when the legislation was enacted in March 2015 
it included an amendment (Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment 
(Data Retention) Bill 2014) that requires agencies to seek a warrant to access journalists’ 
communications with sources in certain cases. Transparency is however not required, nor 
is there a possibility to appeal the issuance of a ‘Journalism Information Warrant’. Revelation 
of the existence (or non-existence) of such a warrant is punishable by a two-year jail term. 
Under the amendment, ‘public interest advocates’ will be appointed by the Prime Minister 
to advise on specific cases. 
In Cambodia, in October 2014, the director of the Telecommunication Regulator of 
Cambodia (TRC), ordered 12 mobile phone and Internet providers to be studied by police. 
Information analysed included billing records, network information, and data logs (Pheap A 
and Wilwohl J 2014; Telecommunication Regulator of Cambodia 2014). 
d.  Entitlement to protection: Who is a journalist/What is 
journalism? 
Five of the 24 countries studied in the Asia-Pacific region reflected developments in policy 
and case law pertaining to definitions of ‘journalist’ and ‘journalism’. 
In Australia, six out of nine jurisdictions (at federal level and in New South Wales, Victoria, 
Western Australia, the Australian Capital Territory and Tasmania) have introduced shield 
laws. Three out of those six are potentially broad enough to cover bloggers (Evidence Act 
1995 Cth, s126G (1), Evidence Act 2001 ACT, s 126J, and Evidence (Journalists) Amendment 
Bill 2014, Part 8A—Journalists 72—Interpretation) (Fernandez 2014). Also in Australia, the 
protections for journalistic data contained within the Telecommunications and Interception 
Access Amendment Act 2015 are afforded to “a person who is working in a professional 
capacity as a journalist”. Similarly, sources who might benefit from this amendment are only 
covered if their interactions are with “professional journalists” in the course of professional 
news media production (Hurst 2015). 
The Banisar (2007) report documented the codification of ‘journalist’ in a New Zealand shield 
law in 2006 (Evidence Act 2006, s 68). Significantly, in 2014, a High Court judge extended 
the protection to a political blogger who was deemed to be a journalist, and his blog was 
accepted as a news medium. But it is important to note that the court ordered the source 
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to be revealed as the ‘public interest’ involved in this particular case favoured disclosure 
(Slater v Blomfield [2014]). The decision also relied on tests like ‘regularity’ and ‘effort’ of news 
production which could exclude occasional acts of journalism. Nevertheless, it does offer a 
broader definition of journalistic acts.
In 2010, the Chinese Government introduced a national “Qualification Examination” for 
Journalists. Administered by the General Administration of Press and Publication, the 
government’s main regulator of the press, all practicing and prospective journalists must 
pass a new qualification exam. In addition to screening of journalists, this development 
excludes bloggers and other digital communicators from claiming ethical obligations 
under the China News Workers Code of Professional Ethics.
In 2007, a court required a Reuters journalist to reveal her source in Singapore (Tullett Prebon 
(Singapore) Ltd and Others v Spring Mark Geoffrey and Another [2007] 3 SLR 187; [2007] SGHC 
71). However, in 2014, the Singaporean Court of Appeal protected a blogger from revealing 
his source, although a lower court had decided that he was not a journalist (James Dorsey 
Michael v World Sport Group [2014] SGCA 4).
In Timor-Leste, the 2014 Press Law defines the term ‘journalistic activity’ to encompass 
research, collection/selection of information; processing and dissemination of information 
in the form of written text, sound or image to the public through disclosure in the media. 
(Decree No. 10/III Media Act, Article 2, a)). However, the term ‘journalist’ is limited to a 
professional who is primarily engaged in journalism. The profession of journalist under 
this media law is further constrained by the requirement of a professional license (Ibid, 
article 13, i)) which is issued and controlled by a press council, internship requirements 
and a Bachelors-level qualification in the field. Shortly after being approved by Timor Leste 
Parliament, the Press Law was referred to its highest court by President Taur Matan Ruak, 
which deemed some sections unconstitutional in August 2014 (East Timor Law and Justice 
Bulletin 2014; Pacific Media Centre 2014). 
e.  Other digital developments
In June 2014, the State Administration of Press Publication Radio Film and Television 
(SAPPRFT) – the agency responsible for oversight of China’s media - issued new measures 
aimed at preventing Chinese journalists from sharing certain information on their personal 
blogs and social media accounts, and with foreign news media. The new provisions 
forbid journalists and media employees from sharing certain state secrets, trade secrets, 
intellectual property and undisclosed information obtained during professional activities 
(Politics 2013). All journalists are required to sign an agreement to pledge compliance with 
the regulations. 
In October 2014, police seized digital devices from the home of New Zealand investigative 
journalist Nicky Hagar (Fisher 2014). At the time of writing (July 2015), Hagar was challenging 
the legality of the raid in the High Court of New Zealand, citing concerns about source 
protection. 
There were two searches of Australian newsrooms during the period by the Australian 
Federal Police (AFP). In both cases, the searches involved targeting journalists’ computers 
and mobile phones to access data (The World Today 2011; Bartlett 2015). This example is 
not provided with the presumption that confidential journalistic data was unduly exposed.
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In the second incident, in 2014, police apologised to a TV station in Sydney after searching 
the newsroom in an attempt to establish if a convicted drug trafficker had been paid for 
an interview in a ‘proceeds of crime’ investigation. Documents and computers were seized 
during the search, but the Federal Court overturned the warrants that were issued to 
procure them, and the items were later returned (ABC NEWS 2014). This example is not 
provided with the presumption that confidential journalistic data was unduly exposed.
In Kyrgyzstan in 2008, authorities with support of a court order searched the offices of a 
newspaper, confiscating financial records and computers in a criminal investigation (CPJ 
2008; RSF 2008; WAN-IFRA 2008). This example is not provided with the presumption that 
confidential journalistic data was unduly exposed.
In Uzbekistan, a freelance journalist was detained briefly at Tashkent airport in August 
2011 and had digital equipment taken (RSF 2011b; Freedom House 2012h; Ferghana 2011). 
This example is not provided with the presumption that confidential journalistic data was 
unduly exposed.
f.  Anonymity issues
China has enacted new regulations requiring real-name registration for use of digital and 
social media. In December 2012, the National People’s Congress (NPC) approved a law 
requiring real-name registration for Internet access. The real-name registration system was 
subsequently enacted for the social network Sina Weibo in 2012 (Xinhua 2012), and for 
instant messaging systems in 2014. In April 2013, The Ministry of Industry and Information 
Technology (MIIT) drafted a law requiring real-name registration for setting up any 
phone line or mobile connection in the country. Four months later, China’s three major 
telecommunication companies began to require all subscribers to register with their real 
name and national ID number. In January 2014, the State Administration of Radio, Film, 
and Television (SARFT) issued a notice to video-hosting websites stating that anyone who 
uploads a video to the Internet must be registered using their real name. In 2015, the State 
Internet Information Office announced the implementation of a comprehensive real-name 
registration and oversight system, which covers microblogs, Baidu’s Tieba (discussion) 
forums, and other sites with user-generated content (CAC 2015). 
In the Republic of Korea in 2012, the Constitutional Court rejected a ‘real name law’ 
introduced in 2007 on the grounds that it reduced freedom of speech (Ramstad 2012). 
g.  Other dimensions
The China News Workers’ Code of Professional Ethics (Xinhua 2009) stipulates that the 
reporters should defend the legal rights of sources. It is a voluntary code. Chinese courts 
can require journalists to reveal the identity of sources in a criminal case. According to 
Beijing-based lawyer Shi Hongying, all citizens have the obligation to testify in criminal 
cases according to Article 60 of the criminal law (Fawan 2013).
A company filed a suit in 2012 against the Guangzhou-based Southern Weekend newspaper 
and The Beijing News, charging that the papers printed articles that defamed the organization. 
The court ruled against the papers on the grounds that their articles contained anonymous 
sources and that the papers had refused to disclose the sources to the court (China File 
2014).
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In Hong Kong, China, the Interpretation and General Clauses Ordinance was used in 2013 
by the Independent Commission Against Corruption which went to court to apply for 
orders to try to compel two media organizations to produce interview tapes and notes 
for its officers to use in criminal investigations. It was the first time that a law enforcement 
agency had resorted to production orders since the enactment of the 1995 law, which offers 
additional protection to journalistic material. The applications were ultimately rejected by 
a judge (Buddle 2015).
A number of cases have tested the protections of the shield laws passed in six Australian 
legal jurisdictions since 2011. A recent judgment deemed that discovery orders were 
permitted to uncover sources if the only ‘tangible risk of adverse consequences’ was the 
risk of a source being sued for defamation (Liu v The Age Company [2012] NSWSC 12) 
(Fernandez 2014). In 2014, an Australian academic launched legal proceedings against 
a publication in an attempt to force the revelation of the source of published emails 
containing remarks he made. The court rejected claims of a breach of privacy levelled by 
the litigant, and the application to reveal the source was dropped (New Matilda 2014). In 
another case (Newspaper Ltd v Bond, 2009; Hancock Prospecting v Hancock 2009), the Supreme 
Court of Western Australia dismissed a private individual’s request for a journalist to hand 
over source information (Lidberg 2013). A separate bid by the same individual to pursue 
sources cited in an unauthorised autobiography failed on the basis of the precedent set in 
the first case and in terms of the applicability of Western Australia’s new shield laws (Weber 
2014; Hancock Prospecting v Hancock, 2013; WASC 290). 
Also in Australia, it was reported by Guardian Australia in 2015 that several Government 
agencies had referred cases of confidential source-dependent journalism, about issues 
affecting asylum seekers, to the Australian Federal Police (AFP) for investigation into 
“unauthorised disclosure of commonwealth information”, with a view to identifying the 
sources and other whistleblowers (Farrell 2015 a). 
In Tajikistan, a new media law was introduced in 2013 that effectively reversed an obligation 
on journalists to identify sources (See Article 32 ‘Journalists’ Duties’, The Law of the Republic 
of Tajikistan). In Article 26, the new law imposes a legal obligation upon journalists not to 
reveal their sources (See related discussion in Case Study 2; ARTICLE 19, 2014)
In Timor-Leste, the National Congress of Journalism, an historic gathering of the country’s 
journalists approved a new journalism Code of Ethics in 2013 (Republica Democratica 
De Timor-Leste, 2013; Pearson 2013). This was enshrined via a new media law that was 
approved in the National Parliament in May, 2014.  Article 19, subsection 4 of the Code of 
Ethics protects the journalists’ right to professional secrecy, stating that journalists ‘may not 
be forced to disclose their sources of information, except when so ordered by a court under 
the criminal procedure law’ (Decree No. 10/III).
In another development, Turkmenistan introduced a media law in 2013. Among other 
things, the duties of a journalist are defined, and these include the need to maintain the 
confidentiality of information and/or its source (article 31, subsection 5). Journalists are 
not entitled to identify the person who provided the information on condition of non-
disclosure of her/his name, except in the case of a corresponding demand from the court 
(article 39). The law had not been tested at the time of writing. 
In Malaysia, a Court of Appeal judgement found that a reporter did not have to reveal the 
sources of a story in a defamation case (Mageswari, 2014). In a second case, in 2010 The 
Star Publications sought judicial review on a case in which a journalist refused to hand over 
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notes for examination (Hong Chieh 2010; Loh 2010). The review was granted but The Star 
later withdrew the challenge (Sun Daily 2010).
Regional conclusion
 The region experienced developments over the period in 18 of 24 countries surveyed, 
as regards the issues of a) national security/anti-terrorism impacts; b) Surveillance; c) 
Data retention/handover and the role of third party intermediaries; d) Questions about 
entitlement to claim source protection; e) Other digital dimensions (digitally stored 
journalistic communications being seized), f ) Anonymity issues, and g) Other dimensions.
6.4. Europe and North America
i. Europe
“The protections are strongest in Europe where the European Court of Human Rights has 
specifically found in favour of the right of protection and the Council of Europe has issued 
detailed guidelines on the protections” (Banisar 2007 p. 13).
Since 2007, developments have been identified in 23 European countries, out of the 36 
(64%) examined as a subset of UNESCO Member States identified for study.












16 Slovenia is also a UNESCO State where further research is recommended. It fell outside this Study’s 
scope, however the author noted relevant developments, as reported by a Slovenian academic survey 
respondent, including limits of the existing legal source protection framework in the digital era. 
Additionally, an investigative journalist faced criminal charges after publishing information allegedly 
based on leaks (OSCE 2014 http://www.osce.org/fom/151736). She was called to reveal her sources during 
the trial but the prosecutor withdrew the charges before a verdict was delivered http://globaljournalist.
org/2015/04/slovenia-drops-state-secrets-charge-against-reporter/ Similarly, a 2010 case in Serbia is 














• The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
• Turkey
• United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
The Media Legal Defence Initiative’s Peter Noorlander, interviewed for this study, commented 
that there was a steady stream of cases before the European Court of Human Rights, where 
police had used search and seizure laws and argued that not all journalistic material qualified 
as confidential. He added: “The European Court has held a high line and declared violations 
of source protection and the right to freedom of expression in (nearly) all these cases, but 
the States concerned have been slow to implement them” (Noorlander 2015).
The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s (OSCE) Safety of Journalism 
Guidebook (Horsley 2012) noted “persistent threats of prosecution which contradict the 
accepted right to the protection of sources are of concern”. The OSCE’s Representative 
on Freedom of the Media, Dunja Mijatović, has also routinely condemned threats to legal 
source protection frameworks in Europe and North America during the period.
a. National Security/Anti-terrorism impacts
In January 2015, the attack on the Charlie Hebdo newspaper in Paris, European Interior 
Ministers issued a joint statement in the immediate aftermath of the attack explaining the 
need to take measures in the interests of national security (EU 2015; Posetti 2015a). 
Earlier, the Snowden revelations also led to actions by governments in Europe that have 
impacted on the protection of sources, in instances such as the requirement that The 
Guardian destroy hard drives (Majumdar 2013), and the detention of a journalist’s partner at 
Heathrow airport, along with the concurrent seizure of journalistic material (Bowcott 2014). 
In early 2015 The Guardian published a new cache of Snowden files that reported that a 
UK Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) information security assessment 
listed “investigative journalists” in a threat hierarchy (Ball 2015). In June 2015, the UK’s 
Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, David Anderson QC published the report 
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A Question of Trust: Report of the Investigatory Powers Review (Anderson 2015) which stated 
that: “… the ability of a whistleblower to reveal state misconduct and of a journalist to 
report it requires an assurance that the journalist’s sources will not be made known to the 
state” (See also discussion of Anderson’s recommendations in the Mass Surveillance and 
Data Retention sections below).
Also in the UK, the Terrorism Act (2000) has been used to require materials from journalists 
who investigated or interviewed terror suspects. In 2008, a freelance journalist was required 
to hand over data pertaining to communications with a terror subject during research for 
a book.  The High Court conducted a judicial review of the case and required the journalist 
to hand the material directly gathered from the suspect, but further ruled that he was not 
required to give up materials gathered from other sources (Shiv Malik v Attorney General 
[2008] EWHC 1362) (Fitzsimmons 2008).
In 2009, Germany adopted an anti-terrorism law that provided greater power to authorities 
(namely the BKA – Germany’s Federal Criminal Police Office) to conduct covert surveillance 
(Spiegel Online International 2008). Paragraph 20 of the law provided journalists’ 
communications, along with those of doctors and lawyers, to be intercepted in the absence 
of a requirement for probable cause if a public interest was detected (Hawley 2009, see also 
McGauran 2009). 
The French Senate passed new anti-terrorism legislation in June 2015 (Loi renseignement 
2015) that expanded surveillance powers and granted law enforcement agencies special 
surveillance powers, including new monitoring processes and methods of investigation 
with limited judicial oversight (OSCE 2015). 
Hungary introduced new media legislation in 2010 in terms of which a journalist protecting 
a source (or associated data) could be fined up to €661,000, and a publisher fined €180,000 if 
there was an issue of ‘state security’ (Mayr 2011). This legislation was then amended in 2012 
following a Constitutional Court judgement. According to the amendment, sources must 
be disclosed only if they provide evidence that would be necessary to resolve a criminal 
case. Judges enjoy a large margin of discretion in balancing the journalist’s obligation to 
protect the source and the need to disclose the information in order to solve a criminal case 
(European University Institute: 2014; Falchetta 2015). 
b.  Mass surveillance and targeted surveillance
In France, in 2013, article 13 of a new law was introduced, enabling significantly expanded 
government surveillance of French citizens (Assemblée Nationale (b): 2013). The new law 
allowed a wide range of public officials (including police, gendarmes, intelligence and anti-
terrorist agencies, as well as several government ministries) to directly monitor computer, 
tablet and smartphone use in real time, and without prior authorisation, for the purpose 
of gathering metadata (Willsher 2013). This legislation contains no exemptions that could 
apply to journalistic communications.
In July 2015, CNN reported that NSA surveillance of German journalists and their sources 
had led to a foreign agency revealing the identity of one of these sources to the German 
Government in 2011 (Tapper 2015; Der Spiegel 2015).
In February 2015, an opposition leader in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
claimed that he had obtained evidence that over 20,000 citizens had been subjected to 
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unauthorized surveillance  (IFEX 2015). Among the reported targets were more than 100 
journalists. According to Deutsche Welle, the journalists were invited to the opposition 
party’s headquarters to collect folders and documents filled with transcripts of their 
conversations spanning a two-year period (Georgievski 2015).
An instance of wiretapping of journalists in Lithuania was declared illegal by the Vilnius 
Regional Court in August 2014 (OSCE 2014c). The Vilnius District Court had sanctioned 
wiretapping of BNS news agency journalists at the end of 2013 at the request of the Special 
Investigation Service following an article (based on confidential sources), which was 
published by BNS. The regional Court also found that secret surveillance, searches and an 
order to reveal the sources of information were unlawful. 
In 2014, the UK’s Bureau of Investigative Journalism (BIJ) and a journalist filed an application 
with the European Court of Human Rights (Bureau of Investigative Journalism and Alice 
Ross v. The United Kingdom (2014) 62322/14) to rule on whether UK legislation properly 
protects journalists’ sources and communications from government scrutiny and mass 
surveillance. The case argued that bulk collection of communications data, using methods 
such as Internet cable tapping, breaches international human rights law (Oldroyd 2014). It 
was argued by the Bureau that the UK Government’s practices of intercepting, collecting, 
storing and analysing data, including metadata, under the Regulation of Investigative 
Powers Act 2000 (see discussion on RIPA in the Data Retention section below) make it 
substantially harder for journalists to guarantee confidentiality to their sources (ECHR 2014). 
A number of other surveillance developments with relevance to source protection have 
occurred in the UK. The country’s Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT) found in early 2015 
that the regime governing the sharing of electronic communications collected by Britain 
and the US had been unlawful until disclosures were made by the UK’s Government 
Communications Headquarters agency (GCHQ) in 2014 (06/02/15 IPT/13/77/H Liberty 
& Others vs. the Security Service, SIS, GCHQ; Bowcott a 2015). However, the NSA-GCHQ 
relationship was deemed legal from the point at which it had been disclosed (05/12/14 
IPT/13/77/H Liberty & Others vs. the Security Service, SIS, GCHQ.) The litigants announced 
their intention to appeal to the European Court of Human Rights.
Also in 2015, the UK’s Home Office published a Draft Equipment Interference Code of 
Practice (UK Government 2015) which references journalistic source confidentiality 
and suggests that particular consideration should be given when accessing such data 
through means it describes as “equipment interference”. Point 3.23 states that: “Confidential 
journalistic material includes material acquired or created for the purposes of journalism 
and held subject to an undertaking to hold it in confidence, as well as communications 
resulting in information being acquired for the purposes of journalism and held subject to 
such an undertaking”. The Code requires agencies to carefully consider the necessity and 
proportionality of moves to access such data, to detail the reasons for doing so, to destroy 
the data when it is no longer needed, and to take reasonable steps to ensure the data is 
marked ‘confidential’ if it is handed to outside bodies. However, it does not indicate a data 
retention time limit (Travis 2015).
Further in 2015, the UK parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) released a 
report titled Privacy and Security: A modern and transparent legal framework, which noted 
that the authorities had capacity to trawl massive sets of personal data without statutory 
oversight. It also found that the UK’s legal framework has developed in a “piecemeal” 
manner, was “unnecessarily complicated” and lacked transparency (ISCP 2015). 
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In his report released in June 2015, the UK Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, 
David Anderson QC, recommended judicial review of requests for interception warrants to 
acquire communications data of people who handle privileged or confidential information, 
including journalists. Anderson also proposed that the authorisation should be flagged 
for the attention of the Independent Surveillance and Intelligence Commission (ISIC) in 
the interests of accountability and transparency. Recommendation 68 of his Report states: 
“If communications data is sought for the purposes of determining matters that are 
privileged or confidential such as…the identity of or a journalist’s confidential source, the 
Designated Person should be obliged either to refuse the request or to refer the matter to 
ISIC for a Judicial Commissioner to decide whether to authorise the request” (Anderson 
2015). At the time of writing, the UK Government had not committed itself to Anderson’s 
recommendations (Sparrow 2015). However, in 2015 it indicated that it would soon bring 
forward new legislation (Lomas, 2015). 
When the research for this Study was completed in July 2015, there were several other 
significant UK cases pertaining to surveillance pending in UK and European courts with 
potential implications for source protection in the digital age. 
In Bulgaria, in the course of an ensuing government investigation into the beating of 
an investigative journalist, mass wiretapping of journalists and government officials was 
revealed (Basille 2009; OSCE 2008; Slate 2009).17 
According to the Russian state news agency Ria Novosti (РИА Новости), the number of 
intercepted telephone conversations significantly increased between 2007 and 2012. While 
the Federal Security Service (FSB) is the principle agency responsible for communications 
surveillance, several other Russian security agencies can access a surveillance system in 
accordance with provisions on privacy in the Constitution (article 23), the federal law on 
surveillance (Об оперативно-розыскной деятельности) and other laws (Constitution 
of the Russian Federation 1993; Federal law on surveillance N  144-ФЗ; Federal Law on 
communications N 126-ФЗ; Ria Novosti 2013; Lewis J A 2014; World Policy 2013). 
Polish newspaper Gazeta Wyborcza published an article in 2010 claiming that a number 
of political journalists were under illegal surveillance. Between 2005 and 2007, Polish 
intelligence agencies obtained and analysed the telecommunications data from the author 
of the article (Szymielewic & Walkowiak 2014). In 2011, the journalist took civil action against 
one of the agencies, and in 2012, a Warsaw district court ruled that the use of his telephone 
data violated his right to privacy and constituted a breach of his freedom of expression 
rights. The court ordered the agency to apologise to the journalist and required it to delete 
all data relating to him. 
In Turkey, a law expanding the powers of the National Intelligence Agency came into force 
in April 2014 which permits collection of Internet traffic data (Turkey 2014).  
Belgium’s Law on Protection of Journalists’ Sources (2005) prohibits the use of ‘any detection 
measure or investigative measure’ of any protected media person unless it is authorized 
by a judge under the same restrictions as required to compel a journalist to reveal his/her 
source of information. 
17 There have been legislative developments subsequently:  
http://sofiaecho.com/2009/12/22/834248_electronic-communication-act-amendments-for-first-reading-in-parliament ;  




c.  Data retention/Third party intermediaries 
Protection of journalistic sources in relation to data retention and access, and in relation to 
Internet companies, was the subject of debate in the UK in 2014/2015, following two high 
profile cases where police accessed journalists’ communications records with the explicit 
aim of identifying sources, using the Regulatory Investigative Powers Act (RIPA) to do so 
(Turvill 2014). 
Confidentiality of journalistic sources in the UK is protected by the Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act (PACE) of 1984 which excludes certain material from seizure, including:
• Journalistic material which a person holds in confidence and which consists—
i. of documents; or
ii. of records other than documents.
Journalistic material is defined as follows:
• A person holds journalistic material in confidence for the purposes of this section if—
a. He [or she] holds it subject to such an undertaking, restriction or obligation; and
b. It has been continuously held (by one or more persons) subject to such an undertaking, 
restriction or obligation, since it was first acquired or created for the purposes of 
journalism.
The Regulation of Investigative Powers Act (RIPA 2000), originally intended to safeguard 
national security as an anti-terrorism measure, allows police to circumvent the PACE. The Sun 
newspaper has applied to the Investigative Powers Tribunal for a review of the Metropolitan 
Police’s use of RIPA to access and analyse mobile phone records (O’Carroll 2014). It is alleged 
that the police action breached Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
in ordering Vodafone to hand over the records (Ponsford 2015c). Since the application was 
lodged, it has been revealed that the phone records of two other Sun journalists were also 
intercepted in the course of the same police investigation (Ponsford & Turvill 2015). 
Also in 2012, Essex police accessed the phone data of two Mail on Sunday journalists in the 
course of a leak investigation into the newspaper’s coverage of speeding fines issued to a 
former cabinet minister (Greenslade 2014).
A report assessing the nature of the RIPA surveillance powers was published in mid-2015 by 
the Interception of Communications Commissioner, Sir Anthony May (May 2015). It found 
that the RIPA legislation ‘did not provide adequate safeguards to protect journalistic sources’ 
(Press Gazette 2015). Specifically, it found:
• In the three-year period covered by the inquiry, 19 police forces sought communications 
data in relation to 34 investigations into suspected illicit relationships between public 
officials (sources) and journalists. 
• 608 applications were authorised to seek this communications data
The result was that police forces were able to secretly view phone records of 82 journalists 
during the period, allowing them to identify the journalists’ sources (Ponsford 2015a). 
May’s report recommended that: “Judicial authorisation is obtained in cases where 
81
communications data is sought to determine the source of journalistic information” (May 
2015; The Guardian 2015). The report also stated that that the police forces did not give 
the question of necessity, proportionality and collateral intrusion sufficient consideration 
(Bureau of Investigative Journalism 2015). 
In May 2015, in response to growing concerns about the impact of RIPA disclosures on 
journalistic source protection, temporary measures were introduced to amend the UK 
Serious Crime Bill. The new rules required the police force to seek judicial approval before 
viewing a journalist’s phone records in a criminal investigation.18 
In July 2014, the Data Retention and Investigative Powers Act (DRIPA) was fast-tracked 
into law, requiring bulk retention of data for 12 months, and extending the definition of 
telecommunications services in RIPA to include email and other Internet-based services, 
without exceptions for material covered by legal, medical or journalistic professional 
confidentiality.  In July 2015, the High Court of Justice declared bulk data retention under 
the DRIP Act illegal (Case No: CO/3665/2014, CO/3667/2014, CO/3794/). According to the 
judgement, aspects of the Act were unlawful because they breached Articles 7 and 8 of the 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (BBC 2015a). They declared that section 1 of the act “does 
not lay down clear and precise rules providing for access to and use of communications 
data” and should be “disapplied”. The court identified two key problems with the law: 1) it 
did not provide for independent court or judicial scrutiny to ensure that only data deemed 
“strictly necessary” is examined 2) there was no definition of what constitutes “serious 
offences” in relation to which material can be investigated. They suspended their order 
until March 31 2016 in order to “give parliament the opportunity to put matters right”. The 
Home Office security minister announced that the UK Government would seek to appeal 
the judgement (Bowcott 2015b).
In April 2012, Austria introduced a data retention law, which required telecommunications 
companies and Internet service providers to store user data for up to six months. This was 
then ruled unconstitutional by the Austrian Constitutional Court, as it violated fundamental 
European privacy rights (PC World 2014).  A 2012 Security Policy Act enabled monitoring, 
wiretapping, filming and geolocation of individuals by state authorities (Freedom House 
2014a). 
In Germany, a data retention law passed in 2008 was overturned in 2010 by the Federal 
Constitutional Court and declared unconstitutional because it breached German privacy 
laws. The law had required telecommunication companies and Internet-service providers to 
store citizens’ communications data, including their Internet browsing history, for up to six 
months. Additionally, it permitted the wiretapping of lawyers, doctors, and journalists under 
certain circumstances. The Supreme Court found that there were insufficient safeguards 
and oversights and it ordered that all previously retained data be deleted immediately 
(Freedom House 2011a; Der Spiegel 2010; ERDI 2010).19
In 2011, however, Germany’s Constitutional Court found that the legislature did not have to 
provide journalists the same confidentiality protections applied to other professions, such 
as lawyers. (Freedom House 2012a). 
18 See also the discussion of the News of the World ‘phone hacking’ scandal in the next section of this report 
19 Romania is not covered in this Study’s analysis on methodological grounds, but it can be noted that the 
country’s Constitutional Court also twice ruled that country’s data retention laws unconstitutional (in 2009 
and 2014) c.f. https://edri.org/romania-aftermath-of-second-ccr-data-retention-ruling/
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At the time of writing, the Polish Constitutional Court was considering six complaints from 
the Ombudsman and Prosecutor General arguing for limitations on the powers available to 
intelligence and law enforcement operatives in Poland. In 2012, the mandatory data retention 
period of two years was reduced to 12 months. Two bills - one seeking to limit intelligence 
agencies’ access to Polish citizens’ telecommunications data, and the other providing for 
oversight of intelligence agencies’ complaints processes – were under consideration in 2014 
(GISWatch 2014). (See also the case of mentioned under the surveillance section above).
Dutch lawyers, journalists, privacy organizations and publishers were, at the time of writing, 
taking legal action against the Dutch government in opposition to legislation that requires 
telecom firms to store phone and email information (NU.nl 2014; DutchNews.nl 2014). Legal 
counsel for the complainants alleged that the legislation conflicts with judgments of the 
European Court of Justice in 2014. 
The European Court of Justice earlier found the Irish Data Retention Directive was invalid 
on the grounds that it “interferes in a particularly serious manner with the fundamental 
rights to respect for private life and to the protection of personal data” (NU.nl 2014).  In 
response to criticism from these groups in late 2014, the Dutch Government amended the 
provisions, but still kept the data retention legislation on the grounds that it was needed for 
investigation and prosecution of serious criminal offenses (Rijksoverheid 2015). 
On 23 April 2014, the Slovak Constitutional Court preliminarily suspended Slovakian 
implementation of the 2006 European Union Data Retention Directive, which had been 
given force in Slovakia under the Act on Electronic Communications. The suspension 
followed a case brought in September 2010 by the European Information Society Institute 
(EISi) against data retention in Slovakia (Husovec & Lukic 2014). The laws are still formally 
valid, but have no legal effect until the Court decides on the merits of the complaint. 
In Belarus, several by-laws and governmental decrees have been approved in recent years, 
including one that requires Internet service providers to identify all Internet connections and 
to store data about their customers, and the websites they visit (Aliaksandrau & Bastunets 
2014). Telecommunications companies must record the passport details of people who buy 
SIM cards Internet café staff are required to photograph users, and operators of all cafes and 
hotels are required to register users before supplying them with Wi-Fi access. 
Georgian journalists enjoy constitutional and federal level legal protections regarding 
confidentiality. However, a clause limiting public agencies’ direct access to surveillance data 
was removed from a cybersecurity law in August 2014 (IDFI 2014). The first report of the 
Personal Data Protection Inspector (a government authority established in 2013) on the 
State of Personal Data Protection noted problems of processing of a large amount of data 
without proper legal grounds; the illegal disclosure of personal information; and failure to 
meet legal requirements related to video surveillance (Freedom House 2014m).
d.  Entitlement to protection: Who’s a journalist? What is 
journalism?
A new law adopted by the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia at the end of 2013 
addressed the question of the definition of ‘journalist’ and, therefore, to whom  source 
protection applies. The definition of journalist emphasises official contractual ties to a 
legacy-media newsroom (IREX 2014: 73).  
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Citizenship has been relevant to the issue of who is eligible to have protection of 
confidential sources. Wikileaks’ Editor-in-Chief, Julian Assange travelled to Sweden in 2010, 
before moving his organisation’s servers to the country. Wikileaks wanted to benefit from 
the country’s stringent whistleblower and source protection laws. In Sweden, if a website 
registers with the public authorities and can prove it has an Editor-in-Chief, then it can be 
certified to become legally obliged to protect confidential sources (Euractiv: 2010). Under 
Swedish law, Assange would have needed to become a Swedish citizen in order to apply for 
source protection coverage. (See also detailed discussion of the status of source protection 
in Sweden in the digital age in Thematic Study 2).
e.  Other digital dimensions
In Georgia in 2011, five photojournalists were arrested and had computers, mobile phones 
and other reporting equipment reportedly seized (Robinson M 2011; RSF 2011c). This 
example is not provided with the presumption that confidential journalistic data was 
unduly exposed.
In June 2014, a Polish magazine was repeatedly searched by the Prosecutor’s Office and 
Internal Security Agency officers (OSCE 2014c). The Editor-in-Chief was required to hand 
over recordings and electronic devices to the authorities during the searches.  This example 
is not provided with the presumption that confidential journalistic data was unduly exposed.
In July 2013, GCHQ officials in the United Kingdom oversaw editors destroying laptops 
containing the Snowden files (Fitzsimons et al 2014). The Guardian stated that it had been 
threatened with legal action by the Government to recover the laptops unless they agreed 
to destroy the data (Borger 2013; Harding 2013). By agreeing to destroy the laptops, The 
Guardian believed it was protecting both its source and its reporters.
In Hungary, the Act CLXV on Complaints and Whistleblowing came into force in January 
2014. The new law ushered in an electronic whistleblowing system operated by the 
Commissioner for Fundamental Rights (the ombudsman). Whistleblowing reports are 
registered by an anonymised code and published on the Internet in a form designed to 
be accessible to all, without any data relating to the identity of the actual whistleblower. 
The process then involves the ombudsman transferring the report to the competent 
authority for investigation (Barker Exchange 2014). The Act emphasizes the protection of 
the whistleblower as required by the UN Convention against Corruption in Articles 32 and 
33 (UN 2003). The whistleblowing facility follows a 2007 Pricewaterhouse Coopers study 
that found that whistleblowing had been very beneficial to Hungary in fraud detection 
and reporting economic crime. This model parallels similar systems established by news 
publishers in US, Africa, Latin American and Europe (see Thematic Study 1).
Publishers and source protection 
The UK ‘phone hacking’ scandal (Davies 2014), revealed by The Guardian, that began at News 
International’s News of the World and included a number of other UK tabloid publications, 
raises several complex issues in regard to confidentiality, privacy and protection of sources. 
The original scandal revealed that journalists using private investigators had illegally 
intercepted the mobile phone messages of celebrities and other citizens. This led to a 
number of high profile inquiries into the ethics of the UK tabloid press and several police 
investigations that ultimately ended with the jailing of multiple journalists and their police 
sources (BBC 2014).
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The investigations also revealed that tabloid publications had illegally paid public officials and 
police as sources of confidential information. Under growing pressure, News International 
executives established their own investigation which worked with Pricewaterhouse 
Coopers to assemble a database of 300 million emails and other documents relating to 
journalists’ phone records and expenses (Ellison 2012). Many of these records were then 
turned over to police by News International. These records have since been used by police 
to identify sources, and convict both journalists and their sources (BBC 2015b). There is 
also some evidence that police have used the data given to them by News International 
to investigate police who gave information to journalists but who were not paid (Laville 
2013) – that is, confidential sources who were not in a corrupt relationship with the press. 
News International executives have justified the voluntary turning over of records to police 
(Ellison 2012), but have been criticized by both internal (O’Carroll 2012) and external critics 
(Crook 2014).
Also flowing from the ‘phone hacking’ scandal was the Leveson Inquiry into the practices 
of the British press. In 2012, the Leveson Report (Leveson 2012) recommended weakening 
the source protection rights of journalists by suggesting that the definition of excluded 
material in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) be narrowed. PACE stipulates 
the conditions under which police can seek to obtain unpublished confidential source 
material (Phillips 2014). The Report recommended that protection should only be afforded 
to journalistic material “if it is held, or has continuously been held since it was first acquired 
or created, subject to an enforceable or lawful undertaking, restriction or obligation.” This 
implies the need for an explicit obligation of confidence between a journalist and a source 
in order for protection to be upheld. 
f.  Anonymity issues
No specific developments were registered by the researchers over the period under focus.
g.  Other dimensions 
According to Banisar (2007), 40 countries - the vast majority of countries in Europe – had 
adopted some form of legal protection for journalistic sources by 2007, the only exceptions 
being Ireland, the Netherlands, Slovakia and Greece, and smaller jurisdictions such as the 
Holy See and Andorra. The following paragraphs update this 2007 assessment. 
In the Republic of Ireland, protection of journalistic sources is not dealt with via statutory law. 
Pronouncements by the European Court of Human Rights remain the common reference 
point for Irish courts. For example, in 2007, two journalists from the Irish Times who were 
ordered by Tribunal of Inquiry to produce the original of a leaked letter published in the 
paper, were told by the Irish High Court to comply (Mahon Tribunal v Keena & anor [2009] 
IESC 78). An appeal by the journalists to the Irish Supreme Court unanimously reversed 
the order of the High Court in 2009. The Supreme Court held that the High Court had not 
‘struck the balance between the journalistic privilege derived from the exercise of the right 
to freedom of expression of the appellants and the public interest of the Tribunal in tracing 
the source of the leak’. However, the Supreme Court continued:
“The unilateral decision of a journalist to destroy evidence with intent to deprive the courts 
of jurisdiction is, as the High Court has held, designed to subvert the rule of law. The Courts 
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cannot shirk their duty to penalise journalists who refuse to answer questions legitimately 
and lawfully put to them” 
The Supreme Court held that due to ‘exceptional circumstances’ - that is, the destruction 
by the newspaper of the documents - the Irish Times had to pay all costs (Cormaic, 2014) 
which totalled €600 000 (Greenslade 2009). The Irish Times appealed the costs decision to 
the European Court of Human Rights which rejected the application.20
Slovakia legally recognised protection of journalists’ sources with the Press and News 
Agency Act No. 167/2008, and the subsequent amendment act no. 221/2011 (National 
Council of the Slovak Republic 2011). Section 4 of the Act on Protection of Information 
Sources and Content states:
The publishers of periodicals and press agencies must not disclose the source of information 
acquired for publication in a periodical, or an agency news service, or any part of the content 
of such information which would enable the identification of the source if requested not to do 
so by the natural person who provided the information, and must ensure that the disclosure 
of the content of the information does not breach the rights of third parties; they are obliged 
to take the necessary precautions in the handling of documents, printed matter and other 
media, in particular visual recordings, audio recordings and audio-visual recordings that 
could be used to identify the natural person who provided the information to ensure that the 
identity of the information source is not revealed. 
While this legislation offers stronger legal protection for journalists’ sources, it does not take 
account of the issues identified in this study pertaining to the digital era developments that 
may risk undermining such legislative guarantees, including data retention (see reference 
to Slovakian law in the relevant section above) and mass surveillance.
Iceland ratified a new law in 2011 that strengthened journalistic source protection and 
freedom of expression (Hirsch, 2010, Smith 2010).  A new Information Act was passed in 
January 2013 in which source protection is emphasised. According to the Act, journalists 
are not authorized to name their sources without their consent or a judge’s order when it 
comes to a criminal case (International Modern Media Institute, 2014).  
In Lithuania, amendments to the Law on the Provision of Information to the Public in July 
2014 limit legal coercive action to disclose sources of information. The Law requires that it 
must be established that the disclosure of a source is warranted by an issue of critical public 
importance, or the necessity to ensure the protection of constitutional rights and freedoms, 
before a source is forcibly revealed.  
In Estonia in 2010, the Ministry of Justice introduced legal amendments to the Criminal 
Code, including a provision that would allow courts to jail journalists for up to five years for 
refusing to disclose their sources in the context of serious crimes. 
France strengthened the protection of sources with a law that took effect in 2010 (LOI 
n° 2010-1 du 4 Janvier 2010). It stated that journalists could only be compelled to reveal 
sources when the information is required for the investigation of a serious crime (The 
Economist 2010). In March 2012, the Paris Court of Appeals rejected a case brought by Le 
Monde.   In 2013, a new bill was mooted in the French parliament (projet de loi n° 1127, 
20 The ECtHR stated that future costs order would have “no impact on public interest journalists who 
vehemently protect their sources yet recognise and respect the rule of law”. Mahon Tribunal v Keena & 
anor [2009] IESC 78 
86
déposé le 12 juin 2013) with the intention of expanding and strengthening the protection 
of journalistic sources (Ministry of Justice 2013). At the time of writing, it had yet to be 
approved (Assemblée Nationale (a): 2013) (RSF 2014a, Damge & Cosnard 2015). 
In June 2010, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation issued a clarification regarding 
the Law on Mass Media, stating that in a case involving the disclosure of the source of 
information, courts should follow part 2 article 41 of the Law of the Russian Federation on 
mass media under which: 
The editorial staff is obliged to keep the source of information a secret and has no right 
to name the person who has provided the information on condition of non-disclosure of 
his [sic] name, unless the court has demanded the opposite in connection with the case 
being tried. […] During any stage of the deliberations the court has the right to demand 
corresponding editorial staff disclose the information on the source if all other means of 
finding the circumstances vital for the settlement of a case are exhausted, and the public 
interest in disclosure of the source of information outweighs the public interest in keeping it a 
secret (Supreme Court of the Russian Federation: 2010).  
Portugal amended its Statute of Journalists (Journalist’s Statute Law no. 01/99) in late 2007. 
Article 11 (1) states that: “Without prejudice to the provisions established in penal procedure 
law, journalists are not required to reveal their information sources, and their silence thereof 
is not liable to any direct or indirect sanction”.
In September 2014, the Dutch parliament began considering two new Bills on the 
protection of journalistic sources, following judgments against the Netherlands over the 
European Convention on Human Rights and involving cases concerning journalists and 
source protection. The first Bill amends the Intelligence and Security Services Act 2002 
to require a binding judicial review from the Court of The Hague before intelligence and 
security services are allowed to apply their special powers to journalists in order to uncover 
their sources. This proposal addresses the main issue in the ECtHR judgment against the 
Netherlands in the Telegraaf Media case (see Regional Instruments section of the study) 
(Breemen 2014). The Bills, which were still progressing through the Dutch parliament at the 
time of writing, were welcomed by the Dutch journalists’ union (NUJ 2014).
At the time of writing, Switzerland’s Basler Zeitung was awaiting a decision by the European 
Court of Human Rights regarding its appeal against a Federal Court decision involving a 
journalist asked to reveal the identity of a source. The Basel Court of Appeal had rejected the 
State Attorney’s order that the journalist reveal the identity, however, on further appeal, the 
Federal Court found that the crime could not be solved without the journalist identifying 
the source. The court also indicated than an overriding interest in publication of the article 
did not exist because there was no evidence of political, economic or public administration 
impacts (International Law Office 2014b). 
In Armenia in 2014, Hraparak newspaper and iLur.am (an online news publisher) appealed 
to the Republic’s highest appeal court, the Court of Cassation, against a lower court order 
obliging them to reveal their confidential sources in an assault case. The court of First 
Instance and the Court of Appeal both ruled that the two media organisations should 
disclose the source of their reports, upholding the prosecution’s case that the protection of 
public interest in the criminal process was stronger than the public interest in not disclosing 
the source (Sayadyan 2014). 
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In August 2012, a district court in the Czech Republic reversed fines imposed by police on 
the weekly newspaper Respekt for refusing to reveal the source of a document related to a 
corruption scandal. The court found that the information was not necessary to the police 
investigation (Freedom House 2013b). 
Israel’s Knesset in 2014 discussed the possibility of introducing measures to provide greater 
protection for journalists who obtain national security leaks from confidential sources 
(Freedom House 2014g). The proposed law had not been ratified at the time of writing. 
The German parliament also passed a law as an amendment to the Criminal Code and Code 
of Criminal Procedure in 2012. This prohibited the prosecution of journalists for reporting 
classified information obtained from government informants as well as prohibited searches 
and confiscation of journalistic material and offices in connection to the same case (IRIS 
2012). 
In Greece, the protection of source confidentiality is mentioned only in the Code of Ethics 
for Journalists that was established in 1998 by the Journalists’ Union of the Athens Daily 
Newspapers (ESIEA). Although source protection is not established in Greek law, ESIEA’s 
code of Ethics (article 2) refers to the journalist’s rights, duties and obligations. At paragraph 
i) it says “The journalist is competent and obliged: To adhere to professional discretion as to 
the source of information which has been obtained in confidence” (ETHICNET). The code 
had no legal status at the time of writing.
ii. North America 
The two countries in North America: The United States of America and Canada both 
recorded notable developments in the arena of legal protections for journalists’ sources in 
the period 2007-2015.
Countries demonstrating changes in North America: Two out of two (100%)
• United States of America
• Canada
a.  National Security/Anti-terrorism impacts 
In the USA, the Government pursued eight leak-related prosecutions between 2008-
2015 on national security grounds (Savage 2014a). This involved confidential journalistic 
communications being subpoenaed in a number of cases, and the reaction ultimately 
leading to a revision of procedural rules in an attempt to better protect source confidentiality. 
Reference to national security issues was a factor in the case discussed below. 
In 2013, it was revealed that US Government officials had subpoenaed the telephone 
records of Associated Press (AP) reporters for a two-month period during the preceding 
year (Sherman, 2013; Savage & Kaufman 2013). This occurred notwithstanding the Justice 
Department’s own guidelines (28 C.F.R. § 50.10) (Reporters Committee for Freedom of the 
Press, 2013). AP Chief Executive Gary Pruitt stated that the records potentially revealed 
communications with confidential sources across all of the company’s news gathering 
activities during a two-month period.
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Also in 2013, Der Spiegel reported that the NSA had intercepted, read and analysed internal 
communications at Al Jazeera which had been encrypted by the news organisation (Der 
Spiegel 2013). The story was based on reported NSA documents leaked by Edward Snowden. 
The New York Times journalist James Risen faced jail for refusing to reveal a source cited in 
his 2006 book State of War after he exhausted all legal options up until a failed Supreme 
Court review (United States of America v Jeffrey Alexander Sterling; James Risen US Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, No 11 – 5028, July 19 2013) (Hillebrand 2012; Warren 2014). 
The US Justice Department later abandoned its bid to compel Risen to reveal the source 
in court after outgoing US Attorney Eric Holder said that no reporter who is doing her/his 
job would go to jail on his watch. In January 2015, the jury convicted the accused source 
without Risen’s testimony, referring to phone records showing that the two were frequently 
in contact (The Economist 2015). The source was ultimately jailed for three and a half years 
(Editorial Board, The New York Times 2015).
Another journalist’s confidential source was jailed in the US on espionage charges, after 
the FBI obtained a warrant to access Fox News reporter James Rosen’s  phone and email 
records (Case 1:10-mj-00291-AK US District Court 2010). According to court documents, 
FBI investigators also used the security-badge data of the source, in combination with 
phone records and e-mail exchanges with the journalist, to build a case. They targeted the 
movements of the source and the journalist a few hours before the story was published in 
June 2009 (Marimow 2013).
Investigators reportedly needed to access the journalist’s emails because they suspected 
that the source had deleted some from his own accounts (Savage 2014a; Case 1:10-mj-
00291-AK, US District Court 2010, 11 January 2011). The law circumvented by the search 
warrant that allowed investigators access to Rosen’s emails is U.S. Code § 2000aa ‘Searches 
and seizures by government officers and employees in connection with investigation or 
prosecution of criminal offenses’. It stipulates that: “it shall be unlawful for a government 
officer or employee, in connection with the investigation or prosecution of a criminal 
offense, to search for or seize any work product materials possessed by a person reasonably 
believed to have a purpose to disseminate to the public a newspaper, book, broadcast, 
or other similar form of public communication” unless the person is reasonably suspected 
of being directly involved in the crime to which the materials relate.  (Legal Information 
Institute, date unknown). 
In early 2015, after a period of negotiation with US media houses, their lawyers, and press 
freedom groups, and in response to strong criticism, the Goverment moved to address 
concerns about the undermining of source protection frameworks in the context of leak 
investigations. It signed into force new guidelines restricting access to journalists’ phone 
records and digital data. (See discussion in section d below).
In January 2015, journalist Barrett Brown was jailed in the US for 63 months on charges 
that amounted to linking to material released in connection with the hacking of a private 
intelligence contractor (Woolf 2015). During the trial, the FBI obtained a warrant to access 
Brown’s laptop, with the authority to seize any information related to the group Anonymous 
and others. This warrant permitted access to “email, email contacts, ‘chat’, instant messaging 
logs, photographs, and correspondence” (see also Ludlow 2013). 
In Canada, the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act – anti-terrorism legislation 
known as Bill C-51 - was passed by the parliament in June 2015 (Therrien 2015). Canadian 
Law professors Craig Forcese and Kent Roach have also pointed to the likely chilling effect 
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of the Act on freedom of expression, including journalistic communications (Forcese & 
Roach 2015).
b.  Mass Surveillance and targeted surveillance
Confidential documents leaked by Edward Snowden, first published by the US edition of 
the UK newspaper The Guardian on June 5 2013, reported that the US National Security 
Agency (NSA) monitored telecommunications metadata of citizens (Bauman et al 2014; 
Moore 2014). Another article in early 2015 reported that the NSA and GCHQ had hacked a 
company that makes phone SIM cards, which could compromise the security of millions of 
phones around the world (Scahill 2015). 
On June 2nd2015, the US Senate passed the USA Freedom Act. The Act, which supercedes 
the Patriot Act, ends the practice of bulk collection and storage of US citizens’ metadata 
phone records by the NSA. It also places responsibility for storing citizens’ data in the hands 
of private companies, mandates creation of a panel of public-interest advocates for the 
court that oversees surveillance programs (US Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 
FISA) in cases that involve novel or significant legal issues, and requires the Court to notify 
Congress when it reinterprets law.  Other surveillance powers, including email and Internet 
interception, remained unaffected (Siddiqui 2015, Ackerman 2015, Yuhas 2015).
In a case beginning in 2008, The Nation Magazine and the Pen America Centre joined an 
action against the head of the NSA and the US Attorney General in the District Court of 
New York (Amnesty International et al V Clapper et al 2008) alleging that their constitutional 
rights were being violated by electronic surveillance which undermined and obstructed 
their work with confidential sources. The case was dismissed because the plaintiffs could 
not prove that they had been subject to ‘dragnet surveillance’. However, in May 2015 in 
the Second Circuit Court of Appeal found for the plaintiffs, declaring bulk collection of 
American’s phone records illegal.
In 2013, US District Court Judge Richard J Leon ruled that the NSA’s bulk surveillance and 
long-term of telephone calls violated the Fourth Amendment privacy-related protections 
against unreasonable searches and seizures (Klayman v Obama Civil Act No. 13-0851(RJL) 
December 1, 2013). The case was the subject of an appeal by the US Government at the 
time of writing.
Pro Publica and the American Civil Liberties Union have separately launched three legal 
challenges to secrecy surrounding NSA and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 
processes regarding the authorisation of mass surveillance (Brandeisky 2013). The cases, all 
lodged in 2013, were still pending at the time of writing. 
In March 2015, The Nation Magazine, Pen America, Wikimedia, Amnesty International 
USA, Human Rights Watch and others launched a joint action in the Maryland District 
Court, challenging the NSA’s bulk interception and searching of Americans’ Internet 
communications, including emails, web-browsing content, and search-engine histories 
(Wikimedia et al Vs NSA Case 1:15-cv-00662-RDB).  (See further discussion of this case in the 
‘Entitlement to claim protection’ section below).
In Canada in 2010, a court (see discussion re: R. v. National Post 2010 below) declared that 
mass surveillance undermines commitments that journalists make to protect sources (Best 
2010). 
90
c.  Data retention/Third party intermediaries 
The AP case cited above highlighted the issue of the retention of journalists’ data, including 
data that may identify confidential sources, by third parties. Telecommunications carriers 
(phone, mobile and fixed-line broadband) companies and major Internet services are 
among these third parties, and US law enforcement and security officials have argued that 
there is no expectation of privacy for those records. The key case in this area is Smith v. 
Maryland, and it is under challenge by civil libertarians and others (Smith v Maryland 442 
US 735 Supreme Court 1979). 
The Risen case discussed earlier also shed light on the impact of data retention on reporters’ 
dealings with confidential sources. He concluded that his travel records, credit data and 
phone records had been accessed (CBS 2015). Similarly, in the aforementioned Rosen case, 
the reporter’s email correspondence and phone records were subpoenaed. There was a 
media outcry in response and Rosen was not prosecuted (The Intercept 2014). 
Other cases of data retention and access took place with potential relevance to source 
protection. It emerged in early 2015 that Google had turned over data about Wikileaks and 
its staff to the US Government, under a secret search warrant that included instructions 
not to tell Wikileaks (Kravets 2015). The search company did not tell Wikileaks in a timely 
manner after it was released from the gag order. Ross La Jeunesse, Global Head of Free 
Expression and International Relations at Google, told the author that the company deals 
daily with thousands of requests for revelations and Google frequently pushes back against 
such requests “But we are under the law and we are forced to comply if it’s been through 
due legal process” (Posetti 2015c).
In 2013, the US Government sought access to the encrypted email messages and metadata 
of a user of the Lavabit encrypted email service in the Eastern District Court of Virginia (US 
V Lavabit) The owner of Lavabit resisted, shut the company down and the case was under 
appeal in mid-2015 (Phillips M and Buchanan M 2013).
Several third party intermediaries, including Google, Microsoft, Facebook, LinkedIn and 
Yahoo successfully challenged a range of cases of US Government requests for their clients’ 
data before US courts in 2013, enabling them to make limited revelations. (c.f. Brandeisky 
2013). These judgements served to increase a degree of transparency around such requests.
In 2011 and 2013, the Electronic Frontier Foundation brought actions on behalf of two 
unnamed telecommunications companies who challenged the legitimacy of so-called 
National Security Letters. These US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) ‘letters’ make it 
illegal to disclose information about US Government demands for citizens’ phone records. 
A Federal judge ruled in favour of the plaintiff in one case on the grounds that the ‘letters’ 
were unconstitutional and ordered the FBI to stop producing them (US District Court 2013). 
However, he found against the plaintiff in the second case (US District Court 2013b) and 
the US Government was in the process of appealing the first decision at the time of writing. 
d.  Entitlement to Protection: Who is a journalist? What is 
journalism?
At the time of writing, the US was debating a proposed federal shield law in the Senate 
(Free Flow of Information Act of 2013). The definition of “journalist” under the Bill includes 
someone who was an “employee, independent contractor or agent of an entity or service” 
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who, among other things, “disseminates news or information by means of newspaper…
news website, mobile application or other news or information service (whether distributed 
digitally or otherwise)” (Free Flow of Information Act of 2013, s11(1)(a)i)(I) ‘Covered journalist’). 
The section also defines journalism methods, such as “collecting interviews”. (Free Flow of 
Information Act of 2013, s11 (1)(a)i)(I) ‘Covered journalist’). The bill had not become law by 
the time of this Study’s conclusion in July 2015 and it is uncertain whether it would extend 
to bloggers doing journalism.  
In some US states, such as California (Cf O’Grady v. Superior Court, 139 Cal. App.4th 1423), 
legislatures and courts have explicitly extended the protection to non-traditional journalists 
operating as online news producers.  
Canadian courts have also discussed the issue in case law. The Canadian Supreme Court 
justices, referring to the precedent Grant v. Torstar Corp., 2009 SCC 61, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 640, 
stated that law enforcement would be weakened if source protection was not limited to 
the traditional media (R. v. National Post, 2010 SCC 16, [2010] 1 at para 40). 
e. Other digital dimensions
In one reported case, police searched the home of a Journal de Montréal reporter, taking his 
computer (RSF 2012). This example is not provided with the presumption that confidential 
journalistic data was unduly exposed.
f.  Anonymity issues 
No additional developments were recorded during the research period.
g.  Other dimensions
As indicated above, at the time of writing, the US was debating the introduction of a 
federal shield law. This was against the backdrop of fragmented and differing shield laws 
found at state level, which has highlighted a need for a consistent application of shield 
law protections at federal level for US journalists. According to the Reporters Committee 
For Freedom of the Press, 36 states plus the District of Columbia now have a journalists’ 
“privilege” (Ruane 2011) in their laws or rules (with Utah and New Mexico recognising the 
privilege through court-adopted rules). All of the other states — apart from Wyoming — 
have court decisions recognising some level of special protection (Leslie, 2008). 
The disparity of state shield laws was illustrated when the accused in a court case attempted 
in 2013 to compel a New-York-based Fox News journalist to reveal her confidential source. 
However, an appeal court found that Jana Winter was protected under New York’s shield 
laws from revealing her source, and she was not subject to the weaker Colorado laws (In the 
Matter of James Holmes v. Winter, __ N.E.2d __, 2013 WL 6410422, 2013 N.Y. Slip Op. 08194 at 
23, 25 (Dec. 10, 2013).)
As discussed earlier in this Study, the US Government has been criticised in connection 
with actions designed to discover journalists’ sources, in the course of leak investigations 
(Savage 2014b). In response to these concerns, the US Government embarked upon a series 
of high-level consultations with media industry representatives, advocates, academics 
and press freedom organisations. Following these consultations, the US Department of 
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Justice published the Report on News Media Policies in July 2013 which carried a preamble 
describing revisions designed to “strike the proper balance among several vital interests,” 
such as protecting national security and “safeguarding the essential role of the free press in 
fostering government accountability and an open society” and contained recommendations 
for renovating procedures (DOJ 2013). The recommendations included: 
i. Reversing the Existing Presumption Regarding Advance Notice
This new rule requires authorities to notify news media in advance when access to their 
communications records is sought, in all but the most exceptional cases.
ii. Enhanced Approvals for Use of Search Warrants and Section 2703 (d) Orders 
This rule limits the power to over-ride the journalistic materials seizure exception by 
stipulating that it can be circumvented only when the member of the news media is the 
subject of a criminal investigation for conduct not connected to ordinary newsgathering 
activities. Secondly, the rule requires applicants for search and seizure warrants pertaining 
to news media activities to establish that such access is essential and that permissions are 
narrowly framed to ensure that only material necessary for the investigation is targeted. 
iii. Establishment of a News Media Review Committee
This Committee (comprised of experts within the Justice Department who are not involved 
in the cases under consideration) is established to advise the Attorney General when 
Departmental officers request: a) access to news media records in leak investigations; b) 
authority to access the reporting records of a member of the news media without prior 
notice; c) testimony from a member of the news media that would expose a confidential 
source.
iv. Centralisation of Review and Public Reporting Requirements
This provision is designed to enhance oversight and tracking of the outcome of DOJ 
requests for news media subpoenas.
v. Intelligence Community Certification 
This certification process is designed to ensure that requests for access to news media 
records in the case of investigations connected to revelations of classified or national 
security-related information are proportionate. 
vi. Safeguarding information
This clause promises a revision of the safeguards regarding proper use and handling of the 
communications records of members of the news media. It intends to ensure that records 
obtained are kept secure, while limiting access, usage and sharing of the data.
vii. Technical Revisions
With significance for this study, this point acknowledges the need to account for 
technological changes in newsgathering, distribution and publication. It extends the rules 
above to the records of news media members that are held by third party intermediaries.
viii.  Written Guidance and Training Requirements
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This point highlights the need to ensure that law enforcement officers and relevant 
Department officials are educated about the above changes and equipped to implement 
them.
ix. Establishment of a News Media Dialogue Group
The value of stakeholder engagement in regulating access to private news media 
communications is recognised here. The Group is described as having representatives from 
the news media, the DOJ and its Director of Public Affairs.
x. Intelligence Agency Administrative Remedies
This point provides guidelines for investigating leaks designed to internalise enquiries to 
limit impacts on the news media. 
Following up on these recommendations, the USA’s Attorney General signed off on a 
new set of Department of Justice guidelines in February 2014. Titled Policy Regarding 
Obtaining Information From, or Records of, Members of the News Media; and Regarding 
Questioning, Arresting or Charging Members of the News Media, the new rules (DOJ 2014) 
include the presumption that news media will receive advance notice from prosecutors 
when attempts are made to access their journalistic communications. They also further 
limit exceptions to a law forbidding search warrants for journalistic material unless they 
are suspected of criminal activity, stating that warrants cannot be invoked in the context 
of ordinary newsgathering activities. The new rules apply to criminal investigations, and 
exempt wiretap and search warrants obtained under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act (FISA) as well as subpoenas used to obtain records about communications in terrorism 
and counter espionage investigations on national security grounds.
In Canada, in 2010, a reporter in possession of documents alleging the fraudulent conduct 
of a third party successfully had search warrants set aside, after he claimed that he obtained 
them from a confidential source (R. v. National Post, 2010 SCC 16, [2010] 1). However, the 
Canadian Supreme Court rejected the reporter’s claim to a constitutional right to shield the 
identity of sources during criminal investigations, instead favouring deciding the issues on 
a case-by-case basis. In considering the appeal, the Court relied on the Wigmore Criteria to 
determine that the journalist in the case could not claim a right to source protection (2010 
SCC 16). John Henry Wigmore was an expert on evidence law (Best 2010) who developed 
these criteria in his influential “Treatise on the Anglo-American System of Evidence in Trials 
at Common Law” (Wigmore 1923). Wigmore suggested that confidentiality would be 
upheld if the following criteria were met:
1. The communication originates in a confidence that it will not be disclosed…;
2. The confidence must be essential to the relationship in which the communication 
arises;
3. The relationship must be one which should be “sedulously21 fostered” in the public 
good. And (if all of the criteria 1-3 have been satisfied) then;
21 (“Sedulous[ly]” being defined in the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles (6th ed. 
2007), vol. 2, at p. 2755, as “diligent[ly] . . . deliberately and consciously”. R. v. National Post [2010] 1 SCR 477, 
at para [53]
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4. The court must consider whether in the instant case the public interest served by 
protecting the identity of the informant from disclosure outweighs the public interest 
in getting at the truth 
The judges concluded by majority opinion that: 
The bottom line is that no journalist can give a source a total assurance of confidentiality. All 
such arrangements necessarily carry an element of risk that the source’s identity will 
eventually be revealed.  In the end, the extent of the risk will only become apparent when all 
the circumstances in existence at the time the claim for privilege is asserted are known and 
can be weighed up in the balance.  What this means, amongst other things, is that a source 
who uses anonymity to put information into the public domain maliciously may not in the 
end avoid a measure of accountability (2010 SCC 16: 69)
Also in Canada, in 2012 three cases emerged involving attempts to compel journalists 
to reveal their sources or the use of search warrants to discover them. In the first case, a 
Quebec judge ordered a journalist from the news website MediaSud to reveal his sources 
for a story on the leak of a confidential report to another journalist. In the second case, a 
Quebec court ruled against an attempt by a real estate developer to get a Radio-Canada 
reporter to reveal his source. 
Regional Conclusion 
25 out of 38 (66%) of countries examined in the UNESCO region of Europe and North 
America experienced significant developments pertaining to source protection laws in 
the period 2007-2015. These changes reflected the key themes identified in this report 
associated with emerging digital effects on legal source protection frameworks: a) national 
security/anti-terrorism impacts; b) Surveillance; c) Data retention/handover and the role of 
third party intermediaries; d) Questions about entitlement to claim source protection; e) 
Increased risk of source exposure due to digitally stored journalistic communications being 
seized during investigations. 
6.5. Latin America and The Caribbean
The recognition of protection of journalistic sources is generally respected in Latin America 
both at the regional and local levels. Most countries have adopted constitutional or legal 
protections which give a strong level of legal protection. …There are also important 
declarations from the Organization of American States. Few journalists have been forced 
to reveal their sources by courts, however direct demands for sources still occur regularly in 
many countries, requiring journalists to seek legal recourse in courts. There are also problems 
with searches of newsrooms and journalists’ homes, surveillance and the use of national 
security laws. (Banisar, 2007: 81)
Between 2007-2015, a number of developments in Latin America have had an actual or 
potential bearing on source protection, including mass surveillance, national security 
legislation, searches of newsrooms and journalists’ homes, and physical threats.
At the individual States level, developments in regard to source protection coverage 2007-
2015 were identified in 17 of the 20 countries (85%) examined in Latin America and the 


















• Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of )
According to the Editor-in-Chief of Argentina’s La Nacion, Carlos Guyot, who spoke 
to this study’s research team, in Latin America the laws are strong in many settings but 
enforcement is weak (Guyot 2015). In addition, while many countries have laws in place to 
protect journalists’ sources, it is increasingly evident that sources can be identified by other 
means such as intercepts, threats, searches, accessing stored data, and biometrics. These 
factors, along with the classification and restriction of information in the name of national 
security, have relevance to whether protections for journalists’ sources are substantively 
effective.
Surveillance was a theme in ten of the countries studied, five of which (Bolivia, Ecuador, 
Colombia, Paraguay, Mexico) introduced new laws that allow data retention and/or 
interception during the period examined. Four countries (Peru, Honduras, Panama, Costa 
Rica) have proposed variations to state secret laws or information classification laws which, 
in some cases, allow for prison sentences, for revealing such information.  Three countries in 
the region introduced new source protection dispensations, including the one enshrined 
in the 2010 Constitution of the Dominican Republic. 
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a.  National Security/Anti-terrorism impacts 
Overly broad regulations instituted in the name of national security and anti-terrorism 
measures may be seen to pose a risk to journalistic source protection in parts of Latin 
America. 
Peru’s Decree No. 1129 classifies all information related to national security and defence as 
a state secret (Article 12). It imposes a punishment of up to 15 years in prison for those who 
reveal such information. According to the Inter American Press Association (IAPA 2013), the 
Decree states that: “any person who by reason of his or her position or function, becomes 
aware of classified information of a secret, reserved, or confidential nature, related to Security 
and National Defence, is obliged to keep the corresponding secrecy”.  The Computer 
Crimes Law enacted in 2013 penalizes the release of classified or secret information that 
compromises national defence security with five to 10 years in prison (Khan, 2013). In 
February 2013, the Ombudsman’s Office of Peru filed an action of unconstitutionality against 
Article 12 of the Decree, arguing that it violated the right to access public information 
because: “The article establishes the secret nature of all documentation or information 
regarding matters referring to national security and defense, along with the obligation of 
every person to maintain secret all information on such matters in their possession” (Botero 
2013; IPYS/IFEX 2012; OSF 2014c).  The outcome of this action was unknown by mid-2015 
when the research for this study was concluded.
In January 2014, the Honduran parliament approved the Official Secrets Law, which was 
then suspended pending further study. The law gives state entities the power to classify 
information from “restricted” to “ultra-secret”. In Article 13, those with access to classified 
information are warned that revealing it leads to sanctions (Griffen 2014).
El Salvador’s Public Access to Information Law (LAIP), first passed in 2010, also includes a 
classification of information as military secrets and data compromising national security. 
The classification allows for formal punishments for accessing or revealing such information, 
even if it is in the public interest (Bachmann 2010). Also in 2010, the Legislative Assembly 
introduced a motion to subject staffers to a polygraph test in order to identify an individual 
who had leaked information to the media concerning salaries for legislators. However, this 
initiative was withdrawn due to public opposition (Freedom House 2011c).
Venezuela saw the introduction of the Strategic Centre of Security and Protection 
of the Homeland (Decree CESPPA), which has a wide mandate to monitor all online 
communications (El Nacional, 2014). 
In Panama, an Information Security Bill, which would have imposed prison sentences 
for those who gained access to classified information and publicised it (Article 429) was 
withdrawn in 2012 (Higuera 2012, Simmons 2012). 
In Costa Rica, the government announced that the Cybercrime Offense Law 9048 2012 
- which imposes one to six years in prison for revealing state secrets related to national 
security, defence of sovereignty and foreign relations – would not apply to journalists (RSF 
2013a, RSF/IFEX, 2012). In April 2013, the National Assembly revised the legislation and 
eliminated Article 288 which would have imposed a prison sentence with up to 10 years 
in jail for releasing “state secrets”. The revisions also removed prison terms in the case of 
protected information released in the public interest (Freedom House 2014h)
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b. Mass Surveillance and targeted surveillance
In Columbia, La Semana magazine revealed that the Colombia Administrative Department 
(DAS) reportedly conducted illegal surveillance over six years, including on the telephones 
and emails of journalists, NGO workers, supreme court justices, politicians and government 
critics from 2007-2009 (Soendergaard, 2014). After the dismantling of the DAS, the former 
head of the Department, Maria del Pilar Hurtado, was convicted of illegally spying on human 
rights activists, journalists, politicians and judges. She was sentenced to 14 years jail in May 
2015. In the same case, the high court also sentenced Bernardo Moreno, a former senior 
official, to eight years under house arrest after he faced charges including unlawful violation 
of communications (Latin American Herald Tribune 2015, Botero 2015).
In 2014, Colombian military intelligence reportedly intercepted around 2,600 emails 
between Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) spokespeople and international 
journalists during peace negotiations (Cruz 2014, AP 2014, Panam Post 2014). Colombia-
based Foundation for Freedom of the Press (FLIP) official Pedro Vaca Villareal told this study’s 
researchers that surveillance in Colombia is founded on the Law of Intelligence (Law 1621 
of 2013) and the Law of Public Security (Law 1453 of 2011). These allow the monitoring of 
the electromagnetic spectrum and access to subscriber data from telephone companies.
In 2009, Peru’s former President Alberto Fujimori was sentenced to six years in prison for 
the wiretapping of journalists, politicians and businessmen during his term (Lauría 2010). 
The following year, a former naval intelligence employee was revealed to have reportedly 
intercepted 52,947 emails of journalists and political opponents during the Fujimori 
government (Rodriguez, 2011). 
In 2011, it was revealed that Peru’s Congress had reportedly covertly investigated telephone 
calls made by a group of journalists who had alleged corruption by government officials 
(Cruz 2011). In the aftermath of a court case, the Supreme Court of Peru proposed prison 
sentences for those who publish private communications obtained by illegal wiretapping 
(Medel 2011 b; Peru21, 2011). Also in Peru, a journalist who specialised in reporting drug 
trafficking and terrorism was interrogated about his sources, based on wiretaps used by 
intelligence units against terrorist groups, the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights 
reported in 2013 (Botero 2013).
Concerning Brazil, the Director of the Institute for Technology and Society of Rio De Janeiro, 
Professor Ronaldo Lemos told this study that large companies and the Brazilian Presidency 
had been the targets of surveillance programs. “Accordingly, journalists working with sources 
connected with these institutions might have been collaterally affected,” he said (Lemos 
2015). According to World Editors Forum Chairperson, and Executive Director of Journalism 
at Grupo RBS, Marcelo Rech, targeted surveillance connected to police investigations 
into organised crime and corruption is a problem for journalists dealing with confidential 
sources in Brazil. Rech identified a case in November 2014, in which a prosecutor asked 
that a judge waive the confidentiality of the telephone lines and the mobile lines of the 
newspaper Diário da Região, in order to identify the source of a story about corruption. The 
judge issued the order but the newspaper and the national Brazilian newspaper association 
asked for the Supreme Court to suspend the order. In January 2015 the Court suspended 
the order on the basis of its unconstitutionality (Rech 2015).
The Supreme Court of Costa Rica ruled in 2014 that government surveillance of phone 
records of Diario Extra journalist, Manuel Estrada, was unconstitutional (IPI 2014a). The 
court found that the surveillance violated the privacy of the reporter and it ordered the 
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investigative agency to destroy all recordings pertaining to the investigation, while 
prohibiting any government agency from carrying out this type of operation in the future. 
The judge also criticised the prosecutor’s office for authorising the operation (IPI 2014a).
New Laws Permitting Interception
In Bolivia, the 2011 Telecommunications, Information Technology and Communication Law 
permits telecommunications interception in cases of danger to state security, external 
threat, and internal shock or disaster (Article 111). Under this law, telecommunication 
providers are obliged to cooperate with authorities when asked to provide information 
(Lara 2011) . 
In Ecuador, Article 14 of the 2012 Telecommunication Service Subscribers and Added Value 
Registration Act prohibits third party interception of communications, however, Article 
29.9 of the same resolution allows the regulator CONATEL to track IP addresses from ISP 
customers without judicial order (Freedom House 2013d). A similar clause appears in the 
Peruvian Computer Crimes law that also allows police to access users’ personal information 
without a court order. 
c.  Data retention/Third party intermediaries 
Article 1 of Colombia’s Decree 1704 of 2012 on communications interception and data 
retention states: “The interception of communications, regardless of the origin or underlying 
technology, is a public security mechanism that seeks to optimize the investigation of 
crimes that is conducted by competent authorities and agencies, within the framework of 
the Constitution and the Law” (EFF 2012). Decree 1704 also compels Telecommunication 
Service Providers including ISPs to implement technological means and infrastructure that 
accommodate access to the networks by judicial police (EFF 2012). 
Further, Article 4 requires that communications providers must retain and store subscribers’ 
personal information for five years. Once the relevant legal requirements have been met, 
telecommunications network and service providers must deliver to the authorities the 
subscriber’s data such as identity, invoicing address and type of connection. 
Signed into law in 2014, Mexico’s Broadcasting and Telecommunications Act requires 
providers to store data from clients in Mexico and grants national security agencies and 
police access to this data in the name of national security (IPI 2014c). Article 190 states an 
obligation to retain data for 24 months (Ley de Telecomunicaciones y Radiodifusión 2014). 
Former Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression at the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights Catalina Botero reported to this study’s researchers that the law covers 
metadata and geolocation information, and that it allows the authorities to access the data 
without a court order.
Article 474 of Ecuador’s 2013 Organic Penal Code requires that ISPs store user data in order 
for the state to carry out corresponding investigations (Lavin & Betancourt 2013). 
Paraguay’s 2014 Data Retention Bill obliges service providers and hosting service providers 
to store data for a minimum of six months (Lexology 2014). 
Argentina’s proposed data retention law (National Telecommunications Law of 
2003 Amendment) was ruled unconstitutional in 2009. It would have required all 
telecommunications companies to store data for 10 years (EFF 2009).
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In Brazil, the Internet Bill of Rights’ sections on privacy and data retention (Articles 13 and 
15) require Internet access providers and Internet service provides to retain data for one 
year and six months, respectively. Regulation of such provisions was still pending at the 
time of writing (Law No. 12.965 of 23 April 2014).   
d.  Entitlement to protection: Who is a journalist/What is 
journalism?
The issue of entitlement to claim source confidentiality privileges was raised in 2014, when 
the Supreme Court of Costa Rica ruled on government surveillance of Diario Extra journalist, 
Manuel Estrada (noted above). Presiding Judge Ernesto Jinesta Lobo also referred to people 
who regularly contribute to reporting or public opinion as a category outside traditionally 
defined reporters to whom protection from surveillance applies (IPI 2014b).
Legislative changes regarding the definition of ‘professional journalists’ in the Ecuador 
Communications Act attracted the concern of the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights’ Annual Report in 2013. The Act establishes that only professional journalists and 
media workers may perform journalistic activities of the media, at any level or position. 
Exceptions are made for those who have specialized knowledge, or opinion-based 
programs and columns, and those who perform journalistic activities in the languages of 
the Indigenous peoples and nations (Art. 42) (Botero 2013: 148). 
Mexico City (a federal entity within Mexico) has the Professional Secrets of Journalists Law 
which defines “journalists” as “Individuals as well as media and public dissemination, 
community, private, independent, college, experimental” and extends to “or any other 
whose job is to collect, generate, process, edit, comment, review, disseminate, publish 
or provide information through any media and communication that can be print, radio, 
digital, or image, permanently, with or without compensation and without professional 
qualification or registration required” (Article 1). 
The ‘Who is a journalist?/What is journalism?’ issue has also been debated in the Dominican 
Republic, where a proposed law would criminalise the practice of journalism without a 
journalism degree from an accredited school of journalism or communications. Punishment 
would include up to two years in jail and a US$25,000 fine (Lara 2012c). In 2012 the 
university degree requirement for journalists also existed in Bolivia, Cuba, Chile, Honduras 
and Nicaragua. 
In 2009, the Brazilian Supreme Court ruled that a journalism degree was not mandatory for 
the exercise of journalism in that country (Supremo Tribuno Federal, 2009). 
e.  Anonymity issues
The Brazilian Constitution states that “access to information is ensured to everyone and the 
confidentiality of the source shall be safeguarded, whenever necessary to the professional 
activity”. Anonymity is forbidden in all other circumstances. This provision has recently been 
interpreted by courts and Public Prosecutors (Ministério Público) as a means to ban apps 
and software that provide anonymity on the Internet. Such case law is still recent (Nelson, 
Mashable 2014), but if confirmed over time, it could lead to restrictions on the availability of 
relevant tools for journalists to communicate with anonymous sources.
100
f.  Other digital developments
Chile passed a Net Neutrality law prohibiting ISPs to arbitrarily block, interfere, discriminate, 
hinder or restrict legal content that users send, receive or provide via the Internet (Ley 
20453 2010; Ruiz 2010). 
g.  Other dimensions
Since Mexico’s introduction of a federal shield law in 2006 (Banisar 2007:83), three states 
have introduced protection for journalists’ sources. As signalled above, Mexico City has the 
Professional Secrets of Journalists Law which states in Article 1 that journalists are entitled 
to keep secret the identity of sources who have provided information (Noticeros Televisa 
2014). Additionally, another shield law has been passed in Chihuahua (Medel, 2011), while a 
bill was introduced in Coahuila (Harlow, 2010). 
In Ecuador, the new Organic Communications Law (2013) guarantees the right of journalists 
not to go against their beliefs, to protect their sources, and their right to professional 
confidentiality (RSF 2013b, Martínez 2013).
The Dominican Republic, which previously had no laws for source protection (Banisar 2007: 
85), introduced a new constitution in 2010, including two clauses acknowledging the 
protection of confidential sources: 
Article 70: Habeas data: Every person has the right to a judicial action to know of the existence 
and to access the data corresponding to them that is found in registries or public or private 
data banks and, if case of falsehood or discrimination, to require its suspension, rectification, 
updating and confidentiality, in accordance with the law. The secrecy of the sources of 
journalistic information cannot be affected. 
Article 49: Freedom of expression and information: The professional secret and the clause 
of conscience of the journalist are protected by the Constitution and the law (Constitute 
Project 2010) 
In Brazil, the renovation of freedom of expression-related legal frameworks has resulted in 
significant impacts on the activities of journalists and the protection of sources. The Press 
Law from 1967 was revoked in 2009, but in the process so was this provision: “No journalist or 
radio commentator nor, in general, any person mentioned in Article 25 shall be compelled 
or required to give the name of his informant or news source, and his silence in this regard 
may not make him liable directly or indirectly to any kind of punishment” (Article 71).
In Argentina in 2014, police searched the radio station La Brújula 24 under a court order with 
the aim of pursuing the identity of the source who leaked government wiretap recordings 
to the station (CPJ 2014a). The case was still under investigation at time of writing.  
In the Dominican Republic in 2012, investigative reporter Nuria Piera published a story titled 
The Route to Millions (Investigacion Periodistica 2012) in which she wrote about political 
funding. Piera reported that state intelligence officers searched her home and office in 
pursuit of her story’s sources (Lara 2012a; Free Media 2012) 
In Panama in 2013, the Attorney General’s Office announced the intention to carry out 
inspections and gain access to journalists’ equipment at newspapers La Estrella and El Siglo 
with the intention to discover the source/s of journalists’ reports. However, the Attorney 
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General’s office withdrew approval to search the two newsrooms on the basis of Article 21 
of the Law of Journalism which states: “Journalists shall not be required to reveal sources of 
information and origins of news, without prejudice of other liabilities they may incur”. The 
Declaration of Chapultepec was also cited (see earlier discussion about the Declaration in 
Section 6.2) (IAPA 2013). 
A noteworthy court ruling in terms of source protection occurred in Bolivia in 2014, where 
La Razón’s Ricardo Aguilar and Claudia Benavente were accused of revealing state secrets 
(Knight Centre 2014). A court ordered Aguilar to reveal his sources but he told this study 
that he had promised his source that he would never reveal their identity and therefore he 
refused to do so (Aguilar 2014). Ultimately, a La Paz court ruled that the case against Aguilar 
and Benavente should be heard by a press court, not a criminal court. However, at the time 
of writing, the case had still not been before the press court.
In a landmark ruling in 2009, the Constitutional Court of Colombia protected the right to 
confidential sources in judgment T-298/09, in a case involving el Diario del Huila where a 
politician tried to uncover the source of a story. The Court denied the claims, upholding the 
inviolability of professional privilege. It also quoted verbatim Principle 8 of the Declaration of 
Principles, according to which: “confidentiality is an essential element in the undertaking of 
journalistic work and in the role conferred upon journalism by society to report on matters 
of public interest” (Botero, 2012: 197).
In Uruguay in 2014, a judge asked journalist Roger Rodríguez to identify his source of 
information regarding a case of human rights violations (El Espectador 2014). Rodríguez 
refused, and the judge did not press the issue (IAPA 2014). The same year, a Mercedes court 
called five journalists from the Agesor news agency to testify in a case of alleged sexual 
abuse at a military encampment in 2013. They were asked to reveal their sources, however 
they also refused (IAPA 2014).
In Guatemala in 2013, La Hora reported that a journalist  was summoned to reveal her 
source before the International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) and the 
Public Prosecutors Office, in order to discover the source of a leaked confidential report on 
conditions within Guatemalan prisons (Lara, 2013a). 
In Peru in 2013, the Attorney General called for a journalist from La Región to reveal the 
source of his report regarding a police action (Higuera 2013). 
According to information received by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 
in 2013 in the Argentinean state of Zulia, the Scientific Criminal and Forensic Investigation 
Corps (CICPC) subpoenaed and interrogated a journalist with the newspaper La Verdad and 
correspondent with the organization IPYS Venezuela (La Verdad 2013; Lara 2013b, Botero 
2013) 
Also in Argentina, in 2011 a judge subpoenaed six newspapers for the names and office 
contact details of all reporters and editors who had covered Argentina’s economy over the 
previous five years, in order to call them as witnesses in cases against their sources (AP 
2011). 
In Mexico, journalist Juan Carlos Flores Haro said he was held at the municipal building in 
San Blas and interrogated for an hour to reveal his source (Lara 2012b).  
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Regional conclusion
Since 2007, there have been developments in Latin America with relevance to legal source 
protection frameworks. These have occurred in the context of both traditional contests over 
the protection of confidentiality of journalistic sources, and the digital revolution which 
has seen an accumulation of challenges - in the form of mass surveillance and targeted 
interception, data retention, national security and anti-terrorism measures that can mpact 
on legal source protection. Additionally, questions have centred on which journalistic 
actors are entitled to claim coverage under source protection laws. Journalists in the region 
also face the conundrum that while there has been significant progress in legislation and 
judicidial precedents, these do not necessarily translate as tangible protections.
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7.  Thematic Studies
Three thematic studies were identified in the course of research for this Study to allow in-
depth analysis of key issues. The thematic studies featured in this section are:
a. The impact of source protection erosion in the digital era on the practice of 
investigative journalism globally 
b. Sweden: How a State with one of the oldest and constitutional legal source protection 
frameworks is responding and adapting to emerging digital transformation and 
associated threats
c. Model assessment tool for international legal source protection frameworks 
Thematic Study 1:  
The impact of source protection erosion in the digital era on 
the practice of investigative journalism globally 
This thematic study examines the practical difficulties being confronted by investigative 
journalists with regard to source protection in the digital age, and the significant ways in 
which they are changing their practices in response (C.f HRW 2014). 
For this case study, qualitative research interviews were conducted with 27 investigative 
journalists, editors, legal experts, and freedom of expression specialists drawn from 17 
countries, reflecting the UNESCO groupings of Africa, the Arab States, Asia and the Pacific, 
Europe and North America, and Latin America. The interviews were conducted between 
November 2014 and February 2015 - face-to-face, by phone, Skype and email. The 
quotations below are not intended to represent a scientific sample of a wider set of views, 
but have instead been extrapolated for the purpose of signalling the more general issues at 
stake. Unless otherwise indicated, the individuals cited below were interviewed as part of 
the research for this study.
Research context
Two recent  studies have indicated the significant impact of source protection erosion on 
investigative journalism practices in at least one part of the world:
In February 2015, the Pew Research Center released the results of a survey on “Perceptions 
of vulnerability and changes in behaviour” among members of the USA-based organisation 
Investigative Reporters and Editors (Holcomb, Mitchell & Page 2015). Pew’s research found 
that 64% of investigative journalists surveyed believed that the US Government collected 
data about their communications. The figure rose to 71% among national political reporters 
and those who report foreign affairs and national security issues. Ninety percent of the of 
US investigative journalists who responded to the Pew survey believed that their ISP would 
routinely share their data with the NSA, while more than 70% reported that they had little 
confidence in ISPs’ ability to protect their data.
As a result, 49% of respondents said that over the previous year they had changed the 
way they stored and shared sensitive documents. Twenty-nine percent said that they had 
changed the way that they communicated with journalists and other editors. (See further 
discussion of this research under the headings ‘surveillance’ and ‘third party intermediaries’ 
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below, and separate research on the theme conducted for this study which is presented in 
Thematic Study 3). 
Another study for USA-based Human Rights Watch interviewed 46 senior national security 
journalists from major USA news organisations, revealing the steps being taken to keep 
communications, sources and other confidential information secure in light of surveillance 
revelations (HRW 2014a: 30).  
That study concluded that in the USA the combination of increased surveillance and 
government prosecution of leaks was having a big effect on the news gathering practices 
of national security reporters and their news organisations. It found that: “Journalists are 
struggling harder than ever before to protect their sources, and sources are more reluctant 
to speak. This environment makes reporting both slower and less fruitful” (HRW 2014a: 22). 
The Pew study found that 45% of respondents ranked surveillance as the number one 
or number two challenge facing journalists (Holcomb, Mitchell & Page 2015). Nearly half 
of the national security, political and foreign affairs reporters among them also reported 
that concerns about surveillance have caused them to change the ways in which they 
communicated with sources (with reverting to face-to-face meetings being the main 
means of protecting sources). Meanwhile, 18 percent of this group reported that it was 
becoming harder to get sources to speak “off record”.
 Balancing the benefits and threats of technological change for 
investigative journalism in the context of source protection 
a.  Opportunities and threats
 “Technology is allowing information to be leaked on a vast scale, a scale that couldn’t 
possibly have been imagined…for me as a journalist we’re in boom times, because you’re 
able to get information that’s incredibly detailed and you’re able to get stories that you 
couldn’t possibly [get before]”, Director of the International Consortium of Investigative 
Journalists (ICIJ) Gerard Ryle said, declaring the digital era a “Golden Age for journalism”.
Founder of the Arabic Media Internet Network, Daoud Kuttab, echoed Ryle’s view of the 
digital era:
On the one hand I think it has accelerated and widened the amount of data available to 
everyone and made it very easy to transfer information and documents. But at the same 
time governments are able to invade your privacy much easier and get information. (Daoud 
2015)
Editor-in-Chief of Argentina’s La Nacion, Carlos Guyot, also acknowledged the significant 
benefits of digital era investigative reporting involving confidential sources, including 
access to leaked documents that would have been impossible to get even five or ten years 
ago, although he added a caveat:
New technologies bring new challenges with them, but also new opportunities, like 
encrypted conversations via new software, although this must be combined with old 
fashioned practices…There is nothing like a face to face meeting with a source. …Our main 
investigative reporter drove for three hours to a different city for a 15 minutes conversation 
with a source and drove back to our newsroom. If we are willing to endure the challenges, we 
can still do good journalism. (Guyot 2015)
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b.  Confidence of investigative journalists in legal source protection in 2015
Bolivian investigative journalist Ricardo Aguilar expressed serious concern about the 
reliability of legal source protection in the digital era. “…Mass surveillance, data retention 
and the appeal of the ‘National Security’ category leaves the protection of secret sources in 
latent vulnerability,” he said. 
 ICIJ’s Ryle said: “As a general rule these days, much more than in the past, it’s very difficult 
to protect sources because of the fact that electronic communications can be back-tracked 
and people can be found much easier than they may have been found in the past…” 
Executive Editor of the Washington Post, Martin Baron, told this study that concern 
about surveillance of newspapers’ internal communications led to significant changes to 
newsroom practices during The Post’s coverage of the Snowden story: “I didn’t expect that 
we would have to be communicating with each other in an encrypted fashion and yet on 
many occasions we did just that. And on many occasions when we had meetings everybody 
turned off their cellphone, or left their cell phones behind...” (Baron 2015).
Director of the investigative unit at Sweden’s national public radio (SR), Fredrik Laurin, was 
concerned about the risk of police seizing digital content due to gaps in source protection 
legislation in his country, and he described undertaking extraordinary digital security 
measures to comply with Sweden’s strict laws requiring journalists to protect their sources 
(see Case Study 2).
But Marites Danguilan-Vitug, a co-founder of the Philippines Centre for Investigative 
Journalism, was more optimistic about source security. “My colleagues and I have not yet 
reached the stage when we’re insecure about using confidential sources. Trust is still the 
biggest factor in keeping our confidential sources”. 
c.  Chilling effect on sources 
Co-founder of Pakistan’s Centre for Investigative Reporting, Umar Cheema told researchers 
that the threat of surveillance is having a major chilling effect on sources. “Certainly, source 
insecurity is a major challenge and it is mostly [connected] with the stories about national 
security and high-profile government figures. It is hindering information,” he said. Cheema 
said he believed that his status guaranteed that he is under surveillance and that his sources 
know it. He said that some sources approached him in the belief that he is the right person 
to be taken into confidence, while others hesitated because they feared that he was under 
surveillance and that “any contact with me will put them on radar screen”. 
Former Editor-in-Chief of The Guardian, Alan Rusbridger, told this study that the increased 
risk of exposure is having a direct impact on the willingness of confidential sources to share 
information with journalists. It had led to “a massive drying up of people willing to take the 
risk of talking to news organisations,” he said. 
ICIJ’s Ryle said there is certainly increasing awareness among his sources that the stakes 
are much higher in the age of surveillance: “People are increasingly nervous because the 
truth is it’s quite easy to trace people and to trace sources”. International Editor of Algeria’s 
El Watan newspaper, Zine Cherfaoui, said that sources are more reluctant to speak and 
increasingly require face-to-face meetings. “To really discuss with people we prefer to avoid 
electronic means or social networks. The Snowden Affair turned upside down the work of 
journalists… It’s harder to speak to people. We really have to go out and meet them. It’s 
face to face”. 
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In Bolivia, La Razon’s Ricardo Aguilar reported that sources have adjusted their behaviour, 
having “…intensified precautions ranging from avoiding using the phone to talk to me to 
not exchanging any form of correspondence, or digital messaging”. However he said that 
there is no evidence that his sources are more reluctant to provide information. “In that 
sense, it seems that in the cases where I’ve had the opportunity to work with confidential 
sources, the digital age has nothing to do with the “chilling effect” because it existed by itself 
beyond the control of the Internet”. 
d.  Chilling effect on journalism
The cost of digital security technology, training and legal fees in relation to digital issues 
is having a chilling effect on investigative journalism in some cases. Alan Rusbridger said 
The Guardian spent about a million pounds more a year on legal fees than they did five 
years ago, which reduces the budget to do reporting. This covered companies wanting 
the return of documents, who cited data protection laws and privacy, “so the bills on these 
things just mount and mount and mount and mount, so you can easily be spending tens 
or hundreds, hundreds of thousands of pounds trying to get a story into the paper,” he said. 
“And of course once you get onto secure reporting there is a significant cost in equipment, 
in software, in training - particularly in trying to create a safe environment where we feel we 
can offer our sources the kind of protection that they deserve”. 
Some journalists feel they need to erase archival material to avoid it being seized. UK QC and 
Chair of the Centre for Investigative Journalism at Goldsmith’s University, Gavin Millar, said 
journalists have destroyed unused content (such as un-aired interview footage) because of 
concerns about needing to protect their sources. He referred to the alternative being high 
legal costs for formally attempting to prevent the authorities from accessing un-broadcast 
content, for example.
Rusbridger said that communicating with sources is certainly harder now. “I think reporting 
just becomes much more difficult, it’s much more difficult to talk to police people”. He said 
it was also more difficult, if not impossible, to speak to municipal officials who believed their 
telephone lines were bugged. “All kinds of reporting are becoming much more difficult and 
more expensive…and time consuming”. 
However, in some cases, the biggest chilling effect on investigative journalism based 
on confidential sources is often not digital exposure of sources, but fear of subsequent 
consequences such as prison and death. Executive Director of the Arab Reporters for 
Investigative Journalism (ARIJ) Rana Sabbagh said that ARIJ has compiled 255 investigative 
reports over the past seven years, in many countries:  
Not once were we asked to reveal a source... We are extremely careful and most of our stories 
so far haven’t been the “sexy” investigations on high power or corruption. Our journalists don’t 
have the tools to conduct such investigations, and working on these stories will either get 
them killed or jailed, and I don’t think it’s a risk worth taking. … That doesn’t mean we haven’t 
pursued big political investigations but we do a risk assessment as part of our manual and 
code of ethics. 
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e.  Changing practices
i. Journalists assume they are being watched 
 “I’m more careful with any digital platform that I’m involved in – whether it’s email, phone 
or any other digital format. I assume that [I am] probably being watched, listened to, or read. 
That’s my starting point and I take it from there,” Jordan’s Daoud Kuttab told this study. ICIJ’s 
Gerard Ryle reported that he worked under a similar assumption, and accordingly advised 
colleagues against putting things in writing or emailing if they did not want them to come 
out afterwards. 
Privacy International’s Tomaso Falchetta highlighted the hidden nature of some digital acts 
that can impact on journalists working with confidential sources: “Of significant concern is 
the fact that digital communication surveillance - sometimes by the use of malware on the 
target’s computer - is usually being conducted in secret so the journalist is not aware of the 
intrusion and cannot challenge or limit it”. 
Pedro Vaca Villareal, Executive Director of Colombia’s Foundation for Freedom of the 
Press (FLIP), told this study that investigative reporting practices have already changed in 
his region in response to the challenges posed by digital surveillance and other factors 
undermining source protection. 
According to Deputy Director of the Tow Centre for Digital Journalism, Susan McGregor, a 
change of practice in managing digital communications is required in response – at both 
the personal and professional levels. 
It means that we have to be thoughtful about our devices and our communications in the 
way that most of us aren’t accustomed to doing yet… Some of the habits we’ve developed…
taking our phone everywhere, always having Wi-Fi on, emailing everything, we’re just going 
to have to think differently about those things when it comes to work with sources. Chances 
are we’ll also think differently about them in our personal lives, rather than trying to juggle 
two frameworks of communication.
Sweden’s Fredrik Laurin stated: “Anytime there is any chance of the government being 
interested in what we do, during our research or after publication, I go to great lengths to 
protect my information. That means applying the strongest encryption I can find, the best 
methods, throwaway phones, you name it we try to do it.” (op cit 2015).
US media lawyer Charles Tobin said that there was a growing involvement of legal counsel 
in the story production process due to  source protection issues: 
…It’s just becoming more and more acute because you have seen more journalists’ 
subpoenaed over the last 10 years than you did over the prior 50 years, and so it’s becoming 
more of the subject of conversation when journalists call for advice. …You look at issues 
not only of defamation and the lawfulness of the news gathering, but you also have to 
have a conversation about protecting the sources and how rigorous that needs to be done 
depending on the journalist’s relationship and promises to the source. 
ii. Going back to analogue methods 
Bolivia’s Ricardo Aguilar from La Razon believes that mass surveillance has significantly 
weakened source protection laws. “The response from journalism should be to make mass 
surveillance useless, taking excessive precautions when working with secret sources on 
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issues that affect large economic interest, or persons of economic and political power”. 
(Aguilar 2014)
Alan Rusbridger has questioned if investigative journalism based on confidential sources 
is possible in the digital age, unless journalists go back to what he calls ‘basics’: “I know 
investigative journalism happened before the invention of the phone, so I think maybe 
literally we’re going back to that age, when the only safe thing is face-to-face contact, 
brown envelopes, meetings in parks or whatever,” he said. 
Catalina Botero, former Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression with the Organisation 
of American States, advised going back to what she called ‘the classics’ of journalism practice. 
“Go to the corner, to a coffee shop, and talk to them. This is like a very huge contradiction 
because you have these great tools, wonderful tools to do journalism all around the world 
without moving from your house. But at the same time, you need to ensure that no one 
else is hearing”. 
That’s the practice being adopted by the lead investigative reporter at Argentina’s La 
Nacion, according to the paper’s Editor-in-Chief Carlos Guyot: “[He] is now having more 
conversations face to face than ever before because the vast majority of his sources refuse 
to talk to him on the phone. Or, at least, he has to agree on new ways to communicate with 
them - actually, the old fashioned way: using public booths”. 
UK QC Gavin Millar, who represents several freelance journalists, said that some have a 
contract phone which they throw into the Thames River at the end of each week. They 
meet sources in pubs, write notes, and hide the notebooks in distant places in case their 
houses are searched by police.
Bolivia’s Aguilar avoids using digital communication in order to protect his sources. 
He said extreme distrust is the only defence against the possibility of confidential sources 
being exposed through the clandestine interception of email and  social networks.
Algerian newspaper editor Zine Cherfaoui said journalists in the Middle East and North 
Africa, in particular, have become very cautious with electronic communications. “We prefer 
to meet the person directly and avoid digital platforms. Because of mass surveillance and 
new anti-terrorism laws we like to avoid social networks”. 
From the Philippines, Danguilang-Vitug said that caution is routinely exercised. “We 
continue to be very careful when meeting sources…We take precautions, make sure that 
our mobile phones are not bugged, use secure phones. We opt for personal meetings rather 
than e-mails for security purposes. If we have to use e-mails, some sources create separate 
e-mail accounts when answering our questions. But largely, face-to-face meetings are best”. 
Simple approaches like stretching the timeline between contact with a source and 
publication of their leaks have also been used to protect the confidentiality of connections 
and minimise the chance a confidential source will be identified. ICIJ’s GerardRyle said: “The 
more layers you can put between you and the source sometimes is better, and a lot of that 
is time. If someone gives you some really hot information the temptation is to publish that 
right away, but that’s also when your source is potentially at most risk.” (Ryle 2015).
An editor who responded anonymously to a survey conducted in conjunction with this 
research highlighted the risks that long-term data retention could lead to identification 
of a source who was initially not an object of suspicion. Another news organisation’s legal 
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advisor told this study’s researchers that it is important to split encryption passwords 
between two journalists as an added precaution against data interception in the case of 
the detention of one party. 
iii. Taking responsibility for digital security 
Swedish public radio’s Fredrik Laurin said that journalists are under-prepared when it comes 
to protecting sources in the ‘digital hemisphere’. “Very few journalists use encryption and 
very few journalists even know how to use it - it’s not in their toolbox and that is a major 
problem,” he said. Laurin’s hardcore dedication to digital security in the interests of protecting 
his sources extends to banning certain corporations’ products among his reporting team. 
“We’re using open-source material that we can change, where we are in control. Because 
at the end of the day, source protection is our mandate, our job, also under the law, and 
therefore we cannot use service providers who do not give us the ability to control the 
information.”
Atanas Tchobanov, the Editor-in-Chief of Bulgaria’s investigative journalism website Bivol 
and its extension, Balkanleaks, said that his means of communicating with confidential 
sources have been evolving alongside his investigative journalism practices since Bivol 
launched in 2010. He assesses who is likely to be eavesdropping and what their technical 
capability is, and if it is not advanced, then he will use Skype or WhatsApp without feeling 
the need for further encryption. 
In Brazil, there is less concern about mass surveillance but nervousness about targeted 
monitoring of email and phone lines according to Executive Director of Journalism at Grupo 
RBS, Marcelo Rech. He said journalists in his organization are increasingly turning to chat 
apps to protect their sources. “People sometimes use WhatsApp, which is more tough to 
track…usually the sources prefer to talk by WhatsApp, or in person…” However, confidence 
in WhatsApp (an encrypted message service which is owned by Facebook) is misplaced, 
according to journalism safety expert Javier Garza, who advises the World Editors’ Forum. 
According to ICIJ’s Ryle, another practical consideration is that digital security measures 
designed to protect sources can be unwieldy and time-consuming, and these factors remain 
a deterrent to many investigative journalists. The need for simple, cheap technological 
interventions to protect communications with confidential sources from surveillance was 
also underlined by an anonymous editor who responded to a survey connected to this 
Study.
The Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ’s) Courtney Radsch pointed out that, conducting 
meetings or interviews with sources face-to-face is not always possible, nor practicable 
– particularly on international stories (see also Section 10 below on Gender Dimensions 
Arising). Fredrik Laurin also reflected on this point in regard to an investigation where 
“we needed to investigate the situation on the ground in six different countries and it 
was impossible for us for safety reasons and also practical reasons. We needed to do our 
investigations digitally, over the phone, over Skype, over Facebook, email. That was a major 
challenge to employ all the necessary forms of encryption and secure communication”. 
But ICIJ’s Gerard Ryle argued that too many journalists are growing unnecessarily paranoid. 
“…(T)here are some reporters I know who are completely paranoid about their computers 
- they’re fantastic at encryption, everything is offline. But so what? Most of what they’re 
working on isn’t relevant.” He said he did not believe that any method of source protection 
was 100% fool proof.
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iv. Avoid flagging source protection efforts
Taking ‘radical’ measures to secure communications, including using encryption, can 
actually risk attracting unnecessary attention, Ryle indicated. “You are sometimes better 
off hiding in plain view”. Even providing training in encryption to journalists can attract 
suspicion, according to Internet Sans Frontiers (ISF) journalist and lawyer Julie Owono.
The flipside, however, is the risk to the safety of journalists if digital technology is avoided, as 
recognised by Alan Rusbridger. He said: “You want them to have these devices [smartphones] 
because you want your reporters to be constantly in touch and you want them to file and 
take pictures, but these devices are also tracking devices.” There was a dilemma between 
the risk of yielding digital information about sources, and having a device to help ensure 
personal safety, especially in conflict zones, he argued.   
f. Training and editorial leadership
There is evidence that some news organisations have been slow to respond to the threat of 
source protection erosion in the digital age, with concerns expressed by several interviewees 
and survey respondents about the level of understanding among newsroom managers. 
Other research also indicates problems with the prioritisation of digital security and training 
by news organisations (C.f. Posetti 2014c, Holcomb, Mitchell & Page 2015).
However, La Nacion’s Guyot told this study: “If we want journalism to survive and flourish 
in the 21st century, there is no other option than to give our reporters and sources the 
tools necessary to do their jobs”. Internet Sans Frontiers’ Julie Owono told the researchers 
that there has been a significant uptake of digital security training among journalists in 
Africa and the Arab States since the Tunisian uprising, as reporters have learnt that a single 
password is not sufficient to provide digital protection.
However, ARIJ’s Rana Sabbagh said that even the best training cannot keep up with 
global intelligence services: “…(W)e train our journalists in encryption and how to protect 
their data, and tell them to always assume that everything you’re doing online, on your 
computers, is accessible, because even if you give them the best software and training, 
the intelligence agencies are always a step ahead. They are using the latest technologies to 
decrypt the content “. 
Another point that several interviewees made is that seemingly innocuous local stories 
can be triggers for anonymous sources to make contact, meaning that a story that starts 
small can escalate into a major journalistic investigation, potentially causing confidential 
communications to be exposed through hostile data mining. Also, specialised coverage 
areas like health, politics, sport and financial reporting are increasingly vulnerable to source 
exposure due to leak investigations, according to investigative journalists and editors 
interviewed for this study.
g. Training the sources
“We’re significantly increasing the training within the organisation to get this [digital 
security for source protection] on the radar of reporters to try to help them get around it,” 
Rusbridger said. “But it’s one thing to teach reporters, it’s another thing to try and educate 
the public and the sources”. He was acknowledging an emerging trend in source protection: 
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journalists and news publishers taking on a new responsibility - educating their sources in 
their own protection.
A multi-layered digital security approach, in combination with training and equipping 
sources to contact reporters securely, is the future of source protection, according to Fredrik 
Laurin. “You need to be aware of what tools are available and you need to do that yourself 
and to inform your sources on how to employ these methods”.  ICIJ’s Ryle acknowledged 
the problem with digital safety practice among sources: “Most people who are outed as 
sources make the mistakes before they come to the journalist. And they use their own 
phone, their own computer, they even use an email address that can be traced back to 
them,” he told the author. 
Interviewees identified a role for NGOs and professional organisations in the training of 
sources to communicate more securely in the digital environment, and to support journalists 
to do the same. For example, the Swedish Union of Journalists recently published a book 
designed to educate journalists in online source protection called Digitalt Källskydd.
That level of source education is already happening at The Guardian, albeit in a minor way. 
A secure electronic dropbox has been launched but Rusbridger said that he doubted 
that many reporters had successfully gone out and installed PGP22 on a source’s machine 
and taught them how to use it. The  Washington Post and a number of other major news 
publishers have also introduced secure dropboxes in recent years.
There is also a need for sources to take independent steps to ensure their own digital 
security. “Sources have to share the responsibility with us, they have to believe in the cause 
they’re trying to promote, and it should be a shared responsibility. Both a source, or a 
whistleblower, and a journalist are aiming for the same thing; expose the wrongdoings and 
corruption as well as promote good governance,” ARIJ’s Rana Sabbagh stated.
h. Collaborative strategies
A growing number of regional and international investigative journalism consortia (Alves 
2014) has corresponded with an emerging trend of collective and centralised source 
protection. In its global investigations that involve myriad international publishing partners, 
ICIJ essentially becomes the source: “We don’t take responsibility for the publication of our 
projects in each country, each organisation has to do that, but in terms of giving them the 
information, we become the source. In other words, we give them the documents. ICIJ is 
the source of the material,” Director Gerard Ryle said. 
Jurisdiction ‘shopping’ also becomes a strategy for some journalistic actors, who seek to 
base their digital content in countries with a stronger degree of privacy protections than 
those where the intended audience is based. This was the motivation for The Guardian’s 
decision to move the Snowden investigation offshore to the US. It is also the reason 
Bulgaria’s investigative journalism website Bivol is based in France, and a new international 
Francophone collaboration (see discussion of SourceSure below) is anchored in Belgium. 
Gavin Millar QC pointed to another important area of collaboration in source protection 
– between journalists, freedom of expression activists and people he describes as ‘good 
hackers’. “We’ve done a lot of work with the good hackers in Berlin and in London…we have 
22 Developed by Phil Zimmerman in 1991, PGP stands for Pretty Good Protection. It provides cryptographic 
privacy protection through an encryption and decryption program http://www.pgpi.org/doc/pgpintro/
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a stack of wiped laptops in the offices [of the Centre for Investigative Journalism which 
he chairs], which we sell to investigative journalists at cost price because we’re a charity, 
having got some of the top hackers in the world to devise defence programs for them and 
to upload those programs to defend…against back door access to their digital material.”
Meanwhile, interviewees explained how international news organisations have begun 
collaborating on platforms designed to securely receive digital information from confidential 
sources. AfriLeaks, for example, is a Pan-African project that uses a highly secure mailbox 
designed to receive leaked documents, which connects investigative media houses to 
whistleblowers. It is operated by the African Network of Centres for Investigative Reporting 
(Cummings 2015). Mexicoleaks also launched in 2015 (Attanasio 2015).
Sourcesure and Balkanleaks  are similar Francophone and Bulgarian websites that allow 
whistleblowers to upload secret documents anonymously. Sourcesure, which is based in 
Belgium to take advantage of strong source protection laws there, was jointly established 
in February 2015 by France’s Le Monde, Belgian publications La Libre Belgique and Le Soir de 
Bruxelle  and RTBF (Radio Télévision Belge Francophone). Yves Eudes, Sourcesûre’s cofounder 
and a journalist at Le Monde, believes that the cross-border, multi-platform collaboration 
between leading Francophone news organisations is a source of protection for journalists 
and sources. “Unity is strength. This initiative could not have been launched by Le Monde or 
RTBF alone. Sourcesûre is underpinned by a whole spectrum of collaborators, from liberal 
to conservative media outlets, united by common journalistic values,” he said. Sources using 
the system are encouraged to download TOR software at their end before connecting with 
the system (Eudes 2015).
i. Further issues
For this thematic study, the interviewees were not specifically asked about how the 
practical precautionary measures discussed here could be complemented with other steps. 
A holistic approach would include advocacy to secure legal confidentiality to cover cases 
where technical secrecy or analogue methods proved insufficient. An example would 
be advocacy to secure legal limits on the use of intercepted digital information about 
confidential journalistic sources, in regard to admissible evidence in court. Further research 
could be done in this area as to how experts regard the complimentary range of measures 
to protect confidentiality.
Thematic Study 2:
 How a State with one of the world’s oldest and constitutional 
legal source protection frameworks is responding and 
adapting to emerging digital threats23
Despite the strong legal frameworks that exist, Swedish journalists operate in an increasingly 
difficult environment in relation to the protection of sources in the digital age. Complications 
presented include the rapid development of technology and the time lag involved in 
Swedish legislation adapting in tandem. They also involve the impacts of national security-
based restrictions, mass surveillance impacts, and the education and training barriers faced 
by both journalists and their sources. Collectively, these factors pose a significant challenge 
23  Angelique Lu contributed to this case study
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in a State that criminalises confidential source exposure and places the onus of responsibility 
for the preservation of confidentiality firmly at the door of journalists.
This thematic study is based on in-depth online research and long-form interviews with five 
key actors with expertise in the practical and theoretical issues surrounding Swedish legal 
source protection frameworks in an era of digital transformation. They include investigative 
journalists, the national journalists’ union, lawyers, academics, and a legal policy specialist 
responsible for media freedom issues from Sweden’s Department of Justice.
1.  Strength of traditional Swedish source protection laws
The legal framework in place in Sweden for the protection of sources is based on 
constitutional provisions. The Swedish press enjoys protections in two out of the four pieces 
of legislation that comprise its constitution - the Freedom of the Press Act as well as the 
Fundamental Law on Freedom of Expression (Banisar 2007). In its earliest form – in 1766 - 
the Freedom of the Press Act included protection for anonymous authors (Banisar 2007:21; 
University College London, 2011). This is the foundation of Swedish source protection laws. 
The Fundamental Law on Freedom of Expression (1991) extends these rights to radio, television 
and ‘other technologies’, encompassing blogs and websites (Banisar 2007:72 footnote 203; 
Berglund-Siegbahn 2015.)
In Sweden, a source who divulges information to a journalist on condition of anonymity 
is protected under the Constitution (Freedom of the Press Act, Chapter 3; Fundamental Law 
on Freedom of Expression Chapter 2). In fact, it is a criminal offence for a journalist to breach 
this confidentiality agreement, regardless of whether the identity of a source is revealed 
‘through negligence or by deliberate intent.’ (The Fundamental Law on Freedom of Expression, 
Chapter 2, Article 5; Nygren 2015). A journalist who reveals the identity of a source may be 
subject to a prison sentence of up to one year, or ordered to pay fines (The Fundamental 
Law on Freedom of Expression, Chapter 2, Article 5). The identity of sources is protected from 
disclosure except in limited circumstances, such as a breach of national security and high 
treason (The Fundamental Law on Freedom of Expression, Chapter 5, Article 3; The Freedom of 
the Press Act, Chapter 7; Article 3). Such exceptions must also be vetted by a Swedish court 
(Trehörning 2015) and Swedish courts are constitutionally bound to place weight on the 
protection of press freedom in their deliberations (The Freedom of the Press Act, Chapter 
1 Article 4; The Fundamental Law on Freedom of Expression, Chapter 1, Article 5; Berglund-
Siegbahn, 2015).
There was overwhelming consensus amongst the Swedish experts interviewed regarding 
the soundness of the legal framework that currently operates in Sweden (Berglund-
Siegbahn, 2015; Laurin 2014, 2015; Nygren 2015; Trehörning 2015). According to media 
lawyer and Press Ombudsman Pär Trehörning: “The legal (framework) is very strong because 
it’s a part of our constitution. The person who gets information from a source…can’t reveal 
that. The only exception is in court, and it’s extremely seldom”.
Anita Vahlberg, senior advisor to the President of the Swedish Union of Journalists, stressed 
the significance of the constitutional requirements placed on journalists: “The constitution 
provides for protection of sources which is not a right for journalism, it’s an obligation to 
protect your sources“ (Vahlberg 2015). According to Vahlberg, this obligation underpins 
Swedish journalism practice: “Swedish journalists take the question of protection of sources 
very seriously,” she said.
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There is some debate over the criminalisation of source disclosure by journalists, and 
whether it places an unfair burden on journalists to protect their sources in the digital era. 
Global Freedom of Expression organisation ARTICLE 19, raised issues in a paper discussing 
Tajikistan’s 2013 media law proposing an analogous legal obligation on journalists not to 
reveal the identity of their sources:
Article 26 [of the Tajikistan media law] reverses traditional presumption not to disclose 
information. Although the matter has never been dealt with by an international court, there 
are potentially serious problems with imposing source confidentiality as an obligation on the 
media and it would be preferable for Tajikistan to follow the dominant practise in this area. 
(ARTICLE 19 2014, p.18).  
ARTICLE 19 argues in the case of Tajikistan that source protection should be a legal right, not 
a legal obligation. The Knight Center for Journalism in the Americas’ Silvia Higuera stated, in 
an interview with this Study’s researchers, that a journalist should not be held accountable 
if their sources were exposed as a result of surveillance or other issues connected to their 
digital practice: “I want also to be clear…our obligation to protect our information doesn’t 
mean that when a journalist’s communications are intercepted, it’s her or his fault. The 
journalist is still the victim, and abusers should be prosecuted” (Higuera 2015).
Nevertheless, those who stand by the criminalisation of the revelation of a confidential 
source’s identity without their permission, believe this onus to be core to the success of 
the existing legal framework to date. It is seen as not just protecting the journalist, but 
also ensuring that a source is confident to divulge information on the understanding of 
anonymity. It is not clear, however, how the Swedish courts might interpret a journalist’s 
responsibility to ensure the digital security of their communications with confidential 
sources to avoid their unmasking through interception or bulk data analysis, for example. 
This is an issue that may require testing in terms of the measures considered to be reasonably 
required of journalists to secure their digital communications to avoid legal liability if their 
sources are exposed.
2.  Applying the Certificate of No Legal Impediment to Publication 
online
Journalists in Sweden do not require tertiary qualifications to practise journalism, nor 
are they required to have such qualifications to be eligible for protections under the 
constitution (Laurin 2015, Berglund-Siegbahn 2015). However, publishing platforms do 
require registration for the purpose of accessing certain protections. Protections found 
in the Swedish Constitution apply to the registered medium and not the individual 
journalist (Laurin 2015; Nygren 2015; Berglund-Siegbahn 2015). Thus, the eligibility for 
protection is for the platform, not the individual as such, and there are variations here. 
Thus, traditional forms of news media are automatically covered by Swedish constitutional 
press protections (Berglund-Siegbahn 2015), however Swedish law prescribes a number 
of additional requirements that would need to be met in order for websites to qualify for 
source protection. 
According to the editor of the investigative department at Swedish Public Radio, Fredrik 
Laurin, the Freedom of the Press Act and the Fundamental Law on Freedom of Expression, 
despite being written in 1949 and 1991 respectively, were arguably drafted in wide enough 
terms to encompass bloggers:
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…The law applies not to the journalist as some kind of certified individual, source protection 
law applies to anyone who is willing to divulge important information for the purpose of 
having it published. It doesn’t define who you divulge this information to. (Laurin 2015) 
However, on the publishing side, a website or publication with a Swedish Editor-in-Chief 
must be certified if it wishes to be covered by Swedish source protection law. It is common 
for niche and start-up websites and blogs to have only one contributor, who would also 
need to be considered the Editor-in-Chief in this context. In this mode, those who are not 
members of traditional media, such as bloggers, social media actors or people creating a 
new website, can choose to apply for a ‘certificate of no legal impediment to publication’ in 
order to enjoy Swedish constitutional coverage for periodicals including source protection 
provisions. Individuals or groups wishing to certify their website under this structure 
gain the same protections as traditional media (for example in regard to a degree of libel 
protection) as well as responsibilities, which include the legal obligation to protect source 
confidentiality (Berglund-Siegbahn, 2015, Laurin, 2014, 2015).
The provisions governing the ‘certificate of no legal impediment to publication’ include the 
requirement that the website has a uniform appearance across its pages, it cannot be altered 
by anyone other than editorial staff, and an Editor-in-Chief must be appointed who is liable 
for any violations of provisions governed by the Constitution (Fundamental Law of Freedom 
of Expression: chapter 1; article 9). Further, the Editor-in-Chief must satisfy a number of 
‘required qualifications’ (The Freedom of the Press Act Chapter 5) which stipulate, inter alia, 
that the would-be-editor must live in Sweden, be aged above 18 years, and must not be 
an undischarged bankrupt or under guardianship (The Freedom of the Press Act, Chapter 
5, Article 2). In an analysis conducted by the Association for Progressive Communications 
(APC), the additional obligations and protections offered by registering a website under the 
Swedish constitution was analogous to that of a boxing ring:
Boxers enter the ring knowing that in the ring certain rules apply, protecting them from illegal 
actions; but they are at the same time subject to certain physical risks that are allowed by 
the same rules that protect them in the first place. The risk of taking on the liability of being 
a responsible editor is something the editor would have to accept to be able to enjoy the 
benefits of source protection, inquiry protection and prohibition of censoring. (Almström, H, 
2011). 
The experts interviewed for this thematic study were asked if the application for certification 
process in Sweden is actually a form of licensing. They highlighted that it is a voluntary 
process and does not prohibit anyone from publishing without a certificate. It is not 
required for a blogger to have a ‘certificate of no legal impediment’, and there is also no 
legal basis to withdraw a certificate (where issued) for reasons of content. The interviewees 
were reluctant to even call the certification process ‘registration’ due to their rejection of 
registration procedures used in other contexts to deny or cancel the status of a person 
or platform seeking to publish journalism. (Berglund-Siegbahn, 2015; Laurin 2014, 2015; 
Nygren 2015; Trehörning 2015). 
Non-traditional media publications without a ‘certificate of no legal impediment’, are instead 
covered by a third part of the constitution titled the Instrument of Government (Chapter 2, 
Article 1), and its provisions for fundamental rights and freedoms, as well as by provisions 
under the European Convention for Human Rights (Berglund-Siegbahn 2015; Axberger 
2015). In an interview for this Study, Hans-Gunnar Axberger, Professor of Constitutional 
Law at the University of Uppsala, maintained that the strong protections for journalists 
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contained within the Swedish legal framework have been upheld in the context of new 
technological developments. But he pointed out related issues where expectations have 
changed and clarity is reduced. “For a source who provides information to a blogger who 
has not obtained a ‘certificate of no legal impediment‘, there is potentially an uncertainty 
as to the strength of what the expectation of anonymity can be which they may not even 
be aware of themselves”, he said. Furthermore, he pointed out that while protections for 
authors of texts and their sources remain strong, the subjects of online content produced 
by non-traditional media are in a much weaker position when it comes to accessing legal 
recourse than is the case with traditional media (Axberger 2015).
3.  Swedish source protection may not extend to digitally stored 
content 
Swedish authorities are generally prohibited from seizing journalistic materials that may 
reveal the identity of a source (Laurin 2014; Trehörning 2015, The Fundamental Law on 
Freedom of Expression, Chapter 3, Article 5). There are exceptions, however, as Laurin points 
out. “For example, in the Swedish Criminal Act, there are possibilities for the police to do 
a house search and if they suspect me of a crime, they can come to my house and they 
can break in and they can grab equipment, paper work, computers …”. Nevertheless, “...
source protection is paramount and therefore the police cannot go through documents in 
the newsrooms that contain source protected information. That has to be dealt with (via) 
a special order where the court appoints special measures to protect the source,” he said.
However, while hard copy material (e.g. notepads and paper files) kept by journalists that 
may reveal the identity of sources are constitutionally protected from police searches under 
the conditions described above (The Fundamental Law on Freedom of Expression Chapter 2, 
Article 4; Berglund-Siegbahn 2015), the same protections do not automatically extend to 
digitally stored materials – such as recording devices, discs, smartphones, portable hard 
drives, and computers (Berglund-Siegbahn, 2015; Laurin 2014; 2015). 
This source protection gap was illustrated in a case involving journalist Trond Sefastsson, 
who was investigated by Swedish authorities in 2007 in relation to allegations of bribery 
and tax evasion (Andersson et al 2012). A search warrant was executed in the course of 
the investigation and digital equipment, including a computer containing information 
that could reveal sources’ identities, was seized. The seizure was met with opposition by 
members of the National Press Club as well as TV4, the television channel which employed 
Sefastsson, (Hamrud, 2007). Fredrik Laurin said this is an area where the Swedish law needs 
to be updated. 
Members of the Swedish media also said the seizure of Sefastsson’s data could impact on 
citizens’ confidence in a journalist’s ability to protect their sources (Hamrud, 2007). Some 
expressed concern over what they saw as the disproportionate nature of the seizure 
compared with the allegations (Hellberg 2007). The Deputy Chief Prosecutor in the 
Sefastsson case, Björn Blomqvist has resisted these suggestions and criticisms. His argument 
hinged on the potential for journalists facing criminal allegations to delete incriminating 
evidence during an investigation (Hamrud, 2007). In October 2008, a Swedish court ruled 
that police authorities had the right to retain Sefastsson’s computer because of the serious 
nature of the allegations levelled against him, despite the fact the computer contained 
material relating to his work as an investigative journalist over the course of a decade. 
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There have been a series of cases since the Sefastsson case in 2007 that have implications 
for the protection of sources in Sweden. In March 2011, in an operation designed to combat 
child sex tourism, Swedish customs and police officers raided the premises of 28 people. 
Among them was Swedish journalist Bertil Lintner, whose computer and phone were 
searched in his absence (Folkbladet 2015).  In another case, Sveriges Radio correspondent 
Nils Horner was killed in Afghanistan in March 2014. After his death, many of his belongings 
were confiscated by the International Public Prosecution Office, including computers and 
notebooks. The District Court decided that everything would be returned to his estate except 
for his computers, sim cards and mobile phone. In October 2014, however, all equipment 
was returned to Sveriges Radio (Folkbladet 2015). Also in October 2014, a Dagens Nyheter 
(DN) photographer’s camera memory card was seized by the Swedish military because 
it contained pictures of a military prohibited area. The military seized the memory card, 
which contained 47 images. Under the Sweden constitutional laws The Fundamental Law 
on Freedom of Expression’s and the Freedom of the Press Act’s provisions for ‘anskaffarfrihet’ 
and prohibition against censorship, everyone has the right, subject to freedom of 
expression provisions, to procure data in any subject for the purpose of publication and 
to publish anything without prior scrutiny of authorities (Högsta Domstolen 2015). The DN 
photographer claimed that the photos taken were protected under the “anskaffarfriheten” 
provision. In June 2015, the Supreme Court declared that the constitutional provisions 
outweighed the law on protection of prohibited areas. 
In another case, in March 2015, Swedish Police in the course of a murder investigation 
seized the phone and laptop of Folkbladet journalist Elin Falk who had been the victim. 
Folkbladet Editor-in-Chief Anna Lith objected, stating that the seizure of materials was 
incompatible with Swedish constitutional protection of sources (Hellberg 2015). The 
Lycksele District court upheld the seizure of Falk’s phone and computer but ordered the 
return of her notepad. The Court also found that the electronic items could be searched 
and that the proceedings would be conducted behind closed doors. The decision was 
immediately appealed by Lith and Folkbladet. The Court of Appeal’s decision rested on the 
question of whether the prohibition of the confiscation of written documents could extend 
to electronic information. Under Swedish law, written documents cannot be confiscated 
if the documents can be presumed to contain information given by a source under the 
condition of anonymity under Swedish constitutional law. In its decision, the court stated 
that the decision required a balance between two competing considerations, a criminal 
investigation and the need to protect the anonymity of sources as stated under the Swedish 
constitution. 
However, while the Swedish Court of Appeal acknowledged that electronic information was 
equally important to written information, it found that it would not be permissible to ban 
the confiscation of electronic storage devices whenever there was a risk that the identity 
of a source could be revealed. One of the factors that influenced the court’s decision in this 
regard was the presumption that electronic content could be searched specifically without 
revealing other information (e.g. via keyword searches), distinguishing it from written 
documents. However, the Swedish Court of Appeal took into account the broad nature 
of the search parameters by the Swedish Police, stating that because the investigation did 
not know what it was specifically searching for, the search would constitute the violation 
of an individual’s right to submit information to the media anonymously. The prosecutor 
proposed that a representative from Folkbladet be invited to attend the examination of the 
computer and mobile phone. However, the Swedish Court stated that there was still a risk of 
exposing a source due to the broad nature of the general search by prosecutors. The Court 
of Appeal ultimately decided that for these reasons the prosecutor’s submissions to seize 
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the computer and mobile phone could not be considered to outweigh the constitutional 
interest to protect the identity of sources. 
In 2011, a report was published by the Statens Offentliga Utredningar (Swedish Public 
Inquiry) investigating, among other things, seizures conducted by public authorities 
(Statens Offentliga Utredningar 2011). Legal advisor at the Ministry of Justice Division 
for Constitutional law Katarina Berglund Siegbhan told this study that the following 
recommendation was proposed:
If a computer or another digital information carrier is seized, and may contain protected 
information – for example information covered by the rules about protection of sources – the 
person from which the computer is seized should have the opportunity to be present during 
the examination of it. If protected material is found, the person who performs the examination 
immediately must stop [viewing] this material. (Förundersökning; SOU 2011:45) 
The commission’s proposal was being considered by the Swedish Government at the time 
of writing.
A number of other approaches for updating Sweden’s source protection frameworks 
have been suggested.  Swedish media law academic Hans-Gunnar Axberger proposed 
that prosecutors should go before a court ahead of seizing a journalist’s computer in the 
future (Hamrud, 2007). Swedish media lawyer Pär Trehörning proposed to researchers a 
safeguard through an independent third party who would assess the content to determine 
whether there is information revealing the identity of a source. However, as Trehörning 
recognised, this presents a conundrum: how does the independent third party protect such 
information? Once a party has seen content, including the identity of a confidential source, 
they cannot ‘unsee’ it. 
Swedish Radio’s Laurin said that until this discrepancy in source protection law is addressed, 
Swedish journalists and their sources will remain vulnerable.
4.  Implications of interception, surveillance and data retention
 As discussed in the regional overview section of this Study, new anti-terrorism laws were 
passed in Sweden in 2009, authorising the National Defence Radio Establishment (FRA) 
to access and store all telecommunications (including domestic communications) that 
cross the country’s borders via cable or wireless. There are no exemptions for journalistic 
communications. According to a European Parliament study National programs for mass 
surveillance of personal data in EU member states and their compatibility with EU law (Bigo et 
al 2013), Sweden is becoming an increasingly important partner of the global intelligence 
network, engaging in operations and programmes for the mass collection of data. According 
to the EU report, FRA has been undertaking bulk ‘upstream’ collection of private data – 
content and metadata – where communications crossed Swedish borders.
These developments may impact on Sweden’s historically strong legal source protection 
frameworks. In the Folkbladet/Falk case discussed above, the Swedish Supreme Court found 
that the seizure of digital journalistic communications data could be supported if the terms 
of the search were sufficiently narrow to avoid wholesale exposure of sources. However, in 
the context of mass surveillance, it may no longer be technically possible for journalists to 
promise protection from exposure to their confidential sources when they involve digital 
communications that cross Sweden’s borders. 
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5. Lack of applicability of Swedish source protection to social 
media platforms in Sweden
The protections provided by the existing Swedish legal framework and the ‘certificate of no 
legal impediment’ to publication do not extend to acts of journalism published on social 
media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter, whether they are performed by bloggers 
or professional journalists as curators and editors of their own accounts. The legal experts 
interviewed agreed that this may present issues for any social media actor who uses these 
platforms to publish material based on confidential sources in Sweden. 
Katarina Berglund-Siegbahn, legal advisor at the Ministry of Justice Division for Constitutional 
law, recognised that “it might be quite strange of course that you can say it somewhere and 
have to protect your sources when you write something on your blog, and you don’t have 
the same protection on Facebook”.
Journalist Fredrik Laurin maintained that the current legal framework offered in the Swedish 
constitution provided adequate protection. According to Laurin, any additional provisions 
protecting content published on social media would be unnecessary. But media academic 
Dr Gunnar Nygren from Stockholm University told the researchers: “[I]t’s important that all 
kinds of media outlets, no matter what platform have the same sort of source protection. 
Even if it’s a website. All platforms should have equal kinds of laws”.
Social media platforms and chat apps present additional problems in relation to source 
protection in Sweden. Issues regarding transparency by such third party intermediaries, 
the fact they are generally under foreign jurisdiction, along with potential pressure for data 
handover within these jurisdictions, are other problems identified by Laurin. As a result, 
mindful of being bound by the Swedish constitutional obligation that binds him as a 
professional journalist to protect his sources, Laurin has actively boycotted such platforms.
6. Practical Moves/ The Journalist’s Obligation
The legal obligation placed on Swedish journalists to protect their sources is complicated 
by digital developments. Consistent with trends presented in other regions in this Study, 
Swedish journalists are faced with difficulty in protecting their sources in a mass surveillance 
environment. According to Anita Vahlberg, senior advisor to the President of the Swedish 
Union of Journalists: 
Our major problem is not legal protection. That’s part of the Swedish constitution. The law 
is solid. The problem is more practical when it comes to protecting sources when email, 
telephones, everything is monitored by one or many authorities, sensitive information…can 
be monitored [and] can be hacked by others. 
There have been moves by the Swedish Union of Journalists – so far unsuccessful – to 
introduce exemptions for journalists - in particular for freelancers - from anti-terrorism 
legislation, data retention provisions and the monitoring of telephone communications, as 
these functions may undercut source protection (Vahlberg 2015). 
Swedish journalists have also suggested defensive responses dependent upon changes in 
journalistic practice. According to Fredrik Laurin: “What I see is a change in behaviour from 
a practical point of view, it’s not so much legal but it’s much more a question of how we as 
journalists handle the information in reality”. Approaches identified include the employment 
of encryption techniques, being cognisant of where servers are held, as well as the laws 
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that regulate the data in the country in question, and actively boycotting externally owned 
companies and products.
Consistent with the broad findings in the overarching  study, some of the experts 
interviewed for this thematic study encouraged reporters and sources to use analogue 
methods of engagement with confidential sources, such as meeting in person, using paper, 
avoiding emails, using so-called ‘dumb’ phones, and so on in order to avoid surveillance, 
data retention and digital equipment seizure. 
The Swedish Union of Journalists, in collaboration with other Swedish organisations, has 
published information booklets educating journalists on appropriate practises, while 
Swedish public broadcasters have implemented technical training for employees. However, 
this kind of response is also recognised as having limits in terms of decreasing resources 
in newsrooms, especially with regard to regional, rural and independent media (Vahlberg 
2015; Trehörning 2015). 
7.  Education of Sources
Swedish media experts have also suggested the education of sources as a means of assisting 
in preserving their confidentiality. Journalists’ union lawyer Pär Trehörning stated that first 
contact between a source and a journalist may be problematic in the protection of sources 
and thus the only way to improve digital security at that point would be to provide training 
to sources and the public broadly. 
8.  Conclusion
Despite reliance on what is a very strong traditional legal framework for source protection, 
Swedish journalists, like journalistic actors in other countries, are facing difficulty maintaining 
their commitment to source confidentiality in the digital age. The legal obligation on 
Swedish journalists to protect their sources may become increasingly complex, placing both 
journalists and their sources at greater risk. The primary threats come in the form of digital 
reporting practices, surveillance, data retention, the seizure of digitally stored information, a 
lack of protection over social media platforms, and digital companies falling under different 
jurisdictions. Gaps in the country’s source protection have emerged as a result.
Thematic Study 3:
 Towards an international framework for assessing source 
protection dispensations
This thematic study maps the development of an 11-point framework for assessing the 
effectiveness of legal source protection systems in the digital era. It draws on interviews 
with 31 international experts across all five UNESCO regions. These experts span the areas of 
law, human rights, academia, professional journalism, and ICT experts. The interviews were 
conducted in person, via Skype, telephone and email between November 2014 and May 
2015. Based on initial study of the issues, and in consultation with UNESCO, the researchers 
presented a draft eight-point standard for the experts’ consideration. It was then developed 
and expanded into an 11-point assessment tool, based on the experts’ input, in the course 
of this thematic study.
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The emergent assessment tool is designed to be applicable to all international settings for 
measuring the effectiveness of legal source protection frameworks within a State, in the 
context of established international human rights laws and principles.
Experts interviewed:
1. Professor Rasha Abdulla (Media Studies academic, Egypt)
2. Ricardo Aguilar (Investigative journalist, La Razón, Bolivia) 
3. Catalina Botero (former Special Rapporteur, Freedom of Expression, Inter American 
Court of Human Rights, Latin America)
4. Peter Bartlett (Barrister specialising in media law, Australia)
5. Cliff Buddle (Senior Editor, South China Morning Post, China)
6. Umar Cheema (Centre for Investigative Reporting, Pakistan)
7. Zine Cherfaoui (International Editor, El Watan, Algeria)
8. Marites Dañguilan-Vitug (Investigative journalist, Philippines)
9. Tomaso Falchetta (Privacy International)
10. Javier Garza (Journalist/Journalism safety expert, Mexico)
11. Silvia Higuera (Journalist, Knight Centre for Journalism in the Americas, Latin America)
12. Daoud Kuttab (Journalist/Media freedom activist, Jordan)
13. Fredrik Laurin (Director Investigative Department, Swedish Public Radio)
14. Professor Renaldo Lemos (Director of the Institute for Technology and Society, Brazil)
15. Justine Limpitlaw (Legal expert – electronic communications, South Africa)
16. Henry Maina (ARTICLE 19, Kenya)
17. Susan McGregor (Tow Centre for Digital Journalism, USA)
18. Toby Mendel (Executive Director, Centre for Law and Democracy, Canada)
19. Gavin Millar QC (Lawyer/Chair of the Goldsmith’s Centre for Investigative Journalism, 
UK)
20. Peter Noorlander (Chief Executive Officer, Media Legal Defence Initiative, UK)
21. Leanne O’Donnell (Law Institute of Victoria, Australia)
22. Alan Rusbridger (Editor-in-Chief, The Guardian, UK) 
23. Rana Sabbagh (Executive Director Arab Reporters for Investigative Journalism, Jordan) 
24. Josh Sterns (Journalist/Director, Journalism & Sustainability, Geraldine Dodge 
Foundation, USA)
25. Charles Tobin (Media lawyer, US)
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26. Pär Trehörning (Lawyer/Press Ombudsman, Sweden)
27. Pedro Vaca Villareal (Executive Director, Foundation for Freedom of the Press, FLIP, 
Colombia)
28. Professor Dirk Voorhoof (Media law academic, Belgium)
29. Professor George Williams (Constitutional Law expert, Australia)
30. Prof Wei Yongzheng (Professor of Media Law, University of China)
31. Jillian York (Executive Director, Electronic Frontier Foundation) 
Unless otherwise indicated, all sources were interviewed between November 2014 and May 
2015.
Interest in a universal framework
The expert actors interviewed for this case study saw value in a universal framework for 
effective legal source protection internationally. 
Executive Director of Canada’s Centre for Law and Democracy Toby Mendel contextualised 
the role of such an international framework. “Although there have been a few international 
cases on this subject – most commonly at the European Court of Human Rights – these only 
address the specific issues raised on the facts of the cases and leave many issues unclear. 
The development of a model law on this issue could be useful as well. I would also like to 
see countries adopting best practice legislation in this area”. The head of the Media Legal 
Defence Initiative (MLDI) Peter Noorlander pointed to a Council of Europe policy statement 
on legal source protection as a useful starting point. However, Executive Director of Arab 
Reporters for Investigative Journalism (ARIJ), Rana Sabbagh, cautioned about political will 
to implement such a framework by a number of States.
1.  Draft Assessment Framework
The draft that emerged from the initial research process was presented to the expert 
interviewees as an eight-point framework for review. Their comments and concerns are 
discussed under each proposed point below.
In the draft, it was suggested that a source protection framework might:
1. Recognise the ethical principle and value to society of source protection
“I support this because it is a basic premise in journalism. It will help the public understand 
the importance of unnamed sources,” Philippines investigative journalist Marites Danguilan 
Vitug said, reflecting the views of most of the interviewees. 
However, Toby Mendel disagreed: “I don’t think it is appropriate for such a law to recognise 
an ethical principle. Rather, it should recognise the human rights foundation for source 
protection, which, under international law, is based on the right of the public to receive 
information, and not the right of journalists or others to disseminate it, because then it 
would need to attach to anyone who disseminated information, i.e. everyone”. 
Belgian media law Professor Dirk Voorhoof made a similar point regarding the international 
human rights law underpinning source protection. Columbian press freedom activist Pedro 
123
Vaca Villareal also recommended the alteration or withdrawal of this principle, because “…
legislating journalistic ethics can be tricky”. However, others pointed to the fact that law is 
often built on principles of ethics.
2. Recognise that protection extends to all acts of journalism, defined in inclusive 
terms
Egyptian academic Dr Rasha Abdullah said that protection should cover any medium, and 
encompass blogs and tweets. 
USA media lawyer Charles Tobin commented on the issue of whether there should be a 
‘regular practice’ test to identify what counted as journalistic acts (as applied in several 
jurisdictions). He opposed such a criterion: “a first time freelance journalist who places an 
article in the public interest in a notable forum is entitled to be treated as a journalist for 
most purposes, including source protection”.
Toby Mendel acknowledged a need to define ‘acts of journalism’ and pointed to the 
possibility of exceptions. “I do not believe that source protection should attach to journalists 
but, rather, to the social activity of disseminating information of public interest to the public 
- which might well exclude certain journalistic functions. There would also need to be 
definitions of ‘information’[such as] what sorts of communications are covered as well as 
of sources”. 
The idea of applying a ‘public interest test’ to measure the validity of an act of journalism for 
the purpose of source protection coverage is complex. While the investigative journalists 
interviewed expressed belief in the value of a public interest test, they had difficulty defining 
it. The legal experts’ views differed. Charles Tobin favoured the inclusion of a public interest 
test to measure the validity of an act of journalism for source protection coverage. “It has to 
turn on the specific public interest that was served, the specific purposes that the journalist 
had in mind, the means that they employed and any other factor that is relevant”. For him, 
public interest had to “be something that serves a larger public discussion on an issue that 
has mass effect or interest”. 
However, UK QC Gavin Millar argued that a public interest test presents potential danger, 
particularly where the public interest element is not clear-cut, and where judges could use 
a restrictive understanding of ‘public interest journalism’ to require source disclosure while 
trying to navigate the middle ground between confidential sources about celebrity tattle 
and revealing government corruption. Such territory, Millar argued, needs to be resolved 
on a case-by-case basis. 
Former Guardian Editor-in-Chief, Alan Rusbridger, proposed that some acts of journalism 
should not enjoy the privilege of source protection. “If all they’re doing is collecting the 
information on the sex lives of footballers, why should there be any protection for that?” he 
asked. US journalist and press freedom advocate Josh Stearns thought the public interest 
motivation needed to be untainted. “I do think something around the idea that they are not 
publishing this to extract vengeance or blackmail, and it is indeed in the public interest, is 
important”.
ARTICLE 19’s Director in East Africa, Henry Maina, made the point that protecting the ‘public 
interest’ also serves another function: “We need to ask for due processes that continuously 
balance and protect our rights and the public interest, as opposed to just protecting 
journalists as an entity…”.
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Public interest is also used to justify arguments against granting journalists source 
confidentiality. At a meeting on source protection in the UK, former senior civil servant Sir 
David Omand reportedly said that the public needs to know that those who work in public 
service can be trusted with confidential information. “That, too, is a public interest and a 
mighty strong one in my point of view to weigh alongside the protection of journalists’ 
sources”. A different perspective at the same meeting came from The Guardian’s Rusbridger, 
who was reported as saying that when protection of sources “is done in the public interest, 
society as a whole benefits from these conversations and these relationships”. He further 
stated: “We have to keep reminding ourselves and other people why as journalists we 
understand that much if not most of the information that that we receive of value comes 
from people who are not authorised to talk to us. Or who can talk more honestly if they can 
talk secretly” (Ponsford 2015b).
The issue of acts of journalism leads into the question of how protection may be relevant to 
a range of actors performing these acts. Professor of Law at Rio De Janeiro State University 
Ronaldo Lemos stated: “In the capacity of a member of the Social Communications Council 
in Brazil, headquartered in the Brazilian Congress, I have supported that those laws should 
apply to all professional information gathering agents. This is still a loose term, but it denotes 
that not only ‘journalists’ deserve source protection laws”. 
Colombian journalist Silvia Higuera said that source protection laws should apply to “acts 
of communication or information” (Higuera 2015). She said she would define such acts 
as having the purpose of communicating or informing audiences about issues of public 
interest. “Of course, I’m referring to information that is accurate, fair and has other qualities 
of what is traditionally known as journalistic information. …people who do that should be 
protected”. Higuera also referred to the definition of journalists provided by the Office of 
the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the Inter American Court of Human 
Rights in its 2013 report Violence Against Journalists and Media Workers which states that 
journalists are individuals who “observe and describe events, document and analyse 
events, statements, policies, and any propositions that can affect society, with the purpose 
of systematizing such information and gathering facts and analyses to inform sectors of 
society or society as a whole”  (Botero 2013 p2). It follows from this definition that media 
workers and support staff would be included, along with citizen journalists. 
FLIP’s Pedro Varca Villareal expressed an even broader view: “…protection should be as 
broad as possible and should refer to any person making a diffusion of information or 
opinion with public purposes by any virtual environment”. 
While the boundaries of what is journalism may vary according to perspectives, there is 
recognition that the practice can be done by individuals who are not fulltime or professional 
journalists, but who nevertheless may rely on confidential sources in the public interest – as 
interpreted on a case-by-case basis. Not everyone who does journalism is a journalist, but 
the argument for source protection nevertheless applies to such cases where the output 
constitutes information in the public interest.
3. Recognise that source protection does not entail registration or licensing of 
practitioners of journalism
There was overwhelming support for this principle by the experts.
4. Affirm that confidentiality applies to the use of any collected digital personal 
data by any actor 
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There was some confusion and misinterpretation among the experts interviewed in 
response to this proposed principle. It has since been amended (see final framework 
recommendations below), but at the time of interviewing, it was explained that this point 
referred in actuality to third party intermediaries. 
The Tow Center’s Susan McGregor stated that there needs to be more responsibility and 
accountability within organisations and companies that routinely collect personal data: 
…as a company you cannot collect data if you cannot adequately protect it. The truth is 
most companies can’t. You have to be able to demonstrate the ability to adequately protect 
any consumer data you’re going to collect and centralise if you’re going to collect it. I think if 
you put that restriction on it, companies will collect a lot less data. 
Algerian newspaper editor Zine Cherfaoui went further, requesting measures to prevent 
email providers and social media companies handing over journalists’ data to the 
authorities. “We would like those responsible, or in charge of social networks, to guarantee 
the inviolability of email exchanges, basically that no one hands over emails, especially 
when concerning journalists,” he said. 
That is a point supported by Australian digital media law specialist Leanne O’Donnell 
who was concerned about a data retention laws in her country, which she feared could 
effectively undermine source protection laws. O’Donnell advocated for a data retention 
exemption for journalistic communications to ensure that law enforcement agencies could 
not request data pertaining to journalists’ interactions with their sources, consistent with 
international source protection standards:
That’s what the Court of Justice of the EU recommended in their decision in April (2014) 
where they invalidated the EU data retention directive. Because one of the issues with the EU 
approach was there was no recognition that with certain information in our society there’s 
an expectation that the information is confidential, information such as communications 
with journalists and communications with lawyers, for example. 
However, Toby Mendel from the Centre for Law and Democracy disagreed with the inclusion 
of principle 4 in the framework. He said that source confidentiality was a different idea to 
data protection, which had its own rules. From another perspective, a principle applying to 
third parties could be seen as shifting the onus of responsibility for source protection from 
the journalist or the State to the third party intermediary. In Sweden, under existing law, it 
is the journalist who would potentially face charges if the source was revealed by the third 
party. Investigative journalist Fredrik Laurin said “…(S)ource protection is something that I 
am bound to uphold personally. It’s me, Fredrik who goes to prison if you are my source 
and I lose my notebook at the bar and your name comes out because of that. That’s my 
fault and I go to prison. That’s why I don’t use Gmail for example. Or Facebook”. He added: “I 
need to survey – which I do, very thoroughly – who my suppliers are. I know exactly where 
my server is, I know exactly what the contract says, the hard discs in that server are named 
in my name. With my phone number. There’s a tag on the material that says this material is 
protected according to the Swedish constitution”. 
Generally, a journalist should not be blamed for negligence of a third party, but it is also 
clear that securing confidentiality at the level of intermediaries does not obviate the roles 
of both the journalist and the source. 
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5. Define exceptions to all the above very narrowly in terms of purposes allowing 
limitation of the principle
Professor Rasha Abdulla argued that the provision for exceptions to source protection 
was problematic because such exceptions are too often abused, especially in the name of 
national security. However, ARTICLE 19’s Henry Maina said there was a need for exceptions 
to source protection, such as where a journalist knew the identities of people involved in 
terror attacks. “…We need to clearly understand the right to maintain the confidentiality of 
sources is not an absolute one,” he said. 
Toby Mendel said that no State would adopt a source protection rule without having 
exceptions, and the key issue was how to define the exceptions. 
Silvia Higuera from the Knight Centre for Journalism in the Americas highlighted the 
importance of this principle: “We must understand that there are some exceptions to 
all rules, particularly in this time of terrorism threats, but especially because freedom of 
expression is not an absolute right”. 
FLIP’s Pedro Vaca Villareal said it would be “…important to have the proposal come from the 
community of press freedom which would be timely and would specify those exceptions. 
Leaving it to the discretion of governments may mean that exceptions are broad and 
vague”.Alan Rusbridger articulated the need to tightly limit exceptions.
6. Define exceptions as needing to conform to the necessity provision, in other 
words, when there is no alternative
Gavin Millar QC suggested that an appendix of definitions and exemplars, to assist with legal 
argument in cases where the ‘necessity provision’ is tested, should ultimately accompany a 
legal source protection framework. Specifically, he thought the ‘Goodwin Principle’ should 
be referenced. UK Journalist Bill Goodwin won a landmark case in the European Court of 
Human Rights in 1996 in which the judge ruled that a journalist could not be compelled 
to reveal a confidential source, unless there was an “over-riding requirement in the public 
interest” (ECtHR 1996). Millar called for practical examples of categories of cases where an 
exception to protection might just be acceptable, in order to rule out the ones where it 
would not be acceptable. 
Toby Mendel suggested that the principle needed to go further to articulate additional 
protections. He supported Millar’s view that there need to be explicit examples of 
exceptions provided in order to avoid abuse by authorities. “Of course, any restriction on 
freedom of expression must meet the necessity standard but the issue is: what does this 
imply in the context of source confidentiality? I think the idea of a lack of an alternative 
means of accessing the information is an important concept here, but it only takes us so far, 
as law enforcement authorities often cannot obtain the information elsewhere. We need 
further protections”. 
Tomaso Falchetto from Privacy International recalled that the Council of Europe’s Council of 
Ministers’ 1996 recommendations on protection of sources in national security situations had 
noted: “Having regard to the importance of the confidentiality of sources used by journalists 
in situations of conflict and tension, member states shall ensure that this confidentiality is 
respected”. In addition, Falchetto pointed to the 2005 call by the Council of Ministers “on 
public authorities in member states: [...] to respect, in accordance with Article 10 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights and with Recommendation No. R (2000) 7, the 
127
right of journalists not to disclose their sources of information; the fight against terrorism 
does not allow the authorities to circumvent this right by going beyond what is permitted 
by these texts”. 
7. Define an independent judicial process, with appeal potential, for authorised 
exceptions
Charles Tobin proposed that there should be rules in place in any agency that can issue a 
subpoena to reveal the identity of a source. These rules should involve deep deliberation, 
approval at the highest level and pre-engagement before the issuance of any subpoena or 
search warrant for a journalists’ confidential source.
Alan Rusbridger also called for “a high and independent hurdle” so that it was not a case of 
one policeman authorising another policeman to access journalists’ data.
While journalist and founder of the Arabic Media Internet Network, Daoud Kuttab, 
welcomed this provision as a “very helpful mechanism”, Marites Danguilan Vitug pointed to 
issues with the independence of the judiciary in some States where the judicial system can 
be politicised.
Charles Tobin also argued for an adversarial framing of the ‘independent judicial process’ 
in the context of a request to access a journalists’ confidential data, and for this to involve 
transparency so that the journalist would be entitled to an advocate, and have access to all 
arguments and information.  
Gavin Millar QC pointed out that some countries have used covert requests for access to 
journalists’ data (including metadata). “You get the judge involved but still the journalist 
doesn’t know about it. And the position of the NUJ (National Union of Journalists), and the 
International Federation of Journalists, and most journalist organisations in this country, is 
that that’s not enough. The issue is do you put the journalist on notice of the possibility? 
Then you can’t just have covert access to journalistic source material”. 
As discussed in section 2.c below, the issue of transparency of process is linked to this 
Principle 7, but raises further issues. However, an independent judicial process with appeal 
potential and adversarial framing may be institutionalised even in the absence of full 
transparency.
8. Criminalise arbitrary and unauthorised violations of confidentiality of sources 
by any third party
Silvia Higuera from the Knight Centre for Journalism in the Americas said this point should 
be in law and that violations of source confidentiality should be prosecuted.  Toby Mendel 
agreed with this principle, as long as the ‘unauthorised violations’ were also deemed to be 
‘wilful’ (i.e. that they included the necessary intention which is required to be guilty of a 
criminal action). Stronger laws governing surveillance and data retention by companies are 
necessary for the sake of source protection, according to the Tow Center’s Susan McGregor.
Marites Danguilan Vitug argued that sanctions needed to be added to this principle, as 
did Henry Maina who said that sanctions must be clearly defined. Maina also pointed out: 
“Care needs to be taken with criminalising arbitrary and unauthorised violations, though, to 
ensure this does not restrict the very freedom of expression it is intended to protect”.
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Journalism safety expert Javier Garza Ramos indicated that that there is a need for sanctions 
to be applied to those parties seeking to subject journalists, and by extension their sources, 
to surveillance: “If you’re going to extend legal protection for journalists for sources, then 
there should also be some legal consequence on surveillance of journalists, or on anybody, 
not just journalists. It should be at least prosecution and jail time for whoever is doing illegal 
surveillance, unauthorised surveillance”. 
However, Professor Ronaldo Lemos, Director of the Institute for Technology and Society in 
Brazil, expressed scepticism about such mechanisms and Principle 8 (as proposed here):
I think the rule would need to define the types of situations to which it applied, so as to 
cover all situations, including indirect ones, in which actions led to source exposure. The law 
would also need to define very carefully what exactly those covered by source protection 
are due (or what rights they exercise), along the lines of not being required to divulge the 
identity of their confidential source (i.e. it would need to create specific rights, as opposed to 
simply establishing principles). In a related vein, the law would need to include a number of 
procedural rules, such as about informing those covered by their right not to disclose a source 
and about how to bring an action for source disclosure before a court.
FLIP’s Pedro Varca Villareal said that while there are already penalties for unlawful surveillance 
activity in Colombia, “…it could be very interesting to penalise with the particular aim of 
punishing violations of professional secrecy”. But he cautioned about the need for training 
and education. “Often, professional secrecy tends to be violated by public officials (police 
or judicial officials). To avoid creating a tension between State powers, this could be 
implemented if and only if accompanied by training processes (for) officials. In many cases 
these officials do not understand the scope of the confidentiality of sources and the penalties 
would be disproportionate without previous pedagogical exercises accompanying them”.
2.  Other principles emerging from the thematic study 
underpinning this research
a. Desirability of explicit referencing of source protection in constitutional and 
nationally-applicable law
Former Special Rapporteur with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Catalina 
Botero made the point that constitutional protection of journalists’ sources is desirable “…
having this in the constitution is good … because you need a very clear instruction for the 
judicial power not to do things that can threaten journalism, for example allowing the state 
to spy on journalists”.
This was a view echoed by Australian Constitutional Law expert, Professor George Williams. 
Given the absence of solid constitutional protections for freedom of expression, or an over-
riding piece of legislation at the Federal level in Australia, the introduction of new laws 
pertaining to data retention and the criminalisation of aspects of national security reporting 
have alarmed him with respect to source protection: 
…what we need is not only specific defences but a more generic statute or protection that 
applies to journalist rights and freedom of speech more generally. ... Given we do not have 
a bill of rights, and probably aren’t getting one soon, an alternative would be…a federal 
statute that specifically provides for those rights that would be used to trump, or at least 
interpret other statutes. 
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b. Recognition that metadata should also be treated as confidential information 
by third parties and State actors 
Metadata can be used to pinpoint journalists’ interactions with their sources even when, for 
example, the contents of emails or telephone conversations may remain secret. 
Digital communications lawyer Leanne O’Donnell commented: 
A lot of the privilege laws concentrate on the content, whereas what we’ve learned over the 
last couple of years is that just as invasive or revealing is the data around that content – 
the fact that you looked at ‘x’ websites and you called that phone number and the time you 
did those things. The data that sits around communications can be just as revealing about 
patterns and associations, relationships and identity. I think we are going to get to the stage 
where we are going to have to really grapple with how we protect that data as much as the 
content.
c. Transparency clause proposed
Although this issue is partially covered under draft principle 7 above, (“Define an independent 
judicial process, with appeal potential, for authorised exceptions”), some respondents 
wished to push it further. For example, Alan Rusbridger proposed a transparency provision 
whereby journalists are informed when there is a request from authorities to access their 
data. “… (I)f they’re going to go and look at journalists’ material then they have an obligation 
to tell the journalist… a policeman might not be the best judge of whether something 
imperils a source”. 
Indicative of the difficulty around the issue is the argument of the former British Transport 
Police chief constable Andy Trotter, who spoke at a City University London debate in March 
2015.  He rejected the suggestion that news organisations should be given the opportunity 
to argue the case against the disclosure of journalists’ call records. “If one is investigating 
a journalist, it is like we are investigating any potential criminal – we don’t normally notify 
them that’s what we are going to do (Ponsford 2015b). A similar point was made during the 
debate by former senior civil servant Sir David Omand, who was involved in drafting the 
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) surveillance legislation. He said he believed 
there was no possibility of notifying journalists about requests to view their phone records, 
in part because foreign spies often pose as journalists. 
On the other hand, there is a distinction between investigating a journalist who is doing 
his or her job, and investigating a third party. It is also evident that even in the absence of 
transparency in certain cases, there can still be rules that place limits on the requisitioning 
of data, and there can still be a form of adversarial framing built into the process. 
d. Shield individuals engaged in acts of journalism from targeted surveillance, 
data retention and handover, and data pertaining to their work netted by mass 
surveillance (other than in very narrowly defined exceptional circumstances).
Alan Rusbridger urged such protections, as did Australian digital communications lawyer 
Leanne O’Donnell. But she also acknowledged the practical challenges of implementation: 
“…it would require those law enforcement agencies to do the right thing because…on a 
practical level, the ISP who is receiving that request is not going to know that Joe Boggs is 
a journalist, or that Joe Bloggs is a source. So it would require the law enforcement agency 
not to make those requests in those categories of communications”. 
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Privacy International’s Thomas Falchetto pointed to international examples where such 
limitations and exemptions are in effect, although only a few countries specifically limit 
the use of surveillance to identify sources or other protected materials. “The Belgian 
Law on Protection of Journalists’ Sources prohibits the use of ‘any detection measure or 
investigative measure’ of any protected media person, unless it is authorised by a judge 
under the same restrictions as are required to compel a journalist to reveal her source 
of information”. Falchetto made reference to the Council of Europe (CoE) Committee of 
Ministers 2000 recommendation on ‘The Right of Journalists Not to Disclose Their Sources 
of Information’, which deals with journalistic exclusions regarding surveillance and data 
retention. According to this, Principle 6 (Interception of communication, surveillance and 
judicial search and seizure) states:
a. The following measures should not be applied if their purpose is to circumvent the right 
of journalists, under the terms of these principles, not to disclose information identifying a 
source:
i. interception orders or actions concerning communication or correspondence of journalists 
or their employers,
ii. surveillance orders or actions concerning journalists, their contacts or their employers, or
iii. search or seizure orders or actions concerning the private or business premises, belongings 
or correspondence of journalists or their employers or personal data related to their 
professional work.
b. Where information identifying a source has been properly obtained by police or judicial 
authorities by any of the above actions, although this might not have been the purpose of 
these actions, measures should be taken to prevent the subsequent use of this information as 
evidence before courts, unless the disclosure would be justified under Principle 3.
The CoE Principle 3 referred to here defines parameters around to the right of non-disclosure. 
It specifies that in determining whether a legitimate interest in a disclosure outweighs the 
public interest in not disclosing information identifying a source, the competent authorities 
should pay particular regard to the importance of the right of non-disclosure and the pre-
eminence given to it in the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights. A disclosure 
should only be ordered if there is “an overriding requirement in the public interest and if 
circumstances are of a sufficiently vital and serious nature”. Principle 3 further states that the 
disclosure of information identifying a source should not be deemed necessary unless it can 
be convincingly established that reasonable alternative measures to the disclosure do not 
exist or have been exhausted by the persons or public authorities that seek the disclosure.  
However, Toby Mendel opposed the inclusion of a principle in the draft framework that 
would exempt journalists from surveillance or data retention provisions, saying this was 
neither possible nor reasonable. “Source protection has never been understood as protecting 
journalists against ordinary criminal law processes, and it would not be justifiable to suggest 
this. Given the broad nature of any reasonable definition of a journalist, if we were to protect 
them against surveillance, anyone who wished to engage in terrorist activity could easily 
bring themselves within that definition. Rather than look at it from this angle, I think the 
proper solution, at least in democracies, is to enhance the legal and oversight controls over 
surveillance”.
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The issue that emerges from this discussion concerns the feasibility and desirability of not 
intercepting or collecting private journalistic data (or metadata), as well as the distinct 
issue of limitations on the use of the data that is collected so as to ensure a high level 
of confidentiality and protection. The general principle, however, maintains protection of 
confidentiality of sources for acts of journalism as an aspiration in relation to both targeted 
surveillance and mass surveillance, as well as data retention and rendition, and it points to 
the value of legal process and narrow conditions being required if confidentiality is to be 
legitimately compromised.
e. Complementarity of source protection laws with whistleblower legislation
Many of the experts interviewed indicated the need for recognition of parallel whistleblower 
laws to strengthen the legal framework for source protection. “In the places where we don’t 
have them, we should start with that. And, it’s not specifically journalists’ protections, but 
more broadly whistleblower protections, because whistleblower protection laws do help,” 
Javier Garza said.
Henry Maina said: “…if the sources understand that there is protection of whistleblowers, 
then those two would go hand-in-hand. Where journalists are seeking to have protection 
of their sources, the best point of entry is to have whistleblower protection, as opposed to 
making arguments as journalists”. He added: “When you begin to think of it as whistleblowers 
are protected, then you can, as a person who has received this information, seek protection 
of your source”. 
However Josh Stearns expressed reservations: “In an ideal world where a whistleblower law 
was written to include whistleblowing to the press, it could work. But where the rubber 
meets the road I have a hard time seeing that actually play out in practice. …I also think 
that there may be philosophical and legal distinctions to be made between the protection 
of a journalist to gather and disseminate news, versus the rights of someone to reveal 
wrongdoing that they are witnessing”.
f. The need for source protection laws to apply across all mediums
All of the interviewees agreed that source protection laws needed to explicitly encompass 
digital media to avoid emerging disparities that have resulted in analogue data (e.g. 
reporters’ notepads) being protected, while digital data (e.g. a journalist’s hard drive or 
smartphone) is not protected. “Traditionally when we have thought about how to protect 
sources, especially in law through things like shield laws, it’s been very analogue in focus, 
and the new world that we live in - in terms of digital surveillance and security - makes a lot 
of those shield laws problematically dated in some ways,” Josh Stearns said. 
g. The need to revise existing laws
The Media Legal Defence Institute’s Peter Noorlander called for amendments to existing 
legal frameworks, along with strategic litigation, to ensure their effectiveness in the digital 
era: 
Existing national security and search and seizure laws should be amended to strengthen 
source protection, and it should be made clear in those countries where it is not yet (the case) 
that source protection is part and parcel of the constitutional right to freedom of expression. 
Currently this is the case only in European countries, and even there constitutional source 
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protection is being undermined, so this will be a large task and take some sustained and 
combined effort of lobbying and strategic litigation. 
Silvia Higuera said that States needed to be convinced to give journalists working in digital 
environments “the same protection they had in the other mass media”. 
This was a point also made by one respondent to the survey attached to this Study. Sudanese 
journalist Liemia Eljaili Abubkr said that source protection laws should be revised to “include 
articles protecting journalists on the Internet (to ensure that they are not subjected to) 
criminal punishment” (Abubkr 2014). She also called for the criminalisation of “hacking, 
spying, filtering and following journalists’ communication”.
h.  Internationally relevant actions
Several interviewees promoted the idea of international-level legal support for source 
protection. FLIP’s Pedro Varca Villareal was among them: 
In our opinion these issues are easier to promote if they have international support at the 
level of a treaty, commemoration in the form of an international day, or the creation of 
recommendations. It may also have a greater impact if this issue, among others related to 
fundamental rights on the Internet, were included in exercises such as the Universal Periodic 
Review of the Human Rights Committee of the United Nations.
Charles Tobin said that treaties and conventions can be very helpful to furthering an 
international culture where free speech is valued.  Bolivian investigative journalist Ricardo 
Aguilar highlighted the interdependence of secure source protection and development: 
“Considering the undeniable fact that the confidentiality of the source is a key for access to 
information and freedom of the press, then its protection far exceeds the mere defence of 
democratic values  and inclusively involves the development of countries”. 
i. The need to educate civil servants, law enforcement agents and the judiciary 
in the purpose and value of legal source protection frameworks: 
As he argued  for in the case of draft principle 8 above, Pedro Vaca Villareal highlighted 
the importance of including in a framework whether there are measures for promotion, 
training and awareness, especially with the judiciary and law enforcement. The main 
problem he said “is the lack of knowledge of legislators and judges regarding the impact 
of technological surveillance. Beyond these policy changes, it is essential that policies and 
awareness training of staff are included”. 
3.  Revised 11 Principles for assessing legal source protection 
frameworks internationally
The following principles represent the research-informed augmentation and expansion of 
the eight-framework principles originally proposed for expert review, taking into account 
the feedback of the experts. Accordingly, a robust and comprehensive source protection 
framework would encompass the need to: 
1. Recognise the value to the public interest of source protection, with its legal foundation 
in the right to freedom of expression (including press freedom), and to privacy. These 
protections should also be embedded within a country’s constitution and/or national 
law, 
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2. Recognise that source protection should extend to all acts of journalism and across all 
platforms, services and mediums (of data storage and publication), and that it includes 
digital data and meta-data, 
3. Recognise that source protection does not entail registration or licensing of 
practitioners of journalism, 
4. Recognise the potential detrimental impact on public interest journalism, and on 
society, of source-related information being caught up in bulk data recording, tracking, 
storage and collection, 
5. Affirm that State and corporate actors (including third party intermediaries), who 
capture journalistic digital data must treat it confidentially (acknowledging also the 
desirability of the storage and use of such data being consistent with the general right 
to privacy), 
6. Shield acts of journalism from targeted surveillance, data retention and handover of 
material connected to confidential sources, 
7. Define exceptions to all the above very narrowly, so as to preserve the principle of 
source protection as the effective norm and standard, 
8. Define exceptions as needing to conform to a provision of “necessity” and 
“proportionality” — in other words, when no alternative to disclosure is possible, when 
there is greater public interest in disclosure than in protection, and when the terms 
and extent of disclosure still preserve confidentiality as much as possible, 
9. Define a transparent and independent judicial process with appeal potential for 
authorised exceptions, and ensure that law-enforcement agents and judicial actors 
are educated about the principles involved, 
10. Criminalise arbitrary, unauthorised and willful violations of confidentiality of sources 
by third party actors, 
11. Recognise that source protection laws can be strengthened by complementary 
whistleblower legislation. 
Further research could develop a repository of examples of model laws and exemplar 
judgements that address the issues of ‘exceptions’ and ‘necessity’ provisions. A summary of 
such could be appended to this model assessment framework.
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8. Gender Dimensions Arising
Women journalists face additional risks in the course of their work – on and offline. In the 
physical realm, these risks can include sexual harassment, physical assault and rape. In the 
digital sphere, acts of harassment and threats of violence are rampant. Similarly, female 
sources face increased risks when acting as whistleblowers or confidential informants. 
These issues manifest in several ways as regards the issue of source protection in the digital 
era:
1. Women journalists face greater risks in dealing with confidential sources 
2. Women sources face greater physical risks in encounters with journalists and in 
revealing confidential information
3. The physical risks confronted by women journalists and sources in the course of 
confidential communications may require reliance on digital communications
4. Secure digital communications defences, including encryption, are arguably even 
more necessary for female journalists and sources 
Specific factors for consideration
1. Female journalists and sources need to be able to 
communicate digitally
Female journalists working in the context of reporting conflict and organised crime are 
particularly vulnerable to physical attacks, including sexual assault, and harassment. In 
some contexts, their physical mobility may be restricted due to overt threats to their safety, 
or as a result of cultural prohibitions on women’s conduct in public, including meeting 
privately with male sources. Therefore, women journalists need to be able to rely on secure 
non-physical means of communication with their sources.
Women sources may face the same physical risks outlined above – especially if their 
journalistic contact is male and/or they experience cultural restrictions, or they are working 
in conflict zones.  
Additionally, female confidential sources who are domestic abuse victims may be physically 
unable to leave their homes, and therefore be reliant on digital communications.  
These factors present additional challenges for women journalists and sources, in regard to 
maintaining confidentiality in the digital era.
2. Digital safety and security are paramount for both female 
journalists and sources 
Women journalists need to be able to rely on secure digital communications to ensure that 
they are not at increased risk in conflict zones, or when working on dangerous stories, such 
as those about corruption and crime. The ability to covertly intercept and analyse journalistic 
communications with sources increases the physical risk to both women journalists and 
their sources in such contexts. Encrypted communications and other defensive measures 
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are therefore of great importance to ensure that their movements are not tracked and the 
identity of the source remains confidential.
The risks of exposure for confidential sources are magnified for female whistleblowers. 
Therefore, they need to be able to have access to secure secure digital communications 
methods to ensure that they are at minimum risk of detection and unmasking. They also 
need to have confidence in the ability to make secure contact with journalists to ensure 
that stories affecting women are told – secure digital communications can be an enabler for 
women’s participation in public interest journalism. They can also help to avoid magnifying 
the ‘chilling’ of investigative journalism dependent upon female confidential sources. Also 
needed are strong legal protections for confidentiality, which are applied in a gender-
sensitive manner - especially in regard to judicial orders compelling disclosure.
3. Online harassment and threats
Journalists and sources using the Internet or mobile apps to communicate face greater risk 
of gendered harassment and threats of violence. These risks need to be understood and 
mitigated to avoid further chilling women’s involvement in journalism – as practitioners or 
sources.
4. Summary
Strong source protection laws which respond to the challenges of the digital age discussed 
at length in this Study can help to avoid the chilling of women’s involvement in investigative 
journalism that is dependent upon confidential sources. They can assist in empowering 
women’s participation in accountability reporting that addresses social and development 
needs, such as systemic failures in public utilities and services, corruption and organised 
crime.  
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9. Protecting Journalism Sources in the Digital Age: Conclusion
The legal frameworks that support protection of journalists’ sources - at international, 
regional and country levels - are under significant strain in the digital era. In many of the 
countries studied, frameworks are being affected by national security, anti-terrorism and 
data retention legislation that overrides source protection laws, or they risk being undercut 
by arbitrary surveillance and mass surveillance (Hughes 2012; Learner & Bar Nissim 2014). 
Other threats arise due to pressure being applied to third party intermediaries to release 
data that risk exposing sources. There are also increasing challenges to technical measures 
that support confidentiality, such as limits on anonymity, and moves to outlaw encryption. 
Furthermore, there is the question of entitlement to protection: in an era where citizens and 
other social communicators have the capacity to publish directly to their own audiences, 
and those sharing information in the public interest are recognised as legitimate journalistic 
actors by the United Nations, to whom should source protection laws apply? On the one 
hand, broadening the legal definition of ‘journalist’ to ensure adequate protection for citizen 
reporters (working on and offline) is desirable, and case law is catching up gradually on this 
issue of redefinition. However, on the other hand, it opens up debates about licensing and 
registering those who do journalism and who wish to be recognised for protection of their 
sources.  This is why the key tests in contemporary society for access to source protection 
laws are evolving towards the definition and identification of ‘acts of journalism’, rather than 
occupational or professional descriptors. 
Journalists and news organisations are in the process of adapting their practices – 
strengthening digital security and reverting to pre-digital era methods of communication 
with confidential sources. But unless individual States and regional bodies revise and 
strengthen their legal source protection frameworks, journalists adapting reporting methods 
and reverting to analogue ‘basics’ (an option not always practically feasible, especially, as 
argued above, for many of the women who do journalism) will not be enough to preserve 
source protection in the digital age. In an era of technologically advanced spy-craft, it is 
also necessary for States to review surveillance practises and oversight in line with UN 
General Assembly resolutions on privacy. In addition, source confidentiality requires limits 
to data retention and rendition laws, improved accountability and transparency measures 
(applied to both states and corporations in regard to journalistic data), and exemptions for 
journalistic acts in relation to over-riding national security legislation.
This study has shown that the issue of the confidentiality of journalism sources in the 
digital age is at the nexus of many intersecting issues.  This situation calls out for revision of 
existing dispensations, and the introduction of new ones, and an 11-pointframework has 
been advanced to assist in the process. If attention is not given to the new complexities, 




At UNESCO, Member States could: 
1. Consider framing an explicit resolution that calls on Member States to review and 
update (as necessitated) their legal frameworks for journalistic source protection 
drawing on the framework proposed in Thematic Study 3 to ensure their efficacy in 
the digital era
2. Request support to Member States who wish to adopt and/or review legal frameworks 
for protecting the confidentiality of journalistic sources in the new conditions
3. Assess source confidentiality issues in submissions to the Universal Periodic Review of 
the UN Human Rights Committee 
4. Support regional workshops, in collaboration with media and civil society, designed 
to equip digital communicators and journalistic actors with knowledge, skills and the 
opportunity to collaborate on the challenges and solutions to the issues raised in this 
study, with regard to continuing investigative journalism practice
5. Consider, where requested, to use this study to help support training of the judiciary, 
police and civil servants within Member States to ensure that they are adequately 
educated about the value of legal source protection frameworks.  
Individual member States could consider:
1. Applying the proposed framework in Thematic Study 3 above, assessing their own 
legal source protection dispensations against its provisions
2. Legislating for source protection that extends to digital communications and 
publishing, and to all acts of journalism in the public interest
3. Ensuring that legislation designed to address national security and crime concerns 
does not override source protection laws other than in narrowly defined exceptional 
circumstances 
4. Ensuring that surveillance (mass and targeted), and mandatory data retention policies 
do not undercut legal source confidentiality protection frameworks 
5. Working with journalists’ organisations and civil society groups to monitor the impacts 
of the potential corrosive effects on source protection identified in this Study, especially 
in order to ensure that investigative journalism dependent upon confidential sources 
is able to continue
6. Consider the applicability of good international practice, including, for instance, the 
Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation 1950 on the protection 
of journalists´ sources (CoE 2011) which encourages states to:
• Legislate for source protection 
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• Review their national laws on surveillance, anti-terrorism, data retention, and access to 
telecommunications records
• Co-operate with journalists’ and media freedom organisations to produce guidelines 
for prosecutors and police officers, and training materials for judges on the right of 
journalists not to disclose their sources. 
• Develop guidelines for public authorities and private service providers concerning the 
protection of the confidentiality of journalists’ sources in the context of the interception 
or disclosure of computer data and traffic data of computer networks
• Applying source protection regimes and defined exceptions in a gender-sensitive way
Recommendations for media actors and other producers of 
journalism:
1. Engage with digital issues impacting on source confidentiality protection, and actively 
campaign for laws and rules that provide adequate protection 
2. Explain to the public what is at stake in the protection of source confidentiality, 
especially in the digital age
3. Ensure that sources are aware of the digital era threats to confidentiality 
4. Consider altering practices – including ‘going back to analogue methods’ when 
required (recognising this may not always be possible due to international or gender 
dynamics) – in order to offer a degree of protection to their confidential sources
5. Help audiences become more secure in their own communications, for example 
explaining how encryption works, and why it is important not to have communications 
security compromised 
6. Consider providing technical advice and training to sources to ensure secure 
communications, with the assistance of NGOs and representative organisations
7. In the case of media leaders, ensure that they also respect their journalists’ ethical 
commitment (and in some cases legal obligation) to source confidentiality 
8. In the case of media owners, ensure that their journalists, and freelancers who 
contribute investigative reports, have access to the appropriate tools and training 
needed to ensure that they are able to offer the most secure channels of digital 
communication possible to their sources
Recommendations for civil society 
1. Advocate, for robust source protection frameworks in line with that described in 
Thematic Study 3 above
2. Invest in, and partner with, news publishers and academia to research and develop 
new tools to aid secure digital communication between journalistic actors and their 
sources
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3. Assist in training and implementation of digital security tools among journalistic actors 
and whistleblowers 
4. Work with UNESCO and other UN actors and Governments to develop complementary 
whistleblower regimes
5. Assisting in training in digital source protection solutions for both journalists and their 
sources
General recommendations for multiple stakeholders
1. There should be further research into the impacts of the digital era on source protection 
in Member States which are not included in this Study’s methodological approach
2. Consideration could be given to bi-annual source protection research mapping 
exercises to build on, and maintain the relevance of, this benchmark global study 
3. An international conference/symposium could be convened on the implications of 
the digital age for legal source protection frameworks internationally
4. There should be further research to develop a repository of examples of model laws and 
exemplar judgements that address the issues of ‘exceptions’ and ‘necessity’ provisions. 
A summary of such could be appended to the model assessment framework, as 
identified as desirable in Thematic Study 3.
5. Support should be given to developing an online repository for the specific purpose 
of making centrally available data on legal and environmental challenges to source 
protection efficacy within Member States. This could be orchestrated collaboratively 
with a range of civil society groups via a crowd-mapping exercise
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Appendix 1: List of experts accessed for qualitative interviews*
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31 Marcelo Rech Globo RBS, Director 
of Journalism/Chair, 
World Editors Forum
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(Brazil)
Julie Posetti
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Director of the 
institute for 
technology and 
society of Rio de 
Janeiro (ITS) and a 
law professor at the 
Rio de Janeiro State 
University




33 Carlos Guyot Editor-in-Chief, La 
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Male Latin America 
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Alice Matthews
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*   Designations correct at mid-2015 
** Gender breakdown: 44% female
191
Appendix 2: List of review panel members24* 25**
REVIEW PANEL MEMBER AFFILIATION
1. Professor Mark Pearson (media law/
digital journalism expert) 
Griffith University
AUSTRALIA
2. Dr Julie Reid (media studies in Africa 
expert)
UNISA (University of South Africa)
SOUTH AFRICA
3. Lillian Nalwoga (African ICT policy 
expert) 
President of the Internet Society’s Uganda 
Chapter; Policy Officer at the Collaboration on 
International ICT Policy in East and Southern 
Africa (CIPESA); coordinator of the Uganda and 
East African Internet Governance Forums.
UGANDA
4. Dan Gillmor (journalism professor and 
international digital media expert)
Dan Gillmor is Professor of Practice, 
Walter Cronkite School of Journalism and Mass 
Communication, Arizona 
State University. 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
5. Prisca Orsonneau (barrister, legal 
expert in press freedom matters)
Lawyer at the Paris Bar, specializing in Media 
Law and Human Rights. 
Chair of the Reporters Without Borders Legal 
Committee. 
FRANCE
6. Gayathry Venkiteswaran (Press 
organization represenative)
Executive Director, Southeast Asian Press 
Alliance 
THAILAND
7. Mario Calabresi (newspaper editor) Editor-in-Chief, La Stampa; World Editors Forum 
board member
ITALY
8. Mishi Choudhary (international digital 
law expert)
Legal Director, Software Freedom Law Centre 
and SFLC.in 
INDIA
24 *  Designations as at mid-2015
25 ** Gender breakdown: 63% female


